Delusions have traditionally been considered the hallmark of mental illness, and their conception, diagnosis and treatment raise many of the fundamental conceptual and practical questions of psychopathology. One of these fundamental questions is whether delusions are understandable. In this paper, we propose to consider the question of understandability of delusions from a philosophy of language perspective. For this purpose, we frame the question of how delusions can be understood as a question about the meaning of delusional utterances. Accordingly, we ask: (...) “what meaning(s) can delusional utterances possibly have?”. We argue that in the current literature, there is a standard approach to the meaning of delusional utterances, namely the descriptive account which assumes that a delusional utterance “p” means that p is the case. Drawing on Speech Act Theory, we argue that solely relying on the descriptive account disregards essential ways of how linguistic meaning is constituted. Further, we show that Speech Act Theory can prove a helpful addition to the theoretical and clinical “toolbox” used for attempting to understand delusional utterances. This, we believe, may address some of the theoretical and clinical shortcomings of using only the currently predominant descriptive account. (shrink)

Since 1945, and particularly since the facts of the 'Heidegger case' became widely known in 1987, an enormous number of words have been devoted to establishing not only Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but also that his philosophy is irredeemably discredited thereby. This book, while in no way denying the depth or seriousness of Heidegger's political involvement, challenges this tide of opinion, arguing that his philosophy is not compromised in any of its phases, and that acceptance of it is fully consistent (...) with a deep commitment to liberal democracy. This striking thesis is grounded in an astute examination of Heidegger's thought that will provide the reader with a clear and valuable exposition of the philosophy of one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is widely recognised as one of the most important Western philosophers since Aristotle. His thought has had, and continues to have, a profound effect on every branch of philosophy, including aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion. This Lexicon contains detailed and original entries by 130 leading Kant scholars, covering Kant's most important concepts as well as each of his writings. Part I covers Kant's notoriously difficult philosophical concepts, providing entries on these individual 'trees' of (...) Kant's philosophical system. Part II, by contrast, provides an overview of the 'forest' of Kant's philosophy, with entries on each of his published works and on each of his sets of lectures and personal reflections. This part is arranged chronologically, revealing not only the broad sweep of Kant's thought but also its development over time. Professors, graduate students, and undergraduates will value this landmark volume. (shrink)

Drawing on a wide range of Kant's recorded thought beyond his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, this essay presents an overview of Kant's account of practical agency as embodied practical agency and argues against the intellectualized interpretations of Kant's account of practical agency presented by Christine Korsgaard and Henry Sidgwick. In both Kant's empirical-psychological and metaphysical descriptions of practical agency, he presents a recognizably human practical agent that is broader and deeper than the faculty of reason alone. This agent (...) chooses action from a reflective distance, but not from the complete affective distance of reason. We choose neither as reason alone, nor even as the sum of all of our ‘higher’ faculties, of cognition (including reason), feeling, and desire, in Kant's view. Instead, we choose as an agent that also has ‘lower’, ‘sensible’ faculties, of cognition (including sense), feeling, and desire, which together comprise our ‘sensibility’. These mental states of sensibility are not merely confused versions of our higher cognitions, feelings, or desires, and so different from them in degree only, but are instead distinct from our higher states in kind also; and these distinct sensible states are not dependent on our higher states and so on a commitment to the value of humanity, for example. For this reason, a choice in favour of sensible states and in opposition to the moral law need in no way undermine its own foundations and thus be incoherent, as Korsgaard and Sidgwick argue, but instead only immoral. Because Kant does not reduce the problem of immoral choice to one of insufficient reflection and ensuing confusion, he does not view moral progress in cognitive terms alone, whether in the form of a clearer understanding of the moral law, improved judgment in applying it, or deeper insight into our own nature as practical agents. Kant instead recognizes the crucial importance of cultivating our feelings and desires over the course of a lifetime both as a way to make ourselves worthy of the humanity within us directly and also as a way to facilitate future moral choices. (shrink)

According to Bertrand Russell, Nietzsche's only value is the flourishing of the exceptional individual. The well-being of ordinary people is, in itself, without value. Yet there are passages in Nietzsche that appear to regard the flourishing of the community as a whole alongside, perhaps even above, that of the exceptional individual. The ten essays that comprise this volume wrestle with the tension between individual and community in Nietzsche's writings. Some defend a reading close to Russell's. Others suggest that Nietzsche's highest (...) value is the flourishing of the community as a whole and that exceptional individuals find their highest value only in promoting that flourishing. In viewing Nietzsche from the perspective of community, the essays also cast new light on other aspects of his philosophy, for instance, his ideal of scientific research and his philosophy of language. (shrink)

The knowledge norm of assertion is the subject of a lively debate on when someone is in a position to assert something. However, not much has been said about the logic that underlies such debate. In this paper, I propose a formalisation of the knowledge norm in a deontic logic that aims to be explanatory and conceptually sound. Afterwards, I investigate some problems that this formalisation makes visible. This reveals some significant limitations of the underlying logic: it can neither contain (...) Axiom 4 nor Axiom C4. Moreover, sentences of the form p and I have not asserted that p appear to licence a violation of deontic rules. (shrink)

Biobank research is potentially fruitful. It is argued that broad consent is acceptable for future research on biological material because a) the benefit is high, b) it pays respect to people’s autonomy, c) it is consistent with current practices and d) because the risk is low. Furthermore, broad consent should be allowed if information is handled safely, people can withdraw and expanded research should be approved by an ethics review board. However, these arguments are flawed and the criteria for broad (...) consent are either too restrictive to allow any research or fail to address important challenges with biobank research. Broad consent for biobank research can hide substantial ethical challenges and threaten trust in research. This does not mean that biobank research should be abandoned or that people cannot authorise future research on donated biological material. (shrink)

The feeling of the sublime is, says Kant, the bitter-sweet combination of fear and utter security that one experiences in the face of, for instance, the night sky or the raging torrent. Fear of what? Fear of - this, I suggest, was Kant's seminal insight - death. But how can these feelings co-exist? Surely the one cancels the other out? Schopenhauer's great insight, I argue, was that the explanation of the sublime requires a division of the personality into two - (...) a threatened self and an unthreatened one. The feeling of "being safe whatever happens" comes from a primary identification with the individual-transcending self. The trouble, however, with Schopenhauer's account is that, based as it is on his version of idealism, it represents the entire world of nature as being absorbed into the content of the transcendent subject's consciousness. This makes the feeling of the sublime a kind of egoism, a contraction of the vastness of nature into the content of "my" consciousness. And this gets things precisely wrong, I suggest, since the feeling of the sublime is, in truth, an "oceanic" feeling, an expansion of the self into the vastness of being. What this shows, I conclude, is that to understand the sublime we actually need not idealism but a kind of realism; specifically, Heidegger's, as I call it, "magic" realism. (shrink)

According to the expressivist argument the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. The argument has stirred a lively debate and has recently received renewed attention. This article starts with presenting the expressivist argument and its core elements. It then goes on to present and examine the counter-arguments before it addresses some aspects that have gained surprisingly little attention. The analysis demonstrates that the (...) expressivist argument has a wide range of underpinnings and that counter-arguments tend to focus on only a few of these. It also reveals an important aspect that appears to have been ignored, i.e., that people do not select foetuses based on chromosomes or other biological traits, but based on characteristics of living persons with specific disabilities. This makes it more difficult to undermine the claim that negative selection of foetuses expresses a disvaluing of persons with such disabilities. It leaves the expressivist argument with a strong bite still. (shrink)

Disease radically changes the life of many people and satisfies formal criteria for being a transformative experience. According to the influential philosophy of Paul, transformative experiences undermine traditional criteria for rational decision-making. Thus, the transformative experience of disease can challenge basic principles and rules in medical ethics, such as patient autonomy and informed consent. This article applies Paul’s theory of transformative experience and its expansion by Carel and Kidd to investigate the implications for medical ethics. It leads to the very (...) uncomfortable conclusion that disease involves transformative experiences in ways that can reduce people’s rational decision-making ability and undermine the basic principle of respect for autonomy and the moral rule of informed consent. While such cases are limited, they are crucial for medical ethics and health policy and deserve more attention and further scrutiny. (shrink)

As recently stakeholders complain about the use of conflict minerals in consumer products that are often invisible to them in final products, firms across industries implement conflict mineral management practices. Conflict minerals are those, whose systemic exploitation and trade contribute to human right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas. Particularly, supply chain managers in the Western world are challenged taking reasonable steps to identify and prevent risks associated with these resources due to the globally dispersed nature of (...) supply chains and the opacity of the origin of commodities. Supply chain due diligence represents a holistic concept to proactively manage supply chains reducing the likelihood of the use of conflict minerals effectively. Based on an exploratory study with 27 semi-structured interviews within five European industries, we provide insights into patterns of implementation, key motivational factors, barriers and enablers, and impacts of SCDD in mineral supply chains. Our results contribute to both theory and practice as we provide first insights to SCDD practices and make recommendations for an industry-wide implementation of SCDD. Altogether, this study provides the basis for future theory testing research in the context of SCDD and conflict mineral management. (shrink)

In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance with one’s apparent reasons. Dispositionalism about (...) rational abilities will be vindicated, since it helps to see why and how these two-way abilities entail an ability to decide otherwise and, thus, free will. (shrink)

Reasoning that compares two objects or situations to draw conclusions about previously unknown properties of one of them has traditionally been taken to be ampliative and probabilistic. I propose that it is apodeictic reasoning from a premise about isomorphic structures that is often uncertain, but which we may have good reasons to believe. I characterize the structures and their isomorphism, describe patterns of reasoning appropriate to them, and discuss some complications not immediately obvious.

Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued her claim (...) and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm‐formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated. (shrink)

As a first approximation, it may be said that the central issue in the correspondence concerns whether semantical statements are essentially, albeit implicitly, mentalistic or psychological in character. In the language of the protagonists themselves, it concerns whether statements of the form.

The objective of this article is to investigate whether the concept of techne is fruitful as a framework to analyze some of the pressing challenges inmodernmedicine. To do this, the concept of techne is scrutinized, and it is argued that it is a concept that integrates theoretical, practical and evaluative aspects, and that this makes it particularly suitable to analyze the complex activity of modern medicine. After applying this technical framework in relation to modern medicine, some of its general consequences (...) are elaborated. In particular, it is argued that the concept of techne is appropriate to address the constitutive role of technology in medicine. Techne thus appears to be as fruitful a philosophical concept today as it was in antiquity. (shrink)

This gesture tyrannises with the effect of supposition: as though. It is as though or as if there could only ever be one kind of reading, ...

First impressions -- Sheep -- Counting sheep in the belly of the wolf -- What was pastoral (again)? more versions (otium for sheep) -- Oranges -- Invisible Inc. (time for oranges) -- Gold you can eat (on theft) -- Yeast -- Bread and stones (on bubbles) -- Erasures.

Creationists who object to evolution in the science curriculum of public schools often cite Jonathan Well’s book Icons of Evolution in their support (Wells 2000). In the third chapter of his book Wells claims that neither paleontological nor molecular evidence supports the thesis that the history of life is an evolutionary process of descent from preexisting ancestors. We argue that Wells inappropriately relies upon ambiguities inherent in the term ‘Darwinian’ and the phrase ‘Darwin’s theory’. Furthermore, he does not accurately distinguish (...) between the overwhelming evidence that supports the thesis of common descent and controversies that pertain to causal mechanisms such as natural selection. We also argue that Wells’ attempts to undermine the evidence in support of common descent are flawed and his characterization of the relevant data is misleading. In particular, his assessment of the ‘Cambrian explosion’ does not do justice to the fossil record. Nor do his selective references to debate about molecular and paleontological phylogenies constitute a case against common descent. We conclude that the fossil and molecular evidence is more than sufficient to warrant science educators to present common descent as a well-established scientific fact. We also argue that diagrams depicting the ‘tree of life’ can be pedagogically useful as simplified representations of the history of life. (shrink)

The first part of this paper reveals a conflict between the core principles of deterministic causation and the standard method of difference, which is widely seen as a correct method of causally analyzing deterministic structures. We show that applying the method of difference to deterministic structures can give rise to causal inferences that contradict the principles of deterministic causation. The second part then locates the source of this conflict in an inference rule implemented in the method of difference according to (...) which factors that can make a difference to investigated effects relative to one particular test setup are to be identified as causes, provided the causal background of the corresponding setup is homogeneous. The paper ends by modifying the method of difference in a way that renders it compatible with the principles of deterministic causation. (shrink)

It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is (...) also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. (shrink)

Geographical variations are documented for a wide range of health care services. As many such variations cannot be explained by demographical or epidemiological differences, they are problematic with respect to distributive justice, quality of care, and health policy. Despite much attention, geographical variations prevail. One reason for this can be that the ethical issues of geographical variations are rarely addressed explicitly. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to analyse the ethical aspects of geographical variations in the provision of health (...) services. Applying a principlist approach the article identifies and addresses four specific ethical issues: injustice, harm, lack of beneficence, and paternalism. Then it investigates the normative leap from the description of geographical variations to the prescription of right care. Lastly, the article argues that professional approaches such as developing guidelines, checklists, appropriateness criteria, and standards of care are important measures when addressing geographical variations, but that such efforts should be accompanied and supported by ethical analysis. Hence, geographical variations are not only a healthcare provision, management, or a policy making problem, but an ethical one. Addressing the ethical issues with geographical variations is key for handling this crucial problem in the provision of health services. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to investigate ethical aspects of technology through the moral term “paternalism”. The field of investigation is medicine. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, “paternalism” has gained moral relevance through modern medicine, where physicians have been accused of behaving paternalistic and threatening patients’ autonomy. Secondly, medicine is a brilliant area to scrutinise the evaluative aspects of technology. It is argued that paternalism is a morally relevant term for the ethics of technology, but that its (...) traditional conception is not adequate to address the challenges of modern technology. A modification towards a “technological paternalism” is necessary. That is, “technological paternalism” is a fruitful term in the ethics of technology. Moreover, it is suited to point out the deficiencies of the traditional concept of paternalism and to reform and vitalise the conception of paternalism in ethics in order to handle the challenges of technology. (shrink)

In previous work the author has introduced a lambda calculus SLR with modal and linear types which serves as an extension of Bellantoni–Cook's function algebra BC to higher types. It is a step towards a functional programming language in which all programs run in polynomial time. In this paper we develop a semantics of SLR using BCK -algebras consisting of certain polynomial-time algorithms. It will follow from this semantics that safe recursion with arbitrary result type built up from N and (...) ⊸ as well as recursion over trees and other data structures remains within polynomial time. In its original formulation SLR supported only natural numbers and recursion on notation with first-order functional result type. (shrink)

Analyser av cellefritt DNA fra foster i gravide kvinners blod gir nye muligheter innen fosterdiagnostikk: Testene er bedre enn eksisterende tester, de reduserer risikoen og er billigere. Flere land har tatt i bruk disse testene, og Helsedirektoratet i Norge har mottatt søknad om å ta i bruk en test som erstatter tidlig ultralyd og blodprøver. Likevel nøler norske myndigheter. Hvorfor gjør de det? Ett av svarene er at non-invasive prenatale tester fører med seg en rekke faglige og moralske spørsmål og (...) gir flere grunnleggende etiske utfordringer. Denne artikkelen gjennomgår et bredt knippe av de utfordringene som NIPT reiser. Hensikten er å synliggjøre hvorfor NIPT påkaller etisk refleksjon og å bidra til en åpen debatt og en transparent beslutningsprosess. Artikkelen identifiserer fem sentrale og konkrete spørsmål for vurderingen av NIPT.Nøkkelord: non-invasiv prenatal diagnostikk, testing, fravalg, foster, blodprøve, ekspressivisme, statsliberalt dilemma, dilemma, abort, retten til ikke å viteEnglish summary: Ethical challenges with non-invasive prenatal tests Non-invasive prenatal testing performed with the use of massively parallel sequencing of cell-free DNA in maternal plasma gives extended possibilities in prenatal screening. The tests are claimed to be better than existing alternative tests, they reduce the risk, and it is claimed they are cheaper. They have been used in several countries since 2012, and the University Hospital of North Norway has applied to the Directorate of Health to replace first trimester ultrasound and plasma screening with NIPT. The Directorate of Health is reluctant to reply. Why is this? One of the answers may be that NIPT raises a series of professional and moral questions, and poses profound ethical challenges. This article reviews a series of the challenges with NIPT. The aim is to highlight why NIPT calls for ethical reflection and to contribute to an open debate and a transparent decision-making process. The article identifies five major questions to address in the assessment of NIPT: What are the criteria for screening and removing certain conditions? How certain do we have to be that these conditions do appear in living children? How should we handle information from NIPT for living persons? How can we avoid that persons with the conditions that are selected for screening and removal are insulted, stigmatized, or discriminated? How can we avoid that systematic screening and removal of fetuses with certain conditions develop norms and values that breach with basic social or ethical principles? (shrink)

Darcy's law is a phenomenological relationship for fluid flow rate that finds one of its principle applications in hydrology. Theoretical hydrologists rely upon a multiplicity of conceptual models to carry out approximate derivations of Darcy's law. These derivations provide structural explanations of the law; they require the application of fundamental principles, such as conservation of momentum, to idealized models of the porous media within which the flow occurs. In practice, recognition of the idealized conditions incorporated into models facilitates the empirical (...) clarification of the domain within which the law remains accurate. Structural explanations also contribute to the physical interpretation of phenomenological parameters. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Wahrheit, Perspektive, Interpretation" verfügbar.

Given that biases can distort bioethics work, it has received surprisingly little and fragmented attention compared to in other fields of research. This article provides an overview of potentially relevant biases in bioethics, such as cognitive biases, affective biases, imperatives, and moral biases. Special attention is given to moral biases, which are discussed in terms of (1) Framings, (2) Moral theory bias, (3) Analysis bias, (4) Argumentation bias, and (5) Decision bias. While the overview is not exhaustive and the taxonomy (...) by no means is absolute, it provides initial guidance with respect to assessing the relevance of various biases for specific kinds of bioethics work. One reason why we should identify and address biases in bioethics is that it can help us assess and improve the quality of bioethics work. (shrink)

This essay is a critique of a version of progressive creation developed by Michael Chaberek, O. P. He holds that there are exceptions to evolutionary descent due to the supernatural production of “natural species,” taxa that allegedly do not have biological ancestry, are theologically identified with biblical kinds, and are metaphysically characterized by distinct substantial forms. Chaberek’s assertion that these natural species correspond “roughly” to the Linnaean taxa of biological families contradicts modern scientific conclusions regarding the continuity of evolutionary descent. (...) To illustrate this conflict, I examine some of the extensive evidence for the evolutionary origins of families within the Feliformia sub-order. I conclude that Chaberek’s assertion of supernatural progressive creation is a God-of-the-gaps theology burdened by a defensive stance with respect to scientific progress. (shrink)

SummaryThe article takes issue with W. G. Runciman's contention, in Great Books, Bad Arguments, that modern political development has moved beyond both theory and practice of governance by a sovereign power over subjects as expounded in Hobbes's Leviathan. Runciman's allegations that Hobbes overrates education, that he fails to recognise the potential for dissent and revolt in a polity under a sovereign, and that he ignores society's pre-political scope and its post-absolutist, eventually democratic prospects, are checked against the text and argument (...) of Leviathan. Runciman's contention that government without subjection has been achieved in modern constitutions is confronted with Hobbes's resistance. (shrink)