CONSENSUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES Various atomistic and individualistic theories of knowledge, language, ethics and politics have dominated philosophical ...

Particularists maintain that conspiracy theories are to be assessed individually, while generalists hold that conspiracy theories may be assessed as a class. This paper seeks to clarify the nature and importance of the debate between particularism and generalism, while offering an argument for a version of generalism. I begin by considering three approaches to the definition of conspiracy theory, and offer reason to prefer an approach that defines conspiracy theories in opposition to the claims of epistemic authorities. I argue that (...) particularists rely on an untenably broad definition of conspiracy theory. Then, I argue that particularism and its counterpart are best understood as constellations of theses, rather than a pair of incompatible theses. While some particularist theses are highly plausible, I argue that one important particularist thesis is false. The argument for this conclusion draws on the history of false conspiracy theories. I then defend this conclusion against a pair of potential objections. (shrink)

This paper identifies and elucidates the underappreciated phenomenon of epistemic domination. Epistemic domination is the nonmutual capacity of one party to control the evidence available to another. Where this capacity is exercised, especially by parties that are ill-intentioned or ill-informed, the dominated party may have difficulty attaining epistemically valuable states. I begin with a discussion of epistemic domination and how it is possible. I then highlight three negative consequences that may result from epistemic domination.

Bringing together leading international scholars within the fields of social and political theory and philosophy, this book explores how we should understand work and its role in our lives and wider society. What challenges are posed by work in our changing economy and the new economic forms that are beginning to emerge, and how can we best address these challenges? In what ways do patterns of working, as well as work technologies, shape people's lives within and outside work, in particular (...) their life opportunities and their social and natural environment? How might we organize-or seek to reorganize-workplaces so that the experience of work better reflects our shared ethical ideals and normative principles? This volume examines these vital questions in a comprehensive and systematic manner in order to provide much needed theoretical insight and practical guidance in reflecting on the nature, problems, and possibilities of work currently. This book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students and established academics in the areas of contemporary political theory and philosophy, social theory, legal philosophy, labour studies, the sociology of work, practical ethics, critical theory, and political activism. (shrink)

The three main kinds of theory in normative ethics, namely, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are often presented as the ‘palette’ from which we may choose, or use as a starting point for an investigation. However, this way of doing ethics and philosophy, by the palette, may be leading some of us astray. It has led some to believe that all that there is to ethics, and to ethics of AI, is given in terms of these already devised petrified categories (...) of theory. It has also led others to abandon normative ethics and philosophy altogether and to resort to descriptive methods that are then used to justify action. I wish to argue that (1) we should not abandon traditional philosophical approaches, but (2a) this does not entail that the petrified palette should constitute the beginning of our philosophical investigations. Further, (2b) I recommend a non-methodological approach in which it is instead radical questions that spur these investigations, which arise through consideration of the practical actions (potential or otherwise) of machines and their programmers. (shrink)

Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can (...) help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Festschrift for Michiel van Lambalgen on the occasion of his retirement as professor of logic and cognitive science at the University of Amsterdam.

Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Birthmark offers a sharp lens through which to examine power, purity, and personal identity. Scientist and spiritual idealist, Aylmer, is obsessed with “correcting” the only flaw he perceives in his wife Georgina, the imprint of a small red hand on her pale cheek. For Alymer, this one “imperfection” reaches deep into Georgina’s heart, a sign of sin, decay, and mortality. It is the natural that must be overcome with science. Drawing on Hawthorne’s tragic fiction, this paper questions (...) the influence of stigma, power dynamics, and mind-body dualism in constructing disability identity within the framework of medical and spiritual practices of care. Whether in the role of a spiritual leader, chaplain, or medical professional, people providing care must first address ableism and perceptions of normalcy in relation to their own identity and calling before offering professional advice to disabled people seeking guidance or support. It is only as professional fields adopt a posture marked by courageous humility that healing practices will promote the flourishing of all people, including those with disabilities. (shrink)

This essay shows that truth cannot be divorced from human experience and an individual’s world view, his or her weltanschauung. There exist different weltanschauungen that favour alternative truths. Thus, loosely speaking, truth is determined by context. It may be socially acceptable to prefer one among the alternative truths as truly true, but this goal necessarily involves taking an ideological perspective on what is perceived and accepted as the sole truth. In other words, it is prejudiced. The truth value assigned to (...) the proposition God exists starkly illustrates this claim, but in the course of this essay I demonstrate that alternative truths are widespread and that conflicting truths can co-exist within a community even when they create dissension. A hegemonic group will assert a preference for one truth over its alternatives, but that does not eliminate the existence of alternative truths. Alternative weltanschauungen need to be managed somehow, and the recognition that alternative truths exist is one step in their management. (shrink)

The state of affairs of some things falling under a predicate is supposedly a single entity that collects these things as its constituents. But whether we think of a state of affairs as a fact, a proposition or a possibility, problems will arise if we adopt a plural logic. For plural logic says that any plurality include themselves, so whenever there are some things, the state of affairs of their plural self-inclusion should be a single thing that collects them all. (...) This leads to paradoxes analogous to those that afflict naïve set theory. Here I suggest that they are the very same paradoxes, because sets can be reduced to states of affairs. However, to obtain a consistent theoretical reduction we must restrict the usual axiom scheme of Comprehension for plural logic to ‘stratified’ formulas, to avoid viciously circular definitions. I prove that with this modification to the background plural logic, the theory of states of affairs is consistent; moreover, it yields the axioms of the familiar set theory NFU. (shrink)

In metaphysics, we seem to have in every generation an oscillation between realist positions and stances that are in one way or another idealist, instrumentalist, or constructivist. Realists in the philosophy of science are those philosophers who will not conclude, from the fact that scientific theories are undoubtedly constructs of human mentality and culture, that therefore the content of these theories is inevitably some function of the human mentality and culture that have produced them. Realists are unimpressed by response-dependence. Realism (...) is metaphysical optimism; it has not abandoned the notion that exercising our capacities does not disqualify us from discovery. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore how themes of existential philosophy have been used to develop a formal orientation of psychotherapy, and we discuss the main principles of existential psychotherapy and their application in practice. We also draw upon case examples to specifically illustrate how the approach of existential psychotherapy is utilized in clinical practice. In the case examples, each patient's identify has been disguised to maintain confidentiality. The new science of meaning, represented by the chapters in this volume, not only (...) offers therapists a deep conceptual framework within which to practice older, more established techniques but should also suggest new approaches. By recognizing the centrality of meaning as sense making and acknowledging the distinction between the what and the why of sense making, therapists should be armed with a variety of epistemic and teleological tools with which to fashion therapy strategies that are unique for each individual. (shrink)

This reference work aims describes all aspects of the study of meaning in language. It synthesises the latest scholarly positions on the construction, interpretation, clarification, obscurity, illustration, amplification, simplification, negotiation, contradiction, contraction and paraphrasing of meaning.

We summarize some of the classic theoretical underpinnings of the emerging psychology of meaning, with special emphasis on the existentialist perspective that understood meaning in a way that converges with our present understanding and provides a blueprint for subsequent efforts. As we go on to describe, all of these perspectives intersect at a central understanding of meaning making: the ways that we make sense of ourselves and our environment, the feelings that are aroused when these understandings are constructed or violated, (...) and the common ways in which we respond to these violations. In particular, we focus on a general distinction within the notion of meaning that can often obscure what meaning always is—a sense of what is, and a sense of why this should be so. To a remarkable extent, the chapters that constitute this volume on meaning mirror this distinction, focusing on both the what and the why of sense making. In particular, these chapters also describe a strikingly analogous account of the feelings and behaviors that follow from violations of either the whats or the whys of sense making. (shrink)

P EM Manifestos for History /EM is a thought-provoking and controversial text that, through a star studded collection of essays, presents a wide ranging ...

Abstract:We aim in this paper to explore several related challenges to contemporary analytical legal theorists who accept as theoretically foundational the state-based view of legality and legal system advanced by H.L.A. Hart. We contend that this approach contains internal explanatory problems which limit the view’s capacity to account for novel prima facie legal phenomena outside the typical experience of the law-state. We supplement the analytical approach by advancing the rudiments of what we call an ‘inter-institutional theory of legality,’ a theory (...) of legality derived from a morally-neutral, descriptive-explanatory picture of legal system qua system of legal institutions. Our theory additionally enables us to account for the novel prima facie legal phenomena we identify, and to conclude that while prior analytical legal theorists’ approaches to legality and legal system were historically right to depart from the example of the municipal legal system, that example and departure point are no longer most salient, so explanation of the legality within the state is no longer sufficient as a general explanation of legality.Resumen:En este artículo los autores se proponen explorar diversos retos que enfrentan los teóricos analíticos del derecho contemporáneos, los cuales han aceptado que una perspectiva estatista del sistema jurídico y de la legalidad —introducida por H. L. A. Hart— es fundamental como punto de partida en la teoría. Los autores sostienen que este enfoque contiene problemas explicativos internos que limitan su capacidad para explicar fenómenos jurídicos prima facie novedosos que no se ajustan a la experiencia paradigmática de un derecho-estado. Los autores reformulan el enfoque analítico mediante la introducción de las bases de lo que deno minan una “teoría de la legalidad interinstitucional”, esto es, una teoría de la legalidad derivada de una noción moralmente neutral, descriptiva y explicativa del sistema jurídico como un sistema de instituciones jurídicas. Esta teoría permite, además, explicar los fenómenos jurídicos prima facie novedosos que identifican los autores; y concluir que si bien los enfoques anteriores hacia el sistema jurídico y la legalidad de los teóricos analíticos estuvieron históricamente en lo correcto al tomar como punto de partida el ejemplo de un sistema jurídico municipal, ese ejemplo y punto de partida han dejado de ser relevantes, dicho ejemplo y punto de partida no resulta suficiente, por lo que la explicación de la legalidad dentro de los confines del Estado no es suficiente para una explicación general de la legalidad. (shrink)

The form of representation cannot be fully described, as Wittgenstein noted. This is because there is a non-linguistic component in the representation of truth that aesthetic experience shows us. It is the self-represented exemplar of conscious experience. On this basis, the author defends empiricism against the objection that all representation of experience is subject to error.

On Thomas Reid's 18thC theory of psychology and ontology, our conception of primary qualities was original and our conception of secondary qualities was acquired. The conception of both was a response to sensations. In the Inquiry Reid insisted that our original conceptions were automatic and irresistible, while in the Essays he insisted that our conception of general attributes arises from a two step process of abstraction and generalization. These doctrines are rendered consistent by a distinction between particular attributes, which exist (...) and are conceived by abstraction, and general attributes, which do not exist and are conceived by generalization guided by their utility in knowledge and communication. (shrink)

I begin by querying whether ‘post-axial’ religions are cosmically optimistic, though what John Hick has in mind is forms of religious beliefs that affirm that there is life after physical death, and the possibility of final fulfilment for all. Hick accepts that ideas of this fulfilment, the ultimate goal of human striving, conflict. I query whether diverse traditions would accept that ‘the Real’ is wholly beyond their conceptions of it, and that their conception is no more authentic than the conceptions (...) held by other traditions. I reject soteriology as a criterion of choice between religions, as the criterion is either presently unverifiable or fails to pick out religions in a distinctive way. I suggest that ethics depends on ontology, or on basic views of human nature, and that Hick actually agrees with this, and in fact holds a personalist view of the metaphysical ground of ethics. This view allows various religions to apprehend aspects of ‘the Real’, but does not allow that all are more or less equally authentic. It is thus pluralistic but not totally egalitarian, though it is also not committed to the view that one tradition is wholly correct. (shrink)

In an analysis of 47 U.S. journalism ethics codes, we found that although most consider images, only 9 address a gripping issue: how to treat images of tragedy and violence, such as those produced on the battlefields of Iraq, during the 2005 London bombings, and after Hurricane Katrina. Among codes that consider violent and tragic images, there is agreement on what images are problematic and a move toward green-light considerations of ethical responsibilities. However, the special problems of violence and truth (...) telling in wartime and issues of how to handle graphic images across media platforms receive virtually no attention. (shrink)

Our rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? What makes what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for action? We can explain where reasons come from without postulation or regress. The explanation rests on our trustworthiness combined with our acceptance of it and our preference for it. The explanation reveals that theoretical and practical reason are intertwined in a loop of (...) trustworthiness in what we accept, what we prefer and how we reason. The loop is the keystone of our rationality. (shrink)