It is advisable to treat some sorts of discourse about fiction with the aid of an intensional operator "in such-And-Such fiction...." the operator may appear either explicitly or tacitly. It may be analyzed in terms of similarity of worlds, As follows: "in the fiction f, A" means that a is true in those of the worlds where f is told as known fact rather than fiction that differ least from our world, Or from the belief worlds of the community in (...) which the fiction originated. (shrink)

Current textbooks in formal semantics are all versions of, or introductions to, the same paradigm in semantic theory: Montague Grammar. Knowledge of Meaning is based on different assumptions and a different history. It provides the only introduction to truth- theoretic semantics for natural languages, fully integrating semantic theory into the modern Chomskyan program in linguistic theory and connecting linguistic semantics to research elsewhere in cognitive psychology and philosophy. As such, it better fits into a modern graduate or undergraduate program in (...) linguistics, cognitive science, or philosophy. Furthermore, since the technical tools it employs are much simpler to teach and to master, Knowledge of Meaning can be taught by someone who is not primarily a semanticist. Linguistic semantics cannot be studied as a stand-alone subject but only as part of cognitive psychology, the authors assert. It is the study of a particular human cognitive competence governing the meanings of words and phrases. Larson and Segal argue that speakers have unconscious knowledge of the semantic rules of their language, and they present concrete, empirically motivated proposals about a formal theory of this competence based on the work of Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson. The theory is extended to a wide range of constructions occurring in natural language, including predicates, proper nouns, pronouns and demonstratives, quantifiers, definite descriptions, anaphoric expressions, clausal complements, and adverbs. Knowledge of Meaning gives equal weight to philosophical, empirical, and formal discussions. It addresses not only the empirical issues of linguistic semantics but also its fundamental conceptual questions, including the relation of truth to meaning and the methodology of semantic theorizing. Numerous exercises are included in the book. (shrink)

1. Pŏmbu ŭi p'ungnyu chŏngsin ch'ŏnmyŏng kwa "Hwarang oesa" kusang : kungmin todŏk seugi wa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 2. Nae ka ponŭn Pŏmbu wa Pak Chŏng-hŭi ŭi sasŭng kwan'gye : Pak Chŏng-hŭi chipkwŏn ch'ogi ŭi chŏngch'i kihoek kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 3. Han t'ojong sasangga ŭi sam kwa saenggak : iyagi ka innŭn Pŏmbu kim chŏngsŏl yŏnbo -- 4. Samin chŏngdam : chŏngch'i, kyŏngje, munhwa e kŏlch'yŏ -- 5. Yŏhaenggi : kurŭm ttara mul ttara ch'ŏlli rŭl kada.

1. Yu Hyŏng-wŏn ŭi ppuri wa Pan'gyehak ŭl nonhada -- 1.1. Pan'gye Yu Hyŏng-wŏn kagye punsŏk -- 1.2. Chiyŏkhak ŭrosŏ Pan'gyehak yŏn'gu -- 2. Pan'gye Sŏnsaeng palchach'wi rŭl ch'aja kada -- 2.1. Sirhak ŭi mek'a, Puan Uban-dong -- 2.2. Pan'gye Sŏnsaeng i namgin palchach'wi -- 2.3. Puan chiyŏk Yugyo munhwa yusan ŭi hyŏnhwang kwa kwaje -- 3. Pan'gye Sŏnsaeng ŭl kirida -- 3.1. Puan Tongnim Sŏwŏn ŭi kŏllip kwa pyŏnch'ŏn e taehan yŏn'gu -- 3.2. Tŏkch'on Yang Tŭk-chung ŭi kagye wa (...) ch'usung e kwanhan yŏn'gu -- 3.3. Hong Kye-hŭi Kyŏngseron ŭi chaejijŏk kiban. (shrink)

U drugom dijelu članka »Neki od problemskih aspekata ‘Projekta svjetski etos’« autor pokušava istaknuti daljnje kritičke momente samog Projekta. K ovim kritičkim točkama pripadaju, između ostalog, Küngov pojednostavljeni pogled na pojedine etos-tradicije, nadalje tu su političke implikacije Projekta te na kraju upitna mogućnost praktične primjene temeljnih teza projekta uopće. Pojedine su etos-tradicije prema našem mišljenju mnogo složenije nego li to autor Hans Küng vidi. Njegovu tezu da moralne norme pojedinih religija ukazuju prvotno na ono što on označava pod pojmom ‘Humanum’, (...) smatramo isto tako neodrživom. Također se pojavljuju problemi kada se radi o političkim implikacijama Projekta: tezu – religije igraju odlučujuću ulogu u stvaranju jednog globalnog, političkog mira – smatramo također neodrživom, upravo zbog toga jer sama politika prije religije ovdje igra puno važniju ulogu. Sve ovo upućuje na to da Projekt stupa na svoje granice upravo tamo gdje se radi o praktičnoj primjeni njegovih glavnih teza.Im zweiten Teil des Aufsatzes „Einige von den problematischen Aspekten des ,Projekts Weltethos’” wird der Versuch unternommen, die weitere problematische Aspekte des Projekts Weltethos hervorheben. Zu diesen weiteren kritischen Punkten gehören unter anderem vereinfachte Sicht der einzelnen Ethos- Traditionen, auch weiter politischen Implikationen des Projekts und am Ende die fragwürdige Möglichkeit der praktischen Anwendbarkeit der zentralen Thesen des Projekts überhaupt. Die einzelne Ethos- Traditionen sind unserer Meinung nach viel komplexer als es Autor Hans Küng sieht. Seine These, dass die moralischen Normen der einzelnen Religionen auf ein Humanum hinweisen, halten wir für unhaltbar. Ebenso ergeben sich die Probleme, wenn es um die politischen Fragen geht: die These – Religionen spielen ausschlaggebende Rolle bei der Schaffung eines globalpolitischen Friedens, finden wir auch als unhaltbar, gerade deswegen, weil selbst Politik vor der Religion hier viel wichtigere Rolle spielt. All das weist darauf hin, dass das Projekt auf seine Grenzen stoßt besonders dort wo es um die praktischen Anwendbarkeiten seiner wichtigen Thesen geht. (shrink)

Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I critically examine (...) Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions. (shrink)

Devitt has developed an interesting defense of realism against the threats posed by the Pessimistic Induction and the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives. Devitt argues that the best explanation for the success of our current theories, and the fact that they are superior to the theories they replaced, is that they were developed and tested with the aid of better methods than the methods used to develop and test the many theories that were discarded earlier in the history of science. It (...) is no surprise that theories developed earlier in the history of science needed to be replaced. But our current theories are different, having been developed and tested with the aid of these more recently developed superior methods. I critically analyze Devitt’s defense of realism. I argue that recent developments in methodology cannot support the claims Devitt makes. I present an argument I call the “Argument from Unconceived Methods.” Given the history of science, it seems likely that scientists will continue to develop new methods in the future. And some of these methods will enable scientists to generate data that cannot be reconciled with the currently accepted theories. Consequently, it seems that our current best theories are not immune from being replaced in the future by radically different theories. (shrink)

I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest (...) that most scientific theories are apt to be discarded sometime, superseded by new theories that better serve scientists’ new research interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that many of the theories we currently accept, despite their many impressive successes, will be discarded sometime in the future. But I also argue that discarded theories are not always aptly characterized as a sign of failure or as a sign of some sort of shortcoming with science. Theories are discarded because scientists are making advances in their pursuit of knowledge. Thus, discarded theories are often a sign of the good health of science. Scientists are responding to their changing research interests. (shrink)

Structurally free logic LC was introduced in [4]. A natural extension of LC, in particular, in a sequent formulation, is by conjunction and disjunction that do not distribute over each other. We define a set theoretical semantics for these logics via constructing a representation of a lattice that we extend by intensional operations. Canonically, minimally overlapping filter-ideal pairs are used; this construction avoids the use of an equivalent of the axiom of choice and lends transparency to the structure. We also (...) discuss adapting the present semantics for substructural logics, as well as, the question of cannnonicity of LC+. (shrink)

I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture (...) of science, a picture that figured prominently in the general education natural science courses that Conant taught at Harvard. On the other hand, I show that Kuhn’s Structure contains important contributions that do not figure in Conant’s picture of science. I argue that the following three themes in Structure do not originate with Conant: (1) the concept of “normal science”; (2) “the problem of scientific revolutions,” that is, the apparent threat posed by radical changes of theory in science; and (3) Kuhn’s emphasis on the social dimensions of science, specifically the social structure of research communities. (shrink)

Fourteen experienced psychiatric nurses participated in a pilot study aimed at describing the experiential aspect of making decisions for the patient. In-depth interviews focused on conflicts, were transcribed, coded, and categorized according to the Grounded Theory method. The theoretical construct, 'modifying autonomy' and its dimensions, such as being aware of the patient's vulnerability, caring for and caring about the patient, were identified. The findings in this study make clear the need for further research into the experiential aspect of ethical decision-making (...) in psychiatric practice. (shrink)

This paper takes a conceptual look at cosmopolitanism and the related issue of what it means to be human in order to arrive at an alternative conceptual framework which is free from empiricist assumptions. With reference to a discussion on Homer’s Iliad , the author develops a ‘humanist’ model of discerning humanity. This model is then compared and contrasted with Martha Nussbaum’s version of cosmopolitanism. The notion of ‘aspect-seeing’ discussed by Wittgenstein in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is (...) also examined in order to shed light on what it involves to discern humanity. Finally, racism is discussed from the philosophical perspective elaborated in order to highlight its distinctive conceptual features. It is hoped that this paper can refocus our attention on important issues concerning the basis of what it means to see human beings as human beings. (shrink)

In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser criticises findings by Kelly et al. that speak against the moral/conventional distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed . Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a M/C distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight (...) the implications for the moral/conventional theory. (shrink)

Clinician gate-keeping is the process whereby healthcare providers prevent access to eligible patients for research recruitment. This paper contends that clinician gate-keeping violates three principles that underpin international ethical guidelines: respect for persons or autonomy; beneficence or a favourable balance of risks and potential benefits; and justice or a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. In order to stimulate further research and debate, three possible strategies are also presented to eliminate gate-keeping: partnership with professional researchers; collaborative research (...) design and clinician education. (shrink)

Magie a estetika odkouzlení u Collingwooda = Magic and the aesthetics of disenchantment in Collingwood / Jakub Stejskal -- Americký trávník jako cvičiště občanské ctnosti = American lawn as a training ground for civic virtue / Jan Hlávka -- Patočkova raná filosofie umění = Patočka's early philosophy of art / Jan Josl -- Koncepce a priori Mikela Dufrenna = Mikel Dufrenne's concept of the a priori / Felix Borecký -- A priori imaginace = The a priori of imagination / Mikel (...) Dufrenne. (shrink)

It is well documented that the higher the socioeconomic status (SES) of patients, the better their health and life expectancy. SES also influences the use of health services—the higher the patients' SES, the more time and specialised health services provided. This leads to the following question: should clinicians give priority to individual patients with low SES in order to enhance health equity? Some argue that equity is best preserved by physicians who remain loyal to ‘ordinary medical fairness’ in non-ideal circumstances (...) when health disparities persist; ie, doctors should allocate care according to needs only and treat everyone with equal regard by being neutral with respect to patients' SES. This paper furthers a discussion of this view by questioning how equitable needs relate to SES. To clarify, it distinguishes between four versions of ‘healthcare need’ and approaches an acceptable conceptualisation of the notion supported by Norman Daniels' theory on health equity. It concludes that doctors should remain neutral to patients' SES in cases in which several patients require the same health care. However, equitable health care requires considerations of the impact of socioeconomic factors (SEF) on patients' capacity to benefit from the care. Remaining neutral towards patients' SES in this respect does not promote equal regard. It follows that priority setting on the basis of SEF is required in fair clinical distribution of care, eg, through allocating more time to patients with low SES. In order to advance equity accurately, the concept of ordinary medical fairness should be amplified according to this clarification. (shrink)

Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we might better measure normal science in (...) future studies. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Papers presented at an annual inter-disciplinary seminar held to facilitate the 60th birthday of Kalarikkal Poulose Aleaz, b. 1947, theologist from Kerala, India during 20-21 September 2007.

Statʹi, razmyshlenii︠a︡, ocherki -- Pisʹma v redakt︠s︡ii -- Perepiska s chlenami Soi︠u︡za svobodomysli︠a︡shchikh -- Pisʹma k M.I. Barskoĭ -- Perepiska mezhdu K.P. Krizhanovskim i I.G. Khusidom -- Iz materialov dela K.P. Krizhanovskogo.

Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately (...) rejects the Continuity Thesis, and I present further evidence to show that the Continuity Thesis is false. I also argue that it is the systematicity of science that ultimately grounds the epistemic authority of science. Hoyningen-Huene thus draws attention to an important feature of science that explains the place of science in contemporary society. (shrink)

Approximately 400,000 people die outside US hospitals or chronic care facilities each year. While there has been some recent movement towards initiating procedures for prehospital Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, the most common situation in the US is that emergency medical systems (EMS) personnel are not authorized to pronounce patients dead, but are required to attempt resuscitation with all of the modalities at their disposal in virtually all patients. It is unfair and probably unrealistic for EMS personnel to have to (...) make a determination of the validity of a non-standard prehospital DNR order (for example, a living will or a durable power of attorney for health care). Existing prehospital DNR protocols range from being very restrictive in the scope of patients allowed to participate and in their implementation, to those that are more liberal. Potential benefits of prehospital DNR orders include freeing up vital personnel and material for use by those who would more fully benefit, and alleviating the enormous emotional strain on patients, families, EMS personnel, and hospital medical staffs involved in unwanted resuscitations that only prolong the dying process. Given this, prehospital DNR orders present several legal and moral problems. These include proper patient identification, the nature of the document itself, precautions incorporated into a DNR system to prevent misuse, potential liability for EMS and hospital personnel, and potential errors in implementation. Functioning prehospital DNR systems need to include: 1) specific legislation detailing the circumstances in which such a document could be used, the wording of such a document, and protection from liability for those implementing the document's directives; 2) having the currently valid document immediately available to the EMS personnel or base station doctors; and 3) acceptable means of identifying the patient. Relatively few US jurisdictions as yet have a prehospital DNR order system, although it is an idea whose time is overdue. Society's imperative to use available technology has pushed us into a situation where a technique to save those with a potential to continue a meaningful and wanted existence is being used indiscriminately to prolong the agony of death. (shrink)