After reappearance of Poland on the map of Europe in 1918, the first major manifestation of the new country’s creative potential was at the 1925 International Exhibition of Applied Arts and Modern Industry in Paris. The Polish Pavilion, which had divided the opinion of critics at home, won the Grand Prix. The award of over 170 prizes to the Polish section in different areas and categories – from posters to art schools – gave ample reason to consider the exhibition an (...) unquestionable success. The forms used in the architecture and interior design of the Polish Pavilion inspired various solutions applied in Polish public architecture of the 1920s. On the wave of the “Paris success” designers tried to translate the Polish variety of art deco into a type of national style which some scholars even came to refer to as the “style of regained independence” which manifested itself in architecture, particularly in interior design, bas reliefs, painted decorations textiles and furniture. Its emergence coincided with the introduction of new education methods in art and craft schools. The text discuss the Polish art deco style in context of two basic currents of interwar years: modernity and tradition. The problem of “Polishness” in art relates also to the concepts of interwar culture and visons of its progress or decadence. (shrink)

Este artigo faz um debate conceptual de terrorismo, extremismo, radicalismo e radicalização com o objectivo de produzir distinções que enriqueçam o debate teórico sobre o fenómeno terrorista, pois assume que há armadilhas retóricas que é preciso esclarecer e ultrapassar para melhorar o debate e teorização sobre o terrorismo. Para o efeito, a principal metodologia usada foi uma abordagem qualitativa, com apoio das técnicas bibliográfica e documental, através das quais foi consultada a principal literatura sobre os conceitos, bem como documentos de (...) instituições e organizações nacionais e internacionais que lidam com os fenómenos em análise. A principal conclusão produzida é de que estes quatro conceitos são distintos entre si porquanto o terrorismo é essencialmente uma acção violenta levada a cabo por indivíduos, grupos, ou até mesmo pelos Estados, contra determinados alvos civis com a pretensão de atingir uma audiência maior do que as vítimas imediatas, visando um objectivo político determinado; por sua vez, o extremismo refere-se à uma intolerância violenta ou não violenta aos outros baseada na convicção da assertividade das suas crenças e consequente tentativa de coartar a liberdade de pensar e agir dos demais; enquanto o radicalismo representa um pensamento progressista que consiste na luta por direitos e liberdades de grupos tradicionalmente excluídos e; finalmente, a radicalização é o processo pelo qual um indivíduo passa até a decisão de cometer actos terroristas. Com isso, o extremismo insere-se no processo de radicalização e o terrorismo é uma acção consequente da radicalização. O radicalismo é um conceito mais distante dos demais pela sua conotação positiva na transformação social. (shrink)

A new theory of time; Events and observability; Multimedial units and language: verbal and nonverbal communication; Judgment formation and problems of description; Memory and perception: some new models; Stochastic models of expertise formation, opinion change, and learning.

The aim of this note is to analyze the problems connected with con- straints on descriptions imposed by limitations of knowledge and/or observability, and constraints imposed by the language used.

The dissertation develops a conception of action based on the concept of practical task-responsibility rather than on the concept of intention. It answers two problems. First, it grounds the distinction between an action and a mere happening, thus meeting Wittgenstein's challenge to explain what is the difference between an agent's raising her arm and her arm rising? Second, it grounds the distinction between acting for a reason and acting while merely having a reason, thus meeting Davidson's challenge to give an (...) account of the explanatory force of reasons. ;One source of resistance to an account of action in terms of normative expectations rather than in terms of intentions comes from explanatory individualism. The explanatory individualist argues that it is ultimately the intentional attitudes of the agent rather than normative expectations of other people that are relevant to the way in which we explain one another's actions, and that they ought to figure in the account of the nature of action. I defend explanatory nonindividualism, according to which we sometimes act on our own intentions and desires but sometimes on the normative expectations and desires of others . Explanatory nonindividualism is fortified by a selectional account of the explanatory force of reasons. I demonstrate that Davidson's challenge can be met by identifying reasons with selectional criteria rather than with causes. ;In response to Wittgenstein's challenge, I propose that we understand what it is to be an action not in terms of a performance being intentional under a description, but in terms of it being reasonable to expect a performance of the agent under some description. Only one concept of reasonableness is necessary to make the distinction between actions and mere happenings, and I explicate that concept. In addition to accounting for actions that are intentional under some description, the account also captures cases that are not so straightforwardly captured by that criterion . Moreover, cases of so-called basic wayward causal chains are excluded from qualifying as actions. (shrink)

In the twentieth century, due to the development of mechanical reproduction and press, photomontage became a popular means of communication – popular and diverse in its nature and methods of exploitation. It is one of the cultural phenomena related to the change of rhythm of life and a sense of its increased pace, and an impression of fragmentation of reality. This article questions the role of photomontage in such an experience. The said role is complex: sometimes photomontage allows for expression (...) of that experience, and sometimes it is meant to evoke it, in the spirit of modernity; it is both a tool of agitation and critique. In order to answer this question I shall assume the approach of Walter Benjamin, who diagnoses the crisis of experience and the loss of storytelling skills – and describes the potential of photography. This potential is differently approached by artists and scholars who point out contradictory purposes and results of using photomontage. Referring to various works of art shall make it possible to define the tensions characteristic of photomontage. Due to its plasticity and the ambiguity of a photograph, and the potential for contextualization and construction, photomontage can function in a hard to understand, rapidly changing world and address the fragmentation of experience. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to show how methods rooted in formal logic may be used to analyze socially important processes of persuasion. A formal approach to the theory of persuasion enables us to thoroughly research issues crucial in everyday life such as: how we argue, why we quarrel, where we are efficient in persuasion, when do we win a negotiation, how we influence others’ decisions, and the kinds of argumentative strategies that are apt to yield more accurate beliefs (...) for all parties involved.I concentrate on three aspects of persuasion practice: nature, success and cognitive value of argumentation process. From a logical perspective, I understand argumentation as reasoning which, after initiation through the opponent’s disagreement, is deployed by the proponent in order to persuade the audience to believe his thesis. Furthermore, I attempt to determine the ways in which we succeed in persuading others. Lastly, I try to specify when an argument is cognitively valuable and when it is reliable, in the sense that it helps us to track the truth. In order to analyze these matters, I investigate argumentation on two independent levels. The subjective level of people’s beliefs is the essential foundation of all persuasion -- every time we aim to make the audience believe our opinions and /or change their decisions. The second level is the objective field of truthfulness, where we consider whether a given argumentation will lead us to true or false conclusions. (shrink)

Dans toutes les dimensions de la communication verbale, le virtuel s'efface devant l'actuel, mais le sens "absent" ne cesse d'escorter le sens « present ». Il le sous-tend, l'informe et, quelquefois, pointe le bout de son nez. En s'inscrivant dans la perspective de la sémantique microstructurale, ce livre se propose de revisiter le virtuel linguistique pour saisir ses rapports avec le domaine de l'actuel, en envisageant la virtualité dans l'optique interprétative qui mobilise tout un éventail de mécanismes sémantico-discursifs de la (...) production du sens en contexte. (shrink)

This is a collection of nine papers dealing with the topic of reporting on beliefs and other attitudes, and in particular with the issue of the semantics-pragmatics boundary dispute which is the core topic of research in the field.

Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)