Many existence propositions in constructive analysis are implied by the lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO; sometimes one can even show equivalence. It was discovered recently that some existence propositions are equivalent to Bouwer's fan theorem FAN if one additionally assumes that there exists at most one object with the desired property. We are providing a list of conditions being equivalent to FAN, such as a unique version of weak König's lemma. This illuminates the relation between FAN and LLPO. Furthermore, (...) we give a short and elementary proof of the fact that FAN is equivalent to each positive valued function with compact domain having positive infimum. (shrink)

Working within Bishop’s constructive framework, we examine the connection between a weak version of the Heine–Borel property, a property antithetical to that in Specker’s theorem in recursive analysis, and the uniform continuity theorem for integer-valued functions. The paper is a contribution to the ongoing programme of constructive reverse mathematics.

It is shown, with intuitionistic logic, that if every locally constant function from to has a property akin to constancy, then the fan theorem for -bars holds, and conversely.

It is shown that, relative to Bishop-style constructive mathematics, the boundedness principle BD-N is equivalent both to a general result about the convergence of double sequences and to a particular one about Cauchyness in a semi-metric space.

Abstract:This article addresses the issue of whether and to what extent moral values can be attributed to collective actors. The paper starts from the premise that business ethics as the ethics of an organization is to be distinguished from the virtues of its members. This point is elaborated in both economic- and organization-theoretic terms within the framework of the New Economics of Organization. The result is the development of a concept of governance ethics. The ethics of governance is about the (...) incorporation of moral conditions and requirements in the management, governance, and control structures of a firm. This is the contextual precondition for the long-lasting and beneficial effects of the virtues of individuals within the organizations. (shrink)

Nach Kant bleibt alles Denken auf das einzelne Subjekt des Denkens und seine Möglichkeiten zurückbezogen. Simon beschreibt Kants Werk als ein System, das den eigenen Denkansatz als einen Besonderen neben anderen begreift. Auch wenn das Subjekt anderes Denken nicht immer von sich aus versteht, bezieht es jenes als "fremde Vernunft" in seine Weltorientierung ein und erkennt es an. Damit ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit des Findens einer Sprache, in der im Ausgang vom eigenen Vorverständnis anderen etwas so gesagt werden kann, dass (...) es auch ihnen "etwas" bedeutet und in diesem Sinne als wahr erscheint. Von hier aus verändert sich dann der Begriff der Bedeutung und die Sprache der Philosophie. (shrink)

Libet considers “positive free voluntary acts” as mere illusions, admitting free will only as Veto. This essay shows seven ways by which we can gain evident knowledge about positive and negative free will, through: (1) the immediate evidence of free will in the cogito, (2) the light of the necessary essence of free will, (3) the experience of moral “oughts” in whose experience freedom is co-given, (4) any denial of human free will entails its assertion or recognition, (5) the objects (...) and subjects of certain acts disclose free will, (6) in a world without free agents there would be no explanation of the beginning of efficient causality, and (7) Veto-power of the will logically presupposes positive free will. Libet’s experiments confirm that the free decision to act at a certain time and the preceding and accompanying free acts make new energy to burst forth in the brain. (shrink)

In a classic paper, Leon Roth asked »Is there a Jewish Philosophy?« to which he replied No. In this paper, focusing on the case of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, I argue, first, that we cannot characterize Jewish philosophy in terms of the identity, religious or secular, of its philosophers, in terms of a language in which it was written or conducted, in terms of a particular style or school, or in terms of content: as philosophy specifically of Judaism the religion. I (...) then go on to argue that all the medieval Jewish philosophers were doing was Philosophy, although I sketch two different conceptions of what a philosophical interpretation of Judaism and the Jews might be: a Saadyanic model and Maimonides’. However, even though there is no kind of philosophy called »Jewish philosophy« as opposed to simply »Philosophy,« I argue that we can identify (medieval) Jewish philosophy as a philosophical »tradition,« a causally related sequence of philosophers who influence and are influenced by each other and who engage in a distinguishable dialogue or conversation among themselves. In the last part of the paper, I critically discuss various recent arguments that purport to show that there is something paradoxical, self-contradictory, and philosophically illegitimate about the very idea of a Jewish philosophy. (shrink)

Ethics and legal design currently seem to be involved in a “vortex of temporality” (Jürgen Habermas), which, according to the understanding of many, integrates them into a modern way of life. Examples are the protection of life (Embryo Protection Act and abortion, reinterpretation of Article 1 of the Basic Law in the Maunz/Dürig commentary by Herdegen), the promotion of plural family forms and sexual relationship worlds (“marriage for all“, life stage partnership), assisted dying (judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on (...) assisted suicide). Apparently, it is always about the dismantling of traditional taboos and the establishment of legal regulations that are intended to correspond to a new ethical consciousness and plural ideological worlds. The discussion in ethics theory and legal theory in this situation has agreed on a model of the gravitational fields of liberal self-execution, in which cultural development in ethics and law should find its moral support and at the same time its legal ethical dynamics. According to this understanding, a basic consensus is maintained in the execution of liberal debates (also on moral and legal questions). It is articulated in human rights principles, which themselves must be discussed again in open conversation in their meaning, but which at the same time bring themselves to the fore as irrefutable exactly in this social process. Theological ethics maintains a certain distance from this interpretation. The understanding of freedom must then be structured for the lifestyle of society in such a way that the one-sidedness of individualism and abstract overemphasis, even exaggeration, is avoided. The aim is to integrate social integration, reference to natural framework conditions and realistic border awareness in ethics and law. Moral theology can be based in this on the further development of social science. (shrink)

Contemporary epistemology seems almost exclusively focused on questions concerning knowledge and justification. Such a focus has had two broad consequences. First, epistemologists have neglected other equally important concepts. Specifically, the concept of understanding is absent in most discussions. Secondly, discussions have avoided the role of the will in the agents to whom we attribute knowledge and justification. Surprisingly, virtue epistemology also suffers from this narrow view. Specifically, virtue epistemologists of all kinds have neglected these two important aspects of our epistemic (...) lives. I examine the spectrum of virtue theories in epistemology, and locate a gap between the two sides—responsibilism and reliabilism. This gap, I suggest, might be bridged if we take seriously (i) the idea that there are other epistemic goals apart from knowledge and justification (e.g., understanding), and (ii) that cognition requires the whole person—intellect and will—and not simply the intellect in isolation from other faculties. (shrink)