Byun Young-joo, jeune réalisatrice coréenne, filme avec beaucoup de pudeur, de tact et même de tendresse le visage des vieilles dames, anciennes victimes de l’esclavage sexuel de l’armée japonaise. La réalisatrice s’est rendue pendant un an à la « Maison de Nanum » à Séoul, où certaines survivantes vivent ensemble, jusqu’à ce que six d’entre elles acceptent d’être filmées. Le film montre le quotidien sobre et discret de ces femmes recelant le passé douloureux et leur évolution, devant la caméra. Hélène (...) Cixous a invité Byun Young-joo à son séminaire en mars 2000 lors de sa visite à Paris pour présenter son film au Festival International des Films des Femmes de Créteil. (shrink)

Ob Mikroskop, Refraktometer, Vakuumpumpe oder Ultraschallbad - viele der Gerätschaften, die im chemischen und analytischen Labor Verwendung finden, lassen sich mit der Kenntnis ihrer physikalischen Grundlagen leichter und sicherer einsetzen. Dieses einführende Lehrbuch ist speziell für den Physikunterricht im Rahmen einer Ausbildung zum Chemisch-technischen Assistenten konzipiert und widmet sich vorrangig solchen Themen, die für die Laborpraxis von Bedeutung sind. Dazu gehören insbesondere die Optik, die Wärme- und Elektrizitätslehre sowie die Radioaktivität. Alle wichtigen Formeln und physikalischen Beziehungen werden durch Rechenbeispiele mit (...) Lösungen veranschaulicht. Mit seinem durchgehenden Praxisbezug leistet dieses Buch auch nach abgeschlossener Ausbildung noch gute Dienste. "Das Buch kann Chemisch-technischen Assistenten und Schülern an naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Berufsfachschulen nur empfohlen werden." (GIT Labor-Fachzeitschrift). (shrink)

1) Gaukroger estimates that there exist two irreconcilable theses in the Cartesian method in the Rules. The first thesis concerns the problem of the cognitive grasp of inference, the other the problem of the method of discovery. Descartes, by integrating deduction as a simple object of intuition, rejects the psychologicalinterpretation of inference, and elevates deduction to the status of a necessary condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of the method of discovery requires that inference produces a new (...) truth as its conclusion. Descartes takes the algebraic solution of equations as the model of this method. But this orientation leads Descartes to deny all cognitive function operating in the inference of synthetic form. Thus, according to Gaukroger, these two theses tendto be opposed, calling into question the unity of the method. 2) We admit the cognitive analysis of Gaukroger on the Cartesian inference. However, Gaukroger does not see the importance of “the natural power of the mind” in the Rules. Indeed, the cognitive role of inference is always understood by Descartes, in light of this natural power. Thus, the main role of the method is to teach ways of increasing this power. Descartes tries to pose, by the algebraic treatment of questions, an analogy between the mathematical order and the order of the operations of the mind, enabling him to discover pure schemes of these operations. And, It is by theses schemes that the mind exercise itself in order to increase its natural power. For this reason, we must reconsider Gaukroger’s thesis that Descartesassimilates literally the method of discovery and algebraic solution, as well as his thesis of the inconsistency of the Cartesian method. (shrink)

Studying institutions as part of the research on cultural evolution prompts us to analyze one very important mechanism of cultural evolution: institutions do distribute cultural variants in the population. Also, it enables relating current research on cultural evolution to some more traditional social sciences: institutions, often seen as macro-social entities, are analyzed in terms of their constitutive micro-phenomena. This article presents Sperber’s characterization of institutions, and then gives some hints about the set of phenomena to which it applies.

Why, when and where are some moral systems supported and followed whilst others are condemned? Are moral values relative or universal? Can immoral actions be tolerated in times of crisis? Is the dream of becoming better sufficient for prompting virtuous behavior, or should we dream about what is best? Do moral values last? The divergence in practices and codes of moral belief and action present significant challenges but also offer opportunities to anthropologists for understanding social life. In this book, Monica (...) Heintz explores these questions, drawing on case studies from Eastern Europe that encompass migration, religion, economic and social policies and paying particular attention to the way morality works in communities undergoing rapid social change. She uses these examples to reflect on the wider question of societal conflict and change, showing how they are driven by moral values. By highlighting the centrality of such values as engines for action and questioning the limits of universal moral values, she argues that anthropology has the capacity to shed light on the study of morality and moral values generally. The Anthropology of Morality: A Dynamic and Interactionist Approach will be of interest to students and researchers in anthropology, as well as those in politics and sociology with an interest in European politics. (shrink)

A unique description of the phenomena that arise from the interaction between quantum systems and their environment. Because of the novel character of the approach discussed, the book addresses scientists from all fields of physics and related disciplines as well as students of physics.

One of the best ways to pursue and go beyond the programme of Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986), I suggest, takes as its point of departure the cognitive anthropology of anthropology. Situating Writing Culture with regard to this field of research can contribute to its further development. It is, after all, sensible to start the anthropological study of anthropology with an analysis of its own cultural productions: ethnographic texts. The analyst can then identify the relevant properties of such cultural (...) products and track down their causes. These causes include especially the cognitive processes of working ethnographers. Starting with textual analysis, I will argue that some of the rhetorical conventions that are viewed critically by contributors to Writing Culture, rather than being misleading, actually serve to inform the reader about the cognitive genesis of the ethnography. The information conveyed when complying with these conventions enables readers to evaluate the reliability of ethnographic accounts and anthropological analyses. Following the textual analysis, I specify some of the cognitive processes at work in the production of ethnographies. These include, for example, a reflexive and critical cognition that is distributed among the community of anthropologists and also 'mind-reading' – a cognitive process, much studied by cognitive psychologists, that enables ethnographers to make sense of the behaviour of indigenous people by attributing mental states to them (beliefs, intentions, desires, feelings). (shrink)

Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.

Discusses the ethical and moral issues surrounding euthanasia, genetic engineering, genetic counseling, organ transplants, and other medical technologies.

Bataille has often been dismissed as an "excremental" philosopher. Recently, however, his writings have garnered more serious attention, especially because of their influence upon contemporary French thought. But Bataille's importance far exceeds his place in the history of ideas. In his notion of communication, Bataille offers us a radically new conception of value. ;Bataille diagnoses utilitarian values as representative of a fundamental selfishness. This selfishness is a result of our placing value on solid things---whether that be the thing desired or (...) the thing that desires---rather than on the movement between beings. Expenditure without return would be the ultimate expression of this non-utilitarian movement. The movement of desire---i.e. communication---is usually recognized only as the means towards a solid end. Reason as teleological is the project of acquisition. In opposition to an economy whose paradigm is acquisition, one which Bataille labels "restricted," Bataille proposes a general economy based on expenditure. ;Life is a movement of luxury. Individuals constantly accumulate resources only to be dissolved in eroticism and in death, in poetry and in tragedy, in laughter and in tears. We vigilantly guard against dissolution, fearing the loss of meaning that comes with the end of separate existence. We close ourselves off to the flux of Being. We deny our intimate participation with the continuity that---to a discontinuous being---can only mean death. But our petty concerns, our worries about the future, our care for self-preservation, lead to a life of niggardly squalor. Separate existences fail to communicate . For Bataille, sovereign value is communication. Both the physical boundaries we maintain and the societal prohibitions we observe---and these two are not unrelated---must be transgressed for a movement of luxury to transfigure lackluster existence and open beings to communication. (shrink)

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant (...) cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture. (shrink)

Discussion of Gottlob Frege's views on predicate-expressions.

Chenu, M.-D. Foi, certitude et recherche.--Gilson, É. Réponse à Louis-Marie Régis, On some difficulties of interpretation.--Dubarle, D. Logique et épistémologie du signe chez Aristote et chez les Stoïciens.--Geiger, L.-B. Ce qui est, se dit en plusiers sens.--Owens, J. "Diversificata in diversis."--Cauchy, V. Être et connaître, l'irréductibilité de l'aristotélisme au platonisme.--Joós, E. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, de l'intentio intellectus, à l'intentio rei.--Murin, C. Pour une démystification de la "mort-de-Dieu" nietzschéenne.--Joós, E. Post-scriptum, la nouvelle scolastique de Louis-Marie Régis.--Landry, A.-M. Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., quelques dates (...) et faits marquants de sa vie.--Lettre d'Henri-Irénée Marrou à Louis-Marie Régis. (shrink)

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, (...) reasoners are well able to evaluate others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one’s mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science. (shrink)

Hudson presents a lucid, thoughtful, and convincing account of how Kant's belief in causal determinism is compatible with his belief in human free will. Hudson's book is divided into five largely self contained chapters, the first of which clearly sets forth the apparent conflict. The second chapter is the heart of the book and is also where Hudson is at his best. Hudson brings Kant into contemporary philosophy of mind in the third chapter. The fourth chapter, which is the least (...) crucial for an appreciation of Hudson's central thesis, reconstructs Kant's argument for causal determinism. Hudson concludes with an account of Kant's theory of free will, an account which is surprisingly unsatisfactory in comparison to the rest of the work. (shrink)

Papers presented at the Lukaacs Symposium held at Concordia University (Montreal, Canada) from October 10-12, 1985.

Throughout the work the author pursues one objective: to show that intentionality belongs to the fabric of reality, hence it is also the source of the intelligibility of this reality. As such, it has an ontological status and a causality of its own which enables it to play its role as intermediary between the knowing subject and the object of thought. This interdependence is responsible for its nature and the two-way movement expressed by intentio intellectus and intentio rei whose efficacy (...) widens or reduces the scope of what is considered as intelligible by a philosophical doctrine. (shrink)