It has often been claimed that orthodox thinking about personal identity undermines the moral authority of advance directives in dementia by implying that the signer of the directive is numerically different from the severely demented patient. This is the ‘identity problem'. I introduce the problem, outline some well‐known solutions, and explain why they might be deemed unattractive. I then propose an alternative solution. It promises to be compatible with orthodox thinking about personal identity. I discuss three ways in which it (...) might be challenged and find that none is convincing. Personal identity is no bar to the moral authority of advance directives. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on a kind of medical intervention that is at the same time fascinating and disturbing: identity-changing interventions. My guiding question is how such interventions can be ethically justified within the bounds of contemporary bioethical mainstream that places great weight on the patient9s informed consent. The answer that is standardly given today is that patients should be informed about the identity effects, thus suggesting that changes in identity can be treated like ‘normal’ side effects. In the (...) paper, I argue that this approach is seriously lacking because it misses important complexities going along with decisions involving identity changes and consequently runs into mistakes. As a remedy I propose a new approach, the ‘perspective-sensitive account’, which avoids these mistakes and thus provides the conceptual resources to systematically reflect on and give a valid consent to identity-changing interventions. (shrink)

Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated by results that can be described as involving changes in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In our paper we take issue with this problem on two accounts. First, we elucidate what is (...) meant by “becoming another person” from a conceptual point of view. After critically discussing two broad approaches we concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we discuss several approaches to determine what distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function model” highlighting the importance of specific dependency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure changes in individual identity and argue that many of the instruments now commonly used in selecting and monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this purpose. Future research in this area is advised combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as a basis of sound ethical appraisal. (shrink)

Many philosophers working on personal identity and ethics say that personal identity is constituted by stories: narratives people tell or would tell about their lives. Most of them also say that this is personal identity in the ‘characterization sense’, that it is the notion people in ordinary contexts are interested in, and that it raises the ‘characterization question’. I argue that these claims are inconsistent. Narrativists can avoid the incompatibility in one of two ways: They can concede that their view (...) is not about the constitution but the epistemology of personal identity. Or they can say that it is not about personal identity at all. (shrink)

Ein Leitmotiv der medizinethischen Auseinandersetzung mit der tiefen Hirnstimulation (THS) ist die Beschäftigung mit Fragen personaler Identität. Da es sich bei personaler Identität auch um ein Problem der theoretischen Philosophie handelt, wird in diesem Aufsatz nicht nur die praktische Frage nach der ethischen Legitimation der THS durch informierte Einwilligung gestellt und ein modifiziertes Legitimationskriterium für wesensändernde THS erarbeitet. Vielmehr wird zunächst versucht, das Problem, um das es in der Debatte um THS und personaler Identität geht, besser zu verstehen.

Ein Leitmotiv der medizinethischen Auseinandersetzung mit der tiefen Hirnstimulation (THS) ist die Beschäftigung mit Fragen personaler Identität. Da es sich bei personaler Identität auch um ein Problem der theoretischen Philosophie handelt, wird in diesem Aufsatz nicht nur die praktische Frage nach der ethischen Legitimation der THS durch informierte Einwilligung gestellt und ein modifiziertes Legitimationskriterium für wesensändernde THS erarbeitet. Vielmehr wird zunächst versucht, das Problem, um das es in der Debatte um THS und personaler Identität geht, besser zu verstehen.

Are physicians sometimes morally required to ease caregiver burden? In our paper we defend an affirmative answer to this question. First, we examine the well-established principle that medical care should be centered on the patient. We argue that although this principle seems to give physicians some leeway to lessen caregivers' suffering, it is very restrictive when spelled out precisely. Based on a critical analysis of existing cases for transcending patient-centeredness we then go on to argue that the medical ethos should (...) indeed contain a rule requiring physicians to alleviate caregiver burden under certain circumstances. Finally, we apply our findings to deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Parkinson's disease. We present empirical data from a recent study of DBS indicating that spousal caregivers of Parkinson patients treated with DBS are sometimes deeply troubled by the effects of the therapy and discuss what moral obligations the treating physicians may have in such cases. (shrink)

Viele Menschen halten Patientenverfügungen für ein geeignetes Mittel, um selbstbestimmt zu entscheiden, wie mit ihnen im Fall schwerer Demenz umgegangen werden soll. Die meisten Bioethiker stimmen ihnen zu: Demenzverfügungen seien Ausdruck der „verlängerten Autonomie“ der Patientin. Doch ob sie recht haben, ist unklar. Dem viel beachteten Identitätseinwand zufolge sind die Ausstellerin der Verfügung und ihre schwer demente Nachfolgerin numerisch verschieden: Sie sind zwei und nicht eins. Wenn das stimmt, kann die Ausstellerin nicht verfügen, wie mit ihr im Falle schwerer Demenz (...) umgegangen werden soll. Die Demenzverfügung ist ungültig. In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich eine neue Replik auf diesen Einwand vorstellen. Ihr Ansatzpunkt ist der menschliche Organismus, den wir sehen, wenn wir in den Spiegel blicken. Er kann schwer dement werden, und auch er hat die Patientenverfügung unterschrieben. Warum sollte sie dann ungültig sein? Auf den ersten Blick hat diese Replik eine Reihe von Vorzügen. Insbesondere akzeptiert sie die populären Annahmen, auf denen der Identitätseinwand basiert. Bei näherem Hinsehen zeigen sich jedoch Probleme, die so gravierend sind, dass wir von ihr Abstand nehmen sollten. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMany philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to do with narratives: the stories we tell about ourselves. While different narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose narrativist accounts of personal identity over time. The paper argues that such accounts have troubling consequences about the beginning and end of our lives, lead to inconsistencies, and involve backwards causation. The problems can be solved, but only by modifying the accounts in ways that deprive them of their appeal.

It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.

ObjectiveIn this study we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate whether motor imagery of handwriting and circle drawing activates a similar handwriting network as writing and drawing itself.MethodsEighteen healthy right-handed participants wrote the German word “Wellen” and drew continuously circles in a sitting and lying position to capture kinematic handwriting parameters such as velocity, pressure and regularity of hand movements. Afterward, they performed the same tasks during fMRI in a MI and an executed condition.ResultsThe kinematic analysis revealed a general (...) correlation of handwriting parameters during sitting and lying except of pen pressure during drawing. Writing compared to imagined writing was accompanied by an increased activity of the ipsilateral cerebellum and the contralateral sensorimotor cortex. Executed compared to imagined drawing revealed elevated activity of a fronto–parieto-temporal network. By contrasting writing and drawing directly, executed writing induced an enhanced activation of the left somatosensory and premotor area. The comparison of the MI of these tasks revealed a higher involvement of occipital activation during imagined writing.ConclusionThe kinematic results pointed to a high comparability of writing in a vertical and horizontal position. Overall, we observed highly overlapping cortical activity except of a higher involvement of motor control areas during motor execution. The sparse difference between writing and drawing can be explained by highly automatized writing in healthy individuals. (shrink)

We reconstruct recent work on macrosocial stress as if it were an instance of a research strategy that tests point-alternative hypotheses within a full-fledged research program. Because this strategy is free of various deficits that beset dominant strategies, our article demonstrates one way in which the confidence crisis may be overcome.

Education is astonishingly simple. We have all been through it, whether as children or later in life—indeed, many of us are still going through it in some form or other; we all know what works; and we are all committed to realising its individual and social potential. Such a view of the matter might dispense with the need for philosophy of education altogether as the problems of education are seen as little more than puzzles to be solved. We know (or (...) think that we know) what we want to achieve, the challenge is how to do so most efficiently. If only the virtues of education were that perspicuous, that simple. If only the vices were so easily identified and expunged. It turns out that education is astonishingly complex. The following chapters aspire to re-introduce a certain complexity that abstains from an all-too-easy understanding. They seek not to offer solutions, but complications, disruptions and dissensions. The authors assume positions against the usual associations and evaluations regarding certain words and phrases—a revaluation that turns the virtues to vices and the vices to virtues. (shrink)

We are all immersed in a sea of social norms, but they are sometimes tricky to observe with any clarity. They are often invisible to us and emerge only when they are not observed. Social norms are important to understand because they are both limiting of our freedom, such as gendered and racialized norms, and at the same time the very conditions of our agency. Social Goodness presents an original, externalist answer to the question of the source or origin of (...) social role normativity. Rather than grounding social normativity in the attitudes of persons, the book argues for an externalism that roots social role normativity in the social world itself: in its positions, institutions, and larger architecture. The core insight of externalism is that the function or structural feature of an enterprise or activity can bring with it normative demands quite independently of the attitudes of those who engage with it. According to the artisanal model, just as a carpenter, ceramicist, or chef is responsive to and evaluable under a set of artisanal norms or techniques, so too is a mother and or an academic or a President. The source of normativity is this technique or expertise, independent of the preferences, endorsements, or recognitive attitudes of individuals. The artisanal model for social role normativity has resources to explain both the "stickiness" or persistence of social norms and our ability to criticize existing norms and to engage in normative self-creation--to create new normative selves. The artisanal model also has resources to capture and express the social situatedness, locality, and materiality of social roles. The relational ontology of social roles, implicit in the artisanal model, provides a useful frame to consider both hierarchical and oppressive social relations. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In den letzten 100 Jahren hat der Buddhismus zusammen mit anderen asiatischen und indischen Traditionen in steigendem Masse in Europa und Amerika an Prasenz gewonnen. Begriffe wie Nirvana, Karma oder Vorstellungen uber Wiedergeburt haben langst Eingang gefunden in den Formenbestand westlicher Welt- und Daseinserschliessung, werden allerdings oft nicht angemessen verstanden oder bleiben reduziert auf Klischees, was eine fruchtbare Auseinandersetzung und damit die Moglichkeit einer wirklichen Bereicherung des eigenen Denkens erschwert. Der Schwerpunkt der Darstellung liegt daher auf dem Verstehen des Buddhismus (...) und - in entsprechend systematischer Perspektive - auf den damit verbundenen hermeneutischen Grundlagen sowie auf einer Explikation relevanter Faktoren interkulturellen Verstehens. (shrink)

In their most informative text, Zuk et al. (2023) describe the perspectives researchers take on DBS and aDBS when discussing changes in patients’ personality, mood, or behavior. To this end, Zuk et...

Wissenschaftsfreiheit wird vorherrschend als Freiheit der Wissenschaft von politischer Einmischung verstanden. Der Artikel kritisiert dieses negative Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit anhand einer Analyse seines prominentesten Vertreters, dem Netzwerk Wissenschaftsfreiheit, das damit eine Politisierung einseitig den Vertreter*innen gesellschaftskritischer Ansätze zuschreibt, während es die eigene Position als ‚rein wissenschaftlich‘ und politisch neutral dargestellt. Demgegenüber schlägt der Artikel ein kritisches Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit vor, das seine Politizität reflektiert. Ausgehend von der Analyse, dass starre Macht- und Privilegienstrukturen das zentrale Hindernis für die gemeinsame Arbeit an (...) wissenschaftlicher Objektivität sind, geht es beim kritischen Begriff der Wissenschaftsfreiheit um die Reflexion und Transformation des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik. Dabei steht die Diversifizierung von Zugangschancen und Standpunkten innerhalb der Wissenschaft im Mittelpunkt – also die Neuverteilung von Macht und Privilegien. Der Artikel entwickelt dieses Verständnis aus einer Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik in zwei philosophischen Begründungsmöglichkeiten der Wissenschaftsfreiheit und aus einer Rekonstruktion der kritischen politischen Theorie, insbesondere der foucaultschen Machttheorie und der feministischen Standpunkttheorie. Er zeigt auf dieser Grundlage, dass drei verschiedene Arten der Diversifizierung der Wissenschaft – intern, extern-institutionell und extern-aktivistisch –, die vom vor dem Hintergrund des negativen Begriffs als Einschränkung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit verstanden werden, tatsächlich zu ihrer Verbesserung beitragen. (shrink)

Foucault’s theory of power and subjectification challenges common concepts of freedom in social philosophy and expands them through the concept of ‘freedom as critique’: Freedom can be defined as the capability to critically reflect upon one’s own subjectification, and the conditions of possibility for this critical capacity lie in political and social institutions. The article develops this concept through a critical discussion of the standard response by Foucault interpreters to the standard objection that Foucault’s thinking obscures freedom. The standard response (...) interprets Foucault’s later works, especially The Subject and Power, as a solution to the problem of freedom. It is mistaken, because it conflates different concepts of freedom that are present in Foucault’s work. By differentiating these concepts, this article proposes a new institutionalist approach to solve the problem of freedom that breaks with the partly anarchist underpinnings of Foucault scholarship: As freedom as critique is not given, but itself a result of subjectification, it entails a demand for ‘modal robustness’ and must therefore be institutionalized. This approach helps to draw out the consequences of Foucault’s thinking on freedom for postfoundationalist democratic theory and the general social-philosophical discussion about freedom. (shrink)

Karsten M. Thiel interpretiert die Genealogie der Moral neu. Er rückt Nietzsches Kritik an der Geschichtsschreibung ins Zentrum der Betrachtung und nimmt so seiner Moralkritik alles Schrille, das ihr gewöhnlich anhaftet. Für Nietzsche muss die Geschichtsschreibung über einen belastbaren Begriff von Vergangenheit verfügen. Doch wie konnte es zu einer Geschichtsschreibung ohne einen solchen Begriff überhaupt kommen? Nietzsches Antwort ist verblüffend. Für ihn war Geschichtsschreibung bisher fast immer teleologisch, ausgerichtet auf ein Ideal statt auf die Vergangenheit. Sein Gegenmodell ist die (...) Genealogie: Sinn vergeht, indem er von späterem Sinn "überschrieben" wird. In der Genealogie der Moral ist ein solches Überschreiben mehrfach zu beobachten. die Sklavenmoral erobert den Sinn der Herrenmoral, der archaische Vertrag zwischen Schuldner und Gläubiger wird immer wieder neu ausgelegt, wird zu Gerechtigkeit, schlechtem Gewissen und Schuld. (shrink)

In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy (...) thesis.Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings about empathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance.Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists--who defend various forms of the empathy thesis--and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactive empathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections to empathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates. Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, although empathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations. (shrink)

This article proposes an innovative methodology for enhancing the technical validation, legal alignment and interdisciplinarity of attempts to encode legislation. In the context of an experiment that examines how different legally trained participants convert select provisions of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) into machine-executable code, we find that a combination of manual and automated methods for coding validation, which focus on formal adherence to programming languages and conventions, can significantly increase the similarity of encoded rules between coders. Participants nonetheless (...) encountered various interpretive difficulties, including syntactic ambiguity, and intra- and intertextuality, which necessitated legal evaluation, as distinct from and in addition to coding validation. Many of these difficulties can be resolved through what we call a process of ‘legal alignment’ that aims to enhance the congruence between encoded provisions and the true meaning of a statute as determined by the courts. However, some difficulties cannot be overcome in advance, such as factual indeterminacy. Given the inherently interdisciplinary nature of encoding legislation, we argue that it is desirable for ‘rules as code’ (‘RaC’) initiatives to have, at a minimum, legal subject matter, statutory interpretation and technical programming expertise. Overall, we contend that technical validation, legal alignment and interdisciplinary teamwork are integral to the success of attempts to encode legislation. While legal alignment processes will vary depending on jurisdictionally-specific principles and practices of statutory interpretation, the technical and interdisciplinary components of our methodology are transferable across regulatory contexts, bodies of law and Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. (shrink)

Translated by Henrik Rosenmeier, _A History of Ancient Philosophy_ charts the origins and development of ancient philosophical thought. For easy reference, the book is divided chronologically into six main parts. The sections are further divided into philosophers and philosophical movements: *Pre-Socratic Philosophy, including mythology, the Pythagoreans and Parmenides *The Great Century of Athens, including the Sophists and Socrates *Plato, including The Republic, The Symposium and The Timaeus *Aristotle, including The Physics, The Metaphysics and The Poetics *Hellenistic Philosophy, including the Sceptics, (...) the Stoics, the Epicureans and Cicero *Late Antiquity, including Neoplatonism, Origen and St Augustine. This comprehensive and meticulously documented book is structured to make ancient philosophical thought and ancient thinkers accessible. It contains: *full references to primary sources *detailed interpretations of key philosophical passages, including surveys of previous philosophical readings *an overview of the development of ancient philosophical thought *discussions of the relationships between philosophers and their ideas *analyses of key philosophical concepts and ideologies including ontology, epistemology, logic, semantics, moral and political philosophy, theology and aesthetics *explanations of Greek philosophical terminology. (shrink)

In seiner theoriegeschichtlichen Untersuchung rekonstruiert Karsten Fischer Entwicklungslinien zivilisationstheoretischer Kulturkritik von Nietzsche, Freud und Max Weber zu Adorno. Dies dient ihm zur Klärung der systematischen Frage nach einem möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen menschlicher Naturbeherrschung und sozialer Mutmaßung, dass ein ursprünglicher, zivilisationspsychologischer Zusammenhang zwischen der ideologischen Selbstermächtigung des Menschen zu gewaltsamer Unterwerfung der Natur und seiner Gewaltbereitschaft gegenüber seinen Artgenossen besteht, lässt sich weniger auf hegelianisch-marxistische Motive zurückführen als vielmehr auf Nietzsche, bei dem Horkheimers und Adornos These von der dialektisch in (...) Barbarei zurückschlagenden Aufklärung bereits angelegt ist. Von Nietzsche führt eine direkte Verbindung zu Sigmund Freud, dessen These, dass die zivilisatorische Tabuisierung zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt aus deren ursprünglicher Ausübung resultiert, von Adorno variiert wird. Statt der 'Tabuisierung' zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt problematisiert er die 'Legitimierung" gewaltsamer menschlicher Naturbeherrschung, was ein Interesse an Webers Rationalisierungstheorem begründet, das untergründige Verbindungen mit Freuds Zivilisationspsychologie aufweist. Auf der Basis dieser theoriegeschichtlichen Verortung, mit der eine grundlegend neue Lesart Adornos vorgeschlagen wir, lässt sich sein Theorem schließlich als Erklärungsangebot für die auch ins Abendland zurückgekehrten barbarischen Gewaltexzesse wie auch für das Problem fortschreitender Naturzerstörung diskutieren. (shrink)

Can architecture help us find our place and way in today's complex world? Can it return individuals to a whole, to a world, to a community? Developing Giedion's claim that contemporary architecture's main task is to interpret a way of life valid for our time, philosopher Karsten Harries answers that architecture should serve a common ethos. But if architecture is to meet that task, it first has to free itself from the dominant formalist approach, and get beyond the notion (...) that its purpose is to produce endless variations of the decorated shed. In a series of cogent and balanced arguments, Harries questions the premises on which architects and theorists have long relied—premises which have contributed to architecture's current identity crisis and marginalization. He first criticizes the aesthetic approach, focusing on the problems of decoration and ornament. He then turns to the language of architecture. If the main task of architecture is indeed interpretation, in just what sense can it be said to speak, and what should it be speaking about? Expanding upon suggestions made by Martin Heidegger, Harries also considers the relationship of building to the idea and meaning of dwelling. Architecture, Harries observes, has a responsibility to community; but its ethical function is inevitably also political. He concludes by examining these seemingly paradoxical functions. (shrink)

In deze beschouwing ordent Karsten Harries zijn gedachten over het fenomeen ‘kitsch’. Hij gaat daarbij uit van de vraag of kitsch eigenlijk wel zo afkeurenswaardig is. Of hoort ze bij de menselijke natuur en haar hang naar romantiek en nostalgie? We kwalificeren iets als kitsch als we denken dat het voortkomt uit onoprechtheid en getuigt van slechte smaak. Maar is de nostalgie, het dromerige of stichtelijke van kitsch niet beter dan postmoderne ironie of moedeloosheid? Daar staat tegenover dat kitsch (...) onder het mom van authenticiteit de werkelijkheid afbeeldt, maar deze feitelijk met zijn leugens aan het zicht onttrekt. Iets dergelijks geldt ook voor kitsch en religie: niet langer tracht het kunstwerk een werkelijkheid uit te beelden die ons voorstellingsvermogen te boven gaat, maar het wordt in de plaats van die werkelijkheid gesteld. In de politiek kan eenzelfde esthetisering de werkelijkheid een schijn van betekenis geven die mensen blind maakt voor de menselijkheid van hun medemensen. Niet kitsch, maar alleen het ‘aura’ van kunst kan en moet ons ontvankelijk maken voor deze werkelijkheid, die uitstijgt boven wat de rede kan bevatten. (shrink)

Our review of the literature shows that only a minority of youngsters shifts to a more extreme political position because of their experience with unemployment. Unemployment deepens the political apathy of the majority of the youngsters. Unemployment isolates youngsters, so they cannot develop any involvement in polities. The"learned-helplessness" experience of unemployment also contributes to their political apathy.In 1985, 536 employed and 220 unemployed were surveyed on their political, socio-economical and religious attitudes, and their voting behaviour. Because the majority of the (...) respondents were militants of the Christian Labour Movement, we expected the unemployed to shift to the left, rather than to become politically apathetic. The results confirm this hypothesis : the unemployed described themselves as "center left", were more radical on socio-economical issues and favored a more leftist vote that the employed. Surprisingly, the unemployed were also more sceptical about religion and more permissive in sexual ethics. (shrink)

Even when we confine ourselves to poetry, we have to agree with Ortega y Gasset's observation that "the instrument of metaphoric expression can be used for many diverse purposes." It can be used to embellish or ennoble things or persons—Campion's poem offers a good example. Such embellishment need not involve semantic innovation. Metaphors can also function as weapons turned against reality. There are metaphors that negate the referential function of language so successfully that talk about truth or, for that matter, (...) about lattices or lenses seems inappropriate. Yet as poetry pushes towards this extreme, it may acquire a revelatory power all its own: from the ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic congruence but a silence that is heard as the language of transcendence. This is not to deny that metaphors can effect semantic change or help to establish a new world. As David Tracy's contribution to this symposium shows, Scripture furnished the most obvious example. Heidegger's claim that poetry establishes the world can indeed be shown to rest on this paradigm. It is a claim that tends to ascribe something of the prophetic power of Scripture to all great poetry. But, although we may long to rediscover the prophet in the poet, to what extent does the scriptural paradigm help to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially, the poetry of this godless age? Most modern poetry has an aesthetic character that is incompatible with a religious world view. Theories of poetic metaphor cannot afford to neglect the history of poetry, just as general theories of metaphor cannot afford to neglect the many uses of metaphor. (shrink)