Bd. 1. Acht Bücher Physik.--Bd. 2. Vier Bücher über das Himmelgebäude und zwei Bücher über Entstehen und Vergehen.--Bd. 3. Fünf Bücher von der Zeugung und Entwickelung der Tiere.--Bd. 4. Über die Dichtkunst. 2. Aufl.--Bd. 5. Vier Bücher über die Teile der Tiere.--Bd. 6. Politik Teil 1, Text und Übersetzung.--Bd. 7. Politik, Teil 2, Inhaltsübersicht und Anmerkungen.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:New Light from Arabic Sources on Galen and the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism NICHOLAS RESCHER The Problem of the Origin of the Fourth Figure FLYING IN THE FACE of the long-standing tradition--going back in Europe to Renaissance times--which credits Galen of Pergamon with the origination of the fourth syllogistic figure, recent authorities have almost to a man evinced doubt about Galen's claim to this innovation. Heinrieh Scholz speaks (...) of "the Galenian syllogistic figure which has been attributed to him, probably wrongly." i j. W. Stakelum concludes his careful discussion of the matter with the categorical assertion that "Galen did not teach the fourth figure." ~ I. M. Bochenski--following Lukasiewicz (see below)--says that the fourth figure "was only ascribed to Galen by a misunderstanding." : William Kneale (also following Lukasiewicz) writes that "it is easy to see how misunderstanding.., by some Arabian philosopher... could have given rise to the tradition that Galen added a fourth figure to Aristotle's syllogistic theory." 4 The currently received account of the matter is that of Jan Lukasiewicz who, in his book on Aristotle's Syllogistic (1951; 2d ed., 1957), presents the known reports about Galen and the fourth figure as follows (I list them in the order in which they came to light) : 1) Several passages in Averroes' (d. 1198) Middle Commentary on Prior Analytics credit Galen with introducing a fourth figure (ad Anal. Pr. I, 5; I, 8; I, 23). These passages, known in Europe through a Renaissance Latin translation of a Hebrew version, provided the basis upon which Zabarella in his work, De Quarta Syllogismorum Figura (in his Opera [Leiden: 1587], pp. 41-53), popularized the "Galenian figure" in European logic. 2) In 1844 Minoides Mynas published in the Preface to his edition of Galen's EisagSg~ dialektik~ an anonymous Greek fragment (late, perhaps 6th century) which states that certain "later scholars" transformed the indirect moods of the first figure added by Theophrastus and Eudeffms into a new fourth figure, citing Galen as the originator of this doctrine.~ 1Abriss der Geschichte der Logik (Miinster: 1931), trans, into English by K. F. Leidecker, ConciseHistory of Logic (NewYork: 1961);p. 38ofthe Englishversion. "Why 'Galenian' Figure?" The New Scholasticism, XVI (1942),289-296. s Formale Logik (Miinchen-Freiburg:1956; 2nd. ed., 1962), trans, into English by Ivo Thomas, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame: 1961);p. 142of the Englishversion. Williamand Martha Kneale, The Developmentof Logic (Oxford: 1962),p. 184. Alsoprinted in Karl Kalbfieisch, ~ber Galen s Einleitung in die Logik, 2~. Supplementband der Jahrbi~cherfi~r klassische Philologie (Leipzig:1897), p. 707. This datum casts some 28 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3) A Greek fragment was found around 1858 by Karl Prantl in a logical work of the Byzantine scholar Ioannes Italus (llth century) which says that Galen taught the existence of a fourth figure, adding sarcastically that he (Galen) thought thus to appear cleverer than the older logical commentators (presumably Theophrastus and Eudemus are intended), but fell far short.6 4) In 1899 Maximilian Wallies published7 an anonymous Greek scholium (of perhaps the 6th or the 7th century) on Ammonins' commentary on Prior Analytics which states that Galen "says in his Apodictic that there are four figures, because he looks at the compound syllogisms consisting of four terms (i.e., with three premisses )" rather than the simple (three-term, two-premiss) syllogisms of Aristotle. (The scholiast goes on to explain at some length how such compound syllogisms can be sorted into four groups.) It is readily seen that, given these data, two possibilities stand before us: a) Galen did actually invent the traditional fourth figure. Reports (1)-(3) are correct, and the anonymous scholiast of (4) was put on the wrong track by the fact that Galen also said that compound syllogisms of four terms can be classed into four groups. b) Galen did not invent the traditional fourth figure. Only after his time when once the indirect moods of the first figure had--somehow--become systematized into a separate "figure," was this credited to Galen by a mistake along the lines described by the anonymous scholiast. Thus (4) alone is right, and (1)-(3) are mistaken. Which of... (shrink)

This book explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later critical works provide a plausible defense of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures (...) and several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work. The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of the Amerik's 'moderate' interpretation of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In this volume, Karl Ameriks explores 'Kantian subjects' in three senses. In Part I, he first clarifies the most distinctive features-such as freedom and autonomy-of Kant's notion of what it is for us to be a subject. Other chapters then consider related 'subjects' that are basic topics in other parts of Kant's philosophy, such as his notions of necessity and history. Part II examines the ways in which many of us, as 'late modern,' have been highly influenced by Kant's (...) philosophy and its indirect effect on our self-conception through successive generations of post-Kantians, such as Hegel and Schelling, and early Romantic writers such as Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis, thus making us 'Kantian subjects' in a new historical sense. By defending the fundamentals of Kant's ethics in reaction to some of the latest scholarship in the opening chapters, Ameriks offers an extensive argument that Hölderlin expresses a valuable philosophical position that is much closer to Kant than has generally been recognized. He also argues that it was necessary for Kant's position to be supplemented by the new conception, introduced by the post-Kantians, of philosophy as fundamentally historical, and that this conception has had a growing influence on the most interesting strands of Anglophone as well as Continental philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

There is a steadily growing literature on the role of the immune system in psychiatric disorders. So far, these advances have largely taken the form of correlations between specific aspects of inflammation (e.g. blood plasma levels of inflammatory markers, genetic mutations in immune pathways, viral or bacterial infection) with the development of neuropsychiatric conditions such as autism, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and depression. A fundamental question remains open: why are psychiatric disorders and immune responses intertwined? To address this would require a (...) step back from a historical mind–body dualism that has created such a dichotomy. We propose three contributions of active inference when addressing this question: translation, unification, and simulation. To illustrate these contributions, we consider the following questions. Is there an immunological analogue of sensory attenuation? Is there a common generative model that the brain and immune system jointly optimise? Can the immune response and psychiatric illness both be explained in terms of self-organising systems responding to threatening stimuli in their external environment, whether those stimuli happen to be pathogens, predators, or people? Does false inference at an immunological level alter the message passing at a psychological level (or vice versa) through a principled exchange between the two systems? (shrink)

BackgroundSuicide research aims to contribute to a better understanding of suicidal behaviour and its prevention. However, there are many ethical challenges in this research field, for example, regarding consent and potential risks to participants. While studies to-date have focused on the perspective of the researchers, this study aimed to investigate the views and experiences of members of Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) in dealing with suicide-related study applications.MethodsThis qualitative study entailed a thematic analysis using an inductive approach. We conducted semi-structured (...) interviews with a purposive sample (N = 15) of HREC Chairs or their delegates from Australian research-intensive universities. The interview guide included questions regarding the ethical concerns and challenges in suicide-related research raised by HREC members, how they dealt with those challenges and what advice they could give to researchers.ResultsThe analysis identified four main themes: (1) HREC members’ experiences of reviewing suicide-related study applications, (2) HREC members’ perceptions of suicide, suicide research, and study participants, (3) Complexity in HREC members’ decision-making processes, and (4) HREC members’ relationships with researchers.ConclusionsReliance on ethical guidelines and dialogue with researchers are crucial in the assessment of suicide-related study applications. Both researchers and HREC members may benefit from guidance and resources on how to conduct ethically sound suicide-related studies. Developing working relationships will be likely to help HRECs to facilitate high quality, ethical suicide-related research and researchers to conduct such research. (shrink)

This paper is a very early and very preliminary report of some of the findings from the research project, "Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy." The project eventually lead to two books: "Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy" and "the Prehistory of Private Property" (both coauthored by Grant S. McCall). The basic argument of the project is that influential, modern political theories often rely on dubious claims about prehistory. It examines the political philosophy literature to show how these claims are (...) used as essential premises in influential arguments. It then examines evidence from anthropology, archaeology, and history to show that these claims are dubious. This paper previews some of the early findings of the project that became those books. Please cite the books rather than this preliminary report. For info or access to the books, contact Karl at widerquist dot com. (shrink)

Can desires and actions be evaluated as responsive or unresponsive to reasons, in ways that extend beyond the instrumental implications of one's (other) desires? And does there exist any form of inference or reasoning that is practical in nature? Hume is generally supposed to have given an unambiguously negative reply to both of these questions. In particular, he is often taken to have held that no desire, passion, or action may ever be said to be opposed to reasons, except (perhaps) (...) in so far as it is based on a false belief or confused piece of means-ends reasoning. And he is generally taken to have held that the existence of some sort of peculiarly practical form of inference or reasoning is fundamentally .. (shrink)

In what follows I wish to raise and eventually to suggest an answer to the following question: What is the rationality of human communication? Why should we ask this question? By way of a first approach I would place the problem within the context of the so called “pragmatic turn” of analytic philosophy, i.e. within a context in which the concept of the rationality of logical syntactics and logical semantics of language systems has been integrated into, or superseded by, the (...) rationality concept of the human use of language—say, e.g., of arguments. (shrink)

Die Serie "Meisterwerke der Literatur" beinhaltet die Klassiker der deutschen und weltweiten Literatur in einer einzigartigen Sammlung für Ihren eBook Reader. Lesen Sie die besten Werke großer Schriftsteller,Poeten, Autoren und Philosophen auf Ihrem Reader. Dieses Werk bietet zusätzlich * Eine Biografie/Bibliografie des Autors. Vorländer Werk gehört auch heute noch zu den Referenzbüchern. Inhalt: Karl Vorländer – Biografie und Bibliografie Geschichte der Philosophie Vorwort zur 1. Auflage. Aus dem Vorwort zur 2. Auflage. Vorwort zur 3. Auflage. Zur fünften Auflage. Einleitung. (...) 1. Philosophie. Ihr Name und Begriff. 2. Die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ihre Methode, Quellen und Hilfsmittel. Einteilung des Stoffes. 3. Verhältnis der orientalischen Völker zur Philosophie. 4. Selbständigkeit der griechischen Philosophie. Quellen und Hilfsmittel zu ihrer Geschichte. Die Philosophie des Altertums Erste Periode. Vorsokratische Philosophie. Kapitel I. Anfänge der Reflexion über den Kosmos. Kapitel II. Anfänge der Reflexion über das Denken vom Kosmos. Sein und Werden (die Eleaten und Heraklit). Kapitel III. Die jüngeren Naturphilosophen: Empedokles, Anaxagoras u. a. Kapitel IV. Zweite Periode. Sokrates und die Sophisten. Kapitel V. Die sophistische Aufklärung. Kapitel VI. Sokrates. Kapitel VII. Die sokratischen Schulen. Dritte Periode. Die klassische Philosophie der Griechen: Plato und Aristoteles. Kapitel VIII. Plato. Kapitel IX. Aristoteles. Vierte Periode. Die hellenistisch-römische Philosophie. A. Hellenistische Periode. Kapitel X. Die Stoiker. Kapitel XI. Die Epikureer. Kapitel XII. Die Skeptiker. B. Die Philosophie auf dem Boden des römischen Weltreichs. Kapitel XIII. Die Philosophie bei den Römern. Kapitel XIV. Vorläufer des Neuplatonismus. Kapitel XV. Die Neuplatoniker. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Erster Abschnitt. Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter (Patristik). Kapitel I. Ältere Patristik. Kapitel II. Jüngere Patristik Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Scholastik. Kapitel III. Die Anfänge der Scholastik. Kapitel IV. Die Glanzzeit der Scholastik. Kapitel V. Ausgang der Scholastik. Zunehmender Zwiespalt zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Blüte der deutschen Mystik. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit Übergangsperiode. Kapitel I. Die Philosophie der Renaissance. Kapitel II. Die Begründung der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Erste Periode. Die Zeit der grossen Systeme. Kapitel I. Descartes (1596-1650). Kapitel II. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Kapitel III. Spinoza (1632-1677). Kapitel IV. Leibniz (1646-1716). Zweite Periode. Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. A. England und Schottland. Kapitel V. Locke (1632-1704). Kapitel VI. Weitere Entwicklung der Aufklärungsphilosophie in England. B. In Frankreich. Kapitel VII. Die französische Aufklärungsphilosophie von Bayle bis Rousseau. C. In Deutschland. Kapitel VIII. Die deutsche Aufklärungsphilosophie. Dritte Periode.Die Neubegründung der Philosophie durch Immanuel Kant Kapitel IX. Einleitung. Kapitel X. Kants Neubegründung der Wissenschaft. Kapitel XI. Die regulativen Prinzipien der Erfahrung oder die Ideen. Kapitel XII. Kants Neubegründung der Ethik. Kapitel XIII. Die Begründung der Ästhetik. Vierte Periode. Die Systeme der nachkantischen Philosophie von Fichte bis Schopenhauer. Kapitel XIV. Einleitung: Von Kant zu Fichte. Kapitel XV. Fichte. Kapitel XVI. Schelling. Kapitel XVII. Hegel. Kapitel XVIII. Kritische Nebenströmungen. Schleiermacher, Herbart, Beneke. Kapitel XIX. Schopenhauer. Fünfte Periode. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Kapitel XX. Der Positivismus. Kapitel XXI. Materialismus und Spiritualismus. Kapitel XXII. Die moderne Entwicklungsphilosophie: Darwin, Spencer. Kapitel XXIII. Idealistische Systembildungen auf naturwissenschaftlicher Grundlage. Kapitel XXIV. Die Erneuerung des Kritizismus. Kapitel XXV. Sozialismus und Individualismus. Kapitel XXVI. Sonstige philosophische Erscheinungen der Gegenwart. Zeittafel zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Fußnoten. (shrink)

Problems from Kant is distinctive in the way that it combines the crisp and often extremely critical style of argumentation found in Jonathan Bennett’s work with a very helpful grasp of the much more metaphysical character of the leading trends in current systematic philosophy. Although the book defends a phenomenalist reading of Kant's transcendental idealism that is not far from Bennett's empiricist interpretation, it also stresses many points that derive mostly from a philosophical and interpretative sympathy for the rationalist tradition (...) and a revival of modal considerations in the spirit of David Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. Since there is not enough room here to go into the many points on which I very much agree with the rationalist side of Van Cleve’s reading, I will take this occasion to play the role of critic and concentrate on one of the few areas in which it appears we have some serious disagreements. These disagreements are worthy of special attention because they arise in the chapter that overlaps the least with Van Cleve’s earlier publications, and they concern a topic that all would agree is at the very center of the Critique, namely Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories. (shrink)