Closely related to this is Mr. Bruner's "evolutionary instrumentalism," his conception of instruction as the means of transmitting the tools and skills of a ...

" In the generations since, its influence has grown-today it is accepted as a classic of general jurisprudence.The work is a bold and persuasive attack on the ...

Background: As actors with the key responsibility for the protection of human research participants, Research Ethics Committees (RECs) need to be competent and well-resourced in order to fulfil their roles. Despite recent programs designed to strengthen RECs in Africa, much more needs to be accomplished before these committees can function optimally.Objective: To assess training needs for biomedical research ethics evaluation among targeted countries.Methods: Members of RECs operating in three targeted African countries were surveyed between August and November 2007. Before implementing (...) the survey, ethical approvals were obtained from RECs in Switzerland, Cameroon, Mali and Tanzania. Data were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire in English and in French.Results: A total of 74 respondents participated in the study. The participation rate was 68%. Seventy one percent of respondents reported having received some training in research ethics evaluation. This training was given by national institutions (31%) and international institutions (69%). Researchers and REC members were ranked as the top target audiences to be trained. Of 32 topics, the top five training priorities were: basic ethical principles, coverage of applicable laws and regulations, how to conduct ethics review, evaluating informed consent processes and the role of the REC.Conclusion: Although the majority of REC members in the targeted African countries had received training in ethics, they expressed a need for additional training. The results of this survey have been used to design a training program in research ethics evaluation that meets this need. (shrink)

Philosophical and popular ethics tend to focus on the question "What ought I to do?" Is there, in addition to the ethics of action, an ethics of fantasy? Are there fantasies one ought not to have? Of course there are fantasies with horrific content. Does it follow that there is something wrong with a person who has such fantasies or that they ought to make efforts to suppress them or to otherwise change themselves? Do the problems such fantasies raise depend (...) on their links to desire and action? Masturbation fantasies are considered as well as fantasies that may emerge during sex with others, fantasies that include actual others, and fantasies that get embodied in pornography. Psychoanalytic and legal aspects of the issues are emphasized. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Though individual categorization or decision processes have been studied separately in many previous investigations, few studies have investigated how they interact by using a two-stage task of first categorizing and then deciding. To address this issue, we investigated a categorization-decision task in two experiments. In both, participants were shown six faces varying in width, first asked to categorize the faces, and then decide a course of action for each face. Each experiment was designed to include three groups, and for each (...) group, we manipulated the probabilistic contingencies between stimulus, category assignments, and decision consequences. For each group, each participant received three different sequences of category response, category feedback, decision response, and decision feedback. We found that participants were only partially responsive in the appropriate directions to the contingencies assigned to each group. Comparisons of results from different sequences provided evidence for empirical interference effects of categorization on decisions. The empirical interference effect is defined as the difference between the probability of taking a hostile action in decision-alone conditions and the total probability of taking a hostile action in categorization-decision conditions. To test competing accounts for multiple empirical results, including two-stage choice probabilities and empirical interference effects, we compared a quantum cognition model versus a two-stage exemplar categorization model at both aggregate and individual levels. Using a Bayesian information criterion, we found that the quantum model provided an overall better model fit than the exemplar model. Although both models predicted empirical interference effects, the exemplar model was able to generate probabilistic deviation by incorporating category information of the first stage into the feature representation of the subsequent decision stage, while the quantum model produced interference effect by superposition, measurement, and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

The history of ideas is an interdisciplinary field that began as an offshoot of the history of philosophy and was transformed by notions of perspective and cultural context drawn from the tradition of historical studies. The result is the practice of intellectual history, which has been carried out between the poles of inquiry commonly known as internalist and externalist, corresponding to mental phenomena and collective behavior in cultural surroundings. These are not opposed but rather complementary methods, and intellectual history may (...) be seen as the inside of cultural history and cultural history as the outside of intellectual history, the intellectual historian's task being to bring the two into alliance. (shrink)

There is something embarrassing about money. Everybody is seeking it but at the same time they are reluctant to talk about their bank balances and stock holdings. As a society we have so much of it that we can install 7000 saffron curtains all over Central Park, send tourists into outer space, and analyze the gas on the surface of Titan, yet we fail to spend it on millions of poverty-stricken people who die of disease or starvation each year. We (...) do open our pocketbooks sometimes, but only when television images of massive destruction overwhelm our sensibilities. Money often dominates our consciousness and bombards us in the headlines: Our national debt is 7.7 trillion dollars and it's increasing by more than 2 billion dollars a day; corporate executives of Enron walk away with millions while their employees lose their jobs and their pensions; and we had an endless fascination with Martha Stewart, who is worth millions, but went to jail trying to save a few thousand. (shrink)

Christian theology still condemns the sin of pride, yet many modern political movements stake their claims in terms of pride (Black Pride, Gay Pride, Deaf Pride, etc.). In the age of identity politics, it would seem pride may help to overcome self-loathing and to transform society. To see the appropriate personal and political place of pride, one must properly understand the differing roles of responsibility and value in the constitution of pride. A distinction between self-respect and self-esteem also helps clarify (...) the issues. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology also extends to politics, which he does not only understand from a Marxist point of view. In his articles on Montaigne and Machiavelli, he operates a reduction of the political subject in order to show how it is always already involved in the world, in history and in political affairs, how these phenomena appear to it, and how it can act. In this light, the ‘Preface’ to Humanism and Terror presents both a description of the demands of political (...) judgment and action, and a statement of Merleau-Ponty’s position as a political subject in postwar France. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mental Disorder and Moral Responsibility:Disorders of Personhood as Harmful Dysfunctions, With Special Reference to AlcoholismJerome C. Wakefield (bio)Keywordsalcohol dependence, philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorder, harmful dysfunction, psychiatric diagnosis, person, moral responsibilityIn his paper, Ethical Decisions in the Classification of Mental Conditions as Mental Illness, Craig Edwards grapples with a profound problem: why is it that when we classify a mental condition as a mental disorder, that tends to take (...) the condition out of the sphere of moral responsibility or virtuousness of character? For example, it is not uncommon when someone commits suicide and the question is raised as to why he or she did it, that instead of a reason or character trait that would place the act within a moral calculus, one is offered the explanation "she was clinically depressed" or "he was bipolar," and this tends to terminate discussion and make reasons and moral evaluation superfluous. Why does such a comment have that effect?As Edwards notes, this can get complicated as the moral and the disordered interact. Certainly people are sometimes morally responsible for acting on their disordered impulses (as in pedophilia), and they are responsible for putting themselves in the way of disorder, as when someone imbibes in a way likely to lead to alcoholism. But at the normal/disorder divide, there seems to be a consistent lifting of some responsibility, reflecting the application of the sick role. For example, the rough equivalent of our current category of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was recognized as a disorder in earlier wars ("shell shock," "war neurosis"), but often considered an expression of cowardice; the cowardice was morally evaluable as a failure of virtue (even if, like many personality traits, being a coward is not within the person's direct voluntary control) and led to contempt for those with PTSD, but nonetheless—except in cases thought to be malingering—the PTSD that resulted constituted a disorder for which the individual was [End Page 91] not in the same direct sense blameworthy. This moral shift requires explanation.This topic also has important social ramifications. Relief from responsibility may sound like a good thing, and it is trumpeted by mental health advocates as a reason for supporting the classification of many conditions as disorders. But as Edwards is aware, it is a two-edged sword. Disordered status may allow escape from censure and offer the protections of the sick role, but it also changes the relationship of the agent to his or her own actions and imposes the responsibility of the sick role on the individual to attempt to change ("get better"). The sick role allows for no defense of an idiosyncrasy based on normal variation ("It takes all kinds…") or the individual's eccentric vision or steadfast integrity, for that vision or sense of integrity are now seen as pathological and not morally legitimate. The individual is subjected to endless entreaties to seek help and it is implied that not to do so is irresponsible, so that a decision to embrace one's nature and remain as one is becomes illegitimate. Moreover, the sick role allows for no explanation in terms of the individual's normal defensive response to unjust, deprived, or challenging social or environmental circumstances, thus weakening the motives for social change rather than individual intervention.In sum, there is an inevitable sense in which being placed in the sick role inherently stigmatizes the "sick" condition in virtue of the special moral attitudes extended to the disordered. Cultures can thus easily exploit the sick role and its much-touted relief from responsibility to extend the reach of social control processes. This is one reason why the distinction between disorder and non-disorder is so important, and why it is crucial to identify when non-disordered conditions are mislabeled as disorders—as when, for example, psychiatry gets it wrong about the distinction between normal and disordered sadness (Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007). Such overpathologization can redefine the boundaries of our moral universe on mistaken grounds.Edwards offers two provocative answers—not entirely at ease with each other—to the question of why mental disorders relieve the patient from moral responsibility: (1) mental disorders are... (shrink)

Matching bias refers to the non-normative performance that occurs when elements mentioned in a rule do not correspond with those in a test item. One aim of the present work is to capture matching bias via reaction times as participants carry out truth-table evaluation tasks. Experiment 1 requires participants to verify conditional rules, and Experiment 2 to falsify them as the paradigm employs four types of conditional sentences that systematically rotate negatives in the antecedent and consequent; and presents predominantly cases (...) having true antecedents. These experiments reveal that mismatching is linked to higher rates of incorrect responses and slower evaluation times. A second aim is to investigate the way not is processed. We compare a narrow view of negations, which argues that negation only denies information, to a search for alternatives view, which says that negations function to prime appropriate alternatives. Findings from both experiments support a narrow reading view. (shrink)

Les Annales ont tracé, depuis leurs débuts dans les années 1930, des frontières avec la sociologie. L’étude de trois moments majeurs (l’ère des fondateurs, le moment Braudel et la décennie 1980) permet de saisir le travail d ‘horographie comme un enjeu sans cesse actualisé dans les rapports de force institutionnels et épistémologiques. L’identité collective des Annales, émergeant dans ces débats de délimitation avec la sociologie, s’appuie sur un réseau de valeurs et de références continuellement ajusté.

Vertical/compatible theoretical integration provides an alternative way of unifying sociocultural anthropology and related disciplines. It involves analyzing theoretical statements for their implicit and explicit assumptions at multiple levels of analysis and then determining whether these assumptions are compatible with consensus in the relevant disciplines (e.g., does the sociological theory include an assumption at odds with consensus psychology?). Incompatibilities indicate a need for further research. This approach is much more likely to salvage the bulk of humanities-oriented anthropology than is that of (...) the authors. (Published Online November 9 2006). (shrink)

We prove a local normal form theorem of the Gaifman type for the infinitary logic L∞ωω whose formulas involve arbitrary unary quantifiers but finite quantifier rank. We use a local Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type game similar to the one in [9]. A consequence is that every sentence of L∞ωω of quantifier rank n is equivalent to an infinite Boolean combination of sentences of the form ψ, where ψ has counting quantifiers restricted to the -neighborhood of y.

L’homme est un animal extraordinaire selon Platon, mais il est bien un animal. Il faut donc maîtriser et domestiquer l’animalité de l’homme. Le cas de l’alimentation montre l’importance des pulsions animales en l’homme. L’animal n’est pas l’autre de l’homme, mais l’une de ses possibilités.

Current symptom-based DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria for mental disorders are prone to yielding false positives because they ignore the context of symptoms. This is often seen as a benign flaw because problems of living and emotional suffering, even if not true disorders, may benefit from support and treatment. However, diagnosis of a disorder in our society has many ramifications not only for treatment choice but for broader social reactions to the diagnosed individual. In particular, mental disorders impose a sick (...) role on individuals and place a burden upon them to change; thus, disorders decrease the level of respect and acceptance generally accorded to those with even annoying normal variations in traits and features. Thus, minimizing false positives is important to a pluralistic society. The harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder is used to diagnose the sources of likely false positives, and propose potential remedies to the current weaknesses in the validity of diagnostic criteria. (shrink)

“Imagine A rather short-sighted person told to read an inscription in small letters from some way off….' So begins the quest for “the real nature of justice and injustice” undertaken in response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus to show that “justice pays”. It is often alleged that the search leads through analogy to a monster “organic” state that lives by devouring individual rights. I believe that these charges are mistaken. Plato's political theory does not derive from an analogy (...) which makes the state a monster individual with interests superior to and independent of those of ordinary citizens; it derives rather from a doctrine of objective interests discernible by those with special training and ability, interests which later thinkers have taken to be the object of a “real will”, unerring even where a person's mere empirical desires are shortsightedly misdirected. Plato identifies the interests of his ideal state with the objective interests of its citizens , and in his harmonious world, metaphysics, moral psychology, and political organization combine to ensure that those interests need never override individual mundane interests for they never conflict: they coincide. That the whole theory is dubious should not prevent us from seeing that just what the theory is may be clarified by examining the arguments which putatively lead to it, and that those arguments provide grounds for not confounding Plato's theory with others which may reach similar conclusions about political organization and obligation. (shrink)

Cet entretien réalisé avec une personne transsexuelle Male to Female témoigne de l’impact que la transformation physique du corps peut avoir sur la perception de Soi. Si les catégories de sexe et de genre paraissent, aux observateurs que nous sommes, bien distinctes, naturalisées et, de ce fait, « allant de soi », l’itinéraire d’un androgyne montre, au contraire, qu’elles s’imposent à un certain moment de la vie – ici après la trentaine – après avoir été tenues pour insignifiantes. Il montre (...) aussi combien leurs chevauchements sont complexes et s’articulent, souvent mal, avec des pratiques sexuelles présumées féminines ou masculines. Avec sa dimension intimiste, le témoignage proposé pose directement la question du rapport à l’autre : pour qui change-t-on de sexe? Le poids du regard d’autrui parait primordial, davantage que le sentiment de Soi qui, semble-t-il, s’accommode très facilement des discordances entre genre, sexe et sexualité. Le témoignage de Sandrine montre également comment une construction identitaire subjective de « femme », y compris en termes de sexualité, peut entièrement s’appuyer sur une expérience de vie en tant qu’« homme », fût-il androgyne. (shrink)

Est « ego » qui dit « ego »É. Benveniste Si la philosophie est un discours sur la totalité qui en cherche la rationalité, les modalités d’existence et, parfois, la justification ou le fondement, le « je » empirique du philosophe qui écrit et qui signe l’un des mille et un textes formant « la » philosophie dans son histoire et sa variété est en tension entre l’affirmation pleine et entière d’un ego qui assume ses propos et s’y investit pl...

Platon, dans les Lois, renonce au vocabulaire des « parties de l’âme » et souligne l’unité de l’activité psychique humaine: nous sommes mus de l’extérieur, comme une marionnette par des fils (I, 644c-645a). Comment comprendre la mollesse de l’or et la dureté du fer dont il est alors question? Y a-t-il nécessairement conflit entre ces différentes impulsions?

L’univers de Lucrèce (la summarum summa) est fragile. Hormis les agrégats divins dans les inter-mondes, tout y est mortel : l’âme humaine, le corps, le monde et les étoiles. Le sage cherche cependant une stabilité qu’il ne peut fonder sur un Principe unique, Bien, Premier moteur ou Providence de Zeus : il cherche donc des fondations pour que le bonheur soit possible au sein des moenia mundi, des « murailles du monde ». Comment comprendre cette image et plus généralement la (...) place de l’architecture dans le De natura rerum? sur quoi repose l’ataraxie du sage? (shrink)

Retrace l'histoire du néant en Occident en étudiant ses étapes décisives et ses principales désignations.

Nous sommes des mutants : la science des mutations du vivant reste indissociable des techniques qui rendent nos corps modifiables. Nous sommes des mythants : nous gardons la tendance à nous réapproprier la vie en lui donnant un sens qui la surplombe, si bien que le don de la vie comme celui des organes restent pris dans la logique mythique du don et du sacrifice. Nous sommes dans une mutation, dit J.-L. Nancy : dans une époque où la vie s’exploite (...) ou se transmet, se marchande ou se partage, où elle (se) demande sans s’imposer. C’est ainsi qu’une mutation historique sort de l’histoire. (shrink)

Résumé — L’Encyclopédie hégélienne n’indique pas ce que devrait être une philosophie systématique, mais rend ce système effectif. Et, pourtant, sa présentation rigoureuse, sous forme de paragraphes, accepte le voisinage intermittent et désordonné d’un certain nombre de remarques, munies du laissez-passer tout relatif que leur offre leur brièveté, et récusant souvent par leur longueur cette justification même. On tente d’abord ici de saisir l’origine des remarques, en s’intéressant aux différents voisinages du système encyclopédique : la parole philosophique et populaire, le (...) parcours phénoménologique, les explications préliminaires, les esquisses d’encyclopédie non publiées et l’énigmatique « encyclopédie autre, habituelle » à laquelle se réfère régulièrement Hegel. Le désordre des remarques s’explique alors par la rencontre entre différents ordres .On en déduit finalement qu’il y a place chez Hegel pour une logique de la non-rigueur, qui fonde l’invention des remarques, en acceptant toutes les rencontres. Cette logique révèle, selon ses propres termes, les parentés et les divergences entre les connaissances non philosophiques et la pensée pure ; elle assure la brièveté et la complétude de l’exposition. Bref, elle réalise toutes les exigences d’une encyclopédie philosophique, elle la fait être.Die hegelianische Enzyklopädie weist nicht darauf hin, wie eine systematische Philosophie beschaffen sein sollte, sondern sie verwirklicht dieses System selbst. Ihre strenge Darstellung, organisiert inParagraphen, lässt das zeitweilig unterbrochene und ungeordnete Nebeneinander zahlreicher Anmerkungen zu. Deren Kürze verleiht ihnen auf befremdliche Art einen Freibrief, eine Rechtfertigung, die jedoch durch die Länge einiger Anmerkungen zurückgewiesen wird. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht zunächst, den Ursprung dieser Anmerkungen zu erfassen, indem er sich den verschiedenen Nebenbereichen des enzyklopädischen Systems zuwendet : der philosophischen und der populären Rede, dem phänomenologischen Verlauf,den vorläufigen Erklärungen, den unveröffentlichten Entwürfen der Enzyklopädie und schliesslich der rätselhaften « anderen, gewöhnlichen Encyclopädie », auf die sich Hegel regelmässig bezieht. Im Lichte dieser Beziehungen erklärt sich die Unordnung der Anmerkungen alsdann als das Ergebnis eines Zusammentreffens unterschiedlicher Ordnungen .Aus diesen Untersuchungen ergibt sich die Feststellung, dass Hegel einen Platz einräumt für eine Logik der Nicht-Strenge, die die Erfindung der Anmerkungen begründet, indem sie ein jegliches Zusammentreffen zulässt. Diese Logik enthüllt, nach ihren eigenen Worten, die Verwandtschaften und Abweichungen zwischen den nicht-philosophischen Kenntnissen und dem reinen Denken ; sie sichert die Kürze und die Vollkommenheit der Ausführungen. Kurz gesagt, sie erfüllt alle Anforderungen einer philosophischen Enzyklopädie, sie verwirklicht ihr Sein. (shrink)

This book features contributions from twenty six leading experts that survey the theoretical, historical, methodological, empirical, and clinical aspects of ...

Le présent article propose de faire le point sur la façon dont le législateur français appréhende le conflit d’intérêts dans le milieu sanitaire, partagé entre droit commun et déontologie, au moment même où des scandales médiatiques l’obligent à encadrer la profession médicale. Le problème du débat juridique français est de se concentrer sur la définition essentialiste du conflit d’intérêts, alors qu’une approche pragmatique semblerait plus appropriée pour le qualifier pénalement. L’expérience française que nous relatons ici est riche d’enseignement pour d’autres (...) États. Entre déontologie et droit normatif, ce débat montre les limites du langage juridique et nous éclaire sur la bonne méthode à appliquer pour traiter les conflits d’intérêts. (shrink)