La série Doctor Who est parvenue, en cinquante ans d’existence, à mettre en place une mythologie dans laquelle technologie et mythes des origines ont donné vie à un univers que la majorité des personnages perçoit comme étant « magique ». Tout comme le magicien ou la figure du sage dans le monomythe campbellien, le Docteur apparaît toujours au bon moment et provoque l’appel de l’aventure qui guide ses compagnons humains dans un monde merveilleux. Offrant souvent des explications pseudo-scientifiques incompréhensibles pour (...) le commun des mortels, le Docteur ressemble ainsi au magicien d’Oz dont les pouvoirs magiques viennent d’une maîtrise scientifique supérieure à celle de ses interlocuteurs. Mais la représentation de ce magicien spatio-temporel a pris une toute nouvelle tournure lorsqu’il est devenu évident que le Docteur et Merlin avaient une histoire et des origines communes. In fifty years, Doctor Who managed to develop a mythology in which technology and origin myths gave birth to a universe that most characters perceive as “magical”. Just like the wizard or the wise in the Campbellian monomyth, the Doctor systematically appears at the right moment and provokes the call to adventure that will lead his human companions in a wonderful world. His pseudo-scientific explanations, often incomprehensible for us mortals, thus create a certain connection between the Doctor and the Wizard of Oz, whose magic powers result from a superior knowledge of science. But the representation of this spatiotemporal magician became quite different when the Doctor and Merlin started to have a common history and a same origin. (shrink)

Depuis plusieurs années, Michel Onfray s'offre tous les plateaux télé, la radio et la presse pour dire qu'il est un contestataire et un rebelle. Les médias lui offrent des colonnes et des boulevards et il est régulièrement sollicité pour livrer son avis sur les gens, le monde, la politique, les faits de société. Il réalise l'acrobatie étonnante d'être un incontournable du système médiatique et commercial tout en prétendant combattre ce système. Ce livre a pour objet de disséquer, d'analyser et de (...) démontrer le mythe Onfray, une fable médiatique créée de toutes pièces par une industrie bien huilée qui avait besoin qu'un prétendant occupe le siège vacant de l'intellectuel de service. Mission accomplie. Mais Michel Onfray est-il le philosophe de génie que nous vendent les médias? Est-il un intellectuel crédible? En réalité sa vision du monde est binaire, schématique ; son rapport à l'Histoire sans nuance et ce qu'il prend pour la construction d'une pensée philosophique solide ressemble davantage à une crise d'adolescence qui n'a jamais fini. Sa critique politique est simpliste, sans surprise, totalement conforme aux dogmes du prêt-à-penser moderne. Les contradictions, les non-sens et les banalités abondent dans une oeuvre littéraire creuse et répétitive. Ce livre explore la réalité onfrayenne et en tire un bilan sans appel qui détricote le mythe. (shrink)

Cet article se concentre sur le jeu de danse d’une petite fille de neuf ans, filmé par elle-même dans la cour d’une école primaire écossaise, en 2018. Olivia incorpore dans son jeu des objets numériques, non numériques, et son environnement, passant de la sélection de chansons sur un téléphone à la danse avec la caméra, au jeu avec le vent, et à la manipulation d’un cône de signalisation. Elle créé un espace de jeu personnel au milieu de l’espace commun, marqué (...) par la musique, le mouvement, les objets et elle-même. Cet article examine comment, à travers ce processus de danse ludique, Olivia met en scène son enfance genrée au féminin, dans sa façon d’interagir avec les gens, l’espace et les objets. Olivia s’inscrit ainsi dans la tradition du jeu dansé des filles. Mais dans la cour post-numérique, les objets numériques deviennent une partie de son jeu, suivant une autre tradition enfantine du jeu, le “bricolage”, dans lequel les enfants utilisent le monde qui les entoure, à travers le temps et l’espace. (shrink)

Nous soutenons que l’enseignement de la philosophie à travers le monde est encore hanté par une «politique» de marginalisation des traditions moins favorisées comme la philosophie africaine. Des travaux renommés montrent que le programme classique de philosophie utilisé dans les établissements d’enseignement à travers le monde est principalement occidental et, en tant que tel, très colonial. Nous soutenons que cela équivaut à une sorte d’«injustice épistémique» qui porte préjudice à la production de la connaissance. Nous affirmons en particulier que cette (...) «politique» doit être interrompue. Nous proposons comme alternative la tradition conversationnelle, à partir de laquelle une programme de philosophie compréhensif et inconciliable avec la politique d’exclusion pourrait être mis au point. (shrink)

Le réalisme métaphysique est la conception suivant laquelle la plupart des objets qui peuplent le monde existent indépendamment de notre pensée et possèdent une nature indépendante de la manière dont nous pouvons éventuellement la concevoir. A mon sens cette position engage à admettre une forme robuste d'essentialisme. Beaucoup des formes modernes de l'anti-réalisme tirent leurs origines d'une forme de conceptualisme, suivant laquelle toutes les vérités que nous puissions connaître au sujet des essences sont en dernière analyse fondées sur nos concepts, (...) plutôt que dans les choses « en elles-mêmes ». Mon but est de montrer que l'anti-réalisme conceptualiste est une doctrine incohérente, et comment nous pouvons soutenir le réalisme métaphysique et l'essentialisme robuste, tout en reconnaissant clairement le rôle cognitif des concepts en tant qu'intermédiaires dans notre appréhension de la nature de la réalité indépendante de l'esprit. (shrink)

Comment se caractérise la peinture abstraite contemporaine? Quelles relations entretient-elle avec celle des maîtres du début du XXe siècle? Pour l'auteur, des oeuvres comme celles de Shirley Jaffe, Jonathan Lasker, Philippe Richard et Diana Cooper se caractérisent par un refus de l'unité, de l'harmonie et de la pureté, c'est-à-dire d'une recherche de la perfection. L'hétérogénéité, constitutive de leurs oeuvres, est fondée sur la reprise d'images réelles et l'ouverture des oeuvres à l'espace qui les environne. Elle participe d'une position politique (...) et d'une vision désenchantée du monde contemporain. (shrink)

I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown.

What contribution can political philosophers make to policy questions, such as the best configuration of the welfare state? On one view, political philosophers set out abstract theories of justice that can guide policy makers in their attempt to transform existing institutions. Yet it rarely seems the case that such a model is used in practice, and it therefore becomes unclear how political philosophy can contribute to policy debates. Following a suggestion from Margaret MacDonald, I consider the view that political philosophers (...) can contribute by drawing attention to relatively neglected values. I develop this view to add the possibility that political philosophers can try to correct a situation in which a particular value, though important, can come to be too highly emphasised. I illustrate the account by considering the rise of the value of ‘responsibility’ in the welfare state, and ultimately the damage that has been done to society to disadvantaged groups by the over-insistence on the importance of responsibility. (shrink)

Explores the relationship between philosophers' and psychoanalysts' attempts to discover how man thinks and perceives himself.

My claim in this article is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust inanimate objects – per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to hold their weight, for instance), and, perhaps most importantly, that this poses a challenge to that orthodoxy. My argument consists of four parts. In Section 2 I introduce an alleged distinction between trust as mere reliance and trust as (...) a rich, morally loaded notion. In the course of doing so, I briefly sketch some models of trust. This will help us to get a handle on how some of the mainstream models of trust preclude or ignore the trusting of inanimate objects. In Section 3 I introduce cases designed to show that we have reason to think that we do trust inanimate objects. In Section 4 I consider an objection, and in Section 5 I discuss some consequences of this finding, before concluding in Section 6. (shrink)

:Advocates of social equality need to develop an account of the society they favor. I have argued elsewhere that social equality should be conceived negatively: in terms of opposition to asymmetric and alienating relations such as hierarchy, domination and social exclusion, rather than in terms of a positive model of equality. This essay looks in detail at social exclusion, or rather “differential social inclusion,” and especially at the mechanisms that create exclusion and bind excluded groups together, and the consequent effects (...) these mechanisms have on the reinforcement of inequality of opportunity and failure of social solidarity. Possible policies, such as improved social mobility, assertive self-affirmation, validation of subcultures, integration, and the creation of a large public sector are considered as possible responses to differential social inclusion in order to move closer to the idea of a society of equals. (shrink)

COVID-19 epidemic models raise important questions for science and philosophy of science. Here I provide a brief preliminary exploration of three: what kinds of predictions do epidemic models make, are they causal models, and how do different kinds of epidemic models differ in terms of what they represent?

Health‐related Quality of Life measures have recently been attacked from two directions, both of which criticize the preference‐based method of evaluating health states they typically incorporate. One attack, based on work by Daniel Kahneman and others, argues that ‘experience’ is a better basis for evaluation. The other, inspired by Amartya Sen, argues that ‘capability’ should be the guiding concept. In addition, opinion differs as to whether health evaluation measures are best derived from consultations with the general public, with patients, or (...) with health professionals. And there is disagreement about whether these opinions should be solicited individually and aggregated, or derived instead from a process of collective deliberation. These distinctions yield a wide variety of possible approaches, with potentially differing policy implications. We consider some areas of disagreement between some of these approaches. We show that many of the perspectives seem to capture something important, such that it may be a mistake to reject any of them. Instead we suggest that some of the existing ‘instruments’ designed to measure HR QoLs may in fact successfully already combine these attributes, and with further refinement such instruments may be able to provide a reasonable reconciliation between the perspectives. (shrink)

First-in-human clinical trials represent a critical juncture in the translation of laboratory discoveries. However, because they involve the greatest degree of uncertainty at any point in the drug development process, their initiation is beset by a series of nettlesome ethical questions [1]: has clinical promise been sufficiently demonstrated in animals? Should trial access be restricted to patients with refractory disease? Should trials be viewed as therapeutic? Have researchers adequately minimized risks? The resolution of such ethical questions inevitably turns on claims (...) about future events like harms, therapeutic response, and clinical translation. Recurrent failures in clinical translation, like Eli Lilly's Alzheimer candidate semagacestat, highlight the severe limitations of current methods of prediction. In this case, patients in the active arm of the placebo-controlled trial had earlier onset of dementia and elevated rates of skin cancer [2]. Various authoritative accounts of human research ethics state that decision-making about risk and benefit should be careful, systematic, and non-arbitrary [3]–[5]. Yet, these sources provide little guidance about what kinds of evidence stakeholders should use to ensure their estimates of such events ground responsible ethical decisions. In this article, we suggest that investigators, oversight bodies, and sponsors often base their predictions on a flawed and inappropriately narrow preclinical evidence base. (shrink)

in Risk: Philosophical Perspectives ed Tim Lewens, Routledge.

Various influential ethical theories propose that we should strive to develop morally sound character traits, either because good actions are those that issue from good character traits, or because good traits are those that generally incline us toward actions that are good for some independent reason such as the intentions with which they are performed or the consequences of performing them. This proposal obviously raises questions about the nature and origins of character traits, and our degree of control over them. (...) For if we cannot develop our traits then this proposal should be abandoned, and if we can then we need to know how this is best achieved. (shrink)

Innovation in basic science is often a cause for won­der and excitement. Those associated with a new development are quick to point out the anticipated benefits: a cure for cancer or dementia, an end to unsafe water or hunger. These advocates are slower to draw at­tention to the possible costs, which may become known only much later. It is always hard to have an accurate overview, as it is almost impossible to predict the total effects of the widespread adoption of (...) any new technology and, especially, its longer‐term or cumulative effects, as as­bestos and CFCs demonstrate. For this reason, some policy‐makers or members of the public hope that we can apply “the precautionary principle” to innovation. Unfortunately, if one is looking for a principle that can guide action, then, strictly speaking, there is no pre­cautionary principle. One might better speak of a “pre­cautionary approach,” although even this needs to be unpacked. (shrink)

Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.

Research on the division of cognitive labor has found that adults and children as young as age 5 are able to find appropriate experts for different causal systems. However, little work has explored how children and adults decide when to seek out expert knowledge in the first place. We propose that children and adults rely on “mechanism metadata,” information about mechanism information. We argue that mechanism metadata is relatively consistent across individuals exposed to similar amounts of mechanism information, and it (...) is applicable to a wide range of causal systems. In three experiments, we show that adults and children as young as 5 years of age have a consistent sense of the causal complexity of different causal systems, and that this sense of complexity is related to decisions about when to seek expert knowledge, but over development there is a shift in focus from procedural information to internal mechanism information. (shrink)

Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting (...) 'colour phenomenalism', rather than physicalism, is required to give a satisfactory account of the necessity of Wittgenstein's 'puzzle propositions' about colour. (shrink)

If one values freedom, what sort of regime of property should one favor: libertarianism, socialism, or something else again? Debate on this topic has been hampered by a failure to distinguish freedom and liberty, which are both of great value, but can come into conflict. Furthermore there are many similar concepts—distinct from both liberty and freedom, yet each representing something we rightly value—which may also come into conflict with each other and with freedom and liberty. Consequently the question posed above (...) has no easy answer. (shrink)

I develop a class of counterexamples to Blome-Tillmann’s ‘Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism’. There are cases in which subjects are ignorant of key propositions that are inconsistent with the pragmatic presuppositions in conversational contexts in which they are discussed; in such contexts, PEC wrongly predicts the subjects to satisfy certain ‘knows’ attributions.

Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...) principle can be articulated that will survive scrutiny. Opponents of contextualism often try to gain an advantage over it by claiming that their view mimics these virtues of contextualism as well as having other virtues. A recent example of the same is termed ‘contrastivism," as presented by Jonathan Schaffer. I will argue that the representation made is chimerical, that in fact contrastivism has no hope of mirroring these twin virtues of contextualism. (shrink)

Solar radiation management (SRM) has been proposed as a means of mitigating climate change. Although SRM poses new risks, it is sometimes proposed as the ‘lesser evil’. I consider how research and implementation of SRM could be regulated, drawing on what I call a ‘precautionary checklist’, which includes consideration of the longer term political implications of technical change. Particular attention is given to the moral hazard of ‘regulatory drift’, in which strong initial regulation softens through complacency, deliberate deregulation (‘regulatory gift’) (...) and the limited constituency of people with the skills to regulate (‘thin markets’). I propose the strengthening of civil society groups to keep regulators in check. (shrink)