Discourse marker analysis has been widely studied, leading Fraser to call this subject `a growth market in linguistics'. In our present research, we extended the study of discourse markers to the Chinese marker meiyou, which has traditionally been treated as a negator. The corpus studied here contains 40 conversations, totaling 482'27”. The analytical framework adopted in the study was drawn from van Dijk's model, which mainly consists of a semantic/textual level and a pragmatic/interactional level. A total of 141 occurrences of (...) meiyou were identified as discourse markers in the corpus: 13 of them occur at the textual level and 128 of them at the interactional level. Thus, meiyou occurs more frequently at the interactional level than at the textual level. At the textual level, meiyou introduces an answer to a self-inquiry or self-correction. At the interactional level, meiyou mainly serves as a response to provide information, as a marker of correction/clarification or evasion, and as a response to praise or gratitude. In particular, with respect to meiyou's interactive functions, we use the concepts of preference structure and face-threatening acts to analyze the collected data. We further demonstrate that intersubjectification, a mechanism whereby meanings become more centered on the addressee, is involved in the development of the discourse marker meiyou. (shrink)

This study draws on Relevance Theory, Conversation Analysis, and Politeness Theory in investigating a full range of discourse functions for hao and dui with reference to recurrent patterns, distributions, and forms of organization in a large corpus of talk. Special emphasis is placed on a comparison of hao and dui in combination with a small subset of discourse particles: in particular hao/hao le/ hao la/hao a/hao ba and dui/dui a/dui le in spoken discourse. We find that both of the markers (...) signal special sequential relatedness in talk and carry information which is relevant in determining the boundaries of conversational exchange. However, in interaction hao is used for expressing acceptance of the other speaker’s move or act, whereas dui conveys acknowledgment of the propositional content of the utterance produced by the other speaker. (shrink)

BackgroundBreast cancer patients are at elevated risk of depression during treatment, thus provoking the chance of poor clinical outcomes. This retrospective cohort study aimed to investigate whether integrating Chinese herbal medicines citation into conventional cancer therapy could decrease the risk of depression in the long-term breast cancer survivors.MethodsA cohort of patients aged 20–70 years and with newly diagnosed breast cancer during 2000–2008 was identified from a nationwide claims database. In this study, we focused solely on survivors of breast cancer at (...) least1 year after diagnosis. After one-to-one matching for age, sex, and baseline comorbidities, breast cancer patients who received and did not receive CHM treatment were enrolled. The incidence rate and hazard ratio citation for depression between the two groups was estimated at the end of 2012. A Cox proportional hazard model was constructed to examine the impact of the CHM use on the risk of depression.ResultsDuring the study period, the incidence rate of depression was significantly lower in the treated cohort than in the untreated cohort [8.57 compared with 11.01 per 1,000 person-years citation], and the adjusted HR remained significant at 0.74 in a Cox proportional hazards regression model. The corresponding risk further decreasing to 43% among those using CHM for more than 1 year.ConclusionFinding from this investigation indicated that the lower risk of depression observed in breast cancer patients treated with CHM, suggesting that CHM treatment should be considered for disease management toward breast cancer. Yet, the optimal administered dose should be determined in further clinical trials. (shrink)

本书主要介绍坚持马克思主义的哲学史观、董仲舒与黄老之学——儒学之创新、真理标准研究中应当重视的两个理论问题、论逻辑的本质及逻辑的方法、维特根斯坦的现象学之谜等内容。.

Ben shu xi tong chan shu liao Zhongguo zhe xue de yuan qi, fa zhan he wei lai.quan shu gong fen cheng si ge da bu fen:yuan qi yu chu xing; er, ge ming hua de ding xing; san, xin shi dai de zhuan xiang;si, zou xiang quan qiu hua shi dai de Zhongguo zhe xue.

Ben shu tong guo li shi shang de yi ge ge xiao gu shi lai shuo li,Rang du zhe kan dao le yi ge zhong min ai min,Shou min ai dai de yan zi,Yi ge qin zheng lian jie,Chi shen li jie de yan zi,Yi ge chong shang jie jian,Fan dui she hua de yan zi.

Ben shu jie shao le liang shu ming xian sheng shi shang ge shi ji de zhong guo wen hua ming ren zhi yi, Shi 20 shi ji xin ru jia de kai chuang zhe, Shi si xiang jia, Zhe xue jia, Jiao yu jia, You shi po you ying xiang de she hui huo dong jia. You qi ta de du te de si xiang he xue shi, Ta de te li du xing de kan ke ren sheng jing (...) li, Yi bei zi jian chi jiang zhen hua, Shi bu tong xun chang de, Ye shi ruo gan tong shi dai de zhi ming ren shi suo bu ke qi ji de. (shrink)

Ben shu wei wo she chong dian tu shu hua xia wen ku ru xue shu xi zhong di yi ben. Gai shu yi jian ming de wen zi gou le le Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi san wei Ming mo da ru sheng huo de shi dai bei jing, hong ru de sheng ping jing li, ta men de xue shu zao yi (zhu yao zhi ta men zai ru xue fang mian de cheng jiu), cheng yu jiao (...) you yi ji san wei zai li shi shang de di wei he gong xian, ta men ren sheng de kan ke du lai ling ren bu sheng xi. (shrink)

Xue xi he yan jiu Zhongguo zhe xue, yi ban lai shuo, Feng xian sheng shi ke chao er bu ke yue de. Yi si shi, hou ren wan quan ke neng er qie ye ying dang sheng guo Feng xian sheng, dan shi que bu neng rao guo Feng xian sheng. Rao guo Feng xian sheng, bu dan bi ran yao duo fei li qi, er qie rong yi zou wan lu er nan yu shen ru tang ao. Feng (...) Youlan zuo wei wo guo jin dai zhe xue de yi dai ju bo, zai mou zhong yi yi shang, ying xiang liao zheng ge jin dai Zhongguo zhe xue de ge ju. Er dui yu Feng Youlan zhe xue ji qi xue shu sheng ya de yan jiu, ye sui zhe dang dai guo xue yan jiu de xing qi, shou dao yue lai yue duo de guan zhu. Minguo shi qi de Zhongguo xue shu jie, ying gai shuo shi hui ju le yi da pi kua shi dai de xue shu jing ying, te bie shi zai chuan tong xue shu ling yu, kan cheng yi chang si xiang de sheng yan.ben shu zuo zhe zai hao ru yan hai de Minguo wen xian zhong, jing xin zheng li chu dang shi xue jie dui Feng Youlan zhe xue de hui ying he dui hua, qi zhong bao kuo zhu ru Chen Yinke, Jin Yuelin, Hu Shi, Zhang Dainian, Cai Shangsi deng yi da pi xue jie tai dou de wen zhang, zi liao xing fei chang qiang, bu jin fan ying le zhu wei xue zhe ge ren de du dao jian jie, geng cong yi ge ce mian fan ying le Minguo shi qi Feng Youlan zhe xue yan jiu de sheng kuang, dui dang xia yan jiu Feng Youlan zhe xue si xiang ju you zhong yao de can kao jia zhi. (shrink)

This paper provides an ethical reflection on “children’s autonomy” from the perspective of cross-cultural bioethics based on theories related to Asian values. The author supports the premise of “children’s” autonomy and explores the differences between Western and non-Western cultures regarding claims of children’s autonomy. By comparing the legal regulations on children’s medical decisions in the USA, the UK, Japan, and Taiwan, the paper illustrates the national legal differences in children’s decision-making, even under the influence of similar Asian cultural values. The (...) author further explains, adopting Tsai’s “Confucian two-dimensional personhood theory” and Markus and Kitayama’s “Construal of Self” theory, that although Asian countries like Taiwan have historically been influenced by relational personhood dimension and interdependent self-construal orientation, individual autonomy and children’s medical decisions are significantly affected or limited by family or parental determinism. However, under the influence of global human rights values and universal bioethical principles, the conceptions, legislations, and practices have evolved towards respecting individual rights and autonomous choices. Hereby, Tsai’s two-dimensional personhood theory can balance the tension between individual autonomy and family determinism, as well as between children’s autonomy and paternalism. This theoretical framework can provide a rational resolution to the long-standing cross-cultural bioethical controversy regarding individual autonomy and family determinism, and offer insights and solutions for pediatric ethics and children’s medical decisions under Asian values. (shrink)

The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom (...) as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel. (shrink)

Human embryonic stem cell research can bring about major biomedical breakthroughs and thus contribute enormously to human welfare, yet it raises serious moral problems because it involves using human embryos for experiment. The “moral status of the human embryo” remains the core of such debates. Three different positions regarding the moral status of the human embryo can be categorised: the “all” position, the “none” position, and the “gradualist” position.The author proposes that the “gradualist” position is more plausible than the other (...) two positions. Confucius’s moral principle of jen, which proposes a unique theory of “love of gradation”, and the principle of yi, which advocates “due treatment for persons”, are then explored. The author then argues that our moral obligations to do good to other living organisms, persons, and our families are different.Putting together the “gradualist” position on the human embryo, and Confucius’s theories of “love of gradation” and “due treatment for persons”, the author concludes that the early embryo has less ethical significance than the later fetus and adult human. The moral obligation we have toward persons is clearer and stronger than that which we have toward human embryos. Embryo research is justifiable if it brings enormous welfare to human persons that cannot be otherwise achieved. The “love of gradation” requires us, however, to extend love and respect towards other entities according to their different status. We should therefore be very cautious in using human embryos for research, acknowledging the gradualist nature of their moral status. (shrink)

In July 2002, I had the honour to be invited to give a 15 minute presentation on behalf of my country, Taiwan, on the topic of “Current system of national guidance on human subject protection in medical research” in a panel discussion of the Forum for Ethical Review Committees in Asia and the Western Pacific , World Health Organization international conference held in Chin-Mai, Thailand. In that conference, four delegates from Taiwan had a rare and therefore very precious opportunity to (...) share Taiwan’s experience in establishing and promoting “human subject protection system” with delegates from 27 WHO member countries of the region. Through the vigorous exchanges of opinion in those four …. (shrink)

The truth table method, natural deduction, and the truth tree method, the three validity proving methods standardly taught in an introductory logic course, are too clumsy for the battlefield of real-life. The “short truth table” test is handy at times, but it stumbles at many other times. In this paper, we set up a general method that can beat all the methods mentioned above in a contest of speed. Furthermore, the procedure can be step-by-step paraphrased in a natural language, so (...) that, unlike the other methods, a real-life logical problem can be analyzed and explained in a real-life language too. (shrink)

Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is a capacity the possession of which enables one to make good practical judgments and thus fulfill the distinctive function of human beings. Nir Eisikovits and Dan Feldman convincingly argue that this capacity may be undermined by statistical machine-learning-based AI. The critic questions: why should we worry that AI undermines phronesis? Why can’t we epistemically defer to AI, especially when it is superintelligent? Eisikovits and Feldman acknowledge such objection but do not consider it seriously. In this (...) paper, we argue that there is a way to reconcile Eisikovits and Feldman with their critic by adopting the principle of epistemic heed, according to which we should exercise our rational capacity as much as possible while heeding a superintelligence’s output whenever possible. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of respect (specifically, the interest in having the respect of other people) in enabling blame to be effective: i.e., to achieve the desired effect of changing the blamed’s attitude and behavior. It develops an account of blame’s operations in three different cases: standard, intermediate, and proleptic. It ends by raising the worry that effective blame toward the morally distant approximates manipulation and coercion, leaving a moral residue.

Mereological theories are theories based on a binary predicate ‘being a part of’. It is believed that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. A mereological theory can be obtained by adding on top of the basic axioms of partial orderings some of the other axioms posited based on pertinent philosophical insights. Though mereological theories have aroused quite a few philosophers’ interest recently, not much has been said about their meta-logical properties. In this paper, I will look (...) into whether those theories are decidable or not. Besides, since theories of Boolean algebras are in some sense upper bounds of mereological theories which can be found in the literature, I shall also make some observations about the possibility of getting mereological theories beyond Boolean algebras. (shrink)

Quite a few results concerning the decidability of mereological theories have been given in my previous paper. But many mereological theories are still left unaccounted for. In this paper I will refine a general method for proving the undecidability of a theory and then by making use of it, I will show that most mereological theories that are strictly weaker than CEM are finitely inseparable and hence undecidable. The same results might be carried over to some extensions of those weak (...) theories by adding the fusion axiom schema. Most of the proofs to be presented in this paper take finite lattices as the base models when applying the refined method. However, I shall also point out the limitation of this kind of reduction and make some observations and conjectures concerning the decidability of stronger mereological theories. (shrink)

This paper argues that debates between the Confucians and Mohists in Classical China anticipate contemporary discussions in political philosophy. Specifically, their debates about our responsibilities to other people are akin to debates between Rawlsans, Cosmopolitans, and Utilitarians about the content of our political obligations to other people, and about the proper scope of application of norms of justice.

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate P which stands for the relation “being a part of”. Traditionally, P must be a partial ordering, that is, ${\forall{x}Pxx, \forall{x}\forall{y}((Pxy\land Pyx)\to x=y)}$ and ${\forall{x}\forall{y}\forall{z}((Pxy\land Pyz)\to Pxz))}$ are three basic mereological axioms. The best-known mereological theory is “general extensional mereology”, which is axiomatized by the three basic axioms plus the following axiom and axiom schema: (Strong Supplementation) ${\forall{x}\forall{y}(\neg Pyx\to \exists z(Pzy\land \neg Ozx))}$ , where Oxy means ${\exists (...) z(Pzx\land Pzy)}$ , and (Fusion) ${\exists x\alpha \to \exists z\forall y(Oyz\leftrightarrow \exists x(\alpha \land Oyx))}$ , for any formula α where z and y do not occur free. In this paper, I will show that general extensional mereology is decidable, and will also point out that the decidability of the first-order approximation of the theory of complete Boolean algebras can be shown in the same way. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of friendship and the nature of exploitation, and the intersection of the two phenomena. It argues that because vulnerability is an essential aspect of friendship, the possibility of exploitation is ineliminable in friendship. Considers how we might, nonetheless, reduce our exposure to unfair treatment in friendships.

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate which stands for the relation “being a part of” and it has been strongly suggested that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. Mereological theories owe their origin to Leśniewski. However, some more recent authors, such as Simons as well as Casati and Varzi, have reformulated mereology in a way most logicians today are familiar with. It turns out that any theory which can be (...) formed by using the reformulated mereological axioms or axiom schemas is in a sense a subtheory of the elementary theory of Boolean algebras or of the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras. It is known that the theory of partial orderings is undecidable while the elementary theory of Boolean algebras and the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras are decidable. In this paper, I will look into the behaviors in terms of decidability of those mereological theories located in between. More precisely, I will give a comprehensive picture of the said issue by offering solutions to the open problems which I have raised in some of my papers published previously. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that it counts against one morally if one is close and good friends with a bad person. Some argue that one acts badly by counting a bad person as a good friend, because such friendships carry significant moral risks. Others locate the moral badness in one’s moral psychology, suggesting that one becomes objectionably complacent by being good friends with a bad person. In this paper, I argue that none of these accounts are plausible. In fact, I propose (...) that the starting intuition, that there is something pro tanto morally bad in being close and good friends with a bad person, does not track ethical reality. A person’s friend list isn’t at all in-principle informative of a person’s moral character. I also diagnose why we nonetheless have this mistaken intuition. I propose that friendships are fragmented in two crucial aspects. Once we observe these fragmentations, our initially mistaken intuition completely goes away. (shrink)

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics (4PBE) has, since the 1970s, been increasingly developed as a universal bioethics method. Despite its wide acceptance and popularity, the 4PBE has received many challenges to its cross-cultural plausibility. This paper first specifies the principles and characteristics of ancient Chinese medical ethics (ACME), then makes a comparison between ACME and the 4PBE with a view to testing out the 4PBE's cross-cultural plausibility when applied to one particular but very extensive and prominent cultural context. (...) The result shows that the concepts of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice are clearly identifiable in ACME. Yet, being influenced by certain socio-cultural factors, those applying the 4PBE in Chinese society may tend to adopt a "beneficence-oriented", rather than an "autonomy-oriented" approach, which, in general, is dissimilar to the practice of contemporary Western bioethics, where "autonomy often triumphs". (shrink)

Hua-Ching Ni encourages each person to go beyond religion and theology in order to rediscover his or her own spiritual nature. He provides the tools with which one can unlock the spiritual treasures of the universe, lighting the way to internal and external harmony and fulfilment.

In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn (...) from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn. (shrink)

Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating (...) the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner. (shrink)

This paper examines whether the modern bioethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice proposed by Beauchamp and Childress are existent in, compatible with, or acceptable to the leading Chinese moral philosophy—the ethics of Confucius. The author concludes that the moral values which the four prima facie principles uphold are expressly identifiable in Confucius’ teachings. However, Confucius’ emphasis on the filial piety, family values, the “love of gradation”, altruism of people, and the “role specified relation oriented ethics” will (...) inevitably influence the “specification” and application of these bioethical principles and hence tend to grant “beneficence” a favourable position that diminishes the respect for individual rights and autonomy. In contrast, the centrality of respect for autonomy and its stance of “first among equals” are more and more stressed in Western liberal viewpoints. Nevertheless, if the Confucian “doctrine of Mean” and a balanced “two dimensional personhood” approach are properly employed, this will require both theorists and clinicians, who are facing medical ethical dilemmas, of searching to attain due mean out of competing moral principles thus preventing “giving beneficence a priority” or “asserting autonomy must triumph”. (shrink)

Ben shu chan shu de nei rong shi zhi shi zhong ya fang wen hua de shen tou yu jiao liu.

The use of technology in elite sports is becoming increasingly widespread, but its use is not without limits, especially considering factors such as fairness and health. This paper aims to explore under what condition the use of technology in elite sports should be restricted, particularly focusing on the concept of “achievement”. Delving into such a question is practically beneficial as we can justifiably maximize the use of technology in elite sports within the boundary set forth by the condition. Focusing on (...) the concept of “achievement” is advantageous as it helps determine the appropriate extent of technology use from the perspective of the essence of sports. To achieve this aim, we develop and defend an argument against performance-enhancing technology in sport, called the Weaken and Illusory Athletic Achievements Argument (WIAAA), the conclusion of which states that for any athlete S, ceteris paribus, S ought not attain athletic aims that could have been attained by S without enhancement or athletic aims that could not have been attained by S without enhancement, with enhancement. Based on the WIAAA, the use of technology in elite sports is justified if and only if it does not diminish or nullify athletic achievement. (shrink)

Like more than two hundred thousand other Americans, George Floyd howled horribly for air before his death. But his breathlessness was not born from a virus. He was murdered with the burden of anti...