The primary aim of this research was to investigate the intricate relationship between the structural elements of experiences and their essential role in meaning formation. The analysis focused on understanding the nature of mental representations and the subjective, phenomenal qualities that emerge within experiences. To achieve this, an integrated approach, combining cognitive semantics with phenomenological analysis, was employed to examine the compositional complexities of the dynamic interaction between a priori and immediate experiences and their significance in meaning formation. The study (...) highlights the interconnectivity of structural elements within experience as a critical factor in shaping the phenomenal qualities of mental representations. Another key contribution of this study is the introduction of the “fulfiller” concept, which underscores the importance of absent qualities in meaning formation-an often-overlooked aspect in traditional models that focus solely on present attributes. The “fulfiller” concept emphasizes how absence, in addition to presence, influences meaning assignment. This inclusion enhances our understanding of meaning formation by considering both the tangible and intangible dimensions of the experiential-intentional process, offering a more comprehensive framework for understanding how meaning emerges from the complex interaction of present and absent qualities. (shrink)

This short work sets out to argue that the set of simple expressions comprising the lexicon of a given individual and the lexis of a given community are not just contingently but necessarily finite at any given moment in time. Where the lexicon is concerned, this is done by adapting a very simple argument presented by Fred Dretske (1965) concerning whether an individual can count to infinity. This is extended to the more challenging case of the lexis of a community (...) by introducing lexicalization as a condition, which facilitates the same sort of argument as presented for the lexicon. Though the lexicon and lexis are often implicitly assumed to be finite, with little need for further argumentation, there does appear to be grounds for the stronger and more interesting claim that they are necessarily finite at any given moment in time. (shrink)

Illness and injury are often accompanied by experiences of bodily objectification. Medical treatments intended to restore the structure or function of the body may amplify these experiences of objectification by recasting the patient’s body as a biomedical object—something to be examined, measured, and manipulated. In this article, we contribute to the phenomenology of embodiment in illness and medicine by reexamining the results of a qualitative study of the experiences of nurses and patients isolated in an intensive care unit during the (...) first wave of COVID-19. Drawing upon the phenomenological concept of embodiment—as developed in the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Emmanuel Levinas—we reconsider how bodily objectification manifests in complex clinical encounters. We show that, in these settings, objectification is not simply the unilateral act of a clinician objectifying a patient. Rather, both clinicians and patients reported a variety of objectifying experiences influenced by their interactions, the immediate context of the intensive care milieu, and the broader atmosphere of a global pandemic. In light of these findings, we argue that bodily objectification in illness and medicine can often be more complicated than typically presented in the phenomenological literature. (shrink)

This article presents an existential framework for understanding loss and grief. Since not all experiences of loss lead to grief, I begin by exploring what constitutes grievable losses. The dominant approach in grief research has been to understand grief in terms of bereavement. In light of emerging discourses on living and non-death losses, this approach no longer seems tenable, and the contemporary debate requires an account of grievability that extends beyond bereavement. In response to this challenge, I propose a two-part (...) existential framework. The first part introduces mourning as a ground attunement, suggesting that our finitude is the basis for generalized experiences of loss. The second part posits that specific grievable losses reflect a loss of identity. To explain this, I introduce the concept of existential identity and four associated axes susceptible to loss. Lastly, I demonstrate how this framework can be used to analyze loss as complex existential experiences. (shrink)

Many have criticized the peer-review system employed in scientific publication because of the apparent lack of inter-referee reliability. It is often remarked that if referees cannot agree about the quality of a scientific manuscript, then the selection of manuscripts for publication is arbitrary. Some critics have even called for abolishing pre-publication peer-review. I argue that too much emphasis has been put on inter-referee reliability. As such, a lack of inter-referee reliability in the current peer-review system is not damning for the (...) system. I argue that peer review is effective at finding mistakes. (shrink)

For centuries medical schools in Britain and elsewhere had a fairly static curriculum based on what might be called the 'three Rs' of medicine, and consequently had to make room for new subjects as the need arose in a fashion which was sometimes makeshift. However, Southampton University has only had a medical school for six years, and therefore their course on medical ethics and legal medicine was carefully integrated into the curriculum after some preliminary experiments carried out by a subcommittee (...) which is continually reviewing the situation. Medical ethics has now a definite place in the fourth year, preceded by an introduction to ethical problems encountered in medicine in the first year. Not only do members of the medical faculty participate in this teaching but also members of the faculties of law and the arts. (shrink)