It is well known that the emperor Julian plays a central role in the life and writings of the Antiochene sophist Libanius. As a commentator on the life and reign of the emperor Constantine, he is seldom taken into account, and if he is, he usually gets short shrift as being verbose and unreliable. This neglect is, I believe, hardly justified. Even if it were true that Libanius could not teach us anything about the historical Constantine, his testimony still (...) deserves attention as an example of the attitude of eastern pagans to Constantine. Moreover, although much of what Libanius has to say about Constantine was written down half a century after the events, Libanius himself, born in 314, was a contemporary of the latter part of Constantine's reign. Unlike Julian, born in 331/2,2and Eunapius, born in 347/8,3he was able to form a judgement on Constantine based on first-hand knowledge. (shrink)

Since 1945, and particularly since the facts of the 'Heidegger case' became widely known in 1987, an enormous number of words have been devoted to establishing not only Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but also that his philosophy is irredeemably discredited thereby. This book, while in no way denying the depth or seriousness of Heidegger's political involvement, challenges this tide of opinion, arguing that his philosophy is not compromised in any of its phases, and that acceptance of it is fully consistent (...) with a deep commitment to liberal democracy. This striking thesis is grounded in an astute examination of Heidegger's thought that will provide the reader with a clear and valuable exposition of the philosophy of one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is widely recognised as one of the most important Western philosophers since Aristotle. His thought has had, and continues to have, a profound effect on every branch of philosophy, including aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion. This Lexicon contains detailed and original entries by 130 leading Kant scholars, covering Kant's most important concepts as well as each of his writings. Part I covers Kant's notoriously difficult philosophical concepts, providing entries on these individual 'trees' of (...) Kant's philosophical system. Part II, by contrast, provides an overview of the 'forest' of Kant's philosophy, with entries on each of his published works and on each of his sets of lectures and personal reflections. This part is arranged chronologically, revealing not only the broad sweep of Kant's thought but also its development over time. Professors, graduate students, and undergraduates will value this landmark volume. (shrink)

Drawing on a wide range of Kant's recorded thought beyond his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, this essay presents an overview of Kant's account of practical agency as embodied practical agency and argues against the intellectualized interpretations of Kant's account of practical agency presented by Christine Korsgaard and Henry Sidgwick. In both Kant's empirical-psychological and metaphysical descriptions of practical agency, he presents a recognizably human practical agent that is broader and deeper than the faculty of reason alone. This agent (...) chooses action from a reflective distance, but not from the complete affective distance of reason. We choose neither as reason alone, nor even as the sum of all of our ‘higher’ faculties, of cognition (including reason), feeling, and desire, in Kant's view. Instead, we choose as an agent that also has ‘lower’, ‘sensible’ faculties, of cognition (including sense), feeling, and desire, which together comprise our ‘sensibility’. These mental states of sensibility are not merely confused versions of our higher cognitions, feelings, or desires, and so different from them in degree only, but are instead distinct from our higher states in kind also; and these distinct sensible states are not dependent on our higher states and so on a commitment to the value of humanity, for example. For this reason, a choice in favour of sensible states and in opposition to the moral law need in no way undermine its own foundations and thus be incoherent, as Korsgaard and Sidgwick argue, but instead only immoral. Because Kant does not reduce the problem of immoral choice to one of insufficient reflection and ensuing confusion, he does not view moral progress in cognitive terms alone, whether in the form of a clearer understanding of the moral law, improved judgment in applying it, or deeper insight into our own nature as practical agents. Kant instead recognizes the crucial importance of cultivating our feelings and desires over the course of a lifetime both as a way to make ourselves worthy of the humanity within us directly and also as a way to facilitate future moral choices. (shrink)

In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have ‘misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors’. We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors' personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying. We argue (...) that eligible patients could be guaranteed access to medical services that are subject to conscientious objections by: removing a right to conscientious objection; selecting candidates into relevant medical specialities or general practice who do not have objections; demonopolizing the provision of these services away from the medical profession. (shrink)

According to Bertrand Russell, Nietzsche's only value is the flourishing of the exceptional individual. The well-being of ordinary people is, in itself, without value. Yet there are passages in Nietzsche that appear to regard the flourishing of the community as a whole alongside, perhaps even above, that of the exceptional individual. The ten essays that comprise this volume wrestle with the tension between individual and community in Nietzsche's writings. Some defend a reading close to Russell's. Others suggest that Nietzsche's highest (...) value is the flourishing of the community as a whole and that exceptional individuals find their highest value only in promoting that flourishing. In viewing Nietzsche from the perspective of community, the essays also cast new light on other aspects of his philosophy, for instance, his ideal of scientific research and his philosophy of language. (shrink)

The knowledge norm of assertion is the subject of a lively debate on when someone is in a position to assert something. However, not much has been said about the logic that underlies such debate. In this paper, I propose a formalisation of the knowledge norm in a deontic logic that aims to be explanatory and conceptually sound. Afterwards, I investigate some problems that this formalisation makes visible. This reveals some significant limitations of the underlying logic: it can neither contain (...) Axiom 4 nor Axiom C4. Moreover, sentences of the form p and I have not asserted that p appear to licence a violation of deontic rules. (shrink)

In order to prevent the rapid spread of COVID-19, governments have placed significant restrictions on liberty, including preventing all non-essential travel. These restrictions were justified on the basis the health system may be overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases and in order to prevent deaths. Governments are now considering how they may de-escalate these restrictions. This article argues that an appropriate approach may be to lift the general lockdown but implement selective isolation of the elderly. While this discriminates against the elderly, there (...) is a morally relevant difference—the elderly are far more likely to require hospitalisation and die than the rest of the population. If the aim is to ensure the health system is not overwhelmed and to reduce the death rate, preventing the elderly from contracting the virus may be an effective means of achieving this. The alternative is to continue to keep everyone in lockdown. It is argued that this is levelling down equality and is unethical. It suggests that in order for the elderly to avoid contracting the virus, the whole population should have their liberty deprived, even though the same result could be achieved by only restricting the liberty of the elderly. Similar arguments may also be applied to all groups at increased risk of COVID-19, such as men and those with comorbidities, the obese and people from ethnic minorities or socially deprived groups. This utilitarian concern must be balanced against other considerations, such as equality and justice, and the benefits gained from discriminating in these ways must be proportionately greater than the negative consequences of doing so. Such selective discrimination will be most justified when the liberty restriction to a group promotes the well-being of that group (apart from its wider social benefits). (shrink)

The feeling of the sublime is, says Kant, the bitter-sweet combination of fear and utter security that one experiences in the face of, for instance, the night sky or the raging torrent. Fear of what? Fear of - this, I suggest, was Kant's seminal insight - death. But how can these feelings co-exist? Surely the one cancels the other out? Schopenhauer's great insight, I argue, was that the explanation of the sublime requires a division of the personality into two - (...) a threatened self and an unthreatened one. The feeling of "being safe whatever happens" comes from a primary identification with the individual-transcending self. The trouble, however, with Schopenhauer's account is that, based as it is on his version of idealism, it represents the entire world of nature as being absorbed into the content of the transcendent subject's consciousness. This makes the feeling of the sublime a kind of egoism, a contraction of the vastness of nature into the content of "my" consciousness. And this gets things precisely wrong, I suggest, since the feeling of the sublime is, in truth, an "oceanic" feeling, an expansion of the self into the vastness of being. What this shows, I conclude, is that to understand the sublime we actually need not idealism but a kind of realism; specifically, Heidegger's, as I call it, "magic" realism. (shrink)

Enhancing Human Capacities is the first to review the very latest scientific developments in human enhancement. It is unique in its examination of the ethical and policy implications of these technologies from a broad range of perspectives. Presents a rich range of perspectives on enhancement from world leading ethicists and scientists from Europe and North America The most comprehensive volume yet on the science and ethics of human enhancement Unique in providing a detailed overview of current and expected scientific advances (...) in this area Discusses both general conceptual and ethical issues and concrete questions of policy Includes sections covering all major forms of enhancement: cognitive, affective, physical, and life extension. (shrink)

There are ethical obligations to conduct research that contributes to generalisable knowledge and improves reproductive health, and this should include embryo research in jurisdictions where it is permitted. Often, the controversial nature of embryo research can alarm ethics committee members, which can unnecessarily delay important research that can potentially improve fertility for patients and society. Such delay is ethically unjustified. Moreover, countries such as the UK, Australia and Singapore have legislation which unnecessarily captures low-risk research, such as observational research, in (...) an often cumbersome and protracted review process. Such countries should revise such legislation to better facilitate low-risk embryo research.We introduce a philosophical distinction to help decision-makers more efficiently identify higher risk embryo research from that which presents no more risks to persons than other types of tissue research. That distinction is between future person embryo research and non-future person embryo research. We apply this distinction to four examples of embryo research that might be presented to ethics committees.Embryo research is most controversial and deserving of detailed scrutiny when it potentially affects a future person. Where it does not, it should generally require less ethical scrutiny. We explore a variety of ways in which research can affect a future person, including by deriving information about that person, and manipulating eggs or sperm before an embryo is created. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer a new account of disability. According to our account, some state of a person's biology or psychology is a disability if that state makes it more likely that a person's life will get worse, in terms of his or her own wellbeing, in a given set of social and environmental circumstances. Unlike the medical model of disability, our welfarist approach does not tie disability to deviation from normal species’ functioning, nor does it understand disability in (...) essentialist terms. Like the social model of disability, the welfarist approach sees disability as a harmful state that results from the interaction between a person's biology and psychology and his or her surrounding environment. However, unlike the social model, it denies that the harm associated with disability is entirely due to social prejudice or injustice. In this paper, we outline and clarify the welfarist approach, answer common objections and illustrate its usefulness in addressing a range of difficult ethical questions involving disability. (shrink)

Reasoning that compares two objects or situations to draw conclusions about previously unknown properties of one of them has traditionally been taken to be ampliative and probabilistic. I propose that it is apodeictic reasoning from a premise about isomorphic structures that is often uncertain, but which we may have good reasons to believe. I characterize the structures and their isomorphism, describe patterns of reasoning appropriate to them, and discuss some complications not immediately obvious.

As a first approximation, it may be said that the central issue in the correspondence concerns whether semantical statements are essentially, albeit implicitly, mentalistic or psychological in character. In the language of the protagonists themselves, it concerns whether statements of the form.

In her excellent and comprehensive article, Friesen argues that utilising personal responsibility in healthcare is problematic in several ways: it is difficult to ascribe responsibility to behaviour; there is a risk of prejudice and bias in deciding which behaviours a person should be held responsible for; it may be ineffective at reducing health costs. In this short commentary, I will elaborate the critique of personal responsibility in health but suggest one way in which it could be used ethically. In doing (...) so, I will introduce the concepts of reasonable risk and golden opportunity. I previously argued that it is both difficult to disentangle responsibility and that we risk prejudice and bias in singling out behaviours that are socially disapproved of.1 So I am sympathetic to Friesen’s concerns. I also discussed another way in which ascribing personal responsibility for health is problematic which Friesen does not discuss and which, in my view, is the most concerning and further supports her arguments. It represents a back door assault on liberalism and neutrality towards concepts of the good life. Even if one were to accurately and in an unbiased way divine the personal contribution to disease, the greatest problem would remain: those who voluntarily take on risk would be penalised. That is, such a system would be risk-averse. Those lives which avoided risk would be prioritised, while those who chose to take on risky activities in their conception of the good life would be penalised. Yet risk is necessary, both for the good life, and social progress. Columbus, Edmund Hilary, Florence Nightingale, Ernest Hemingway and countless monumental figures in human history took risks in order to achieve something great. Should we aim for a society of trembling, teetotalling health nuts? Surely that prospect is horrific. It is horrific because it elevates health …. (shrink)

This gesture tyrannises with the effect of supposition: as though. It is as though or as if there could only ever be one kind of reading, ...

First impressions -- Sheep -- Counting sheep in the belly of the wolf -- What was pastoral (again)? more versions (otium for sheep) -- Oranges -- Invisible Inc. (time for oranges) -- Gold you can eat (on theft) -- Yeast -- Bread and stones (on bubbles) -- Erasures.

Some of my colleagues will sadly not be attending the IAB World Congress in Qatar. Amongst other things, they wish to take a stand against Qatar’s human rights record and the treatment of women and...

We examine the philosophical and ethical issues associated with conjoined twins and their surgical separation. In cases in which there is an extensive sharing of organs, but nevertheless two distinguishable functioning brains, there are a number of philosophical and ethical challenges. This is because such conjoined twins: 1. give rise to puzzles concerning our identity, about whether we are identical to something psychological or biological;2. force us to decide whether what matters from an ethical point of view is the biological (...) life of our organisms or the existence of our consciousness or mind; 3. raise questions concerning when, if ever, it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one of us to save another;4. force us to reflect on the conditions for ownership of organs and the justification of removal of organs for transplantation which causes the death of the donor; 5. raise questions about who should take decisions about life-risking treatments when this cannot be decided by patients themselves.We examine and suggest answers to these questions. (shrink)

We review recent research to introduce human brain organoids into the brains of infant rats. This research shows these organoids integrate and function to affect behaviour in rats. We argue that this raises issues of moral status that will imminently arise and must be addressed through functional studies of these new life forms. We situate this research in the broader context of the biological revolution, arguing we already have the technological power to create fully human embodied animals. This raises profound, (...) so far unaddressed ethical issues which call for urgent attention. (shrink)

I argue that pregnant women have a duty to refrain from behaviours or to allow certain acts to be done to them for the sake of their foetus if the foetus has a reasonable chance of living and being in a harmed state if the woman does not refrain from those behaviours or allow those things to be done to her. There is a proviso: that her refraining from acting or allowing acts to be performed upon her does not significantly (...) harm her. This duty does not presuppose that the foetus is a person. It is grounded on principles of respect for the interests of sentient beings and prevention of harm to future individuals. I give an argument for a general duty of easy rescue. (shrink)

Examples of uniformly moving charge distributions that possess conserved electromagnetic stress tensors are exhibited. These constitute stable systems with covariantly characterized electromagnetic mass. This note, on a topic to which Paul Dirac made a significant contribution in 1938, is dedicated to him for his 80th birthday.

Hughes offers a consequentialist response to our rejection of accommodation of conscientious objection in medicine. We argue here that his compromise proposition has been tried in many jurisdictions and has failed to deliver unimpeded access to care for eligible patients. The compromise position, entailing an accommodation of conscientious objection provided there is unimpeded access, fails to grasp that the objectors are both determined not to provide services they object to as well as to subvert patient access to the objected to (...) services. Unpredictable future developments in drug R&D and resulting treatment and prevention options in medicine make the compromise position unrealistic. (shrink)

(2001). The Fiction of 'Undue Inducement': Why Researchers Should Be Allowed to Pay Participants Any Amount of Money for Any Reasonable Research Project. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1g-3g.

One objection to embryonic stem (ES) cell research is that it ‘cannibalizes’ human beings, that is, kills some human beings to benefit others. I grant for argument’s sake that the embryo is a person. Nonetheless, killing it may be justified. I show this through the Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery. Whether killing a person is justified depends on: (1) whether innocent people at risk of being killed for ES cell research also stand to benefit from the research and (2) whether their (...) overall chances of living are higher in a world in which killing and ES cell research is conducted. I call this kind of killing ‘risk reductive.‘. (shrink)

Criminal behaviour is but one behavioural tendency for which a genetic influence has been suggested. Whilst this research certainly raises difficult ethical questions and is subject to scientific criticism, one recent research project suggests that for some families, criminal tendency might be predicted by genetics. In this paper, supposing this research is valid, we consider whether intervening in the criminal tendency of future children is ethically justifiable. We argue that, if avoidance of harm is a paramount consideration, such an intervention (...) is acceptable when genetic selection is employed instead of genetic enhancement. Moreover, other moral problems in avoiding having children with a tendency to criminal behaviour, such as the prospect of social discrimination, can also be overcome. (shrink)

In 2002, I wrote an editorial in this Journal arguing that it was time to review the structure and function of ethics committees in the USA, Australia and the UK.1 This followed the deaths of Ellen Roche and Jesse Gelsinger, which were at least in significant part due to the poor functioning of research ethics committees in the USA.2 In the case of Ellen Roche, it was the failure to require a systematic review of the existing literature which led to (...) her death. Iain Chalmers and I had previously documented in 1996 the failure of ethics committees to require systematic review.3 In 1998, at the time of revising the previous guidelines and forming the first Australian National Statement on Research Ethics, I made a public submission to the Australian Health Ethics Committee arguing that the new guidelines for RECs should include a person with skills in conducting systematic reviews of the literature and that the requirement to have a religious representative on the committee be replaced with the requirement to have an ethicist. Neither of these changes was made. I argued, ‘It is time to ask whether institutional RECs should be abandoned in favour of expert committees that cover many institutions—suprainstitutional specialist committees. Supraregional specialist ethics committees could specialise—for example, in genetic research, cancer clinical trials, dermatology, respiratory physiology and each of the specialist areas of medical research. An example of such a committee is provided by the Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand research ethics committee, which reviews multicentre trials of respiratory drugs’.4 Around that time, I was involved ‘at the coal face’ as Chair of the Department of Human Services Ethics Committee in Victoria. In a public presentation, I arguedThere are two philosophical views of what ethics review is. On the …. (shrink)

Over the past 10 years, John Harris has made important contributions to thinking about distributive justice in health care. In his latest work, Harris controversially argues that clinicians should stop prioritising patients according to prognosis. He argues that the good or benefit of health care is providing each individual with an opportunity to live the best and longest life possible for him or her. I call this thesis, opportunism. For the purpose of distribution of resources in health care, Harris rejects (...) welfarism (the thesis that the good of health care is well-being) and argues that utilitarianism in general may lead to de facto discrimination against groups of people needing health care. I argue that well-being is a superior theory of the good of health care to Harris' opportunism. Harris' concerns about utilitarianism can be better addressed by: (i) relating justice more closely to reasons for action; (ii) by conceptualising the relationship between reasons for action and the value of the consequences of those actions as a plateau rather than scalar relationship. Justice can be understood as satisfying as many equally rational claims on resources as possible. The rationality of a person's claim on health resources turns on the strength of that person's reasons to promote certain health-related states of affairs. I argue that the strength of that reason does not track the expected value of that state of affairs in a fully scalar fashion. Rather a person can have most reason to promote some state of affairs, even though he or she could promote other more valuable states of affairs. Thus there can be equal reason for a distributor of public resources to save either of two people, even though one will have a better and more valuable life. This approach, while addressing many of Harris' concerns about utilitarianism, does not imply that doctors should give up prioritising patients according to prognosis altogether, but it does allow that patients with lower but reasonable prognosis should have a share of public resources. (shrink)

Current and future possibilities for enhancing human physical ability, cognition, mood, and lifespan raise the ethical question of whether we should enhance normal human capacities in these ways. This chapter offers such an account of enhancement. It begins by reviewing a number of suggested accounts of enhancement, and points to their shortcomings. The chapter then identifies two key senses of “enhancement”: functional enhancement, the enhancement of some capacity or power (e.g. vision, intelligence, health) and human enhancement, the enhancement of a (...) human being's life. The latter notion is the notion of enhancement most relevant to ethical debate. The chapter argues that it is best understood in welfarist terms. It illustrates this welfarist approach to enhancement by applying it to the case of cognitive enhancement. Unlike the sociological pragmatic and functional approaches, the welfarist account is inherently normative. It ties enhancement to the value of well‐being. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that there are psychological and biological constraints on our moral behaviour, rational decision-making and capacities to love. For example, low oxytocin levels can constrain our willingness to cooperate with others, and our capacity to maintain long-term loving relationships. There is also evidence that increasing iodine intake can improve a person’s general intelligence, while drugs such as Modafinil can enhance cognitive performance. Savulescu argues that we have a moral obligation to remove those constraints, and that (...) we ought to accept these methods of improving our moral behaviour, decision-making, and cognitive functioning. (shrink)

I discuss social constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics and argue for a novel variety of social constructivism that I call Practice-Dependent Realism.