The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Essays on Spanish-American philosophy, particularly Mexican. Part 2 includes selections from the works of José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Adolfo Menéndez Samara, Oswaldo Robes, Alfonso Reyes, Justino Fernández, Edmundo O'Gorman, J.D. García Bacca, Eduardo Nicol, José Medina Echevarría and Juan Larrea.

Replies to contributions to a symposium on the book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief.

Trata-se, no presente artigo, de analisar as mudanças que historicamente tem ocorrido no EU e as rupturas na apreensâo da realidade. As atuais transformaçoes da realidade teriam levado a um asvaziamento do ser? Ou ainda, a realidade nâo teria mais nada a ver com o sujeito? Como apreender essas transformaçoes? Esta investigaçâo faz-se valer da leitura de Gramsci, por meio da qual a unidade entre se e o pensar aparece como uma possibilidade de superaçao da metafísica do sujeito à elaboraçâo (...) de uma ontología concreta. (shrink)

El artículo presenta los resultados de una investigación sobre la violencia política en Perú y su actual incidencia en la crisis de legitimidad de las instituciones políticas democráticas. La metodología empleada supone la revisión documental y el tratamiento de otras fuentes sobre las múltiples maneras como el conflicto armado debilitó la credibilidad en los mecanismos y estamentos democráticos. Se presentan elementos concluyentes sobre la continuidad, durante y después del conflicto, de la desigualdad, la frustración en la búsqueda de la verdad (...) y justicia ante la violación de los derechos humanos como causas de la crisis e inestabilidad política en Perú. El artículo permitirá concluir con la grave crisis de gobernabilidad que atraviesa el país, que se traduce en prácticas corruptas que paralizan su desarrollo económico, marcando el paso de una crisis económica a una crisis política: un puente que une los años 1992 a 2018 y que deja como saldo una pérdida generalizada de confianza en la clase política y en las instituciones del poder público en Perú. (shrink)

La filosofía de la historia se halla en un momento crucial. Ha de repensar categorías fundamentales -como la de progreso-, y debe hacerlo con tanta voluntad de escucha como espíritu crítico, recogiendo aportaciones que enriquezcan sus perspectivas. Es el caso de algunas que continúan procediendo de la herencia judeocristiana -matriz de la conciencia histórica de Occidente1- y, más concretamente, provenientes del Apocalipsis. Estas páginas se inician con propuestas en torno al acceso hermenéutico a ese último libro de la Biblia. La (...) recepción de su legado por una hermenéutica filosófica iluminará la tarea de plantear el postulado del progreso bajo el impacto de lo que supone el punto de vista de la redención, abordando en términos filosóficos la coimplicación de sentido de la existencia de los individuos y sentido de la historia. (shrink)

This work is not a specific assessment of Utility of Religion by John Stuart Mill, but a defence of what I think is a utilitarian, but not millian, view on the problem that work states, the question of the utility of religion in contemporary societies. I construct that view from neohumeanism more than from millian positions, notwithstanding, I postulate that view as a genuine utilitarian one. -/- Every cultural tradition makes a different approach to ethical and political theories. Spanish and (...) Ibero-American utilitarians make precisely it with Classical Utilitarianism. -/- From that point of view, Ibero-American people identifies utilitarianism with radical and enlightened tradition linked with the reform that through XVIIIth and XIXth centuries tried to undermine the foundations of conservative society in our nations. -/- This aim was not achieved, at least not completely; because of that, the pursuit of Utilitarianism remains opened between us. In the end, I will argue that Spanish and Ibero-American utilitarians connect utilitarianism with philosophical and political radicalism, and inside that Hispanic utilitarianism, plays an important role the criticism of social and political functions of Religion. -/- Maybe, part of the future of Utilitarianism in our cultural context depends on a return of the Theory to its radical roots, also in religious subjects. (shrink)

Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures of model theory, as sets of objects from which (...) the extralogical symbols of the language receive their denotations. I argue that there is an alternative, holistic, approach to the task of defining logical consequence for a formal language. It specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an assignment of truth values to all the sentences of the language to be compatible with the intended interpretation of its logical constants. It achieves this without invoking possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, or the formal resources that are employed to generate these. I show how this approach can be successfully applied to modal propositional logic and to first-order logic, modal as well as nonmodal. I show that the holistic definitions of logical consequence that I supply for these languages are equivalent to the standard atomistic definitions. (shrink)

Este articulo busca interpretar los eventos narrados en las sociedades imaginadas de la serie televisiva Game of Thrones a la luz de los conceptos claves que la filosofía política contemporánea ha elaborado para analizar y comprender nuestra actual crisis civilizatoria.

We provide all possible axiomatizations with independent axioms of E→ and R→ formulable with Anderson and Belnap’s list.

Let R+ be the positive fragment of Anderson and Belnap’s Logic of Relevance, R. And let RMO+ be the result of adding the Mingle principle ) to R+. We have shown in [2] that either a minimal negation or else a semiclassical one can be added to RMO+ preserving the variable-sharing property. Moreover, each of there systems is given a semantics in the Routley-Meyer style. In describing in [2] the models for RMO+ plus minimal negation, we noted that a similar (...) strategy would give us a semantics for R+ with minimal negation; that is, constructive R. The aim of this paper is to prove this claim. (shrink)

The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic. Wedefine the logics BK+ and BK′+ by adding to B+ the K rule and to BK+the characteristic S4 axiom, respectively. These logics are endowed witha relatively strong non-constructive negation. We prove that all the logicsdefined lack the K axiom and the standard paradoxes of consistency.