Aus dem Inhalt: Marcelo Da Veiga: Selbstdenken und Stil bei J.G. Fichte und Goethe. - Bernward Loheide: Artistisches Fichtisieren: Zur Hoheren Wissenschaftslehre bei Novalis. - Ruth Pouvreau: Schopferische Weltbetrachtung: zum Verhaltnis von Einbildung und Erkenntnis in Texten der deutschen Romantik. - Martin Goetze: Das praktische Ich in der 'Wissenschaftslehre' und in der fruhromantischen Philosophie des Lebens.".

This book is a clear and concise history of the soul in western philosophy, from Plato to cutting-edge contemporary work in philosophy of mind. Packed with arguments for and against a range of different, historically significant philosophies of the soul Addresses the essential issues, including mind-body interaction, the causal closure of the physical world, and the philosophical implications of the brain sciences for the soul's existence Includes coverage of theories from key figures, such as Plato, Aquinas, Locke, Hume, and Descartes (...) Unique in combining the history of ideas and the development of a powerful case for a non-reductionist, non-materialist account of the soul. (shrink)

Over the past twenty-five years, no one has done more than J. P. Moreland to equip Christians to love God with their minds. In his work as a Christian philosopher, scholar, and apologist, he has influenced thousands of students, written groundbreaking books, and taught multitudes of Christians to defend their faith. -/- In honor of Moreland's ministry, general editors Paul M. Gould and Richard Brian Davis have assembled a team of friends and colleagues to celebrate his work. In three major (...) parts devoted to philosophy, apologetics, and spiritual formation, scholars such as Stewart Goetz, Paul Copan, Douglas Groothuis, Scott Rae, and Klaus Issler interact with Moreland's thought and make their own contributions to these important subjects. Moreland concludes the volume with his own essay, "Reflections on the Journey Ahead.". (shrink)

My dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I begin by assuming the plausibility of the libertarian thesis that agents sometimes could have done otherwise than they did given the very same history of the world. In light of this assumption, I undertake to develop a model of agency which does not employ the concept of agent-causation. My agency theory is developed in three main stages: I suggest that any agency theory must satisfy four desiderata: It must (...) adequately account for the freedom and responsibility of human agents. It must provide an adequate answer to the question of what distinguishes human actions from mere happenings. It must adequately account for the epistemological fact that human agents have an immediate and nonobservational awareness of their actions. It should have the support of a respectable philosophical tradition. I argue that agent-causation provides a theory of agency which fails adequately to satisfy these four desiderata. I claim both that human actions are uncaused exercisings by agents of their powers and that human agents typically act for reasons. I maintain that the central issue dividing agency theorists and nonagency theorists is whether reasons for performing actions cause the latter. I maintain that the sense of 'because' in 'I did x because...' is not causal in nature, but teleological. ;Having developed my model of agency, in the second part of my dissertation I investigate what are some of the paradigmatic actions human agents perform. I claim that bodily actions, such as moving an arm, are psychological in nature. Essential to my argument is the concept of a body-image. A normal agent 'feels' as if she is present in her physical arm. The way a normal agent feels is revealed in the case of a phantom limb. The subject of a phantom arm feels as if her amputated physical arm is still there and she can move while feeling armishly. I maintain that the bodily action of moving an arm is the agent's movement as a psychological arm-image of her physical arm, whether the physical arm is present or not. (shrink)

Argues against naturalism, or the idea that natural physical processes explain everything, the mind and soul do not exist, and consciousness and causality may have no basis, and suggests that it does not account for human--or any--action.

A monumental new biography of a pivotal yet poorly understood pioneer in modern philosophy. When a painter once told Goethe that he wanted to paint the most famous man of the age, Goethe directed him to Georg Friederich Wilhelm Hegel. Hegel, the most famous figure in modern philosophy, arguably its father, believed that to philosophize is to learn to live freely. He was slow and cautious in the development of his philosophy; yet his intellectual growth was like an Odyssey of (...) the mind, and, contrary to popular belief, his life was full of twists and turns, of suspense and even danger. In this landmark biography, the philosopher Klaus Vieweg paints a new picture of the life and work of the most important representative of German idealism. His vivid portrait provides readers an intimate account of Hegel's times and the milieu in which he developed his thought, along with detailed, clear-sighted analyses of Hegel's four major works. What results is a new interpretation of Hegel through the lens of reason and freedom. Vieweg draws on extensive archival research that has brought to light a wealth of hitherto undiscovered documents and handwritten notes relating to Hegel's work, touching on Hegel's engagement with the leading thinkers and writers of his age: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, HoÌ⁸lderlin and others. Combatting cliche̹s and misunderstandings about Hegel, Vieweg also offers a sustained defense of the philosopher's more progressive impulses. Highly praised upon its release in Germany as having set the new biographical standard, this monumental work emphasizes Hegel's relevance for today, depicting him as a vital figure in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a noncausal view of agency. I defend the thesis that choices are uncaused mental actions and maintain, contrary to causal theorists of action, that choices differ intrinsically or inherently from nonactions. I explain how they do by placing them in an ontology favored by causal agency theorists (agent-causationists). This ontology is one of powers and liabilities.After explicating how a choice is an uncaused event, I explain how an adequate account of freedom involves the concept of (...) choosing for a reason. Choosing for a reason is a teleological notion, and I set forth what is involved in making a choice for a purpose. (shrink)

Rape of women by men might be generated either by a specialized rape adaptation or as a by-product of other psychological adaptations. Although increasing number of sexual partners is a proposed benefit of rape according to the “rape as an adaptation” and the “rape as a by-product” hypotheses, neither hypothesis addresses directly why some men rape their long-term partners, to whom they already have sexual access. In two studies we tested specific hypotheses derived from the general hypothesis that sexual coercion (...) in the context of an intimate relationship may function as a sperm competition tactic. We hypothesized that men’s sexual coercion in the context of an intimate relationship is related positively to his partner’s perceived infidelities and that men’s sexual coercion is related positively to their mate retention behaviors (behaviors designed to prevent a partner’s infidelity). The results from Study 1 (self-reports from 246 men) and Study 2 (partner-reports from 276 women) supported the hypotheses. The Discussion section addresses limitations of this research and highlights future directions for research on sexual coercion in intimate relationships. (shrink)

In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt‐style counterexamples to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility (...) of PAP. (shrink)

Whilst Rahimzadeh et al. (2023) apply a critical lens to the pedagogical use of LLM bioethics assistants, we outline here further reason for skepticism. Two features of LLM chatbots are of signific...

Bernard Stiegler highlights many of the problems faced by education with respect to the ‘bringing forth’ of knowledge on an individual, collective, and technical level in the Anthropocene. These problems include the short-circuiting of dreams, automatization of thought, and toxic digital networks. Stiegler’s φάρμακον seeks to treat the toxicity of the Anthropocene with a care-ful hermeneutic approach that is directed towards the disautomatized, inventive, co-individuating knowledge act. This paper first explores Stiegler’s Anthropocene and his development of Heideggerian ποίησις in terms (...) of the challenge of the ‘bringing forth’ of knowledge acts, which are illustrated by free software. It then explores, through the additional example of free radio, of Félix Guattari’s work in free radio, the problem and possibility of creative co-individuating ex-pression in the Anthropocene by expanding on Stiegler’s emphasis on the importance of hermeneutics. This raises the question of how to read Stiegler’s own ex-pression of the future of knowledge. Next, the paper reviews Stiegler’s educational project involving a dis-automatizable hermeneutic web. Finally, the paper gives an autoethnographic account of an attempt to ‘bring forth’ learning through the implementation of free software in local, online classrooms. The free software example does not solve the problem of the Anthropocene but does raise the question of our responsibility to choose our digital tools care-fully and the importance of maintaining the possibility of co-individuating ex-pression like the kind that is remembered in song and which online education should remind us of. (shrink)

Describes the classicall law theory basics. Translaltion from German.

Building on previous work by Mints, Buchholz and Schwichtenberg, a simplified version of continuous normalization for the untyped λ-calculus and Gödel’s is presented and analysed in the coalgebraic framework of non-wellfounded terms with so-called repetition constructors.The primitive recursive normalization function is uniformly continuous w.r.t. the natural metric on non-wellfounded terms. Furthermore, the number of necessary repetition constructors is locally related to the number of reduction steps needed to reach the normal form and its size.It is also shown how continuous normal (...) forms relate to derivations of strong normalizability in the typed λ-calculus and how this leads to new bounds for the sum of the height of the reduction tree and the size of the normal form.Finally, the methods are extended to an infinitary λ-calculus with ω-rule and permutative conversions and this is used to derive a strong form of normalization for an iterative version of Gödel’s system , leading to a value table semantics for number-theoretic functions. (shrink)

Die besonderen Bedingungen der griechischen Sprache und ihrer langen Geschichte seit den Zeiten Homers haben schon seit der klassischen Epoche und zunehmend im Hellenismus und der Kaiserzeit Probleme der korrekten Akzentuierung und Orthographie aufgeworfen. Zumal die gelehrten hellenistischen und kaiserzeitlichen Editoren und Interpreten der homerischen Gedichte und anderer frühgriechischer und klassischer Poesie mußten zu unzähligen strittigen Fragen des Akzents und der richtigen Schreibung Stellung beziehen. Im 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr. hat der aus Alexandreia gebürtige, in Rom tätige Grammatiker Ailios Herodianos (...) über beide Bereiche umfassende Bücher verfaßt. Auf Aufforderung Kaiser Mark Aurels (und diesem gewidmet) schrieb er sein gewaltiges Hauptwerk in 21 Büchern, die Καθολιϰη πϱοσωδία („Allgemeine Akzentlehre“) und ebenfalls ein umfangreiches Buch Πεϱι οϱθογϱαϕίας. Beide sind wie alle seine anderen Werke bis auf die Schrift Πεϱι μονήϱους λέξεως verloren. Mit geradezu herodianischem Fleiß hat A. Lentz eine Rekonstruktion des Verlorenen unternommen. Man muß leider sagen, daß die Zeit für eine solche Rekonstruktion noch nicht reif war; einerseits mußte Lentz für fast alle Quellschriften auf Editionen zurückgreifen, die auf völlig unzureichender handschriftlicher Basis erstellt waren, andererseits konnte er noch nicht die spektakulären Handschriftenfunde R. Reitzensteins und die daraus resultierenden umstürzenden Ergebnis zur Kenntnis nehmen. „Es liegt eine Tragik darin, daß ein unter den größten Schwierigkeiten geleistetes Lebenswerk durch die Fahrlässigkeit der Herausgeber, deren Leistungen Lentz zugrunde legen mußte, von vornherein auf ungenügendem Fundament ruhte.“ Sowohl für den Bereich der Akzentlehre („Orthoepik“) wie den der Orthographie der Spätantike und der byzantinischen Zeit hat Peter Egenolff in zwei bahnbrechenden Schulprogrammen einen Überblick über die unzähligen Traktate in der Nachfolge Herodians und die sie tradierenden Handschriften geliefert. Egenolffs Arbeiten sind naturgemäß stark veraltet, da zahlreiche Handschriften erst nach ihm bekannt wurden und sehr viele neue Erkenntnisse auf dem Gebiet der griechischen Grammatik und Lexikographie seither erzielt worden sind. Aber Egenolffs Sammlungen und Überblicke sind bisher nicht überholt worden und werden auch für das Gebiet der Orthographien durch das hier zu behandelnde Werk leider nicht wirklich ersetzt. (shrink)

Defining a composition operation on sets of formulas one obtains a many-sorted algebra which satisfies the superassociative law and one more identity. This algebra is called the clone of formulas of the given type. The interpretations of formulas on an algebraic system of the same type form a many-sorted algebra with similar properties. The satisfaction of a formula by an algebraic system defines a Galois connection between classes of algebraic systems of the same type and collections of formulas. Hypersubstitutions are (...) mappings sending pairs of operation symbols to pairs of terms of the corresponding arities and relation symbols to formulas of the same arities. Using hypersubstitutions we define hyperformulas. Satisfaction of a hyperformula by an algebraic system defines a second Galois connection between classes of algebraic systems of the same type and collections of formulas. A class of algebraic systems is said to be solid if every formula which is satisfied is also satisfied as a hyperformula. On the basis of these two Galois connections we construct a conjugate pair of additive closure operators and are able to characterize solid classes of algebraic systems. (shrink)

The article argues that the ‘crisis of Europe’, triggered by market and governance dysfunctionalities (summarized as the Euro crisis), represents a ‘critical moment’ in the evolution of a European society. This society so far does not offer much resistance to such critical moments which is due to its incapacity to form a demos capable of acting together. The existing European society – and this is the basic claim – is nothing but the sum of individuals living in ‘sub-European’ (mainly national) (...) groups. The evolution triggered by this critical situation opens pathways to turn these peoples of Europe into something more than being a sum of peoples governed by supranational bureaucracies. To decipher such processes a model is presented using Hirschman’s idea of exit, voice and loyalty as mechanisms to generate social ties. Two points arise as crucial. The first is the observation that national societies which continue to provide foundational claims for people have turned into interest groups in the context of the European Union. This undermines not only the ontological nationalism still dominating the self-presentation of national societies in Europe, but it also offers evolutionary paths towards a society beyond national foundational claims in Europe. Yet it also provokes reactive processes such as the return to the self-contained nation (or even ethnic group). This is the core of the crisis of Europe. The systemic crises of the state and the market in Europe are speeding up an evolutionary process of people-making, the outcome of which could be either the regression to a people with foundational identities or to a people without foundational identities. The latter will be described as a postnational society, which would make an emerging European society the first really modern society. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Locke Butler Reid Hume Kant.

David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. Eleonore Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its acceptance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism.This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not at all clear that Stump’s view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that she has not provided a good reason (...) for thinking that a libertarian can abandon PAP. (shrink)

Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom (...) to act otherwise. (shrink)

While William Hasker and I for the most part broadly agree in our opposition to much of the contemporary philosophical community concerning issues in the philosophy of mind that he discusses in his book, there are nevertheless seemingly some domestic disputes between him and me about certain matters concerning the nature of events involving the self. In this paper, I will focus on two of these disagreements. The first disagreement concerns Hasker’s treatment of what is widely known today as the (...) argument from reason and whether the events involved in our reasoning are essentially causal or teleological in nature. The second disagreement is about Hasker’s account of libertarian freedom, and whether agent causation is required to explain our free choices. (shrink)

In this book, which was originally published in 1992, Klaus Scherer brought together leading scholars from the social sciences to discuss theoretical and empirical studies of justice. They examined the nature of justice from the perspective of philosophy, economics, law, sociology and psychology, and explored possible lines of convergence. A critical examination of theories of justice from Plato and Aristotle, through Marx, to Rawls and Habermas heads a collection which addresses the role of justice in economics and the law (...) and which evaluates sociological and psychological stances in relation to justice distributive and procedural. All the material is of clear cross-disciplinary interest; and this broad and authoritative survey of thinking on the topic will appeal to all researchers in the area, whatever their background, as well as to those confronting issues of justice in law politics and business. (shrink)

This article attempts to clarify an “argument from reason” set forth by C. S. Lewis in his Miracles. While there are various contemporary interpretations of the argument, Lewis intended to expose the “cardinal difficulty of naturalism.” First, this article seeks to clarify both Lewis’s argument and the understanding of naturalism that it presupposes. Second, philosophers of religion—especially, William Hasker and Alvin Plantinga—have significantly contributed to the argument’s contemporary discussion, and so their views are addressed with the intent to show how (...) they differ from Lewis’s contribution. C. S. Lewis’s argument from reason was and is remains to this day philosophically timely and deserving of serious consideration. (shrink)

If we have libertarian free will, then it is plausible to believe that the occurrences of certain physical events have irreducible and ineliminable mental explanations. According to a strong version of naturalism, everything in the physical world is in principle explicable in nonmental terms. Therefore, the truth of naturalism implies that libertarian choices cannot explain the occurrences of any physical events. In this paper, I example a methodological argument for the truth of naturalism and conclude that the argument fails. I (...) then consider additional concerns raised against the reality of libertarian freedom. First, I examine the claim that if a physical event E is not causally determined to occur by another physical event, then there is no way to account for the difference between E’s occurring randomly and E’s being causally determined to occur by a mental event. Second, I consider the assertion that the affirmation of libertarianism is a mind-of-the-gaps version of the God-of-the-gaps objection to a divine explanation of a physical event. Third, I take up the question of whether the inability of libertarians to pinpoint precisely where the initial physical effects of libertarian choices occur is a good reason for rejecting libertarianism. Fourth, I examine the claim that belief in the existence of the soul or immaterial mind is the result of an explanatory hypothesis to account for how libertarian free choices can causally produce physical effects. Fifth, I look at the traditional objection to substance dualism from the impossibility of causal interaction between a soul and its body. (shrink)