I suggest that the Kantian categorical imperative can be a basis for an ethical duty to live sustainably. The universalizability formulation of the categorical imperative should be seen as a test of whether the principle underlying a way of life is self-destructive of the system of living and acting which makes the way of life possible. In exploring this interpretation the self should be conceptualized as a socially and system-constituted being, rather than an atomized will. In this sense, a (...) self which lives in a way that is destructive of the system of life, is also in principle willing its own self-destruction. (shrink)

Abstract:The literature contains many recommendations, both explicit and implicit, that suggest how an ethics program ought to be designed. While we recognize the contributions of these works, we also note that these recommendations are typically based on either social scientific theory or data and as a result they tend to discount the moral aspects of ethics programs. To contrast and complement these approaches, we refer to a theory of the right to identify the characteristics of an effective ethics program. We (...) draw from Kant’s ethical theory to identify three guiding principles of a moral ethics program and then apply those principles to the specific components of ethics programs as discussed in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Doing so provides insights as to how an ethics program ought to be designed from a moral point of view and sparks discussion of the moral aspects of ethics programs. (shrink)

Abstract:The literature contains many recommendations, both explicit and implicit, that suggest how an ethics program ought to be designed. While we recognize the contributions of these works, we also note that these recommendations are typically based on either social scientific theory or data and as a result they tend to discount the moral aspects of ethics programs. To contrast and complement these approaches, we refer to a theory of the right to identify the characteristics of an effective ethics program. We (...) draw from Kant’s ethical theory to identify three guiding principles of a moral ethics program and then apply those principles to the specific components of ethics programs as discussed in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Doing so provides insights as to how an ethics program ought to be designed from a moral point of view and sparks discussion of the moral aspects of ethics programs. (shrink)

Rejecting Kant''s absolute opposition to revolution, I propose a modified Kantian perspective for reflecting on political violence, drawing from Kant''s basic ideas but abandoning some dubious assumptions. Developing suggestions in earlier papers, the essay sketches a model for moral legislation that combines the core ideas of each of Kant''s formulas of the Categorical Imperative. Though only a framework for deliberation, not a complete decision procedure, this excludes extremist positions, prohibitive and permissive, about political violence. Despite Kant''s hopes, the (...) values implicit in his fundamental principle fail to support easy, inflexible solutions; but they place strong presumptions against lawless coercion and killing, undermining social order, treating persons as dispensable, underestimating options, arrogant faith in one''s own judgment, and reckless simplicity in political thinking. (shrink)

This is a review of the book Mozg - kultura - socium. Kantianskaya programma v cognitivnykh issledovaniyakh by Bazhanov V.A. The author`s main aim is a reconsideration of some fundamental principles of epistemology and philosophy of science in the light of state-of-the-art advancements of neurosciences. According to the author of the book, social and cultural revolution in neurosciences has been crucially modifying the initial Kantian program of consciousness research and the modes of linguistic representation of its results. In particular, (...) in epistemology the universal concept of transcendental subject has been altered with regard to neurobiological and social data, which concern some preconditions of cognitive activity. In philosophy of science such a shift of research perspective allows to implement a naturalistic interpretation of natural sciences, clarifies the problem of empirical foundations of mathematics and sheds a new light on the problem of apriori elements of mathematical thought. The analysis of evolutionary and neurobiological preconditions of logical thought leads to the sort of revival of psychologism program in logic, which enables author to put forward an original interpretation of the problem of plurality of logical systems. Finally, some topics of social sciences as well as problems of genesis of art, ethical and religious systems, can acquire new interpretation with respect to modern investigations in cognitive science. (shrink)

An anti-realist stance prevalent in philosophy of film, probably less familiar to analytical than continental philosophers, raises issues that are philosophically accessible and engaging. While this anti-realist stance can be historically situated many of its constituent ideas remain influential in contemporary milieus. A common claim of anti-realism is that realist art or cinema, in part by virtue of ‘reification', is inherently ‘non-transformative’. Without rigorously refuting all manifestations of the ‘reification thesis’, key assumptions of anti-realism associated with it are challenged in (...) this paper. An aesthetic and a political-ideological anti-realist thesis are identified and critiqued. Kant’s distinction between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘mechanical art’ provides a basis for defending a form of cinematic realism that vindicates its potential transformative power. The Kantian framework provides a reference point for a comparative analysis of Brecht’s and Lukács’ views on anti-realism versus realism as well as for a favourable reconsideration of Andre Bazin’s cinematic realism. (shrink)

Can war ever be just? By what right do we charge people with war crimes? Can war itself be a crime? What is a good peace treaty? Since the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, many wars have erupted, inflaming such areas as the Persian Gulf, Central Africa and Central Europe. Brutalities committed during these conflicts have sparked new interest in the ethics of war and peace. Brian Orend explores the ethics of war and peace from a Kantian (...) perspective, emphasizing human rights protection, the rule of international law and a fully global concept of justice. Contending that Kant’s just war doctrine has not been given its due, Orend displays Kant’s theory to its fullest, impressive effect. He then completely and clearly updates Kant’s perspective for application to our time. Along the way, he criticizes pacifism and realism, explores the nature of human rights protection during wartime, and defends a theory of just war. He also looks ahead to future developments in global institutional reform using cases from the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda to illustrate his argument. Controversial and timely, perhaps the most important contribution War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective makes is with regard to the question of justice after war. Orend offers a principled theory of war termination, making an urgent plea to reform current international law. (shrink)

Respect, Pluralism, and Justice is a series of essays which sketches a broadly Kantian framework for moral deliberation, and then uses it to address important social and political issues. Hill shows how Kantian theory can be developed to deal with questions about cultural diversity, punishment, political violence, responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, and state coercion in a pluralistic society.

This book provides essential reading for anyone with an academic or professional interest in business ethics today.

The ‘unity of reason’ is mentioned at several points in Kant's writings, but it is never systematically discussed or explained in any detail. Occasionally, this ‘unity’ seems something that we can take for granted. At other times, it appears to be a thesis that has just been implicitly established. However, for the most part it is presented as an extremely ambitious, all-encompassing research project that Kant feels he has to postpone until some indefinite time in the future. This chapter tries (...) to disentangle these different ‘unities’ of reason, arguing that Kant was primarily concerned with the unity of the final philosophical system that reason as a unitary faculty seeks to produce, whereas the unity of reason in the sense of a unitary faculty of reason is taken for granted. The chapter focuses on some philosophically important features of Kant's critical theory of reason, reasoning and reasons in the two spheres. (shrink)

The ‘unity of reason’ is mentioned at several points in Kant's writings, but it is never systematically discussed or explained in any detail. Occasionally, this ‘unity’ seems something that we can take for granted. At other times, it appears to be a thesis that has just been implicitly established. However, for the most part it is presented as an extremely ambitious, all-encompassing research project that Kant feels he has to postpone until some indefinite time in the future. This chapter tries (...) to disentangle these different ‘unities’ of reason, arguing that Kant was primarily concerned with the unity of the final philosophical system that reason as a unitary faculty seeks to produce, whereas the unity of reason in the sense of a unitary faculty of reason is taken for granted. The chapter focuses on some philosophically important features of Kant's critical theory of reason, reasoning and reasons in the two spheres. (shrink)

This article discusses whether it is rational and valuable to have hope in the face of the climate crisis. The aim is to explore a distinctive Kantian perspective characterized by three main elements. First, hope is not seen primarily as a means of sustaining action, but action is viewed as a condition for rational hope. Second, the value of certain ‘fundamental’ hopes is not merely instrumental but derives from their constitutive role in our practical identity. Here, I focus (...) on Kantian hope in the compatibility of our fundamental ends, happiness and morality. Third, the rationality of such a hope presupposes trust – in particular, trust that our conceptions of morality and the good life are sufficiently flexible to adapt to drastically new circumstances. (shrink)

Newton’s absolute pace-time view is the basis of his classical mechanics, and his description of relative motion is based on absolute space. However, the existence of this absolute space has been questioned by the academic circles. In order to defend its theoretical foundation, Newton established a famous bucket experiment to prove the existence of absolute space. But his experiment was also questioned, and the experiment is also divided into different opinions. This paper hopes to find the answer to the question (...) from Kantian perspective. (shrink)

This essay will inform the reader about Kant’s views on mathematics and aesthetics. It will also critically discuss these views and offer further suggestions and personal opinions from the author’s side. Kant (1724-1804) was not a mathematician, nor was he an artist. One must even admit that he had little understanding of higher mathematics and that he did not have much of a theory that could be called a “philosophy of mathematics” either. But he formulated a very influential aesthetic theory (...) that is contained in his “Critique of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment” (1790), and his views on mathematics, especially those that compare it with philosophy, are distinctive and worthy of our attention. Hence, combining mathematics and aesthetics, asking whether mathematics can be beautiful and why and how it can or cannot be so called, according to Kant’s theory, will be particularly interesting. This essay has three parts: it discusses mathematics, aesthetics, and the aesthetics of mathematics, primarily in Kantian perspectives but also in ways that critically evaluate those perspectives. (shrink)

To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of (...) all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian. (shrink)

Is the Kantian basis of valuing in humanity sufficient or sound enough to account for all valuing? At least two other such bases have been proposed across the ages, that of the sentiments and the valuing of life itself. This article focuses on the Kantian view, the first of these three possible bases of valuing. The concern is: by which criteria can we assess whether a given theory of or approach to basing a value is in fact usable (...) and optimal, that is can in fact explain why a value can be assuredly based on a theory of value. That is, can a possible theory of value indeed explain all other values? That is, it seems a “meta” analysis of the situation is due. The article looks to five perspectives on the Kantian concept of humanity to determine if that humanity, as a theory of all valuing’s bases, is at least supportable / sustainable, if not yet sufficiently fleshed out. The article concludes that these five perspective may each and severally leave some cogent doubt of humanity as the basis of all other value, while leaving unsettled the possibility the perspective is flawed or is not thorough enough for due criticism of humanity as basis. (shrink)

Moral anxiety is the unease that we experience in the face of a novel or difficult moral decision, an unease that helps us recognize the significance of the issue we face and engages epistemic behaviors aimed at helping us work through it (reflection, information gathering, etc.). But recent discussions in philosophy raise questions about the value of moral anxiety (do we really do better when we’re anxious?); and work in cognitive science challenges its psychological plausibility (is there really such an (...) emotion?). Drawing on Kant and Kantians, I develop a model of moral anxiety (or ‘conscience’ in Kant’s terminology) that highlights both its empirical credentials and its distinctive value. Kant, it turns out, was an early—and sophisticated—dual-process theorist. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is objectivity from Kant's point of view: or better, my own perspective on Kant's perspective on objectivity. More precisely, I want to draw attention to some aspects of the latter, which I believe are too narrow and must be widened before we can benefit from a Kantian approach today.

Structural realism was born in the attempt to reach a compromise between a realist argument and an antirealist one, namely the ‘no miracle’ ­argument and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, respectively. According to the ‘no miracle’ argument, scientific realism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. The only way of explaining why science is so ­successful in making predictions that most of the time turn out to be verified, is to believe that theoretical terms refer, (...) that theories in mature science are true or at least approximately true, and that the same term refers to the same thing even if it occurs in different theories. It is the referential nature of scientific theories that explains the success of science. (shrink)

Aristotelian ethics has the resources to address a range of first as well as second order ethical questions precisely in those areas in which Kantian ethics is traditionally supposed to be weak. My aim in this chapter is to examine some of these questions, narrowing my remit to those concerning the nature of the good and the authority of norms. In particular, I want to motivate and sketch a non-naturalist Kantian response to the neo-Aristotelian challenge that targets specifically (...) its meta-ethical and meta-normative naturalistic assumptions. (shrink)

The foremost aim of this paper is to realize the fourth part of the Aufbau. This part, which provides an actual phenomenalistic constitution system, is interpretable from a Kantian perspective (§§1-4). But Carnap plotted to overcome Kant’s old style of philosophy as well. We review this aspect of his constitution, focusing on space (§§7-13) and time (§§5-6), especially.

This book advances our understanding of the nature, grounds and limits of human dignity by connecting it with Kant's notion of an ideal moral community, or Kingdom of Ends. It features original essays by leading Kant scholars and moral and political philosophers from around the world. Although Kant's influential injunction to treat humanity as an end in itself and never merely as a means has garnered the most attention among those interested in analyzing human dignity with a Kantian lens, (...) Kant himself places much more emphasis on the Kingdom of Ends as crucial for defining human dignity. The chapters in this collection focus not only on interpretive issues related to the Kingdom of Ends, but also on practical applications that have the potential to advance discussions about the nature and foundations of rights, the content of moral principles, the importance of moral ideals and attitudes and the nature of moral motivation. Exploring and connecting the ideas of human dignity and the Kingdom of Ends significantly deepens our moral understanding, advances discussions in moral and political philosophy and enhances our appreciation of Kant's moral theory. Human Dignity and the Kingdom of Ends: Kantian Perspectives and Practical Applications will appeal to scholars and advanced students of Kant, moral philosophy, political philosophy, and political theory. (shrink)

“What must we do to prevent a nuclear omnicide?” I want to answer this question from a Kantian perspective. For Kant a state of peace is not only the denial of a state of war but also a state of justice, in which right rules might. Kant’s concept of peace is normative. According to him, practical reason commands us to leave the state of nature, which is a state of war, and establish a state of peace, inasmuch as (...) this is a necessary condition for a state of justice. For Kant justice is an a priori concept “entirely derivable from the concept of freedom in the mutual relationships of human beings.” Accordingly, the pursuit of peace is a political duty dictated by practical reason, and the task of realizing peace is a moral task incumbent upon everyone engaged in the conduct of government. This paper has three parts. In the first two parts, we will explore Kant’s perspective of peace, focusing on his concept of peace and his view of the task of peace. In the third and concluding part, using Kant’s perspective as our vantage point, we will reflect upon the prevailing mode of peace-thinking in our time and then address our question: “What must we do to prevent a nuclear omnicide?”. (shrink)

This essay seeks to construct an understanding of the relationship between religious ritual and morality by means of an exploration of disparate and undeveloped suggestions in the writings of Immanuel Kant. The position worked out sees ritual as the effort to use complex symbolic and group activity for the purpose of expressing and vivifying the fundamental moral conceptions that underlie religious belief. In a closing discussion, early Christian baptism is used to illustrate and partly to substantiate this Kantian moral (...) account of religious ritual. (shrink)

:This article reexamines the “prostitution objection” to paid surrogacy, and argues that rebuttals to this objection fail to focus on surrogates as embodied persons. This failure is based on the false distinction between “selling one’s reproductive services” and “selling one’s body.” To ground the analysis of humans as embodied persons, this article uses Kant’s late ethical theory, which develops the conceptual framework for understanding human beings as embodied selves. Literature on surrogacy commonly emphasizes that all Kantian duties heed to (...) the categorical prohibition to treat persons as mere means. What this literature leaves out is that this imperative commands us more specifically to engage ourselves and others as embodied persons. This article aims to relate this point to a specific issue in assisted reproduction. It argues that a Kantian account of human beings as embodied persons prohibits paid surrogacy on exactly the same grounds as it prohibits prostitution. (shrink)

This book presents a systematic interpretation of Charles S. Peirce’s work based on a Kantian understanding of his teleological account of thought and inquiry. Departing from readings that contrast Peirce’s treatment of purpose, end, and teleology with his early studies of Kant, Gabriele Gava instead argues that focusing on Peirce’s purposefulness as a necessary regulative condition for inquiry and semiotic processes allows for a transcendental interpretation of Peirce’s philosophical project. The author advances this interpretation through presenting original views on (...) aspects of Peirce’s thought, including: a detailed analysis of Peirce’s ‘methodeutic’ and ‘speculative rhetoric,’ as well as his ‘critical common-sensism’; a comparison between Peirce’s and James’ pragmatisms in view of the account of purposefulness Gava puts forth; and an examination of the logical relationships that order Peirce’s architectonic classification of the sciences. (shrink)

This article outlines an epistemological perspective to understand the organism as a temporally changing whole. To analyze the mental faculties involved, the organism’s development and persisting existence is differentiated into four interdependent aspects: descent, future existence, persistent species, and environmentally adapted physical appearance. It is outlined that these aspects are recognized by comparative memory, concept-guided anticipation, conceptual thinking, and sensory perception, respectively. Furthermore, it is pointed out that these aspects correspond to the famous four Aristotelian “causes” or principles of (...) explanation. The descent of an organism corresponds to Aristotle’s efficient principle (“where does it come from?”), its future existence to the final principle (“what is if for?”), its physical structure to the material principle (“out of what is it?”) and its persistent species to the formal principle (“what is it?”). Aristotle regarded the unity of the efficient, formal and final principle as the ontological cause of the organism and called it the “soul” (psyche), while the material principle can be understood to represent its “body” (soma). I suggest that Aristotle’s “soul” corresponds to three of the four mental faculties required for cognition of a self-maintaining organism. I argue that in a Kantian perspective, the Aristotelian “soul” represents the condition for recognizing an organism at all. Therefore, the Aristotelian principle of life becomes intelligible and even empirically observable through the inner sense. In summary, I suggest that the four aspects of the organism described here can be viewed as the general, epistemological and ontological principle of the organism, the Bio-Logos. (shrink)

By reappraising the biological theory of vitalism, Canguilhem attempted to give pride of place to the idea that acquiring knowledge about living beings is an activity of living beings. He is indeed credited with the view that knowledge in particular and rationality in general are “tied to a conception of life” whereby “life predominantly manifests itself in organic individuals that act and react within specific environments which, in turn, are defined by the needs and desires of these individuals” (Schmidgen H. (...) Hist Philos Life Sci, 36(2): 4, 2014. doi:10.1007/s40656-014-0030-1). These needs and desires, we are told, constitute “un système de référence irréductible et par là absolu” (Canguilhem G. Le vivant et son milieu. In: La connaissance de la vie (Deuxième édition revue et augmenté). Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 129–154, 1992c). Canguilhem’s legacy is exactly this: rationality is rooted in life, and not the other way around. And yet, in “Le concept et la vie” (from 1966) and “De la science et de la contre-science” (from 1971), Canguilhem seems to tell another story about the complex intertwinement of life and rationality. Not only are we condemned to enter the realm of rationality (i.e., to take part in logical activities such as forming concepts and judgments about the world and about our own condition) because we have needs and desires as living beings, but we also have needs and desires as living beings that depend on the fact we are always already caught-up in the dynamics of rationality, i.e., always already logically active. At this point, Canguilhem’s thinking comes closer than ever to a Kantian, transcendental point of view on rationality. Paradoxically, the inscription of human rationality in organic life brings with it the idea of a subject, divided between two inverse but correlated realms in which it cannot but participate: the singular realm of sensibility and the general realm of logic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Does effective moral judgment in business ethics rely upon the identification of a suitable set of moral principles? We address this question by examining a number of criticisms of the role that principles can play in moral judgment. Critics claim that reliance on principles requires moral agents to abstract themselves from actual circumstances, relationships and personal commitments in answering moral questions. This is said to enforce an artificial uniformity in moral judgment. We challenge these critics by developing an account of (...) principle-based moral judgment that has been widely discussed by contemporary Kantian scholars. In so doing we respond to some basic problems raised by so-called “moral particularists” who voice theoretical objections to the role of principles as well as to contemporary business ethicists who have criticized principle-based moral judgment along similar lines. We conclude with some future areas of research. (shrink)

In Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness, Gabriele Gava tackles one of the thorniest questions in Peirce research, namely the problem of Peirce’s relationship to Kantian philosophy. The leading argument of the book amounts to what may be the most sustained defence of a transcendental reading of Peirce’s thought since Karl-Otto Apel’s pioneering efforts. In pursuing this path, Gava is not exactly moving through uncharted terrain; but nor has he chosen the road most travelled in recent times. For...

In this article, I address the issue of whether we have an obligation to remember past immoral actions. My central question is: do we have an obligation to remember past moral transgressions? I address this central question through three more specific questions. In the first section, I enquiry whether we have an obligation to remember our own past transgressions. In the second section, I ask whether we have an obligation to remember the wrongful actions that others have committed against ourselves. (...) In the last section, I investigate whether we have a duty to remember the suffering of victims of crimes that have a political aspect, crimes such as state violence, oppression and racial discrimination, for example. Here I use the term ‘obligation’ in a board sense to refer to actions that are recommended from the moral point of view, that is, when we have moral reasons to act in a certain way. Here I decided to explore these issues from a Kantian perspective. At first glance, Kant does not seem to have much to offer to an ethics of memory since he does not ask these questions directly. Nevertheless, I was interested to explore to what extent Kant’s ethics, and Kantian ethics more generally, can give us tools to answer these questions. What I have discovered is that, despite my initial doubts, the Kantian framework can provide us with materials to build arguments that can help us to answer these questions. In fact, I will argue that in Kant’s ethics, we have an obligation to remember past immoral actions. With regard to our own transgressions, I argue that we ought to remember our past transgressions because this is an aspect of our moral development. With regard to others’ transgressions, I argue that we have a duty of self-respect to demand that others respect us (in the Kantian sense, that is, that others treat us in a morally correct way) and that this involves remembering others’ transgressions, particularly when there is no evidence of their repentance or if they have not apologized. However, if we have (fallible) reasons to think that the wrongdoer has repented, then there is certainly no need to continue to remind them of their offenses. Thus, in the first two sections, my arguments are based on a certain interpretation of Kant’s ethical texts. However, when I address the political dimension of the ethics of memory I have based my arguments on the work of contemporary authors, especially Jeffrey Blustein. In the last section then, the perspective is more ‘Kantian’ than Kant’s. I argue that we have a duty to remember the victims of social and political injustice (social and political violence, oppression, discrimination, atrocity and crimes against humanity). Defenders of the importance of political memory usually appeal to consequentialist arguments. However, these arguments have limits. A Kantian perspective (deontological) is relevant here because it allows us to provide new arguments in support of the importance of political memory and thus ultimately to provide a stronger defense of duties of memory. -/- The issues that arise in relation to an ethics of memory will no doubt require that we study other sources in addition to the materials and arguments provided from a Kantian perspective. Nevertheless, I conclude that perhaps a bit surprisingly, the Kantian tradition has more to offer than it initially seemed, and it can certainly provide part of the theoretical framework to develop an ethics of memory. (shrink)

Thomas Hill, a leading figure in the recent development of Kantian moral philosophy, presents a set of essays exploring the implications of basic Kantian ideas for practical issues. The first part of the book provides background in central themes in Kant's ethics; the second part discusses questions regarding human welfare; the third focuses on moral worth-the nature and grounds of moral assessment of persons as deserving esteem or blame. Hill shows moral, political, and social philosophers just how valuable (...) moral theory can be in addressing practical matters. (shrink)

AbstractMultinationals’ aggressive tax lobbying that involves free-riding behaviour and results in disproportional benefits to the disadvantage of other taxpayers, is problematic for several reasons. Such lobbying undermines the legitimacy of tax legislation and has a negative impact on trust in the tax system. Based on Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory, this article first suggests a new normative basis for a moral duty that requires multinationals and their leaders to be transparent about their political activities and tax lobbying. Next, it introduces a (...) new concept of transparency in respect of tax lobbying. ‘Deliberative transparency’ requires multinationals and their leaders not only to be open about their reasons for tax lobbying, but also to deliberate with stakeholders and, maybe even more importantly, to provide evidence supporting their lobbying positions. Finally, based on these new understandings, additional government interventions against aggressive tax lobbying are suggested, for example mandatory stakeholder consultation, reporting on stakeholder attitudes and perception, and evidence-based lobbying requirements. (shrink)

What, if anything, are we morally required to do on behalf of others besides respecting their rights? And why is such regard for others a reasonable moral requirement? These two questions have long been major concerns of ethical theory, but the answers that philosophers give tend to vary with their beliefs about human nature. More specifically, their answers typically depend on the position they take on a third-question: To what extent, if any, is it possible for us to act altruistically?