Anyone who ponders on existence, touches upon the whole of life. But how to ponder on that which has befallen us even before we have uttered a first word? And how do we get a grip on that which must elude us in spite of all our protest or regret? The trilogy What Obligates Us raises the question about the ethical foundation of the human condition. This first part discusses the exceptional nature of human beings. In their broken relationship to (...) themselves and their surroundings, humans learn of an indebtedness. From this simple truth they cannot hide without alienating themselves from their own being. (shrink)

Studies comparing movement-related cortical potentials, post-excitatory inhibition after transcranial magnetic brain stimulation, and PET findings in normal controls and patients with cerebellar degeneration demonstrate plasticity of cerebro-cerebellar interactions and hereby support Thach's theory that the cerebellum has the ability to play a role in building behavioral context-response linkages and to build up appropriate responses from simpler constitutive elements, [THACH].

The word “Umwelt” is not translated as yet and can perhaps not be translated. In its orginal and well known sense, inaugurated byUexküll, it means of the relations of an organism to its surroundings only those going over the receptive organs and the effective organs, while vegetative relations to the medium,e.g. respiration are excluded. The “Umwelt”-conception of ecology has always been a wider one, but by feeling only, without definition. H.Weber has tried to develop a “general biological Umwelt-conception”, including a (...) 11 relations. In spite of this claim he states, the “Umwelt” of a species be only those external conditions which are indispensable for its life. Here is demonstrated that this conception is quite insufficient, especially because it does not contain so fundamentally important relations as the enemies of an organism and the reactions of the organism upon its surroundings. Furthermore, that conception of “Umwelt” does not contain external conditions determinating the phenotype but not indispensable for the life of the species. A “general biological conception of Umwelt”, asWeber claims to have created, is impossible; the conception is divided in steps corresponding to its application in different branches of science. In physiologye.g. only the direct relations of an organism come in question, in epidemiology the vital relations only. The ecological conception is the most comprehensive, containing all those parts of the surroundings to which an organism has direct or definite indirect relations, and is the complex of them. (shrink)

There is no probative evidence whatever for limiting Augustus’ emphasis on auctoritas at the end of the Res Gestae to his inconsequential function as princeps senatus. Rooted in his res gestae, auctoritas comprises a wider spectrum of performative achievements and makes the case for his future deification.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pierre Jurieu's Contribution to Bayle's Dktionnaire KARL C. SANDBERG PIERRE BAYLE'S VIEWSon faith and reason1as they appear throughout his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) may be reduced to two basic points. First, the doctrines of Christian theology are vulnerable to a great number of rational objections which would seem to destroy them. Second, reason itself is not a reliable guide in areas of speculative knowledge and should be (...) made to bow to the authority of revelation. This position in its essence is neither irreligious nor antireligious. On the contrary, it is closely related to the general stream of seventeenth-century fideism,~ and is only the logical extension of views which Bayle had expressed as a Protestant controversialist in his early writings2 Moreover, recent studies of Bayle in his milieu have presented compelling evidence that Bayle himself lived, wrote, and died as some kind of believing member of the Reformed Church. 4 It is not less certain, however, that Bayle's Dictionnaire was one of the most powerful antireligious influences of the Enlightenment, s for the eighteenth-century rationalists found in it such a tone of polemics coupled with such an abundant display of the rational insufficiencies of Christianity, that they could not take Bayle's ostensible fideism seriously. This paradox leads one to wonder why Bayle as a believer should so insist upon the disparity he found between faith and reason if he did not intend to lead an attack upon religion in general. What would account for the presence of the penetrating rational critique of Christian doctrines except a desire to discredit them? A partial answer might be suggested by Bayle's method of exposition and disputa1By faith is meant the belief in the speculative doctrines of Calvinist Protestantism, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Providence, and in the authority of revelation. By reason is meant essentially the Cartesian method, whose criterium of truth is incontrovertible evidence. See Richard Popkin, "Pierre Bayle's Place in 17th-century Scepticism," in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, ed. Paul Dibon (Amsterdam: 1959). 8During his participation in the Protestant-Catholic controversies of 1682-1687, Bayle became keenly aware that no Christian dogma was susceptible of rational proof. See his Commentaire Philosophique (1686)in his Oeuvres diverses (The Hague: 1737), II, 438. He had, however, previouslybeen convinced of the frailty of reason as a guide in speculative areas (but not in practical matters of morality). See his NouveUes de la Republique des Lettres, September, 1684, in Oeuvres diverses, I, 132-133. These works will hereafter be abbreviated CP, OD, and NRL, respectively. Other abbreviations to be used are DHC, Dictionnaire historique el critique; LFam, Lettres de M. Bayle ~ sa famille; SCP, Supplement du Commentaire philosophique (1687); PDC, Pens~es diverses sur la eomOte (1682); CC, La Cabale ehimdrique (1691). All of these works except the Dictionnaire are found in the Oeuvres diverses. The fourth edition of the Dictionnaire (1730) is the one cited here. 4See Paul Dibon, ed., Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam (Amsterdam: 1959), and Elizabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, Vol. I, "Du Pays de Foix i~la cit~ d'Erasme" (La Haye: 1963). 6Paul Hazard, La Pens~e europ$enne au XVIII~me si~cle de Montesquieu (~ Lessing (Paris [1946], I, 44. [59] 60 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tion, for in examining any question he felt intellectually obligated to set forth the strong and weak points of both sides. One can never boast of having proved a point, he said, without having stated and answered the strongest objections of one's opponent. ~ What subsequent readers found heterodox was possibly only Bayle's statement of his opponent's position. This answer is insufficient, however, because as Bayle had previously become aware of irreconcilable differences between faith and reason in the course of his early thought and writings, he had been extremely reluctant to voice the implications of his disquieting discoveries (1682-1687).7 Ten years later in the Dictionnaire, on the other hand, he seemed to go out of his way to state them with all possible clarity and vigor. It was this change in emphasis in the expression of his thought which was responsible for the great antireligious... (shrink)

Kant's critical philosophy marks the end of a two-thousand year tradition of metaphysics. Against this older tradition, Kant proposes a new metaphysics of knowledge and human freedom with the autonomy of the subject as its principle. Led by the principle of subjectivity, it attempts to obtain a unified understanding of the whole world organized into a system of reason. In this way, the idea of classical metaphysics receives a new controversial interpretation still discussed today. In twelve contributions, the fifth volume (...) of the Yearbook pursues the different forms of grounding metaphysics after Kant. (shrink)

In reconstructing and commenting upon the Kosovo conflict, the cognitive interest of practical philosophy does not evade a political judgment but is primarily led by the interest in answering the question of what normative yardsticks are available (to politicians and to the public) for coping with a situation where the international order of law fails to provide a legal solution to the problem of preserving peace and, at the same time, protecting human rights that are severely violated by a sovereign (...) state. The paper proposes an answer from the point of view of an ethics of history-related responsibility, which takes into account three normative levels based on ethical, legal and political considerations. In this light the action of NATO must be judged. (shrink)

Herbert A. Simon's reply (Inquiry, Vol. 25, No. 3) to my criticism of his 1954 paper is not to the point. He fails to respond to some of my arguments and misconceives others. One of his misconceptions is that any mathematical deduction from empirical premises which are formulated mathematically will necessarily lead to empirically valid conclusions. This claim is particularly unwarrantable in Simon's case since his mathematical premise, the continuity of the reaction function, is empirically meaningless.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spiritual AuthorityA Christian PerspectiveKarl BaierOne could define spiritual authority as the power to support the opening of the entire universe —and especially of the life of human beings—toward union with the redeeming ultimate reality. Christian tradition knows several holders of this power: God, Jesus Christ, the angels, the saints and priests, spiritual guides, and last but not least each and every Christian and person of goodwill. They all are (...) spiritual authorities and together create a field of liberating power with many interdependent centers. One can conceive of spiritual authority in Christianity as a complex interplay between these various forces. The manifestation of spiritual power through them does not take place for its own sake, or to celebrate the holder of spiritual authority, but to empower other centers. Thus, spiritual power is not private property. It is only real insofar as it is passed on to others. In the field of human spiritual authority, tensions and struggles arise if the flow of authority is blocked by a particular center attempting to monopolize spiritual power for the establishment of an illusionary self-identity.Rather than going into an analysis of the entire field, I would like to take a closer look at one of its facets: “spiritual guides,” those who are acknowledged specialists in helping others to a life in the presence of God. Of course, other centers of spiritual authority will sooner or later also come into the picture, because in the field of spiritual power one authority cannot be understood without the others. Fields of other forms of power and their centers of authority (scriptural authority, political authority, etc.) also influence and partially permeate the field of spiritual authority, but that is a subject for another enquiry.Spiritual Guidance in the History of ChristianityA central socioreligious form of spiritual authority manifests itself within relationships of spiritual guidance, or (to use the common Christian phrase) within spiritual direction. The remaining part of this paper deals with concepts of spiritual direction and ways of understanding the authority of the director in his or her relationship to [End Page 107] the directee within Christian spiritual life. Before looking into the current situation, I will highlight some milestones in the history of Christian spiritual guidance.From late antiquity onward, spiritual authority was accepted within Christian communities as a specific form of authority, quite different from other forms and especially different from the authority of the clergy to lead the Church.The earliest context in which this difference appeared coincides with the beginning of spiritual direction. Spiritual direction in Christianity originated as a monastic concept.1 “Historically it was from the movement of desert monasticism that we received the idea of spiritual direction within the framework of Christian practice.”2 As abba (“father”) and amma (“mother”) ascetics, holy men or women, like the hermits of the Egyptian desert who lived on the periphery of the socioreligious zone controlled by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, functioned as independent spiritual authorities for their fellow monks and nuns as well as for people from further afield who visited the desert to ask for spiritual advice. As one can imagine, the relationship between the two forms of authority was complex, and one can observe tensions and attempts at reconciliation between the authority of the charismatic ascetics and the authority of the bishops, as well as between ascetical ideals taken from monasticism and the pastoral care for lay Christians from the fourth to the sixth century.3The Decretum Gelasianum, an official document dating back to the beginning of the sixth century, assessed that the vitae patrum—the books containing narratives of the lives and the spiritual teachings of the desert fathers—were to be accepted by the Church as valid teaching with all honor (cum omni honore suscipimus). The use of the term “father” in this text indirectly confirms that no ordination was necessary to receive this honorary title and the ministry connected to it. Most of the fathers acknowledged by the Decretum Gelasianum have never been ordained priests.When the desert tradition was superseded by organized monasticism, the charismatic authority of the abba or amma became institutionalized in the form of monastery rules, which functioned... (shrink)

Die Transformation der römischen Welt ist ein hoch aktuelles und viel diskutiertes Thema der Geschichtswissenschaft. Die Bedeutung von Verwandtschaft für diesen epochalen Prozess wurde bislang kaum untersucht. Der Sammelband schließt diese Lücke, indem er die Rolle der Verwandtschaft für die Umwandlung der sozialen Ordnung in den Blick nimmt. Er erweitert damit maßgeblich die Perspektive auf den Epochenumbruch von der Spätantike zum Mittelalter.

This is the first book fully dedicated to Indian philosophical doxography. It examines the function such dialectical texts were intended to serve in the intellectual and religious life of their public. It looks at Indian doxography both as a witness of inter and intra sectarian dialogues, and as a religious phenomenon. It argues that doxographies represent dialectical exercises, indicative of a peculiar religious attitude to plurality, and locate these 'exercises' within a known form of 'yoga' dedicated to the cultivation of (...) 'knowledge' or 'gnosis' (jñāna). Concretely, the book presents a critical examination of three Sanskrit doxographies: the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of the Buddhist Bhāviveka, the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya of the Jain Haribhadra, and the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha attributed to the Advaitin Śaṅkara, focusing on each of their respective presentation of the Mīmāṃsā view. It is the first time that the genre of doxography is considered beyond its literary format to ponder its performative dimension, as a spiritual exercise. Theoretically broad, the book reaches out to academics in Religious Studies, Indian Philosophy, Indology, and Classical Studies. (shrink)