Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I critically examine (...) Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions. (shrink)

Devitt has developed an interesting defense of realism against the threats posed by the Pessimistic Induction and the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives. Devitt argues that the best explanation for the success of our current theories, and the fact that they are superior to the theories they replaced, is that they were developed and tested with the aid of better methods than the methods used to develop and test the many theories that were discarded earlier in the history of science. It (...) is no surprise that theories developed earlier in the history of science needed to be replaced. But our current theories are different, having been developed and tested with the aid of these more recently developed superior methods. I critically analyze Devitt’s defense of realism. I argue that recent developments in methodology cannot support the claims Devitt makes. I present an argument I call the “Argument from Unconceived Methods.” Given the history of science, it seems likely that scientists will continue to develop new methods in the future. And some of these methods will enable scientists to generate data that cannot be reconciled with the currently accepted theories. Consequently, it seems that our current best theories are not immune from being replaced in the future by radically different theories. (shrink)

I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest (...) that most scientific theories are apt to be discarded sometime, superseded by new theories that better serve scientists’ new research interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that many of the theories we currently accept, despite their many impressive successes, will be discarded sometime in the future. But I also argue that discarded theories are not always aptly characterized as a sign of failure or as a sign of some sort of shortcoming with science. Theories are discarded because scientists are making advances in their pursuit of knowledge. Thus, discarded theories are often a sign of the good health of science. Scientists are responding to their changing research interests. (shrink)

Structurally free logic LC was introduced in [4]. A natural extension of LC, in particular, in a sequent formulation, is by conjunction and disjunction that do not distribute over each other. We define a set theoretical semantics for these logics via constructing a representation of a lattice that we extend by intensional operations. Canonically, minimally overlapping filter-ideal pairs are used; this construction avoids the use of an equivalent of the axiom of choice and lends transparency to the structure. We also (...) discuss adapting the present semantics for substructural logics, as well as, the question of cannnonicity of LC+. (shrink)

I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture (...) of science, a picture that figured prominently in the general education natural science courses that Conant taught at Harvard. On the other hand, I show that Kuhn’s Structure contains important contributions that do not figure in Conant’s picture of science. I argue that the following three themes in Structure do not originate with Conant: (1) the concept of “normal science”; (2) “the problem of scientific revolutions,” that is, the apparent threat posed by radical changes of theory in science; and (3) Kuhn’s emphasis on the social dimensions of science, specifically the social structure of research communities. (shrink)

Fourteen experienced psychiatric nurses participated in a pilot study aimed at describing the experiential aspect of making decisions for the patient. In-depth interviews focused on conflicts, were transcribed, coded, and categorized according to the Grounded Theory method. The theoretical construct, 'modifying autonomy' and its dimensions, such as being aware of the patient's vulnerability, caring for and caring about the patient, were identified. The findings in this study make clear the need for further research into the experiential aspect of ethical decision-making (...) in psychiatric practice. (shrink)

A review of empirical and theoretical work on reasoning and linguistic inference, which will be a useful introduction to the subject for students of language and thought. The book focuses on the relationship between what people do and what people are supposed to do when making inferences.

In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser criticises findings by Kelly et al. that speak against the moral/conventional distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed . Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a M/C distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight (...) the implications for the moral/conventional theory. (shrink)

Clinician gate-keeping is the process whereby healthcare providers prevent access to eligible patients for research recruitment. This paper contends that clinician gate-keeping violates three principles that underpin international ethical guidelines: respect for persons or autonomy; beneficence or a favourable balance of risks and potential benefits; and justice or a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. In order to stimulate further research and debate, three possible strategies are also presented to eliminate gate-keeping: partnership with professional researchers; collaborative research (...) design and clinician education. (shrink)

This study analyzed 16 potential ethics-related problems associated with use and abuse of video news releases (VNRs) by public relations practitioners and electronic journalists. Causes and possible solutions to the problems were suggested and model ethics code guidelines were developed. Moral rules, moral ideals, theories of ethics, public relations theories, and electronic journalism theories were used to provide a general foundation for the analysis. A more specific foundation was provided by guidelines from a variety of media codes of ethics.

Magie a estetika odkouzlení u Collingwooda = Magic and the aesthetics of disenchantment in Collingwood / Jakub Stejskal -- Americký trávník jako cvičiště občanské ctnosti = American lawn as a training ground for civic virtue / Jan Hlávka -- Patočkova raná filosofie umění = Patočka's early philosophy of art / Jan Josl -- Koncepce a priori Mikela Dufrenna = Mikel Dufrenne's concept of the a priori / Felix Borecký -- A priori imaginace = The a priori of imagination / Mikel (...) Dufrenne. (shrink)

It is well documented that the higher the socioeconomic status (SES) of patients, the better their health and life expectancy. SES also influences the use of health services—the higher the patients' SES, the more time and specialised health services provided. This leads to the following question: should clinicians give priority to individual patients with low SES in order to enhance health equity? Some argue that equity is best preserved by physicians who remain loyal to ‘ordinary medical fairness’ in non-ideal circumstances (...) when health disparities persist; ie, doctors should allocate care according to needs only and treat everyone with equal regard by being neutral with respect to patients' SES. This paper furthers a discussion of this view by questioning how equitable needs relate to SES. To clarify, it distinguishes between four versions of ‘healthcare need’ and approaches an acceptable conceptualisation of the notion supported by Norman Daniels' theory on health equity. It concludes that doctors should remain neutral to patients' SES in cases in which several patients require the same health care. However, equitable health care requires considerations of the impact of socioeconomic factors (SEF) on patients' capacity to benefit from the care. Remaining neutral towards patients' SES in this respect does not promote equal regard. It follows that priority setting on the basis of SEF is required in fair clinical distribution of care, eg, through allocating more time to patients with low SES. In order to advance equity accurately, the concept of ordinary medical fairness should be amplified according to this clarification. (shrink)

Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we might better measure normal science in (...) future studies. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Papers presented at an annual inter-disciplinary seminar held to facilitate the 60th birthday of Kalarikkal Poulose Aleaz, b. 1947, theologist from Kerala, India during 20-21 September 2007.

Statʹi, razmyshlenii︠a︡, ocherki -- Pisʹma v redakt︠s︡ii -- Perepiska s chlenami Soi︠u︡za svobodomysli︠a︡shchikh -- Pisʹma k M.I. Barskoĭ -- Perepiska mezhdu K.P. Krizhanovskim i I.G. Khusidom -- Iz materialov dela K.P. Krizhanovskogo.

Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately (...) rejects the Continuity Thesis, and I present further evidence to show that the Continuity Thesis is false. I also argue that it is the systematicity of science that ultimately grounds the epistemic authority of science. Hoyningen-Huene thus draws attention to an important feature of science that explains the place of science in contemporary society. (shrink)

Approximately 400,000 people die outside US hospitals or chronic care facilities each year. While there has been some recent movement towards initiating procedures for prehospital Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, the most common situation in the US is that emergency medical systems (EMS) personnel are not authorized to pronounce patients dead, but are required to attempt resuscitation with all of the modalities at their disposal in virtually all patients. It is unfair and probably unrealistic for EMS personnel to have to (...) make a determination of the validity of a non-standard prehospital DNR order (for example, a living will or a durable power of attorney for health care). Existing prehospital DNR protocols range from being very restrictive in the scope of patients allowed to participate and in their implementation, to those that are more liberal. Potential benefits of prehospital DNR orders include freeing up vital personnel and material for use by those who would more fully benefit, and alleviating the enormous emotional strain on patients, families, EMS personnel, and hospital medical staffs involved in unwanted resuscitations that only prolong the dying process. Given this, prehospital DNR orders present several legal and moral problems. These include proper patient identification, the nature of the document itself, precautions incorporated into a DNR system to prevent misuse, potential liability for EMS and hospital personnel, and potential errors in implementation. Functioning prehospital DNR systems need to include: 1) specific legislation detailing the circumstances in which such a document could be used, the wording of such a document, and protection from liability for those implementing the document's directives; 2) having the currently valid document immediately available to the EMS personnel or base station doctors; and 3) acceptable means of identifying the patient. Relatively few US jurisdictions as yet have a prehospital DNR order system, although it is an idea whose time is overdue. Society's imperative to use available technology has pushed us into a situation where a technique to save those with a potential to continue a meaningful and wanted existence is being used indiscriminately to prolong the agony of death. (shrink)

Public health emergencies, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, put great pressure on healthcare workers (HCW) across the world, possibly increasing the risk of experiencing ethically challenging situations (ECS). Whereas experiencing ECS as a HCW in such situations is likely unavoidable, mitigation of their adverse effects (e.g., moral distress) is necessary to reduce the risk of long-term negative consequences. One possible route of mitigation of these effects is via work environmental factors. The current study aimed to examine: [1] risk factors associated (...) with ECS among HCW [2], intensity of moral distress associated with ECS across various occupational factors (i.e., profession, degree of exposure to patients with Covid-19), and [3] the impact of work environmental factors on this association, in a sample of HCW during the pandemic. We employed multiple logistic and linear regression to self-report data from 977 HCWs at four Norwegian hospitals responding to a survey at the fourth wave of the pandemic. About half of HCW in this study had experienced ECS during the pandemic, and levels of moral distress associated with such were higher than in previous studies using similar assessment methods. Younger age, female sex, geographical work area (mid-north of Norway), and profession (nurse) were all associated with higher odds (range of OR: 1.30–2.59) of experiencing ECS, as were direct contact with patients with Covid-19. Among those participants who reported that they had experienced ECS during the pandemic, moral distress levels when recalling those situations were moderate (Mean 5.7 on a 0–10 scale). Men reported somewhat lower intensity of moral distress (partial eta squared; ηp2 = 0.02). Reporting a manageable workload (ηp2 = 0.02), and greater opportunity to work according to best practice (ηp2 = 0.02), were associated with lower levels of moral distress. Our findings suggest that moral distress could potentially be mitigated on an organizational level, particularly by focusing on ensuring a manageable workload, and an ability to work according to best practice. To build sustainable healthcare systems robust enough to withstand future public health emergencies, healthcare organizations should implement measures to facilitate these aspects of HCWs’ work environment. (shrink)

This is a review of the biographic drama Love and Mercy. More than a story of the evolution of The Beach Boys, it is the story of the lead Beach Boy, Brian Wilson, and his struggle with substance abuse, mental illness, family stress, emerging love, and a controlling psychologist. Interwoven are many bioethics themes, including the doctor–patient relationship, conflict of interest, autonomy, and patient welfare. For those unaware of the sadness and torment running directly alongside the sunny, bubbly life of (...) The Beach Boys, this film is an eye-opener. It is also a great reminder of the importance of boundaries between clinicians and their patients. (shrink)

In the current climate of dramatic advances in the neurosciences, it has been widely assumed that the diagnosis of mental disorder is a matter exclusively for value-free science. Starting from a detailed case history, this paper describes how, to the contrary, values come into the diagnosis of mental disorders, directly through the criteria at the heart of psychiatry's most scientifically grounded classification, the American Psychiatric Association's DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). Various possible interpretations of the prominence of values in psychiatric (...) diagnosis are outlined. Drawing on work in the Oxford analytic tradition of philosophy, it is shown that, properly understood, the prominence of psychiatric diagnostic values reflects the necessary engagement of psychiatry with the diversity of individual human values. This interpretation opens up psychiatric diagnostic assessment to the resources of a new skills-based approach to working with complex and conflicting values (also derived from analytic philosophy) called 'values-based practice.' Developments in values-based practice in training, policy and research in mental health are briefly outlined. The paper concludes with an indication of how the integration of values-based with evidence-based approaches provides the basis for psychiatric practice in the twenty-first century that is both science-based and person-centred. (shrink)

The goal is to isolate points of philosophical interest in the preceding articles on narrative medical ethics in order to focus subsequent dialogue between the two disciplines. Ethics is an enterprise that has over the centuries developed a somewhat malleable structure, comprising characteristics, methods, lines of reasoning, rules, principles, assumptions, and arguments. This structure provides the framework within which many disciplines contribute to ethics through the exercise of their particular interests, skills, and methods. Challenging or changing the structural components requires (...) arguments of a traditional sort appropriate to the discipline of ethics. Three tenets are proposed as comprising the “received view” or credo of the literature and ethics movement. Each is examined. Then the individual articles in this issue are explored to the end of ferreting out points that would be fruitful points of discussion between philosophy and literature folks pursuing their mutual interest in ethics. (shrink)

J. D. Trout has recently developed a new defense of scientific realism, a new version of the No Miracles Argument. I critically evaluate Trout’s novel defense of realism. I argue that Trout’s argument for scientific realism and the related explanation for the success of science are self-defeating. In the process of arguing against the traditional realist strategies for explaining the success of science, he inadvertently undermines his own argument.