This book provides a fresh examination of the cosmopolitan project of post-war Europe from a variety of perspectives. It explores the ways in which European cosmopolitanism can be theorized differently if we take into account histories which have rarely been at the forefront of such understandings. It also uses neglected historical resources to draw out new and unexpected entanglements and connections between understandings of European cosmopolitanism both in Europe and elsewhere. The final part of the book places European cosmopolitanism in (...) tension with contemporary postcolonial configurations around diaspora, migration, and austerity. Overall, it seeks to draw attention to the ways in which Europe s posited others have always been very much a part of Europe s colonial histories and its postcolonial present. ". (shrink)

This paper responds to Shashi Tharoor’s criticism that “much of Narayan’s prose reads like a translation.” He does not name any writers in another language to back up his claim and without doing so there is an explanation for his impression, but one which leaves it looking misleading.

What is R.K. Narayan’s position in relation to his story “Such perfection”? It is natural to interpret him as conveying a message similar to one Western readers are familiar with from ancient Greek myths: fear perfection; it offends the gods. But there is room for a more complicated interpretation.

I propose that some cases of underrepresentation reflect different conceptions of what is an appropriate time frame for assessment, using the publication history of R.K. Narayan to illustrate my hypothesis.

Nobody claims to be a proponent of white feminism, but according to the critique presented in this article, many in fact are. I argue that feminism that does not take multiple axes of oppression into account is bad in three ways: it strategically undermines solidarity between women; it risks inconsistency by advocating justice and equality for some women but not all; and it impedes the ultimate function of feminism function by employing epistemological “master’s tools” that stand in antithesis to feminist (...) emancipatory work. In investigating ethnocentrism in feminism, I develop the idea of latent ethnocentrism, which occupies the space between meaning that is generated from reference to the self and overt racism. I identify an epistemological prong in the ethnocentrism charge against feminism, where I draw on bell hooks’ interlocking axes-model of oppression to answer why the ethnocentrism problem is important for feminism and what its underlying epistemological causes are. I draw on Uma Narayan’s destabilization of cultural dualisms to argue that they do not serve emancipatory agendas. There is a mutually constitutive relation between language that informs our understanding, on the one hand, and the political agendas that produce this language to sustain the male and the western norm as center, on the other hand. I call this circular and reciprocally reinforcing mechanism the episteme-politic. I conclude that the ethnocentrism problem is not merely an issue of strategy or feminist consistency but of shooting oneself in the foot by uncritically accepting patriarchal concepts for feminist politics. (shrink)

When evaluating R.K. Narayan, Shashi Tharoor seems to commit himself to these theses: Narayan has a natural style of writing, or a style which is second nature to him; to go significantly beyond his limited range he would have to experiment more with language, reducing the accessibility of his fictions. I cast doubt on the first of these by speculating that Narayan’s middle-of-the-road style required suppressing linguistic innovations in earlier drafts.

This paper responds to the question of whether the Internet has made lectures obsolete and Matthew Pickles’ investigation of why lectures persist. It is written as a pastiche of R.K. Narayan, about whom a somewhat parallel question is probably asked. Pickles refers to a logic lecturer so dry people went swimming, and a pastiche approach is an alternative.

This paper argues against a thesis that Shashi Tharoor seems to accept: that R.K. Narayan’s style is bound up with a very specific context, of people left behind by the times in South India. It cannot deal with other subject matter. I present a little fiction to challenge the thesis.

Shashi Tharoor criticizes R.K. Narayan in the following way: “Narayan’s prose was like a bullock-cart: a vehicle that can move only in one gear, is unable to turn, accelerate or reverse, and remains yoked to traditional creatures who have long since been overtaken.” I think there is a quick defence, which is that it is very unlikely that one can write the different kinds of works he did without being able to significantly change pace; but there is an (...) objection from Joseph Conrad criticism. (shrink)

Despite all its merits, the vast majority of critical attention devoted to colonialist literature restricts itself by severely bracketing the political context of culture and history. This typical facet of humanistic closure requires the critic systematically to avoid an analysis of the domination, manipulation, exploitation, and disfranchisement that are inevitably involved in the construction of any cultural artifact or relationship. I can best illustrate such closures in the field of colonialist discourse with two brief examples. In her book The Colonial (...) Encounter, which contrasts the colonial representations of three European and three non-European writers, M. M. Mahood skirts the political issue quite explicitly by arguing that she chose those authors precisely because they are “innocent of emotional exploitation of the colonial scene” and are “distanced” from the politics of domination.`1We find a more interesting example of this closure in Homi Bhabha’s criticism. While otherwise provocative and illuminating, his work rests on two assumptions—the unity of the “colonial subject” and the “ambivalence” of colonial discourse—that are inadequately problematized and, I feel, finally unwarranted and unacceptable. In rejecting Edward Said’s “suggestion that colonial power and discourse is possessed entirely by the colonizer,” Bhabha asserts, without providing any explanation, the unity of the “colonial subject .”2 I do not wish to rule out, a priori, the possibility that at some rarefied theoretical level the varied material and discursive antagonisms between conquerors and natives can be reduced to the workings of a single “subject”; but such a unity, let alone its value, must be demonstrated, not assumed. Though he cites Frantz Fanon, Bhabha completely ignored Fanon’s definition of the conqueror/native relation as a “Manichean” struggle—a definition that is not a fanciful metaphoric caricature but an accurate representation of a profound conflict.3 1. M. M. Mahood, The Colonial Encounter: A Reading of Six Novels , pp. 170, 171; and see p. 3. As many other studies demonstrate, the emotional innocence and the distance of the six writers whom Mahood has chosen—Joseph Conrad, E. M. Forster, Graham Greene, Chinua Achebe, R. K. Narayan, and V. S. Naipaul—are, at best, highly debatable.2. Homi K. Bhabha, “The Other Question—The Stereotype and Colonial Discourse,” Screen 24 : 25, 19.3. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington , p. 41. Abdul R. JanMohamed, assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial Africa. He is a founding member and associate editor of Cultural Critique and is currently working on a study of Richard Wright. (shrink)

This paper identifies the field of work as an adventure of consciousness and uses a new phrase to describe it—WORKSHIP, work as worship. Based primarily on the classical psycho-philosophy of India, laid down in the vedantic literature, this model of workship attempts a shift in paradigm from the Greek concept of work as 'ponos' or pain to a liberating dimension of work, the ultimate aims of which are ananda (bliss) and mukti (freedom). Examining the various elements that constitute workship, the (...) author comes up with the fourfold paths of workship: discipline, righteousness, sacrifice and transcendence, and analyses them in detail. Finally, the paper argues that workship has the potential to unfold man's latent spirituality for a sustainable world order. 1. Rene Fonere; 'Krishnamurti and Modern Thought', in The Mind of J. Krishnamurti (New Delhi: Jaico Publishing House, 1971), p. 170. 2. Willis Harman and John Hormann; Creative Work: The Constructive Role of Business in a Transform ing Society (Indianapolis: Knowledge Systems, Inc., 1993), p. 13. 3. S.K. Chakraborty Management by Values (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 166. 4. Sri Aurobindo; 'Right Attitude in Work', quoted in All India Magazine (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Society, April 1991), p. 5. 5. Ibid., p. 32 6. 'The Meaning of Work', in Man, Work and Society, ed. William Nosow and William H. Form (New York: Basic Books Publishing Company Inc., 1962), p. 18. 7. Wayne W. Dyer; You Will See It When You Believe It (London: Arrow Books, 1989), p. 41. 8. 'The Meaning of Work' (see n. 6 above), p. 4. 9. Ibid., p. 35. 10. Swami Gambhirananda; 'Taitiriya Upanishad', in Eight Upanishads (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977), Vol. 1, p. 392. 11. Jyoti Sobel and Prem; The Hierarchy of Minds—A Compilation from the Works of Sri Aurobindo and The Mother (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Publication Department, 1991), p. 55. 12. Ibid., p. 69. 13. Ibid., p. 76. 14. Ibid., Introduction, p. XIII. 15. World Scripture: A Comparative Anthology of Sacred Texts, ed. Andrew Wilson (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1993). 16. Chakraborty, Management by Values (n. 3 above), p. 164. 17. Swami Vivekananda; Pearls of Wisdom (Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1988), p. 202. 18. The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. Shri man Narayan (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1968), Vol. 4, Chapter 3. 19. Sri Aurobindo; The Message of the Gita (Pondi cherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1977), p. 80. 20. World Scripture (n. 15 above), p. 638. 21. Ibid., p. 620. 22. Ibid. 23. Ronald Robertson; Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 93. (shrink)

The paper considers certain extensions of the system LC introduced in Dunn & Meyer 1997. LC is a structurally free system , but it has combinators as formulas in the place of structural rules. We consider two ways to extend LC with conjunction and disjunction depending on whether they distribute over each other or not. We prove the elimination theorem for the systems. At the end of the paper we give a Routley-Meyer style semantics for the distributive extension, including some (...) new definitions and an algorithm which are used in proving a representation theorem in general, i.e., for arbitrary combinators. (shrink)

Structurally free logic LC was introduced in [4]. A natural extension of LC, in particular, in a sequent formulation, is by conjunction and disjunction that do not distribute over each other. We define a set theoretical semantics for these logics via constructing a representation of a lattice that we extend by intensional operations. Canonically, minimally overlapping filter-ideal pairs are used; this construction avoids the use of an equivalent of the axiom of choice and lends transparency to the structure. We also (...) discuss adapting the present semantics for substructural logics, as well as, the question of cannnonicity of LC+. (shrink)

In Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: A Case Study in 15th-Century Fides-Ratio Controversy, K.M. Ziebart presents an account of the Cusan epistemology as a fascinating late-medieval attempt to definitively harmonize faith and reason.

I examine a number of recent challenges to traditional individualist epistemologies. In chapter I, I examine Margaret Gilbert's claim that certain types of communities, "plural subjects," are capable of having what she calls "collective beliefs." In chapter II, I examine Lynn Hankinson Nelson's claim that communities, and not individuals, are the primary epistemological agents. In chapter III, I examine Miriam Solomon's claim that scientific rationality is a property of communities, not individuals. In chapter IV, I examine Richard Rorty's claim that (...) solidarity is the end of inquiry. Finally, in chapter V, I examine Helen Longino's claim that scientific knowledge and inquiry are mediated by processes that are irreducibly social. ;I argue that many philosophers who argue for a more social epistemology are mistaken about what role the community plays in inquiry, and that only individuals are epistemic agents--only they believe, know, and act rationally. In this respect, traditional individualist epistemologies are correct. I also argue that what is distinctively and irreducibly social about inquiry are the norms and processes that mediate our interaction with each other. These norms and processes require numerous individuals to sustain them. Further, I argue that given this understanding of the role of the community in inquiry we are required to change our understanding of both the nature and role of the individual knower, and the project of epistemology. Individual knowers are dynamic, changing their conception of themselves as they interact in the world with others. An integral but hitherto neglected part of epistemology is the evaluation of the social processes that mediate our interaction with others. (shrink)