Introduction Joseph Dunne, Attracta Ingram, Frank Litton This volume of essays has two main objectives: first, to pay tribute to Fergal O'Connor, ...

Catholic University Of America, Philosophical Studies, No. 145, Abstract No. 2.

In an increasingly data-driven age of medicine, do companies that offer genetic testing directly to patients represent an important part of personalising care, or a dangerous threat to privacy? Should we celebrate this new mechanism of patient involvement, or fear its implications?The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge addressed these issues in the 10th annual Medical Ethics Varsity Debate, through the motion: “This House Regrets the Rise of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing”. This article summarises and extends key arguments made in the debate, (...) exploring the impacts of such genetic testing on both the individual patient and broader society, with special consideration as to whether companies can ever truly guarantee anonymity of genetic data. (shrink)

We are currently facing global healthcare crisis that has placed unprecedented stress on healthcare workers as a result of the coronavirus disease 2019. It is imperative that we develop novel tools to assist healthcare workers in dealing with the significant additional stress and trauma that has arisen as a result of the pandemic. Based in research on the effects of immersive environments on mood, a neuroscience research laboratory was rapidly repurposed using commercially available technologies and materials to create a nature-inspired (...) relaxation space. Frontline healthcare workers were invited to book 15-min experiences in the Recharge Room before, during or after their shifts, where they were exposed to the immersive, multisensory experience 496 Recharge Room users completed a short survey about their experience during an unselected, consecutive 14-day period. Average self-reported stress levels prior to entering the Recharge Room were 4.58/6. After a single 15-min experience in the Recharge Room, the average user-reported stress level was significantly reduced 1.85/6. Net Promoter Score for the experience was 99.3%. Recharge Rooms such as those described here produce significant short-term reductions in perceived stress, and users find them highly enjoyable. These rooms may be of general utility in high-stress healthcare environments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Only the Truth Has Grace:A Tribute to Father Romanus Cessario, O.P.Ryan ConnorsGod's providence arranged that I was first to meet Father Romanus Cessario, O.P., during my studies as an undergraduate at Boston College. One of the first occasions in which I was privileged to learn from him transpired at the 2005 priestly ordination of my friend and his student, Father Kevin Bordelon of the Diocese of Lafayette in Louisiana. (...) After I had driven to the ordination Mass and then to the lunch reception with the newly minted priest, I encountered Father Cessario who noticed my apparently stunned demeanor. In response to his inquiry about my well-being, I explained only that I was struck by the morning's events: "On the ride to the Cathedral Kevin was not a priest. But on the ride to the reception, he was." In his eminently imitable way, Father Romanus instructed: "Ryan, that is called a sacrament in which something really happens."Romanus Cessario is a realist. Indeed, what his Introduction to Moral Theology calls "moral realism" captures the decades of teaching and scholarship of our honored theologian.1 Various forms of idealism, illusions all, render Catholics unable to pass on the faith effectively and unprepared to confront the challenges that invariably arise. In point of fact, moral, sacramental, and ecclesial realism are the only expressions of Catholic theology that serve the Church's mission and do not cause harm to her members.2 In [End Page 1077] what follows, I offer five areas of Catholic theology necessary for flourishing ecclesial life today. A fulsome understanding of each of these aspects of Catholic faith presupposes the wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas and benefits from the teaching of his noted—and much beloved—contemporary interpreter.SatisfactionAt the age of thirty-three, six years after solemn profession as a Dominican friar of the Province of St. Joseph, Father Romanus Cessario set out for the University of Fribourg to complete a doctoral dissertation under the direction of the Irish Dominican Colman O'Neill.3 The subject of this work, satisfaction in Aquinas, has remained a frequent theme of Father's writing in the ensuing decades. Put simply, sin requires a divine solution. People need redemption. Confessors do not stand as attorneys seeking the minimal punishment for their penitent defendants. There is no guiltless sin. Rather, the sacramental realist recognizes that sin carries its own consequence. The unfortunate state of original sin means fallen man stands in need of satisfaction. Christ's sacrificial love through his Passion and death enables the restoration and perfection of the imago Dei.The theme of Christian satisfaction relies upon the realism that grace does not merely cover over sin, but instead really heals and elevates the human person. Man requires—and in Christ can receive through the sacraments of the Church—divinely accomplished restoration.4 Pope Leo XIII, initiator of the Thomist revival of the late nineteenth century, observed: "Nothing is [End Page 1078] more useful than to look upon the world as it really is."5 In the words of Pope Paul VI: "Only the truth has grace." The ultimate error of casuistry lies in its inability to recognize the consequences of defective action.6 Pastoral practice today benefits from the knowledge that a parishioner's ignorance of moral truth does not provide consolation. The ignorance of many young persons, for example, about the defective nature of unchaste activity of whatever kind does not mean they are not harmed by such actions. Rather, the moral realist who observes St. Thomas's teaching, especially with the help of his authentic interpreters, comes to see that bad acts never perfect persons. Sinners stand in need of satisfying assistance. Only Christ provides such a divine remedy.7VirtueThe return to virtue-based moral reasoning in Catholic theology stands as a happy fruit of the post-conciliar period. In particular, Pope John Paul II's 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor remains among the most lasting intellectual contributions of his long pontificate. This much-maligned and misunderstood document has required explanation, especially to the English-speaking world. The United States, in particular, bears a long legacy of the misunderstanding... (shrink)

I will first offer a general understanding of the flavor of libertarianism I will be using as the foundation for my argument for open borders. Then, I will summarize the argument put forth by Joseph Carens in “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” which consummates the importance of open border policy in maintaining the efficacy of property rights. After, I will supplement an additional argument to Carens’s in order to strengthen it. In this section, I will interpret (...) Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia such that it informs the importance of the enforcement of a right of free movement and I will furthermore detail how border restrictions directly violate that right. In the final section of this paper, I will address criticisms made both by libertarian and liberal thinkers against the enforcement of a right of free movement. One of the liberal criticisms, in particular, will serve as a jumping-off point for a conversation highlighting the ways in which libertarian arguments for open borders differ from liberal arguments for open borders. These differences, I contend, illuminate how disparate these philosophical traditions are, especially in the manner that they conceive of rights. (shrink)

Dehaene et al. (2003) showed an absence of conscious, but not masked, conflict effects when patients with schizophrenia performed a number-categorisation priming task. We aimed to replicate these influential results using a different word-categorisation priming task. Counter to Dehaene et al.'s findings, 21 patients and 20 healthy controls showed similar congruence effects for both masked and visible primes. Within patients, a reduced congruence effect for visible primes associated with longer duration of illness and more severe behavioural disorganisation. Patients, unlike controls, (...) were no slower to respond to targets that followed visible compared to masked primes. Conscious conflict effects on priming tasks are not universally reduced in schizophrenia but may associate with chronicity and behavioural disorganisation. That patients were no slower when the preceding primes were clearly visible accords with evidence elsewhere that information processing in schizophrenia is driven more by immediate conscious experience and constrained less by prior events. (shrink)

A new approach for defining causality and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degrees of blame, and causal explanation. Causality plays a central role in the way people structure the world; we constantly seek causal explanations for our observations. But what does it even mean that an event C "actually caused" event E? The problem of defining actual causation goes beyond mere philosophical speculation. For example, in many legal arguments, it is precisely what needs to be established in order (...) to determine responsibility. The philosophy literature has been struggling with the problem of defining causality since Hume. In this book, Joseph Halpern explores actual causality, and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. The goal is to arrive at a definition of causality that matches our natural language usage and is helpful, for example, to a jury deciding a legal case, a programmer looking for the line of code that cause some software to fail, or an economist trying to determine whether austerity caused a subsequent depression. Halpern applies and expands an approach to causality that he and Judea Pearl developed, based on structural equations. He carefully formulates a definition of causality, and building on this, defines degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. He concludes by discussing how these ideas can be applied to such practical problems as accountability and program verification. Technical details are generally confined to the final section of each chapter and can be skipped by non-mathematical readers. (shrink)

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments?Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of (...) human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced.The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project. (shrink)

This book makes a significant contribution to the contemporary debate about multiculturalism and democratic theory. It reflects upon the ways in which claims about culture and identity are advanced by immigrants, national minorities, aboriginals, and other groups. It argues that liberal democrats should provide recognition and support for minority cultures and identities, and examines case studies from a number of different societies to show how theorists can learn about justice.

What does it mean to assert or deny the existence of a legal system? How can one determine whether a given law belongs to a certain legal system? What kind of structure do these systems have, that is--what necessary relations obtain between their laws? The examination of these problems in this volume leads to a new approach to traditional jurisprudential question, though the conclusions are based on a critical appraisal, particularly those of Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, and Hart.

Joseph Agassi is a critic, a gadfly, a debunker and deflater; he is also a constructor, a speculator and an imaginative scholaro In the history and philosophy of science, he has been Peck's bad boy, delighting in sharp and pungent criticism, relishing directness and simplicity, and enjoying it all enormously. As one of that small group of Popper's students (ineluding Bartley, Feyerabend and Lakatos) who took Popper seriously enough to criticize him, Agassi remained his own man, holding Popper's work (...) itself to the criteria of critical refutation. Agassi's range is wide and his publications proliik. He has published serious studies in the historiography of science, applied sociology (on Hong Kong with LC. Jarvie), foundations of anthropology, interpretive scientific biography (Faraday), Judaic studies, philosophy of technology (which Agassi pioneered, particulady in distinguishing it from the philosophy of science), as weIl as the many works on the Iogic, methodoI­ ogy, and history of science. Even as we go to press, Agassi's works are appearing; we append an imperfect and selected bibliography. For Agassi, the test of relevance is whether something is interesting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 535 second English volume), Ratzinger's Behold the Prerced One (pp. 1345 ), and W. Kasper's Theology and Church (pp. 94-108; Kasper says simply, "Rahner's characterization of neo-Chalcedonianism is historicaly inaccurate," p. 214, note 18). As it is, Ols's treatment reminds us that Rahner's own writings, which overlooked the later Councils of Constantinople, presume that Chalcedon had been the end of a development in Christology; this inaccurate presumption (...) has dominated too much of the writing which has followed Rahner's essay. Ols returns to this problem of " latent monophysitism " in some classical christologies in the final chapters of his work (VIII-XI). With a careful examination of the christology of Aquinas, the author skillfully demonstrates the rich development of Christ's true humanity that is possible within the classical approach; he deals specifically with the topics of Christ's knowledge, his sinlessness, and the concept of person. (It is interesting to note that, like Rahner and others before and after, Ols thinks that the word "person" is not particularly felicitous and would prefer simply the word hypostasis or subsistence [p. 187]. His wish is likely to have no more success than previous suggestions in this regard.) Although limited in its intent, this hook is rich in many ways. Ols's knowledge of St. Thomas is deep, and he uses that knowledge well. His critique of Rahner and Schilleheeckx may he forceful in its negative assertions, hut I believe it is accurate in pointing out the philosophical idealism that underlies much of their christological writings. This idealism is too often overlooked and needs the corrective of what we might call "Mediterranean realism." Although his criticism may he incisive, it is never unfair or strident, and he is aware of the positive insights that these men have contributed to our continuing reflections on the Lord. By intent, Ols's work is essentially one of evaluation and criticism. Nevertheless, the chapters that reflect on (and develop) Aquinas's teaching and give a positive presentation of the real human· ity of the Lord lead one to hope that the author will follow this study with a fully elaborated christology. St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie Yonkers, New York JAMES T. O'CONNOR Kant's System of Rights. By LESLIE A. MULHOLLAND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Pp. xvii + 434. $49.00. Several good hooks on Kant's political philosophy have appeared in the past decade, hut the literature on Kant's political philosophy is still both slimmer and weaker than on any other aspect of his thought. 536 BOOK REVIEWS Though we still await a definitive study of the topic, this book goes a long way toward filling some important gaps. Even the best books on Kant's political philosophy tend to treat only the broad outlines of Kant's position, shying away from detailed exposition of Kant's theories of individual right and external possession and of the political theory based on them. Mulholland's is not only the most detailed but also the most persuasive account of these matters which has yet been presented in English. The book's first four chapters attempt to lay the foundations for Kant's political philosophy through a general discussion of his ethical theory. The main function of these (somewhat overlong) introductory chapters is to argue for a tension between the law of nature formula (which Mulholland prefers as a guide to Kant's theory of right) and the formula of humanity as end in itself. According to Mulholland, the law of nature formula leads to a theory of rights and political obliga· tion which places Kant in the natural law tradition, whereas the formula of humanity commits him to what Mulholland calls the " deed principle ": that acquired rights can come about only through a deed on the part of those having the duties corresponding to the rights through which these duties have been assumed. Mulholland argues that if we take the deed principle strictly, then we must base political obligation on consent and thus on a social contract. The burden of Mulholland's argument throughout the book is that Kant cannot sustain the deed principle, and it is... (shrink)

Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language (...) can be classified as valid or invalid. To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

Bottlenecks introduces a powerful new way of understanding equal opportunity. Rather than literal equalization, Joseph Fishkin argues that Americans ought to aim to broaden the range of opportunities open to people, at every stage in life, to pursue different paths.

What do appeals to case studies accomplish? Consider the dilemma: On the one hand, if the case is selected because it exemplifies the philosophical point, then it is not clear that the historical data hasn't been manipulated to fit the point. On the other hand, if one starts with a case study, it is not clear where to go from there—for it is unreasonable to generalize from one case or even two or three.

The privilege of having three sets of extensive and hard-hitting comments on one's work is as welcome as it is rare, and especially so on this occasion as the lectures were, for me, but thefirst (well, not entirely first) stab at a subject I hope to explore at greater length. The reflectionsthat follow will respond to some of the criticisms, but will not be a point by point reply. I will use the occasion to clarify some obscurities in the lectures, (...) and to contrast my view with some of my critics' own positions. I will proceed thematically, starting with some observations about method and about ontology, proceeding to explore several questions about the relations between social dependence and relativism, between genre, value, and normativity, and concluding with a fewwords on pluralism and liberal values. (shrink)

Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher’s ordinary view. Joseph Ulatowski recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics. Call this endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four (...) conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism. (shrink)

Among anthropologists and sociologists, it is widely believed that moral rules are best understood as a type of social norm. Moral philosophers, however, have largely been hostile to this suggestion. In recent years, the impulse to distinguish moral rules from others types of social norm has received what many take to be empirical support from the work of Elliot Turiel and his collaborators, who have argued that there are two distinct “domains” of social cognition, the “moral” and the “conventional.” Many (...) philosophers have taken this as proof that moral rules are fundamentally different from “conventional” social norms. I argue that moral philosophers should not be relying upon Turiel’s view to defend the moral/conventional distinction. First, I show that Turiel is claiming much less than many have taken him to be claiming, because he puts a lot of what philosophers have traditionally thought of as “morality” on the side of convention, or else in the broad region between the two that he refers to as “multidimensional contexts.” Second, I argue that his concept of the “conventional” is so narrow that the overwhelming majority of social norms – such as the standard rules of etiquette – wind up falling into the “multidimensional” category. This stems from his failure to distinguish between genuine conventions and what I refer to as “norms with conventional elements.”. (shrink)

The appropriateness of S5 as a logic of knowledge has been attacked at some length in the philosophical literature. Here one particular attack based on the interplay between knowledge and belief is considered: Suppose that knowledge satisfies S5, belief satisfies KD45, and both the entailment property (knowledge implies belief) and positive certainty (if the agent believes something, she believes she knows it) hold. Then it can be shown that belief reduces to knowledge: it is impossible to have false beliefs. While (...) the entailment property has typically been viewed as perhaps the least controversial of these assumptions, an argument is presented that it can plausibly be viewed as the culprit. More precisely, it is shown that this attack fails if we weaken the entailment property so that it applies only to objective (nonmodal) formulas, rather than to arbitrary formulas. Since the standard arguments in favor of the entailment property are typically given only for objective formulas, this observation suggests that care must be taken in applying intuitions that seem reasonable in the case of objective formulas to arbitrary formulas. (shrink)

The use of terminal sedation to control theintense discomfort of dying patients appearsboth to be an established practice inpalliative care and to run counter to the moraland legal norm that forbids health careprofessionals from intentionally killingpatients. This raises the worry that therequirements of established palliative care areincompatible with moral and legal opposition toeuthanasia. This paper explains how thedoctrine of double effect can be relied on todistinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. The doctrine of double effect is rooted inCatholic moral casuistry, but (...) its applicationin law and morality need not depend on theparticular framework in which it was developed. The paper further explains how the moral weightof the distinction between intended harms andmerely foreseen harms in the doctrine of doubleeffect can be justified by appeal to alimitation on the human capacity to pursue good. (shrink)

The authors propose the integrity capacity construct with its four dimensions (process, judgment, development and system dimensions) as a framework for analyzing and resolving behavioral, moral and legal complexity in business ethics' issues at the individual and collective levels. They claim that moral progress in business comes about through the increase in stakeholders who regularly handle moral complexity by demonstrating process, judgment, developmental and system integrity capacity domestically and globally.

John Stuart Mill is one of the hallowed figures of the liberal tradition, revered for his defense of liberal principles and expansive personal liberty. By examining Mill's arguments in On Liberty in light of his other writings, however, Joseph Hamburger reveals a Mill very different from the "saint of rationalism" so central to liberal thought. He shows that Mill, far from being an advocate of a maximum degree of liberty, was an advocate of liberty and control--indeed a degree of (...) control ultimately incompatible with liberal ideals.Hamburger offers this powerful challenge to conventional scholarship by presenting Mill's views on liberty in the context of his ideas about, in particular, religion and historical development. The book draws on the whole range of Mill's philosophical writings and on his correspondence with, among others, Harriet Taylor Mill, Auguste Comte, and Alexander Bain to show that Mill's underlying goal was to replace the traditional religious basis of society with a form of secular religion that would rest on moral authority, individual restraint, and social control. Hamburger argues that Mill was not self-contradictory in thus championing both control and liberty. Rather, liberty and control worked together in Mill's thought as part of a balanced, coherent program of social and moral reform that was neither liberal nor authoritarian.Based on a lifetime's study of nineteenth-century political thought, this clearly written and forcefully argued book is a major reinterpretation of Mill's ideas and intellectual legacy. (shrink)

By considering the history of bioethics and international humanitarian law, Joseph J. Fins contends that bioethics as an academic and moral community should stand in solidarity with Ukraine as it defends freedom and civility.