The aim of our study was to analyze the behavioural responses of horses to familiar humans and to find factors that may affect these responses in three tests: approach to, standing beside, and following the familiar person. We investigated the impacts of horse-related factors and human-related factors. Horses with one handler needed less time to approach the human than horses with more handlers. Standing beside the human correlated positively with following. Following was mainly affected by training. According to our results, (...) the number of handlers has an important effect on horses' responses to familiar humans, especially regarding approach and follow behaviour. However, following behaviour is fundamentally determined by training. (shrink)

On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...) return to the interior – a Cartesian interior.The Cartesian interior has come in for quite a drubbing in philosophy for some considerable time. In the mid-to-late 1970s, a style of argument emerged, designed to challenge this conception of mind and establish in its place an externalist conception of language and of mind. One version of the argument was due to Hilary Putnam and emerged in the context of considerations concerning linguistic meaning; another was due to Tyler Burge and emerged first in the context of considerations concerning the individual in relation to his/her social environment. In his earliest paper, on this topic, Burge wrote of ‘the elderly Cartesian tradition’ where ‘the spotlight is on what exists or transpires “in” the individual – his secret cognition, his innate cognitive structures, his private perceptions and introspections, his grasping of ideas, concepts or forms’. Farkas wants to defend this ‘elderly tradition’, but she does add to it some interesting twists. First and foremost, she places to one side ideas of privacy, of incorrigibility and infallibility. She also wishes to place the issue of dualism to one side. What Farkas concentrates on is privileged access and argues that this is …. (shrink)

The implicational fragment of the logic of relevant implication, $R_{\to}$ is one of the oldest relevance logics and in 1959 was shown by Kripke to be decidable. The proof is based on $LR_{\to}$ , a Gentzen-style calculus. In this paper, we add the truth constant $\mathbf{t}$ to $LR_{\to}$ , but more importantly we show how to reshape the sequent calculus as a consecution calculus containing a binary structural connective, in which permutation is replaced by two structural rules that involve $\mathbf{t}$ (...) . This calculus, $LT_\to^{\text{\textcircled{$\mathbf{t}$}}}$ , extends the consecution calculus $LT_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ formalizing the implicational fragment of ticket entailment . We introduce two other new calculi as alternative formulations of $R_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ . For each new calculus, we prove the cut theorem as well as the equivalence to the original Hilbert-style axiomatization of $R_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ . These results serve as a basis for our positive solution to the long open problem of the decidability of $T_{\to}$ , which we present in another paper. (shrink)

The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...) and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh. (shrink)

Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...) an answer, for example in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesis. (shrink)

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...) and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed. (shrink)

The study explores the future of AI-driven media and info-communication as envisioned by experts from all world regions, defining relevant terminology and expectations for 2050. Participants engaged in a 4-week series of surveys, questioning their definitions and projections about AI for the field of media and communication. Their expectations predict universal access to democratically available, automated, personalized and unbiased information determined by trusted narratives, recolonization of information technology and the demystification of the media process. These experts, as technology ambassadors, advocate (...) AI-to-AI solutions to mitigate technology-driven misuse and misinformation. The optimistic scenarios shift responsibility to future generations, relying on AI-driven solutions and finding inspiration in nature. Their present-based forecasts could be construed as being indicative of professional near-sightedness and cognitive dissonance. Visualizing our findings into a Glasses Model of AI Trust, the study contributes to key debates regarding AI policy, developmental trajectories, and academic research in media and info-communication fields. (shrink)

Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...) the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception. (shrink)

Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because (...) physicalism is true, there could be no phenomenal truths, and no qualia. I think he is wrong to accept 2); and even if he was right to accept it, the more plausible response would be not to deny the existence of qualia but to deny physicalism. In either case, denying the existence of qualia is the wrong answer. I present a physicalist realist alterative that refutes premise 2 of the Gap Argument; I also make a general case against the scientism that accompanies Frankish’s metaphysics. (shrink)

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

Two consecution calculi are introduced: one for the implicational fragment of the logic of entailment with truth and another one for the disjunction free logic of nondistributive relevant implication. The proof technique—attributable to Gentzen—that uses a double induction on the degree and on the rank of the cut formula is shown to be insufficient to prove admissible various forms of cut and mix in these calculi. The elimination theorem is proven, however, by augmenting the earlier double inductive proof with additional (...) inductions. We also give a new purely inductive proof of the cut theorem for the original single cut rule in Gentzen’s sequent calculus $ LK $ without any use of mix. (shrink)

In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...) while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism. (shrink)

Not so long ago, people had a very different concept of the mind and human nature. Our European heritage is a vision of the body as our mortal coil which we feel and command with our soul. The soul was thought to be immortal and exempt from the laws of nature so that our actions are not determined by anything outside of the boundaries of the soul. Souls of all sorts, of angels and spirits in addition to humans, permeated the (...) universe. The universe was an ordered cosmos with human beings at the center of it with a very special role to play in it. It was commonly held that only the soul can truly exhibit creativity and intelligence which no mere mechanism could replicate. Dreams and visions were considered important messengers. All this is quite intuitive; and its remnants are probably deeply ingrained in the everyday manner in which we still think about ourselves. -/- There is not much about the premodern conception that has survived these changes, except the view that we are conscious beings, i.e., that there is, in Thomas Nagel’s expression, something it is like to be us. Illusionists deny that there consciousness is real; this strange view is spreading from the halls of academia to popular media. I investigate the causes and consequences of this latest development in our conception of the mind. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the effect of the identity combinators in dual systems. The result is based on an easy technical trick, namely, that the identity combinators collapse all the combinators which are dual with respect to them. After reviewing dual combinators I consider the possible combinatory systems and l-calculi in which the functions and/or the application operation are bidirectional. The last section of the paper shows the devastating effect the identity combinators have for a dual system: they (...) half trivialize simple combinatory bases, although they are not sufficient to cause real triviality for what cancellative combinators are needed. (shrink)

This paper investigates set-theoretical semantics for logics that contain unary connectives, which can be viewed as modalities. Indeed, some of the logics we consider are closely related to linear logic. We use insights from the relational semantics of relevance logics together with a new version of the squeeze lemma in our semantics for logics with disjunction. The ideal-based semantics, which takes co-theories to be situations, dualizes the theory-based semantics for logics with conjunction.

The dissertation offers a study of Kant's aesthetic theory as it is developed in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", the first half of his Critique of Judgment, which is widely acknowledged to be the founding text of modern philosophical aesthetics. I aim to show that this work elaborates an important and deeply interesting study of the nature and conditions of aesthetic judgment which---despite the recent resurgence of commentary and of secondary literature---has not yet been inherited. I give an account focused (...) on understanding Kant's idea that aesthetic judgment makes a claim to "subjective universality" and "exemplary necessity", the "twofold peculiarity" of aesthetic judgment that Kant himself presents as the main thematic guiding the course of the Critique. I argue for an interpretation of Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment which takes seriously his idea that its demand for the agreement of others takes the form of a presumption, in which the judge offers her judgment as exemplary of a "universal voice", apart from any independently or transcendentally assured authorization. (shrink)

Released in 1958, Vertigo is widely regarded as Alfred Hitchcock’s masterpiece and one of the greatest films of all time. This is the first book devoted to exploring the philosophical aspects of Vertigo . Following an introduction by the editor that places the film in context, each chapter reflects upon Hitchcock’s film from a philosophical perspective. Topics discussed include: memory, loss, memorialisation, and creativity mimetic or representational art and art as magic the nature of romantic love gender, sexual objectification, and (...) identity looking, "the gaze", and voyeurism film and psychoanalysis fantasy, illusion, and reality the phenomenology of colour. Including annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, this collection is essential reading for anyone interested in Vertigo , and an ideal resource for students of film and philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objectif d’initier, voire de former, les enseignants à l’exploitation phonologique d’un texte littéraire en classe de Français Langue Étrangère. À travers deux textes de genre littéraire différent, un poème et une nouvelle, nous proposons des moyens pratiques, accompagnés de conseils pédagogiques, qui permettraient aux enseignants d’introduire le texte littéraire dans leur classe de langue. Dans le cadre du présent article, nous nous attachons à travailler la compétence réceptive au moyen du poème de Paul Verlaine et la (...) compétence lectorale au moyen de la nouvelle de Marguerite Yourcenar. (shrink)

This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...) he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I attempt to show that this argument is refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is invalid. (shrink)

Reader-friendly without compromising the precision of exposition, the book includes many new research results not found in the available literature.

Four-valued semantics proved useful in many contexts from relevance logics to reasoning about computers. We extend this approach further. A sequent calculus is defined with logical connectives conjunction and disjunction that do not distribute over each other. We give a sound and complete semantics for this system and formulate the same logic as a tableaux system. Intensional conjunction and its residuals can be added to the sequent calculus straightforwardly. We extend a simplified version of the earlier semantics for this system (...) and prove soundness and completeness. Then, with some modifications to this semantics, we arrive at a mathematically elegant yet powerful semantics that we call generalized Kripke semantics. (shrink)

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...) We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow. (shrink)

During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...) cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically implemented. David Chalmers has recently presented a Master Argument to show that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – not just this or that version of it, but any version of it – fails. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia. I argue that it is his Master Argument that fails. My claim is his argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. I also argue that, although the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is successful in showing that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy either. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s work on the semantics of modal logics is well known, unlike his work on Anderson and Belnap’s system E of Entailment (a modal relevance logic), which included his proof of the decidability of its implicational fragment E_>, and also a counterexample to the conjecture of Belnap that E_> is the intersection of the implicational fragments of the relevance logic R and the modal logic S4. This led to Storrs McCall’s suggesting that the “mingle” axiom might be added to (...) E_>, and that this system might be used instead of S4_>. We give a counterexample to this conjecture. We also disprove the conjecture Anderson and Belnap attribute to McCall, in which “restricted mingle” is added to E_>. We use a modal extension of the lattice M_0 and follow ideas of Meyer. In the 1970s, Dunn showed that RM (R with the mingle axiom) can be modeled using a binary accessibility relation, like the accessibility relation in Kripke’s semantics for normal modal logics and his semantics for intuitionistic logic. Dunn also gave a variant interpretation for EM (E with the mingle axiom). We explore some other variations of these binary relational semantics. (shrink)

On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just (...) for the effect that they have on us. (shrink)

Nonclassical logics have played an increasing role in recent years in disciplines ranging from mathematics and computer science to linguistics and philosophy. _Generalized Galois Logics_ develops a uniform framework of relational semantics to mediate between logical calculi and their semantics through algebra. This volume addresses normal modal logics such as K and S5, and substructural logics, including relevance logics, linear logic, and Lambek calculi. The authors also treat less-familiar and new logical systems with equal deftness.

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...) accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...) about reference. Recently some philosophers – among them David Papineau – who advocate a physicalist approach to both the Hard and the Harder problem have called into question the common sense assumption that phenomenal concepts – subjective concepts that we apply directly to experience – refer determinately (modulo vagueness) to real properties that can be instantiated in minds other than my own. The Hardest Problem is the problem of explaining how, given physicalism, this assumption could be true. In this paper I explore how these three problems appear from the perspective of a physicalist approach to consciousness based on Brian Loar’s account of phenomenal concepts, recently dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. My contention is that this approach can go quite far in handling not just the first two problems but the Hardest Problem as well. (shrink)

Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...) he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states. (shrink)

Urquhart works in several areas of logic where he has proved important results. Our paper outlines his topological lattice representation and attempts to relate it to other lattice representations. We show that there are different ways to generalize Priestley’s representation of distributive lattices—Urquhart’s being one of them, which tries to keep prime filters in the representation. Along the way, we also mention how semi-lattices and lattices figured into Urquhart’s work.

Sequent calculi constitute an interesting and important category of proof systems. They are much less known than axiomatic systems or natural deduction systems are, and they are much less known than they should be. Sequent calculi were designed as a theoretical framework for investigations of logical consequence, and they live up to the expectations completely as an abundant source of meta-logical results. The goal of this book is to provide a fairly comprehensive view of sequent calculi -- including a wide (...) range of variations. The focus is on sequent calculi for various non-classical logics, from intuitionistic logic to relevance logic, through linear and modal logics. A particular version of sequent calculi, the so-called consecution calculi, have seen important new developments in the last decade or so. The invention of new consecution calculi for various relevance logics allowed the last major open problem in the area of relevance logic to be solved positively: pure ticket entailment is decidable. An exposition of this result is included in chapter 9 together with further new decidability results (for less famous systems). A series of other results that were obtained by J. M. Dunn and me, or by me in the last decade or so, are also presented in various places in the book. Some of these results are slightly improved in their current presentation. Obviously, many calculi and several important theorems are not new. They are included here to ensure the completeness of the picture; their original formulations may be found in the referenced publications. This book contains very little about semantics, in general, and about the semantics of non-classical logic in particular. (shrink)

In this chapter, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap that is supposed to open when considering identity statements between physical and mental phenomena. I show that the question asked in the original formulation of the explanatory gap was this: ʻwhy this phenomenal character, rather than any other, is attached to this physiological process?ʼ I argue that this question can be answered, because there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional roles. For example, (...) pains feel inherently unpleasant, and that explains why they cause avoidance behaviour, and the felt location and intensity of pain indicates the location and extent of damage to the body. I discuss some other possible gaps in our understanding the relationship between the mental and the physical, and conclude that the fit between functional role and phenomenal character goes a long way, though probably not the whole way, to closing the explanatory gap. (shrink)

Auf die Frage "Wie kann man ein anderes Weltbild, eine andere Kultur verstehen?" lassen sich in Wittgensteins Spätwerk zwei Tendenzen entdecken: Dem wechselseitigen Unverständnis stellt er die „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise und die „Naturgeschichte des Menschen“ gegenüber. Die Bedeutung dieser beiden Begriffe ist umstritten und weist auf ein konzeptionelles Problem in Wittgensteins Argumentation hin. Anhand der Diskussion prominenter Interptetationen von Baker, Hacker, Haller, Savigny u.a. der einschlägigen Stelle § 206 in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen wird herausgearbeitet, daß Wittgenstein nur die unscharfen Grenzen (...) des menschlichen Lebens gegen die unbelebte Natur oder Tiere feststellt, aber nicht genügend differenziert, um mit dem Konzept der gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise das Verständnis des anderen zu sichern. (shrink)

We briefly overview some of the historical landmarks on the path leading to the reduction of the number of logical connectives in classical logic. Relying on the duality inherent in Boolean algebras, we introduce a new operator ( Nallor ) that is the dual of Schönfinkel’s operator. We outline the proof that this operator by itself is sufficient to define all the connectives and operators of classical first-order logic ( Fol ). Having scrutinized the proof, we pinpoint the theorems of (...) Fol that are needed in the proof. Using the insights gained from the proof, we show that there are four binary operators that each can serve as the only undefined logical constant for Fol . Finally, we show that from every n -ary connective that yields a functionally complete singleton set of connectives two Schönfinkel-type operators are definable, and all the latter are so definable. (shrink)

This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...) is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts introspectively to some phenomenally conscious experience as it occurs, we are said to be acquainted with our own conscious experiences. Accounts of PCs either have to explain the acquaintance relation, or acquaintance with our phenomenal experiences has to be denied. PCs have received much attention in recent philosophy of mind mainly because they figure in arguments for dualism and in physicalist responses to these arguments. The main topic of this article is to explore different accounts of phenomenal concepts and their role in recent debates over the metaphysical status of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...) out what lends an experience ‘a sense of reality’: what features are required for an experience to feel ‘real’, in the relevant sense? I will investigate the claim that phenomenological features are largely responsible for a sense of reality, and will find this claim wanting. My suggestion is that a sense of reality is created and sustained by the larger nexus of the subject's beliefs. (shrink)

The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...) access. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.