This book examines different views on the concept of truth in early Chinese philosophy, and considers a variety of theories of truth in Chinese and comparative thought.

At the 2022 Central American Philosophical Association meeting, there was an Author-Meets-Critics session on Carolyn McLeod’s book, Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests. The event was organized and chaired by Heather Stewart and sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women and Kate Norlock, chair of that committee. There were four speakers, including McLeod and three “critics”: Javiera Perez Gomez, Alison Reinheld, and Jennifer Parks, who were all generous enough to provide McLeod with (...) their comments beforehand. The sessions occurred over Zoom even though some speakers were present in person at the conference. McLeod kicked things off by providing a summary of her book, which was then followed by critical comments by the critics in the order in which they’re named above. McLeod responded to their remarks and then Stewart led a Q&A session with our small but lively and intelligent audience. The content of what was said has been reproduced here. (shrink)

Self-protection seems to be negatively correlated with integrity on the standard conception of that virtue. To be self-protective is to lose some of our integrity. In this paper, I pursue the somewhat unlikely claim that a certain amount of self-protection is consistent with integrity and is even required by it in many circumstances.

A peer commentary on an AJOB article by Kyle Fritz called "Unjustified Asymmetry: Positive Claims of Conscience and Heartbeat Bills.".

This translation of Randhir Singh's text of the Prem Sumarag (or Param Sumarag) presents an extended Sanatan account of Sikh ceremonies, Sikh ideals, and the Sikh way of life, thus providing a fresh insight into the history of Khalsa Rahit.

The Rahit Is The Code Of Belief And Conduct Laid Down By The Tenth Guru Gobind Singh For All Sikhs Who Join The Khalsa. The Book Traces The Development Of Rahit And Shows How The Modern Rahit, In Some Respects, Is Different From The Original One.

In the third act of his journey, Michael McLeod, a beloved physician and professor emeritus of medicine at Duke University, has shown why he's an even more beloved professor of life. In a manner that is clear, practical, and inspiring, this book is an invitation to grow and flourish during what can be one of the most challenging periods in our lives. McLeod demonstrates his courage to share his journey and his willingness to learn from his medical students (...) and from the participants in his conscious aging workshops. As you read his words, you can learn alongside this respected elder. He has put together a powerful guide for living your life fully. (shrink)

Evidence-based practice suggests the best approach to improving professionalism in practice is ethics curricula. However, recent research has demonstrated that millennium graduates do not advocate for patients or assert themselves during moral conflicts. The aim of this article is the exploration of evaluation techniques to evaluate one measurable outcome of ethics curricula: moral reasoning. A review of literature, published between 1995 and 2013, demonstrated that the moral orientations of care and justice as conceptualized by Gilligan and Kohlberg are utilized by (...) nursing students to solve ethical dilemmas. Data obtained by means of reflective journaling, Ethics of Care Interview (ECI) and Defining Issues Test (DIT), would objectively measure the interrelated pathways of care-based and justice-based moral reasoning. In conclusion, educators have an ethical responsibility to foster students' ability to exercise sound clinical judgment, and support their professional development. It is recommended that educators design authentic assessments to demonstrate student's improvement of moral reasoning. (shrink)

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'''' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'''' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'''' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'''' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp''s recent attempt toshow that (...) in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'''' A theory of just plain``ought'''' emerges along the way. (shrink)

Infertility can be an agonizing experience, especially for women. And, much of the agony has to do with luck: with how unlucky one is in being infertile, and in how much luck is involved in determining whether one can weather the storm of infertility and perhaps have a child in the end. We argue that bad luck associated with being infertile is often bad moral luck for women. The infertile woman often blames herself or is blamed by others for what (...) is happening to her, even when she cannot control or prevent what is happening to her. She has simply had bad luck. We focus on the self-blame of infertile women and show how it stems from pro-natalism that targets women. We also argue that overall for women, regret is a better moral response to infertility than self-blame. (shrink)

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ (...) the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas. (shrink)

"Chapter One lays out the dominant views of self, agency, and moral responsibility in early Chinese Philosophy. The reason for this is that these views inform the ways early Chinese thinkers approach mental illness, as well as the role they see it playing in self-cultivation as a whole. In this chapter I offer a view of a number of dominant conceptions of mind, body, and agency in early Chinese thought, through a number of philosophical and medical texts"--.

Despite being a common phenomenon with significant consequences on our everyday life, strikes (and direct actions in general) are still relatively undertheorized in the philosophical literature. Our paper has a specific focus that is best encapsulated in a question: What is the relationship between liberalism and the right to strike? Liberalism’s cornerstone is the idea that rights and liberties of individuals are of supreme political importance. Rights and liberties, however, are not created equal. The basic liberties are those that are (...) so politically important that legal restrictions upon them are unjustified unless to protect other basic liberties within an overall scheme of liberties, such as under a bill of rights. So, our question becomes: Is the right to strike a basic liberty? Two ongoing disputes are relevant here. The ‘older’ debate concerns the status of economic liberties and their relation to the right to strike. We will focus on a ‘newer’ discussion because it poses a challenge to liberalism itself. Namely, some ‘radical’ critics of liberalism (Gourevitch, Raekstad and Rossi) have argued that there are rights that involve coercing others, exercised during strikes or engagement in other direct action, that do not qualify as liberal basic liberties and that can sometimes take normative precedence over the liberal basic liberties. This criticism, if correct, defeats liberalism. Notice, though: since the weighing of different particular basic liberties against each other in an overall scheme of liberty is integral to high liberalism, the genuine threat that the radical critique poses stems not from the second conjunct (which its proponents have defended) but from its first (which they have merely assumed). For, if (contrary to what the radical work assumes) the right to engage in coercive strike action is a liberal basic liberty then it can, at least in principle, win out over other basic liberties, within an overall scheme of liberties, in situations of prima facie moral conflict. Raekstad and Rossi extend the radical critique, beyond the case of coercive strikes, to other forms of direct action (outside of industrial disputes) that have avowedly moral or political goals. These could include workplace occupations, street blockades, hacktivism, counter-economics, tax resistance and more. In the paper we argue that the ‘radicals’ are not entitled to the assumption that the right to strike is not a liberal basic liberty. Moreover, we suggest, high liberalism has the resources to accommodate not only a general right to engage in non-coercive strike action, but also the right to engage in some forms of coercive direct action, whether as part of an industrial dispute or not. More precisely, we show that liberalism has the resources to accommodate not only (i) a general right to engage in non-coercive strike action, but also (ii) the right to engage in some forms of coercive direct action, whether (iii) as part of an industrial dispute or (iv) not. (shrink)

The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.” This is what we were told the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Part of the challenge lies in fulfilling the licensing requirements for adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. The question naturally arises for many people who are subjected to these requirements whether they are morally justified. We tackle this question in this paper. In our (...) view, while strong reasons exist in favour of licensing adoptive parents, these reasons support the licensing not only of adoptive parents, but of all or some subset of so-called “natural” parents as well. We therefore conclude that the status quo with respect to parental licensing, according to which only adoptive parents need to be licensed, is morally unjustified. (shrink)

If humans are not capable of immortality, then eschatological doctrines of heaven and hell make little sense. On that Christians agree. But not all Christians agree on whether humans are essentially immortal. Some hold that the early church was right to borrow from the ancient Greek philosophers and to bring their sense of immortality to bear on the interpretation of biblical passages about the afterlife. Others, however, suggest that we are inherently mortal, and only conditionally immortal. This latter view is (...) usually associated with an annihilationist interpretation of the doctrine of hell and a rejection of eternal torment. In a philosophical analysis and argument, McLeod-Harrison proposes that humans are, indeed, immortal, but not essentially so. But neither are we immortal accidentally or conditionally. Instead, immortality is an enduring property--a property we cannot lose once created. McLeod-Harrison carefully delineates the sense of immortality he defends and provides a broadly Christian philosophical argument for it. The argument, if correct, leaves the recent suggestion that the unredeemed are annihilated on unsteady metaphysical feet. However, McLeod-Harrison does not defend eternal conscious punishment for the unredeemed, but suggests some ways to think about the possibility of a universal salvation. ""McLeod-Harrison provides an admirably careful metaphysical analysis of the concept of human immortality, ultimately arguing for the impossibility of personal annihilation. Whether or not one finally agrees with his thesis, this work is an immensely valuable resource, especially as regards discussions of philosophical anthropology and the doctrine of hell."" --James S. Spiegel, Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Taylor University ""In this fascinating, albeit complicated, argument against conditional immortality (annihilationism), the author makes no claim that the human soul is essentially immortal; he argues instead that, once a human offspring acquires a fully robust free will and thus becomes fully human, it is metaphysically impossible that it should cease to exist altogether. Whether or not one accepts every detail of this argument, it provides an original and intriguing twist to theological discussions of free will."" --Thomas Talbott, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Willamette University, Author of The Inescapable Love of God ""I often say the future of the hell debate is between conditional immortality and universal reconciliation, and it is no secret that I think the biblical case for the former is unassailable. However, while I am not persuaded by this volume's case for enduring and universal human immortality, it nevertheless promises to add precision to the language of immortality and to feature prominently in the philosophical side of that debate moving forward."" --Christopher M. Date, editor of Rethinking Hell: Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism Mark S. McLeod-Harrison is Professor of Philosophy at George Fox University. (shrink)

From 1908 to 1922, William Beebe, the curator of birds at the Bronx Zoo, tried unsuccessfully to bring tropical birds known as hoatzin to the zoological park in the Bronx run by the New York Zoological Society. Beebe was committed to bringing hoatzin to the zoo because he thought they could reveal scientific truths about ecology and evolution to him and the visiting public. While contemporary scholarship about zoo science in the United States has focused on how environmental conservation shaped (...) the scientific practices of zoos at the turn to the 20th century, Beebe's efforts to bring hoatzin to the Bronx shows that evolutionary theory and ecology were central issues at the institution. Beebe wanted to use zoo displays to conduct research into the relationships between organisms and environments in order to investigate how certain animal behaviors, such as flight, developed. Beebe's employers, Madison Grant and Henry Osborn, were less interested in Beebe's experimentation with zoo exhibits, and more invested in using the zoo as a place to disseminate evolutionary ideas they already understood as scientific truths about heredity, racial hierarchies, and eugenics. Whereas Beebe saw his scientific practice as dependent on ecological connections, Grant and Osborn stressed a narrative of purity and separation (of species and race) that governed the conservation projects and scientific focus of the Zoological Society, as well as the presentation of animals on zoo grounds. Ultimately, Grant and Osborn's evolutionary concerns and their vision of a hierarchical natural world dictated the scientific direction of the Bronx Zoo in a way that prevented the institution from becoming a site for ecological research. (shrink)

The article aims to distinguish autonomy from integrity. I claim that integrity is different from a form of autonomy at least, but that integrity and autonomy overlap considerably. Integrity itself is a form of autonomy: what ethicists call ‘moral autonomy.’ (They tend to distinguish between personal and moral autonomy.) Autonomy is the genus, one might say, with integrity (i.e., moral autonomy) and personal autonomy being species of it.

The harm principle entails the subprinciple that harm to others provides a pro tanto moral reason for legal or social coercion. We address a ‘scope problem’ for that subprinciple: how can what counts as harm be restricted sufficiently, without sacrificing extensional adequacy, to protect the harm principle’s liberal credentials? While recognizing the centrality of such basic liberties as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of movement to any liberalism worthy of the name, a satisfactory solution to the scope (...) problem must secure a broadly axiological distinction between conduct that harms others and conduct that, while it might negatively affect others (casually or relationally), does not harm them. We ground such a distinction in a further distinction, this time metaphysical, between needs and attitudes. (shrink)

This article investigates dilemmas in the archiving and sharing of qualitative data in educational research, critically engaging with practices and debates from across the social sciences. Ethical, epistemological and methodological challenges are examined in reference to open access agendas, the politics of knowledge production, and transformations in research practices in the era of data management. We first consider practical and interpretive decisions in archiving qualitative data, then map current policy and regulatory frameworks governing research data management, taking Australia as a (...) case-study. We argue that governance and protocols for data sharing have not attended sufficiently to the distinctive ethical and methodological dimensions and knowledge claims of qualitative research. Instead, approaches associated with quantitative data are extrapolated in ways which construct an imaginary of decontextualised data, abstracted from the conditions of its production. We further argue for more critical attention to the double-edged affordances and ambivalent effects of data sharing and openness and to how data archives are imagined, constructed and curated. This includes greater acknowledgement of the affective and temporal dynamics involved in data archiving, understanding them as practices of (re)invention that also curate ‘archives for the future’ and help to foster an historicising imaginary in educational research. (shrink)

Hoffman v. Monsanto raises questions about the civil litigation system. Are courts appropriate institutions, and are class actions the appropriate procedure, for resolving disputes about genetically modified organisms (GMOs)? After addressing the institutional question, this article focuses on procedure. Although class actions are designed to empower group litigation, environmental class actions are rarely permitted. This is partly because their claims for private law actions seeking monetary compensation cause courts to focus on individual aspects of the problem, and the collective harm (...) caused by widespread environmental effects is overlooked. Because most environmental lawsuits are prohibitively complex and expensive for individuals to litigate, this results in a denial of justice. It also prevents courts from playing their institutional role in the struggle to craft appropriate legal responses to GMOs. Greater focus on the role of groups and the collective nature of environmental harms would lead to different approaches to interpreting class action procedure. (shrink)

A concern for evidence can be viewed as a fundamental aspect of human existence. The biological structure of our bodies evolved during over thousands of years in which survival was predicated on a capacity to interpret small signs, such as crushed grass, smells, and sounds as evidence of the whereabouts of prey. The emergence of modern science and medicine was built on the ability to learn about what counted as evidence for what, and to observe it reliably. Evidence is information (...) that matters. Drinking a glass of water because one feels thirsty is not evidence, unless there is a suspicion of an underlying condition for which water intake is a symptom. Appraisal of evidence is a complex task. It relies on the... (shrink)

More is known about the pervasiveness of college cheating than reasons why students cheat. This article reports the results of a study that applied the theory of reasoned action and partial least squares methodology to analyze the responses of 144 students to a survey on cheating behavior. Approximately 60% of the business students and 64% of the non-business students admitted to such behavior. Among cheaters, a "desire to get ahead" was the most important motivating factor - a surprising result given (...) the comprehensive set of factors tested in the study. Among non-cheaters, the presence of a "moral anchor" such as an ethical professor was most important. The article also includes a set of important caveats that might limit this study and suggests some avenues for further study. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the work of W. E. B. Du Bois to expose the disastrous effects of white supremacy in the U.S. and the world. While his early works suggest that white supremacy might be rehabilitated by the careful presentation of contrary evidence, in later works he catalogs the primary features of whiteness, including an infantile comportment, a pathological attachment to innocence, and an epistemic incapacity to absorb evidence of its own error. To capture the scope of the (...) delusion of whiteness on Du Bois’s account, I suggest the term “irrevocable license.” The remainder of the paper uses Du Bois’s account to examine the case of a “Karen”—a white woman who obliviously and inappropriately interferes with the lawful actions of a family of color—and further considers police violence against people of color as an outgrowth of white irrevocable license. (shrink)

Traditional Christianity holds that God is a singular way, not dependent on the conceptual machinations of humans. I argue that God can be plural ways, different in different human conceptual schemes, all the while holding to traditional Christianity. In short, I provide a framework for an ontological pluralism that extends not just to the world being various ways but to God being various ways.

There is increasing research on the effects of industrial livestock production on the environment and human health, but less on the effects this has on animal welfare and ecological justice. The concept of ecological justice as a tool for achieving sustainability is gaining traction in the legal world. Klaus Bosselman defines ecological justice as consisting of three elements: intragenerational justice, intergenerational justice, and interspecies justice. While the first two have been extensively discussed, interspecies justice has received less attention. It is (...) argued that the neglect of interspecies justice in the practice of industrial livestock production leads to both intragenerational and intergenerational injustices. The article focuses primarily on an animal welfare perspective, addressing the extreme harm and oppression of animals entailed by their commoditization for industrial food production. The destructive impact of this mode of food production on environmental resources and its massive contributions to climate change also lead to the impoverishment of the food, environmental, social, and economic health of present and future generations. The article describes the legal mechanisms that have permitted, and indeed encouraged, the move to industrial livestock production, and suggests changes that could reduce the three kinds of ecological injustices which industrial livestock production produces. (shrink)

The introduction to a special issue of the journal Bioethics that we edited.

This article aims to lay out the ‘for money’ and ‘for dignity’ arguments that feminist ethicists have given about the reproductive labour women perform in providing oocytes or in getting pregnant for others. Feminist arguments about the morality of these two practices overlap significantly because, from a feminist perspective, the morally relevant facts about them are quite similar. Still, there are dissimilarities, stemming from the obvious fact that one practice involves giving up oocytes while the other involves giving up a (...) baby after a pregnancy. Some arguments by feminists reflect this core difference, in that they apply specifically to one practice but not to the other. The article highlights when the relevance of a particular argument differs for these different reproductive practices. (shrink)

Background: Visual technologies are central to youth culture and are often the preferred communication means of adolescents. Although these tools can be beneficial in fostering relations, adolescents’ use of visual technologies and social media also raises ethical concerns. Aims: We explored how school public health nurses identify and resolve the ethical challenges involved in the use of visual technologies in health dialogues with adolescents. Research design: This is a qualitative study utilizing data from focus group discussions. Participants and research context: (...) We conducted focus group discussions using two semi-structured discussion guides with seven groups of public health nurses (n = 40) working in Norwegian school health services. The data were collected during January and October 2016. Discussions were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded into themes and subthemes using systematic text condensation. Ethical considerations: The leader of the public health nursing service who agreed to provide access for the study and the Norwegian Center for Research Data that reviewed and approved the study. All participants gave informed consent. Findings: In adolescents’ use of visual materials with public health nurses, ethical concerns were raised regarding suicide ideations, socially unacceptable content, violation of privacy, and presentations of possible child neglect. The nurses utilized their professional knowledge and experience when identifying and navigating these ethical dilemmas; they resolved ethical uncertainties through peer discussion and collaboration with fellow nurses and other professionals. Discussion: We discussed the findings in light of Annemarie Mol’s interpretation of the ethics of care. Mol expands the notion of ethical care to include the action of technologies. Conclusion: Although the increasing use of visual technologies offered benefits, school nurses faced ethical challenges in health dialogues with adolescents. To address and navigate these ethical issues, they relied on their experience and caring practices based on their professional ethics. Uncertainties were resolved through peer dialogue and guidance. (shrink)

My goal is to explicate the ontological framework of the human self that is required for radical discipleship. I do this through two notions: Christian love and Christian humility. To that end I explore the other- and the self-regarding aspects of humility and love, posing a problem for love and humility rooted in our typical notions of self-interest and phronesis. I then propose a way of rethinking humility and love in the context of a sketch of solidarity and an alternative (...) ontology of the self. (shrink)

This book introduces the central topics of the philosophical traditions of indigenous groups of North-Central America such as the Maya and Nahua (Aztecs), and the current state of the field. It includes references to and quotes from crucial primary and secondary literature in the area.