This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention (...) to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits. (shrink)

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)

The author challenges the view that birth cannot be a morally relevant fact in the process of development from zygote to child. He reviews specific arguments against giving any moral significance to the fact of birth. Drawing on recent work in developmental psychology, he contends that the lives of neonates can have a level of self-consciousness that confers moral significance but can only be possessed after birth. He shows that the position he has argued for provides a framework within which (...) the move from the moral validity of aborting sentient fetuses to the moral validity of infanticide might be resisted. He concludes that arguments suggesting that birth can be morally significant support the view that the acquisition of moral significance is a gradual and multilayered phenomenon. (shrink)

Hablar de adolescentes consumidores de drogas supone deducir automáticamente conductas delictivas, violentas, faltas de respeto en la escuela, marginalidad, etc. Todo ello haciéndonos eco de la experiencia social que relaciona consumo y conductas desadaptadas. Esto si no nos ponemos a generalizar y clasificamos a todos los adolescentes como realizadores de estas conductas inadecuadas. Es como si de repente hubiésemos perdido a toda una generación, de hecho hemos llegado a inventarnos un nombre en función de los que no saben hacer y (...) no de lo que son: "generación ni-ni". Partir de esta premisa es un grave error, implica asumir que los adolescentes que hacen as cosas bien (la inmensa mayoría de ellos), son seres extraños e inadaptados que sólo ocuparán su puesto en la sociedad si se dedican a realizar estas conductas. (shrink)

What comes after "postmodernism"?

Part II: Suppes and the mature theory. Representation and uniqueness.

Es preciso penetrar en los motivos que impulsan a Donoso a su interpretación del pensamiento viquiano, comprender su perspectiva filosófica que le hace recibir a Vico como el fundador de la Filosofía de la Historia. El interés básico se halla en el objeto de esa "filosofía de la historia" que con Vico toma consistencia científica: ciencia del mundo humano. Pero aún más, Vico ofrece a Donoso el método de la filosofía de la historia. Sin embargo, hay que preguntarse por qué (...) el Donoso "maduro" se separa del Vico abrazado por el "joven" Donoso; y con ello se entenderá mejor no sólo el desarrollo del pensamiento histórico donosiano sino también la recepción de Vico en España.It is necessary to find out the causes that impel Donoso to his interpretation to the thought of Vico, to understand his philosophical perspective that makes him consider Vico as the founder of the Philosophy of History. The basic interest lies in the aim of that "philosophy of History" that thanks to Vico receives scientific consistency: science of the human world. But even more, Vico offers Donoso the method of the philosophy of History. Nevertheless, one has to wonder why the "mature" Donoso separates from the Vico embraced by the "young" Donoso and having achieved this, one will fully understand not only the development of the historical thought of Donoso but also Vico's reception in Spain. (shrink)

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010 ) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along (...) several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs! (shrink)

KOINONIA/ASETT MINGA/MUTIRÃO DE REVISTAS DE TEOLOGIA LATINO-AMERICANAS Teología de la Liberación en camino hacia nuevos paradigmas (Liberation Theology towards new paradigms).

O artigo tem por objetivo investigar a particular relação que se estabelece entre a temática do início da filosofia – que é de extrema importância para toda a “escola fenomenológica de Freiburg” – e a concepção da essência da filosofia tal como desenvolvida especificamente no pensamento de Martin Heidegger e Eugen Fink. A partir da reinterpretação e radicalização operadas em relação à abordagem estabelecida pela fenomenologia husserliana, mostraremos como a figura de Husserl se impõe tanto como pano de fundo quanto (...) como alvo polêmico das reflexões de Heidegger e Fink. Assim, se o primeiro desenvolve uma concepção da filosofia como práxis radical de um “outro” pensamento, que procede por tentativas e experimentações, o segundo transforma a fenomenologia husserliana no sentido de uma filosofia da liberdade. (shrink)

Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. (...) My aim in this paper is to critically examine this strategy and, subsequently, to suggest that its failure gives support to the neglected view that the self-deceived are not accurately describable as believing either of the relevant propositions. (shrink)

Corporate social performance (CSP) has become a widely applied concept, discussed in most large firms’ corporate reports and the academic literature alike. Unfortunately, CSP has largely been employed as a way of demonstrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) in practice, or to justify the business case for CSR in academia by relating some measure of CSP to some measure of financial performance. In this article, we discuss multiple shortcomings to these approaches. We argue that (1) CSR activities need to be managed (...) and measured as projects and aggregated to the business or corporate level using a project portfolio; (2) appropriate measures need to be identified that move away from reporting the firm’s activities toward quantifying actual social outcomes achieved; and (3) given the types of projects prevalent in CSR, statistical evaluation methods common in other fields (ideally, pre-test post-test control group designs, such as used in medicine or propensity score matching for ongoing or past projects) should be employed to properly measure outcomes. We make a first, albeit imperfect, attempt at using such an approach with data collected on behalf of the Patrimonio Hoy project, a well-publicized CSR initiative carried out by Cemex in Mexico. We show that the results from this data reinforce concerns voiced earlier in this article. (shrink)

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision?making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non?epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision?making. This has led to the introduction of regulation?specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision?relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non?standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be (...) subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non?epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under?regulation or over?regulation, would be more acceptable). (shrink)

Set theory deals with the most fundamental existence questions in mathematics—questions which affect other areas of mathematics, from the real numbers to structures of all kinds, but which are posed as dealing with the existence of sets. Especially noteworthy are principles establishing the existence of some infinite sets, the so-called “arbitrary sets.” This paper is devoted to an analysis of the motivating goal of studying arbitrary sets, usually referred to under the labels of quasi-combinatorialism or combinatorial maximality. After explaining what (...) is meant by definability and by “arbitrariness,” a first historical part discusses the strong motives why set theory was conceived as a theory of arbitrary sets, emphasizing connections with analysis and particularly with the continuum of real numbers. Judged from this perspective, the axiom of choice stands out as a most central and natural set-theoretic principle (in the sense of quasi-combinatorialism). A second part starts by considering the potential mismatch between the formal systems of mathematics and their motivating conceptions, and proceeds to offer an elementary discussion of how far the Zermelo—Fraenkel system goes in laying out principles that capture the idea of “arbitrary sets”. We argue that the theory is rather poor in this respect. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights with regard to basic rights. Two extreme accounts are outlined: the subsumptive approach and the particularistic approach, that embody two main conceptions of practical rationality. Between the two approaches there is room for a range of options, two of which are examined: the proportionalist approach, which conserves the scope of rights restricting their stringency, and the specificationist approach, which preserves the stringency of rights restricting their scope. I will (...) present arguments in defence of the latter. (shrink)

A quienes nos dedicamos a la educación, no importa de qué nivel, nos conviene explicitar qué es una "persona educada", concepto con el que operamos inevitablemente en el curriculum oculto. La respuesta a la cuestión se puede hacer desde diversas disciplinas, pero básicamente desde la filosofía y las ciencias humanas (sociología, psicología, pedagogía...). Es deseable una construcción integrada, y no meramente adyacente, de todos los aportes ; mas para ello, debe comenzarse por demarcar el ámbito de competencia de cada materia, (...) que luego debe ser superado. El artículo expone los límites entre los que se mueve la Sociología de la Educación, e invita a entrar en materia desde las disciplinas implicadas. (shrink)

No livro IV, de O mundo como vontade e representação, Arthur Schopenhauer afirma que as ações humanas podem acontecer por motivos e quietivos. As ações que levam em consideração uma cadeia de motivações são sempre auto-dirigidas, tendo em mente que os indivíduos agem pra satisfação dos seus quereres particulares. Tais ações são classificadas pelo autor de egoístas por não levarem em consideração o outro, mas os desejos que preenchem a consciência humana no ato de agir. Nesse primeiro momento a leitura (...) schopenhaueriana da “natureza humana” corrobora com o egoísmo psicológico, pois os indivíduos procuram afirmar a sua vontade de vida por entenderem intuitivamente que a impossibilidade de efetivação dessa pulsão vital denominada vontade promove carência, sofrimento. Porém, Schopenhauer reconhece que existem ações, embora raras, desinteressadas. Nesse momento o egoísmo é suprimido e o agente moral é tomado por uma compreensão metafísica do mundo que o faz agir por compaixão. Nossa pretensão é clarificar como se dá essa passagem do egoísmo psicológico à compaixão metafísica, segundo a visão de mundo schopenhaueriana, recolocando o autor no debate metaético contemporâneo.: In Book IV of The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer asserts that human actions can happen for reasons and quietivos. The actions that take into account a chain of motives are always self-addressed, bearing in mind that individuals act to the satisfaction of his wants private. Such actions are classified by the author as selfish by not taking into consideration the other, but the desires that fill the human consciousness in the act of acting. In that first moment reading Schopenhauer's "human nature" corroborates psychological egoism, since individuals seek to assert their will to live because they understand intuitively that the impossibility of effecting this vital instinct called deficiency promotes ease suffering. But Schopenhauer recognizes that there are actions, although rare, disinterested. At that moment the selfishness and deleted and moral agent is taken by a metaphysical understanding of the world that makes him act out of compassion. Our intention is to clarify how is this passage from psychological egoism to compassion metaphysics, according to Schopenhauer's worldview, placing the author in contemporary meta-ethical debate. Keywords : Will. Representation. Selfishness. Compassion. (shrink)

We defend the thesis that the logical level and the objective level are in a strong opposition. Logical level is normative and transcendental whereas objective level is naturalist and substance-based. The use of language is an interpretative/valorative praxis which starts by normative presuppositions. We use satisfaction ambits, elastic constraints and critical states in order to achieve meaning. Meaning of language is not a substance, mental language is immeasurable and the project of naturalization of reason, as in evolutionism and cognitivism, doesn’t (...) work with normativity. Finally, we will support a transcendental and normative conception of logic against eliminative materialism. (shrink)