The goal of this article is to use structural, lexical and content analysis to make the case that the Church Father Lactantius, when composing Divinae institutiones 6,21, engaged with Sen. epist. 123,9 f. and pointedly refers to it. In the process, this whole chapter of Lactantius will be examined to see what the relation is between the decisive influence of the Seneca passage and that of other pre-texts that have already been identified as such in existing publications, especially the works (...) of other Church Fathers. The content under discussion concerns the risks of purely instrumental music compared to those of artistically designed speech for the spirit of the listener, closely linked to the question of whether Christian writings, too, may – or even should – be aesthetically appealing. The treatment of this question leads ultimately to a general discussion of the relation of pleasure to virtue in the sense of a life pleasing to God. (shrink)

The objects we encounter in ordinary life and scientific practice - cars, trees, people, houses, molecules, galaxies, and the like - have long been a fruitful source of perplexity for metaphysicians. The Structure of Objects gives an original analysis of those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in our ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Koslicki focuses on material objects in particular, or, as metaphysicians like to call them "concrete particulars", i.e., objects which occupy a single region of (...) space-time at each time at which they exist and which have a certain range of properties that go along with space-occupancy, such as weight, shape, color, texture, and temperature. The Structure of Objects focuses in particular on the question of how the parts of such objects, assuming that they have parts, are related to the wholes which they compose. (shrink)

In _Form, Matter, Substance_, Kathrin Koslicki defends a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects (e.g., living organisms). The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism holds that those entities that fall under it are compounds of matter (hulē) and form (morphē or eidos). Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well-equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of criteria of success. A successful application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of (...) concrete particular objects, however, hinges on how hylomorphists conceive of the matter composing a concrete particular object, its form, and the hylomorphic relations which hold between a matter-form compound, its matter and its form. Through the detailed answers to these questions Koslicki develops in this book, matter-form compounds, despite their metaphysical complexity, emerge as occupying the privileged ontological status traditionally associated with substances, due in particular to their high degree of unity. (shrink)

Normativism in the theory of meaning and content is the view that linguistic meaning and/or intentional content are essentially normative. As both normativity and its essentiality to meaning/content can be interpreted in a number of different ways, there is now a whole family of views laying claim to the slogan “meaning/content is normative”. In this essay, we discuss a number of central normativist theses, and we begin by identifying different versions of meaning normativism, presenting the arguments that have been put (...) forth for and against them. (shrink)

In public debate GMPs are oftenreferred to as being unnatural or a violationof nature. Some people have serious moralconcerns about departures from what is natural.Others are concerned about potential risks tothe environment arising from the combination ofhereditary material moving across naturalboundaries and the limits of scientificforesight of long-term consequences. To addresssome of these concerns we propose that anadditional element in risk assessment based onthe concept of familiarity should beintroduced. The objective is to facilitatetransparency about uncertainties inherent inthe risk assessment of (...) the GMP. Familiarityconventionally involves data and experiencerelating to the plant species and the ecosystemin question. We would like to extend thisconcept to the molecular level of plantbreeding and suggest that GMP characteristicsshould be compared to a reference baselinedetermined by conventional breeding techniques.Three GMPs are ranked according to familiarityat the plant and ecosystem level and themolecular level. The approach may help tointegrate discussion of the scientificarguments and moral questions raised in thedebate about GMOs by providing an operationalscheme within which moral concerns are broughtwithin the framework of science-based riskassessment. (shrink)

In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief (...) relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported. (shrink)

A large body of research shows that emotionally significant stimuli are better stored in memory. One question that has received much less attention is how emotional memories are influenced by factors that influence memories after the initial encoding of stimuli. Intriguingly, several recent studies suggest that post-encoding factors do not differ in their effects on emotional and neutral memories. However, to date, only detrimental factors have been addressed. In the present study, we examined whether emotionally negative memories are differentially influenced (...) by a well-known beneficial factor: the testing of memories. We employed a standard cued recall testing-effect paradigm where participants studied cue-target pairs for negative and neutral target pictures. In a subsequent post-encoding phase, one third of the cue-target pairs were tested and one third restudied; the remaining third served as control pairs. After one week, memory for all cue-target pairs was tested. While replicating both the testing effect and the emotional enhancement effect, no differences between negative and neutral memories in the benefits received from testing and restudying were observed. Thus, it seems to be true that post-encoding factors do not influence emotional memories in any other way than neutral memories, even when they are beneficial. (shrink)

In this book, Kathrin Gl¨uer carefully outlines Donald Davidson's principal claims and arguments, and discusses them in some detail, providing a concise, systematic introduction to all the main elements of Davidson's philosophy.

The Assumption of Agency Theory Content Type Journal Article Category Review Pages 523-528 DOI 10.1558/jcr.v11i4.523 Authors Kathrine Elizabeth Anker, Planetary Collegium, Plymouth University, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 4 / 2012.

Risk assessment studies of herbicide resistant sugarbeet have revealed no risks to human health or the environment.Indeed it appears that commercial growth of this crop mightsecure benefits such as decreased pesticide use and increasedbiodiversity. However, widespread resistance to GM crops such asherbicide resistant sugar beet still persists in Europe. It isargued that this is not just because people do not know therelevant facts. Rather it is because popular resistance to GMfood is driven in part by concerns other than the fear (...) ofnarrowly defined risks to health and the environment. These otherconcerns include an aversion to commercial monopoly and anegative view of pesticide use in general. Herbicide resistantsugar beet may also be perceived as a ``Trojan horse,'''' i.e., acrop whose licensing would create a precedent and make it morelikely that other, less environmentally friendly, crops will beapproved within the current strictly technical and science-basedrisk assessment procedures. To meet these public concerns, a kindof technology assessment reflecting factors such as benefits andconsumer choice is called for. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a novel treatment of generic sentences, which proceeds by means of different levels of analysis. According to this account, all generic sentences (I-generics and D-generics alike) are initially treated in a uniform manner, as involving higher-order predication (following the work of George Boolos, James Higginbotham and Barry Schein on plurals). Their non-uniform character, however, re-emerges at subsequent levels of analysis, when the higher-order predications of the first level are cashed out in terms of quantification over (...) individuals: this last step, I suggest, involves knowledge concerning the lexical meaning of the predicates in question. (shrink)

This chapter discusses why the grounding idiom does not perform as well as we have been led to believe in providing a plausible approach to relative fundamentality. Grounding suffers from some of same deficiencies as supervenience: most prominently, grounding also fails to be sufficiently fine-grained to do its intended explanatory work. In addition, there is doubt as to whether the phenomena collected together under the rubric of grounding are really unified by the presence of a single relation. Grounding turns out (...) not to be helpful in capturing and illuminating what is philosophically important about the traditional substance/non-substance distinction. Although grounding performs better than supervenience in some ways, it does not solve all of the problems to which a supervenience-based approach to relative fundamentality falls prey. (shrink)

Roughly 80,000 U.S. prisoners are held in solitary confinement at any given time. A significant body of research shows that solitary confinement has severe, long-term effects, and the United Nations has condemned the practice of solitary confinement as torture. For years, prisoners have been organizing hunger strikes in order to protest solitary confinement. But such action is not without consequences, and some inmates have suffered serious injury or death. The question I raise in this paper is whether we ought to (...) force-feed hunger striking prisoners when serious harm is imminent. Both the World Medical Association and the American Medical Association have denounced the practice of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike, and yet, the practice is common. Such prevalence is likely a result of the tension between the person-as-patient and person-as-prisoner and cannot easily be resolved. Instead, we must take seriously the complaint that solitary confinement is inhumane and avoid placing health professionals in the position where they must choose to force-feed the prisoner against his will or not. I argue that a conventional bioethics debate centering on polarizing principles of prisoner autonomy and a duty-to-protect the prisoner from harm is an inadequate framework for this complex issue. Instead, we must examine the prisoner’s intent and his right to freedom of speech. I argue that when the prisoner’s intent is to raise awareness and communicate with others, his hunger strike is a form of speech. Protest-as-speech is constitutionally protected—even for prisoners—and remains a minimum ethical obligation for society to uphold. (shrink)

A significant reorientation is currently under way in analytic metaphysics, away from an almost exclusive focus on questions of existence and towards a greater concentration on questions concerning the dependence of one type of phenomenon on another. Surprisingly, despite the central role dependence has played in philosophy since its inception, interest in a systematic study of this concept has only recently surged among contemporary metaphysicians. In this paper, I focus on a promising account of ontological dependence in terms of a (...) non-modal and sufficiently constrained conception of essence developed by Kit Fine. I argue that even this essentialist account is, as it stands, not fine-grained enough to recognize different varieties of dependence which ought to be distinguished even within the realm of ontology. In some cases, an entity may be ontologically dependent on its essential constituents out of which it is constructed; but in other cases, an entity may be ontologically dependent on another for a different reason. A framework which glosses over these differences does not offer a proper diagnosis of why one entity ontologically depends on another. (shrink)

Non-modalists about essence reject the idea that metaphysical modality is prior to essence, e.g., in the sense that the latter can be reduced to or defined in terms of the former. On the contrary, according to these theorists, the explanation, if anything, proceeds in the opposite direction: metaphysical modality does not explain, but is instead explained in terms of, essence. Thus, for non-modalists like Aristotle, Kit Fine and E. J. Lowe, one of the primary theoretical roles of essence is to (...) provide an explanatory basis for metaphysical necessity and possibility. This chapter explores a range of different types of explanatory connections which raise the question of how the non-modalist’s program of explaining metaphysical modality in terms of essence is best carried out. The considerations advanced in this chapter suggest that non-modalists must proceed by way of a non-logical case-by-case engagement with specific cases, since no logical “one-size-fits- all” strategy appears to be available. (shrink)

Rooftop gardens, rooftop greenhouses and indoor farms have been established or planned by activists and private companies in Berlin. These projects promise to produce a range of goods that could have positive impacts on the urban setting but also carry a number of risks and uncertainties. In this early innovation phase, the relevant stakeholders’ perceptions and social acceptance of ZFarming represent important preconditions for success or failure of the further diffusion of this practice. We used the framework of acceptance to (...) investigate the stakeholders’ attitudes and to identify the key factors that might hinder or promote the introduction of ZFarming. The results are based on an analysis of 38 qualitative interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Berlin. As the results show, major perceived benefits of ZFarming include improved consumer awareness, education, and the creation of experimental spaces. Stakeholders further perceive opportunities for resource savings, new business models, repurposing of abandoned buildings and improved aesthetics. Major perceived risks are associated with growing techniques that are considered “unnatural”, health risks, conflicts with images of traditional agriculture, the rejection of animal production in urban areas, the risk of projects being too expensive and too complex or being implemented too early, i.e. before the mechanisms are fully understood. The analysis further reveals which contextual factors—political, legal, market-related, spatial or societal—might negatively or positively influence ZFarming acceptance. (shrink)

Beta‐oxidation of fatty acids and detoxification of reactive oxygen species are generally accepted as being fundamental functions of peroxisomes. Additionally, these pathways might have been the driving force favoring the selection of this compartment during eukaryotic evolution. Here we performed phylogenetic analyses of enzymes involved in beta‐oxidation of fatty acids in Bacteria, Eukaryota, and Archaea. These imply an alpha‐proteobacterial origin for three out of four enzymes. By integrating the enzymes' history into the contrasting models on the origin of eukaryotic cells, (...) we conclude that peroxisomes most likely evolved non‐symbiotically and subsequent to the acquisition of mitochondria in an archaeal host cell. (shrink)

Some theories of linguistic meaning, such as those of Paul Grice and David Lewis, make appeal to higher–order thoughts: thoughts about thoughts. Because of this, such theories run the risk of being empirically refuted by the existence of speakers who lack, completely or to a high degree, the capacity of thinking about thoughts. Research on autism during the past 15 years provides strong evidence for the existence of such speakers. Some persons with autism have linguistic abilities that qualify them as (...) speakers, but manifest a severely impaired capacity to understand what it is to have beliefs. (shrink)

This paper provides a detailed examination of Kit Fine’s sizeable contribution to the development of a neo-Aristotelian alternative to standard mereology; I focus especially on the theory of ‘rigid’ and ‘variable embodiments’, as defended in Fine 1999. Section 2 briefly describes the system I call ‘standard mereology’. Section 3 lays out some of the main principles and consequences of Aristotle’s own mereology, in order to be able to compare Fine’s system with its historical precursor. Section 4 gives an exposition of (...) Fine’s theory of embodiments and goes on to isolate a number of potential concerns to which this account gives rise. In particular, I argue that (i) Fine’s theory threatens to proliferate primitive sui generis relations of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be stipulatively imposed on them, relative to particular domains; (ii) given its ‘superabundance’ of objects, Fine’s system far outstrips the (arguably) already inflated ontological commitments of standard mereology; and (iii) there is a legitimate question as to why we should consider Fine’s primitive and sui generis relations of parthood and composition to be genuinely mereological at all, given their formal profile. These three objections lead me to conclude that we ought to explore other avenues that preserve the highly desirable, hylomorphic, features of Fine’s mereology, while avoiding its methodological and ontological excesses. (shrink)

This essay provides an opinionated survey of some recent developments in the literature on ontological dependence. Some of the most popular definitions of ontological dependence are formulated in modal terms; others in non-modal terms (e.g., in terms of the explanatory connective, ‘because’, or in terms of a non-modal conception of essence); some (viz., the existential construals of ontological dependence) emphasise requirements that must be met in order for an entity to exist; others (viz., the essentialist construals) focus on conditions that (...) must be satisfied in order for an entity to be the very entity it is at each time at which it exists; some are rigid, in the sense that they concern a relation between particular entities; others are generic, in the sense that they involve only a relation between an entity and some entities or other, which bear certain characteristics. I identify three potential measures of success with respect to which these different definitions of ontological dependence can be evaluated and consider the question of how well they in fact meet these desiderata. I end by noting that certain challenges face even the most promising essentialist construals of ontological dependence. (shrink)

Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) (...) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts. (shrink)

In his excellent book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Sider, 2001), Theodore Sider defends a version of four-dimensionalism which he calls the ‘stage-theory’. This paper focuses on Sider's argument from vagueness and argues that, due to the problematic nature of the argument from vagueness, Sider’s case in favor of four-dimensionalism is in the end not successful.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 84-95, January 2022. Emotional stimuli such as images, words, or video clips are often used in studies researching emotion. New sets are continuously being published, creating an immense number of available sets and complicating the task for researchers who are looking for suitable stimuli. This paper presents the KAPODI-database of emotional stimuli sets that are freely available or available upon request. Over 45 aspects including over 25 key set characteristics have been extracted and (...) listed for each set. The database facilitates finding of and comparison between individual sets. It currently contains sets published between 1963 and 2020. A searchable online version allows users to select specific set characteristics and to find matching sets accordingly, as well as to add new published sets. (shrink)

According to some phenomenologists, a tool can be experienced as incorporated when, as a result of habitual use or deliberate practice, someone is able to manipulate it without conscious effort. In this article, we specifically focus on the experience of expertise tool use in elite sport. Based on a case study of elite rope skipping, we argue that the phenomenological concept of incorporation does not suffice to adequately describe how expert tool users feel when interacting with their tools. By analyzing (...) a combination of insights gained from participant observation of 11 elite rope skippers and autoethnographic material from one former elite skipper, we take some initial steps toward the development of a more nuanced understanding of the concept of incorporation; one that is able to accommodate the experiences of expert tool users. In sum, our analyses indicate that the possibility for experiencing a tool as incorporated depends on the existence of an extraordinary kind of relationship between th... (shrink)

Whenever an object constitutes, makes up or composes another object, the objects in question share a striking number of properties. This paper is addressed to the question of what might account for the intimate relation and striking similarity between constitutionally related objects. According to my account, the similarities between constitutionally related objects are captured at least in part by means of a principle akin to that of strong supervenience. My paper addresses two main issues. First, I propose independently plausible principles (...) by means of which to delineate, in a non-ad-hoc, non-stipulative and non-circular fashion, those properties which can be expected to be shared among constitutionally related objects in virtue of their being so related from those which in general cannot be expected to be shared, or which are shared for other reasons. Secondly,I spell out in detail the nature of the supervenience-principle at work in this context. My account thus aims at isolating, in a methodologically responsible fashion, the particular sort of restricted indiscernibility principle which is a component of the constitution-relation. (shrink)

Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In this paper, I present (...) several concerns which suggest that the structural equation model does not transfer as smoothly from the case of causation to the case of grounding as Schaffer would have us believe. If it can in fact be shown that significant differences surface in how the formalism in question applies to the two types of phenomena in question, Schaffer’s attempt at establishing an analogy between grounding and causation has thereby been weakened and, as a result, the application of the Unity Hypothesis to the case of grounding once again stands in need of justification. (shrink)

It is common to think of essence along modal lines: the essential truths, on this approach, are a subset of the necessary truths. But Aristotle conceives of the necessary truths as being distinct and derivative from the essential truths. Such a non-modal conception of essence also constitutes a central component of the neo-Aristotelian approach to metaphysics defended over the last several decades by Kit Fine. Both Aristotle and Fine rely on a distinction between what belongs to the essence proper of (...) an object and what merely follows from the essence proper of an object. In order for this type of approach to essence and modality to be successful, we must be able to identify an appropriate consequence relation which in fact generates the result that the necessary truths about objects follow from the essential truths. I discuss some proposals put forward by Fine and then turn to Aristotle’s account: Aristotle’s central idea, to trace the explanatory power of definitions to the causal power of essences has the potential to open the door to a philosophically satisfying response to the question of why certain things are relevant, while others are irrelevant, to the nature or essence of entities. If at all possible, it would be desirable for example to have something further to say by way of explanation to such questions as ‘Why is the number 2 completely irrelevant to the nature of camels?’. (shrink)

Die Arbeit wendet sich einem zentralen Problem der Modernen Sprachphilosophie zu. Mit Kripkes 'Wittgenstein' hat die Sprachphilosophie einen neuen Slogan erhalten: Beudeutung ist normativ. Dass die Sprache nicht naturlich, sondern konventionell sei, gehort dabei seit der griechischen Sophistik zu den Binsenweisheiten dieses Zweigs der Philosophie. Sehen wir jedoch mit Wittgenstein sprachliche Bedeutung als durch den Gebrauch sprachlicher Ausdrucke bestimmt an, wird daraus schnell die These, es seien die 'Regeln' fur den Gebrauch solcher Ausdrucke, die deren Bedeutung bestimmen, die - mit (...) anderen Worten - bestimmen, was korrekter und was inkorrekter Gebrauch ist. Als Normativthese reformuliert, findet die antike Binsenweisheit so auch in der aktuellen Kontroverse breiten Konsens, eint sie Sprachphilosophen unterschiedlicher Couleur. In Auseinadnersetzung u.a. mit Dummett, Kripke, McDowell, Putnam und Wittgenstein arbeitet Kathrin Gluer nicht nur heraus, dass dieser Konsens aufgrund der Unterschiedlichkeit der dabei in Anspruch genommenen Normativitatsverstandnisse ein scheinbarer isr. Daruber hinaus argumentiert sie, an der Normativitatsthese selbst sei so gut wie alles falsch. Auf der Grundlage eines teilweise an der Philosophie Davidsons orientierten nicht-reduktiven Verstandnisses von Bedeutung und Intentionalitat zeige sich vielmehr, dass Normen oder Regeln nicht in den elementaren "Zirkel" intentionaler Begriffe gehoren. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Fragen erweisen sich Sprachphilosophie, Handlungstheorie und Philosophie des Geistes als untrennbar miteinander verbunden. (shrink)

Health-care professionals in end-of-life care are frequently confronted with patients who seem to be ‘ambivalent’ about treatment decisions, especially if they express a wish to die. This article investigates this phenomenon by analysing two case stories based on narrative interviews with two patients and their caregivers. First, we argue that a respectful approach to patients requires acknowledging that coexistence of opposing wishes can be part of authentic, multi-layered experiences and moral understandings at the end of life. Second, caregivers need to (...) understand when contradictory statements point to tensions in a patient’s moral experience that require support. Third, caregivers should be careful not to negatively label or even pathologize seemingly contradictory patient statements. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue Philosophique, 11 | 2008, 79-96 et mis en ligne ici. Nous remercions Kathrin H. Rosenfield de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire sur RHUTHMOS. On sait qu'Hölderlin s'est délibérément opposé à la « conception régnante par rapport au monde Grec » et au classicisme de Weimar qui voit Sophocle comme le modèle de la mesure rationnelle. Déjà Hellingrath et Beissner ont signalé qu'il accentue « l'enthousiasme excentrique », c'est-à-dire, les - XVIIIe (...) siècle – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the “Foundational Ontologist”, who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological “Skeptic”, who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the Skeptic by means of a counterfactual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the Skeptic to a position (...) within Foundational Ontology, viz., that of Nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of “metaphysical analyticity”. I argue that both components of Dorr’s proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the Foundational Ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic’s position; and the non-Nihilist Foundational Ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the Nihilist outlook. (shrink)

Previous studies have established that Indians tend to be greater in collectivism and gender role traditionalism than Americans. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether these differences explained further cultural differences in romantic beliefs, traditional mate preferences, and anticipation of future difficulties in marital life. Results revealed that Indians reported greater collectivism than Americans and, in turn, held stronger romantic beliefs. Additionally, Indians' greater collectivism and endorsement of more traditional gender roles in part predicted their preferences for (...) a marital partner possessing traditional characteristics, and fully accounted for their heightened concerns about encountering future difficulties in marital life. These results shed light on the processes underlying cultural differences in relationship attitudes and preferences, and point to culture-specific therapies to enhance marital functioning. (shrink)

Along with many other languages, English has a relatively straightforward grammatical distinction between mass-occurrences of nouns and their countoccurrences. As the mass-count distinction, in my view, is best drawn between occurrences of expressions, rather than expressions themselves, it becomes important that there be some rule-governed way of classifying a given noun-occurrence into mass or count. The project of classifying noun-occurrences is the topic of Section II of this paper. Section III, the remainder of the paper, concerns the semantic differences between (...) nouns in their mass-occurrences and those in their count-occurrences. As both the name view and the mixed view are, in my opinion, subject to serious difficulties discussed in Section III.1,I defend a version of the predicate view. Traditionally, nouns in their singular count-occurrences are also analyzed as playing the semantic role of a predicate. How, then, does the predicate view preserve the intuitive difference between nouns in their mass- and those in their count-occurrences? I suggest, in Section III.2, that there are different kinds of predicates: mass-predicates, e.g. ‘is hair’, singular count-predicates, e.g. ‘is a hair’, and plural count-predicates, e.g. ‘are hairs’. Mass-predicates and count-predicates, in my view, are not reducible to each other. The remainder of Section III takes a closer look at the differences and interrelations between these different kinds of predicates. Mass-predicates and count-predicates differ from each other truth-conditionally, and these truth-conditional differences turn out to have interesting implications, in particular concerning the part-whole relation and our practices of counting. But mass- and count-predicates are also related to each other through systematic entailment relations; these entailment relations are examined in Section III.4. (shrink)

This article suggests an assembly of ideas collected from transdisciplinary areas that in integration can potentially cast light on the role of affect and feeling in aesthetic experience. The article takes up a well-known philosophical quest to define the nature of aesthetic experience, but seeks out new territories of explanation that rest upon principles of rhetorical integration across a seemingly ambiguous landscape of separated theories, and under a dynamic, connective observatory perspective. The aim of the article is thus to suggest (...) a rhetorical design integrating results from the fields of neuroscience, biosemiotics, medical theory and philosophy of art, which could potentially result in an extension of traditional understandings of the roles of affect and feeling in processes of communication. I see the space of installation art, based on new technology and science, as a possible laboratory for the speculative mind, to which such investigations could be successfully related. I find that contemporary installation artworks can if successful induce an activation of processes intrinsic to the bodymind, which can bring forward new imaginations, new metaphors and extended self-understandings. (shrink)

In this article I will relate the kinetic sculpture Hylozoic Ground by architect Phillip Beesley and a collaborative group to theoretical and philosophical studies concerning the human subject. I will ask the deep philosophical question what is life? with the expectancy of a close relationship between ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’. Under inspiration from Yair Neuman and Søren Brier, I operate with the idea that ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’ would be directly related to communication processes in the body of both physically measurable and (...) physically immeasurable kinds. And that such communication processes are best described by modelling a hierarchy of qualitatively different, but co-dependent kinds of communication. (shrink)