In this article the author tries to give an answer - from the point of view of the transcendental pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics - to the title question, which was raised by the Unesco conferences entitled `Universal Ethics' in Paris (27 March 1997) and Naples (December 1997). The article should be understood as a supplement to the empiristic-comparative responses of S. Bok and H. Küng, and especially to the communitarian approach of M. Walzer, proposed at the first conference. Unlike (...) traditional rationalism, this approach does not try to deduce concrete moral norms from axiomatic first principles; it begins with transcendental reflection on the undeniable moral presuppositions of argumentative discourse (which is not circumventable in philosophy). The approach first deduces from these presuppositions only the ideal procedures for the moral discourses through which all concrete moral problems ought to be solved, if possible. The second step provides a strategic-counter-strategic supplementation principle for those cases where undistorted moral discourses are not possible. (shrink)

Voltaire, 1694-1778 -- Guizot 1787-1874 -- Burckhardt 1818-1897 -- Lamprecht 1856-1915 -- Huizinga 1872-1945 -- Ortega y Gasset 1883-1955.

An autobiographic instinct may be as old as Man Writing; but only since 1800 has Western Man placed a premium on autobiography. A bibliography of all autobiographic writing prior to that time would be a small fascicule; a bibliography since 1800 a thick tome. The ground behind this simpleminded assertion of a quantitative measure cannot be explained away by easy reference to the mass literacy of the modern world or the greater ease of publishing. It is as much a fact (...) of cultural conditions as is the significant relation of rhetoric to the intense public mindedness of classical men, the relative insignificance of tragedy in a thoroughly Christianized world view, the disappearance of epic from a nonaristocratic world, or the powerful assertion of the novel in an age of burghers. The usage of the term "autobiography" itself is suggestive, although this mode of historical explanation is always defective in the sense that such older terms as "hypomnemata," "commentarii," "vita," "confessions," or "memoirs" may well have covered the functions subsequently encapsulated in a newly fashionable term. In German the term makes its appearance shortly before 1800; the Oxford English Dictionary attributes first English usage to Southey in an article on Portuguese literature from the year 1809. Karl J. Weintraub, Thomas E. Donnelley Professor of History and dean of the Division of the Humanities at the University of Chicago, is the author of Visions of Culture and numerous articles. His introduction to a new edition of Goethe's Autobiography will prove of special interest to our readers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pierre Jurieu's Contribution to Bayle's Dktionnaire KARL C. SANDBERG PIERRE BAYLE'S VIEWSon faith and reason1as they appear throughout his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) may be reduced to two basic points. First, the doctrines of Christian theology are vulnerable to a great number of rational objections which would seem to destroy them. Second, reason itself is not a reliable guide in areas of speculative knowledge and should be (...) made to bow to the authority of revelation. This position in its essence is neither irreligious nor antireligious. On the contrary, it is closely related to the general stream of seventeenth-century fideism,~ and is only the logical extension of views which Bayle had expressed as a Protestant controversialist in his early writings2 Moreover, recent studies of Bayle in his milieu have presented compelling evidence that Bayle himself lived, wrote, and died as some kind of believing member of the Reformed Church. 4 It is not less certain, however, that Bayle's Dictionnaire was one of the most powerful antireligious influences of the Enlightenment, s for the eighteenth-century rationalists found in it such a tone of polemics coupled with such an abundant display of the rational insufficiencies of Christianity, that they could not take Bayle's ostensible fideism seriously. This paradox leads one to wonder why Bayle as a believer should so insist upon the disparity he found between faith and reason if he did not intend to lead an attack upon religion in general. What would account for the presence of the penetrating rational critique of Christian doctrines except a desire to discredit them? A partial answer might be suggested by Bayle's method of exposition and disputa1By faith is meant the belief in the speculative doctrines of Calvinist Protestantism, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Providence, and in the authority of revelation. By reason is meant essentially the Cartesian method, whose criterium of truth is incontrovertible evidence. See Richard Popkin, "Pierre Bayle's Place in 17th-century Scepticism," in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, ed. Paul Dibon (Amsterdam: 1959). 8During his participation in the Protestant-Catholic controversies of 1682-1687, Bayle became keenly aware that no Christian dogma was susceptible of rational proof. See his Commentaire Philosophique (1686)in his Oeuvres diverses (The Hague: 1737), II, 438. He had, however, previouslybeen convinced of the frailty of reason as a guide in speculative areas (but not in practical matters of morality). See his NouveUes de la Republique des Lettres, September, 1684, in Oeuvres diverses, I, 132-133. These works will hereafter be abbreviated CP, OD, and NRL, respectively. Other abbreviations to be used are DHC, Dictionnaire historique el critique; LFam, Lettres de M. Bayle ~ sa famille; SCP, Supplement du Commentaire philosophique (1687); PDC, Pens~es diverses sur la eomOte (1682); CC, La Cabale ehimdrique (1691). All of these works except the Dictionnaire are found in the Oeuvres diverses. The fourth edition of the Dictionnaire (1730) is the one cited here. 4See Paul Dibon, ed., Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam (Amsterdam: 1959), and Elizabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, Vol. I, "Du Pays de Foix i~la cit~ d'Erasme" (La Haye: 1963). 6Paul Hazard, La Pens~e europ$enne au XVIII~me si~cle de Montesquieu (~ Lessing (Paris [1946], I, 44. [59] 60 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tion, for in examining any question he felt intellectually obligated to set forth the strong and weak points of both sides. One can never boast of having proved a point, he said, without having stated and answered the strongest objections of one's opponent. ~ What subsequent readers found heterodox was possibly only Bayle's statement of his opponent's position. This answer is insufficient, however, because as Bayle had previously become aware of irreconcilable differences between faith and reason in the course of his early thought and writings, he had been extremely reluctant to voice the implications of his disquieting discoveries (1682-1687).7 Ten years later in the Dictionnaire, on the other hand, he seemed to go out of his way to state them with all possible clarity and vigor. It was this change in emphasis in the expression of his thought which was responsible for the great antireligious... (shrink)

Leistungssport, Olympische-Spiele, Schulsport, Ideologie, Jugendsport, Trainingslehre, Doping, Massenmedium.

This paper is a response to Justin Bell's “Depression Applied to Moral Imagination: Deweyan Tools for Moral Inquiry." The author first contextualizes Bell’s use of evolutionary psychology in the context of two influential philosophical engagements with medicine: Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the therapeutic and the recent turn towards person-centered medicine over disease-centered medicine. He then raises two concerns about the accounts of depression used in the sources Bell draws on: the way they identify depression as oriented towards social problems and (...) the way they view depression as intentional. (shrink)

Kants Ethik zeigt das typische Profil einer klassischen Theorie: Sie präsentiert im Kontext jeder Zeit neue und überraschende Perspektiven. 200 Jahre nach dem Tod Kants ist die AuseinanderSetzung mit seiner Ethik keineswegs auf das philologische oder philosophiehistorische Interesse beschränkt. Vielmehr ist sie eine der wenigen Beispiele für den Sachverhalt, dass mit dem zeitlichen Abstand der Entstehung eines Werks die systematische Bedeutung immer noch zunehmen kann. Heute werden die großen ethischen Themen der Gegenwart, von den Menschenrechten bis zur Bioethik, nicht ohne (...) ausdrücklichen Bezug auf Kants Ethik behandelt. In diesem Band werden Beiträge vorgelegt, die durchgehend ein systematisches Interesse verfolgen. Sie rekonstruieren ausgehend von einem exegetisch gesicherten Ort im Werk Kants die Erträge für die gegenwärtige Philosophie. Mit Kant wird gleichsam über den ursprünglichen Horizont seines Denkens hinausgegangen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die kantische Ethik nicht nur auf den ihr vertrauten Gebieten von Gerechtigkeit, Autonomie, Verbindlichkeit und Recht Bedeutendes leistet, sondern auch zum Problem der Motivation Lösungsvorschläge bereithält - einem Bereich, der lange Zeit als ihr Schwachpunkt angesehen worden ist. (shrink)

Provides a detailed critical account of the beginning of the argument of part III of Kant’s Groundwork, the section of his writing in which he seems to come closest to offering a direct proof of our absolute freedom. It contends that there are several ambiguities and missteps in what seems to be Kant’s main line of argument here, but these need not count again Kant’s ultimate position. On the contrary, realizing that there may be such fundamental flaws in this part (...) of the Groundwork is the easiest way to understand why Kant never directly refers back to it and why he reversed his method of presentation so dramatically in the second Critique. (shrink)

Alvin plantinga has presented various counterexamples to the argument from analogy for other minds. I argue that the implausibility of the counterexample inferences plantinga offers depends not on a weakness essential to the analogical argument but rather on features peculiar to the inferences he provides. My procedure is to establish a number of necessary conditions for any acceptable analogical argument and then to show plantinga's counterexamples fail to meet these conditions. I then construct an analogical argument for other minds which (...) meets all these conditions and hence appears acceptable and invulnerable to plantinga's objections. Other responses to plantinga are also criticized. (shrink)

Reinhold's Letters on the Kantian Philosophy is arguably the most influential book ever written concerning Kant. It provides a helpful introduction to Kant's philosophy and a valuable explanation of how that philosophy can be understood as an appropriate Enlightenment solution to the 'pantheism dispute' which dominated thought in the era of German Idealism. The first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was slow in gaining a positive reception, but after Reinhold's Letters appeared Kant's Critical Philosophy suddenly attained the central (...) position which it has held to this day. The Letters also brought fame to Reinhold, who developed his own influential 'Elementary Philosophy' and was succeeded by the leading figures of German Idealism: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This English edition of Reinhold's work includes the original 1786–7 version as well as all the major additions and changes from the 1790 edition. (shrink)

The paper tries first to show that P. Strawson’s and J. Searle’s proposal of explicating the illocutionary meaning of speech-acts in terms of the conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction is unsatisfactory. It provides no full understanding of the meaning of speech-acts, at least not of non-constative acts, as e.g. orders, requests, demands, confessions, promisses, etc.; for, through its quasi-verificationist horizon, it provides no unterstanding of the illocutionary force in terms of the conditions of accepting the validity-claims that are connected with (...) the performance of the act. Thus far the paper complies with Habermas’ approach. There remains however an ambiguity with regard to the good reasons for accepting a speech-act, since on the level of life-world communication and interaction not only validity-claims and pertinent arguments but also threats and offers are functioning as socially binding illocutionary forces. How is it possible to show by a cogent argument that openly strategical acts as offers and threats cannot fulfill the role of providing good reasons for accepting speech-acts in the sense of unrestricted Verständigung but are parasitic upon non-strategical ways of consensual communication by understanding and accepting validity-claims?The paper argues that this suggestive contention cannot be proved, i.e. grounded by a descriptive analysis of the normal function of communicative actions in the life-world but only - indeed - by transcendental pragmatic reflection on the normative conditions of argumentative discourse which cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction. (shrink)

To understand human action in general we must look toward its determinants in the agent's cognitive assessment of an existing situation and in the attitudes this has prompted. But we cannot fully determine why a deed is done without reference also to evaluative appraisal which reveals basic commitment to prescripts. Naturalism either overlooks the autonomy of commitment vis- -vis attitude and cognitive assessment or, erroneously assimilating it to attitude, wholly distorts the plain fact of the clash of duty and inclination. (...) Since the roots of conflict derive from the same source as those of action we respond to it appropriately only if we first identify its components. To ignore commitment distorts conflict as grievously as it does action. (shrink)

Provides an overview of a selection of the influential thinkers on education, whose writing has helped in shaping our views on teaching and learning.

This book explores the impulses behind the fascination for that experience.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 90-131.