In groups where members deliberate with limited information, consensus can emerge where, under complete information, fundamental disagreement would prevail. Using an agent-based model, we explore the factors contributing to group consensus by comparing argumentation styles in two types of groups: agents in groups of advocates communicate arguments for options perceived as personally beneficial. Agents in groups of diplomats do the same but avoid disagreement in that they bring up arguments supporting a second-best option whenever their interaction partner perceives to benefit (...) the least from what the sender finds best. Results show that consensus depends on argumentation style, but also on what members initially perceive as preferred. Diplomats are more likely to form consensus when initial perceptions accurately align with full information preferences, which diverge within the group. Conversely, and perhaps counterintuitively, in the presence of inaccurate initial perceptions, groups of advocates converge while diplomats part in disagreement. Our results imply that the ideal argumentation style must be considered carefully in light of both the desired outcome and the initial information distribution: when conflicting stakes produce a trade-off between consensus and truthful perceptions, polite versus selfish ways of deliberation may produce one or the other outcome, depending on the initial information members are equipped with. (shrink)

The path taken by German philosophy in the twentieth century is one of the most exciting and controversial in the history of human thought, by turns radical and conservative and secular and religious. In this outstanding introduction, German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Dilthey to Honneth--the third and final volume in his trilogy, Julian Young examines the work of eight German philosophers and theologians of the period. He shows how they engaged with profound existential questions about individual and collective lives, (...) criticised the increasing rationalisation and mechanisation characteristic of modernity, and committed themselves to varying forms of liberalism, socialism and democracy. Young introduces and assesses the thought of the following figures: Wilhelm Dilthey, the encroachment of the natural sciences upon the study of humanity and his distinction between 'explanation' and 'understanding'; Karl Jaspers, existentialism, the challenge of nihilism and the turn to theology; Edith Stein, our understanding of other people and the philosophy of empathy from a phenomenological standpoint; Paul Tillich, philosophical theology and the 'theonomous' life; Martin Buber, Recovering the 'I-Thou' relationship in the face of modernity and religious socialism; Hans Jonas, responsibility, selfhood and threats to humanity in the twentieth century; Erich Fromm, the 'art of loving' as a bulwark against totalitarianism and the replacement of capitalism by communitarian socialism; Axel Honneth, contemporary Hegelianism and the ethics and politics of recognition. Lucidly and engagingly written, German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Dilthey to Honneth is essential reading for students of German philosophy, phenomenology and theology and will also be of interest to students in related fields such as literature, political theory and sociology. (shrink)

Ontic Structural Realism is a version of realism about science according to which by positing the existence of structures, understood as basic components of reality, one can resolve central difficulties faced by standard versions of scientific realism. Structures are invoked to respond to two important challenges: one posed by the pessimist meta-induction and the other by the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics, which arises in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We argue that difficulties in the proper understanding of what a structure is (...) undermines the realist component of the view. Given the difficulties, either realism should be dropped or additional metaphysical components not fully endorsed by science should be incorporated. (shrink)

The strategy of developing an ontology or models of disability as a prior step to settling ethical issues regarding disabilities is highly problematic for two reasons. First, key definitional aspects of disability are normative and cannot helpfully be made value-neutral. Second, if we accept that the contested concept of disability is value-laden, it is far from obvious that there are definitive reasons for choosing one interpretation of the concept over another. I conclude that the concept of disability is better left (...) ethically open-ended or broad enough to encompass the examination of various ethical issues. Alternatively, the concept of disability could be altogether abandoned in order to focus on specific issues without being hindered by debates about the nature of disability. Only political costs, rather than conceptual considerations internal to the models, could be weighed against such a conclusion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that (...) incompatibilism undermines either the non-reductionist or the physicalist aspirations of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

A close examination of the literature on ontology may strike one with roughly two distinct senses of this word. According to the first of them, which we shall call traditional ontology , ontology is characterized as the a priori study of various “ontological categories”. In a second sense, which may be called naturalized ontology , ontology relies on our best scientific theories and from them it tries to derive the ultimate furniture of the world. From a methodological point of view (...) these two senses of ontology are very far away. Here, we discuss a possible relationship between these senses and argue that they may be made compatible and complement each other. We also examine how logic, understood as a linguistic device dealing with the conceptual framework of a theory and its basic inference patterns must be taken into account in this kind of study. The idea guiding our proposal may be put as follows: naturalized ontology checks for the applicability of the ontological categories proposed by traditional ontology and give substantial feedback for it. The adequate expression of some of the resulting ontological frameworks may require a different logic. We conclude with a discussion of the case of orthodox quantum mechanics, arguing that this theory exemplifies the kind of relationship between the two senses of ontology. We also argue that the view proposed here may throw some light in ontological questions concerning this theory. (shrink)

Any complete theory of “what we owe to each other” must be able to adequately accommodate directed or bipolar obligations, that is, those obligations that are owed to a particular individual and in virtue of which another individual stands to be wronged. Bipolar obligations receive their moral importance from their intimate connection to a particular form of recognition respect that we owe to each other: respect of another as a source of valid claims to whom in particular we owe certain (...) treatment and, at the very least, an apology if we fail to accord that treatment. While some of the most prominent accounts of interpersonal morality fail to adequately accommodate bipolar obligations, I here investigate a recent proposal that explicitly seeks to improve on these accounts—Stephen Darwall’s second-personal theory of morality. Ultimately, I object to Darwall’s theory on the grounds that his second-personal theory normatively ties bipolar obligations too closely to non-directed moral obligations or those that we are under, period. The problem for Darwall’s account is that any obligations that at first appear to be bipolar and owed to someone in particular turn out to be instances of non-directed moral obligations period that have their normative source in the representative authority of the moral community. Adequately accommodating bipolar obligations requires taking seriously a novel second-personal approach, according to which we locate the normative sources of our interpersonal obligations in the claims and demands particular persons and deliberate from what I call the pairwise or bipolar standpoint. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory is a ZFU-like axiomatic set theory, which deals with two kinds of ur-elements: M-atoms, objects like the atoms of ZFU, and m-atoms, items for which the usual identity relation is not defined. One of the motivations to advance such a theory is to deal properly with collections of items like particles in non-relativistic quantum mechanics when these are understood as being non-individuals in the sense that they may be indistinguishable although identity does not apply to them. According to (...) some authors, this is the best way to understand quantum objects. The fact that identity is not defined for m-atoms raises a technical difficulty: it seems impossible to follow the usual procedures to define the cardinal of collections involving these items. In this paper we propose a definition of finite cardinals in quasi-set theory which works for collections involving m-atoms. (shrink)

Debunking arguments in metaethics are often presented as particularly challenging for non‐naturalistic versions of moral realism. The first aim of this paper is to explore and defend a response on behalf of non‐naturalism. The second aim of the paper is to argue that although non‐naturalism’s response is satisfactory, this does not mean that debunking arguments are metaethically uninteresting. They have a limited and indirect role to play in the exchange between non‐naturalists and moral error theorists. In the end, debunking arguments (...) can do less for sceptics and nihilists than what is commonly thought, but not nothing. (shrink)

Poincaré is a pre-eminent figure: as one of the greatest of mathematicians; as a contributor of prime importance to the development of physical theory at a time when physics was undergoing a profound transformation; and as a philosopher. However, I think that Poincaré, with all this virtue, made a serious philosophical mistake. In Poincaré’s own work, this error seems to me to have kept him from several fundamental discoveries in physics. The hypothesis that Poincaré would have made these discoveries if (...) he had not been misled by a philosophical error is not one that lends itself to conclusive assessment; but what I wish to do is to lay out the main circumstances of the case so as to make clear, at least, that the issue of philosophic principle involved, and the questions of fundamental physics under discussion, are of considerable mutual relevance. (shrink)

The paper begins with consideration of Plato and Aristotle, but the question addressed in this essay is the following: What has been meant--and what role has been played--in the succession of doctrines of physics we have had since the seventeenth century, by notions of “power” and of “cause”? The essay concludes with consideration of field theories set in relativistic space-time.

Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not (...) provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist. (shrink)

In this paper we propose to take seriously the claim that at least some kinds of paraconsistent negations are subcontrariety forming operators. We shall argue that from an intuitive point of view, by considering paraconsistent negations as formalizing that particular kind of opposition, one needs not worry with issues about the meaning of true contradictions and the like, given that “true contradictions” are not involved in these paraconsistent logics. Our strategy will consist in showing that, on the one hand, the (...) natural translation for subcontrariety in formal languages is not a contradiction in natural language, and on the other, translating alleged cases of contradiction in natural language to paraconsistent formal systems works only provided we transform them into a subcontrariety. Transforming contradictions into subcontrariety shall provide for an intuitive interpretation for paraconsistent negation, which we also discuss here. By putting all those pieces together, we hope a clearer sense of paraconsistency can be made, one which may liberate us from the need to tame contradictions. (shrink)

Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation, but not those concerning (...) virtue and vice—to be uniformly false. Moral error theorists typically join forces with non-naturalist realists, against naturalism and non-cognitivism. Facts that are normative in the reason-implying sense are irreducibly normative, and they are very different. Many non-naturalist realists and error theorists maintain that it is impossible to give a plausible naturalistic account of moral facts, precisely because they are irreducibly normative; moral naturalism therefore falls prey to the "normativity objection". (shrink)

The historico-political category of 'Continental philosophy' arose in the United States and includes such figures as Adorno, Arendt, Beauvoir, Cairns, Carr, Cavailles, Deleuze, Derrida, Fink, Foucault, Funke, Gadamer, Gurwitsch, Habermas, Heidegger, Held, Ihde, Jaspers, Jonas, Kersten, Kristeva, Ingarden, Landgrebe, Levinas, Lyotard, Marcel, Marcuse, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Mohanty, Natanson, Ortega y Gasset, Patoka, Reinach, Ricoeur, Sartre, Scheler, Schutz, Seebohm, Sokolowski, Spet, Stein, Stroeker, and Waldenfels. What these diverse figures share is (a) an early but not necessarily continued critical involvement with (...) Husserl's phenomenology and (b) subsequent intellectual interaction with others who also began that way. Some comments on relations with analytic philosophy are also included with this historical sketch. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:An Episcopal priest reflects on the spiritual practices and perspectives that guide her work to mobilize a Spirit-filled, faithful response to climate crisis. After considering how Buddhist meditation informs the author's understanding of Christianity, the essay acknowledges that versions of Christianity have inflicted, and continue to inflict, enormous harm on human beings, the land, and the other creatures with whom we share this planet. Yet Christianity, like other religious traditions, can sift through its teachings, practices, and rituals to locate the (...) gold, the elements of deep ecological wisdom that the human community so desperately needs. Every religious tradition must ask itself: How does this unprecedented moment in human history challenge us to evolve so that we truly serve the common good? Our need to "think outside the box" is illustrated by the puzzle of nine dots that can only be connected by four lines if the lines extend beyond the borders of the box. Similarly, four lines of thought or four arrows of prayerful intention disclose an underlying, sacred reality: the love that created all things, connects all things, and sustains all things. The four arrows: (i) We cultivate an interior relationship of love, learning contemplative practices that quiet our minds and deepen our inner stability; (ii) We awaken to the expansive love that dissolves our tightly gripped sense of self and asserts moral values quite different from those of late-stage capitalism—in particular, intersectional justice and reverence for the natural world; (iii) We practice both sorrow and joy, making room for expressive, visceral forms of prayer, lament, and emotional release; and (iv) We take bold action for healing. Love's four arrows pull us out of the box of ordinary consciousness, the box of business as usual, and into a larger, more connected space: a space of healing and transformation. (shrink)

Following Lawrence Kohlberg it has been commonplace to regard Plato's moral theory as ‘intellectualist’, where Plato supposedly believes that becoming virtuous requires nothing other than ‘philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good’. This is a radical misunderstanding of Plato's educational programme, however. While Plato claims that knowledge is extremely important in the initial stages of the moral development of young adults, he also claims that knowledge must be followed by a rigorous process of imitation and habituation. (...) Like Aristotle, Plato believes that it is not possible to become virtuous if one does not practice the virtues under the guidance of virtuous role models. This paper seeks to illuminate this little recognised aspect of Plato's educational programme. When properly understood, Plato's theory offers educators important insights into how best to encourage the moral development of young adults. (shrink)

This article reflects upon the increasingly popular claim that animals are persons. Such a claim can take a metaphysical, a moral, or a legal meaning. Animals may or may not be persons, but I challenge the assumption that it is even fruitful to think about the ways in which animals are “persons.” At best, it is a relatively narrow assimilationist conceptual exercise. At worst, it distracts us from conceptualizing more effective strategies to improve the welfare of animals and impoverishes more (...) promising avenues of philosophical investigation on interspecies relations and on the nature and moral status of both animals and human beings. (shrink)

The technology to create and automate large numbers of fake social media users, or “social bots”, is becoming increasingly more accessible to private individuals. This paper explores one potential use of the technology, namely the creation of “political bots”: social bots aimed at influencing the political opinions of others. Despite initial worries about licensing the use of such bots by private individuals, this paper provides an, albeit limited, argument in favour of this. The argument begins by providing a prima facie (...) case in favour of these political bots and proceeds by attempting to answer a series of potential objections. These objections are based on (1) the dangerous effectiveness of the technology; the (2) corruptive, (3) deceitful and (4) manipulating nature of political bots; (5) the worry that the technology will lead to chaos and be detrimental to trust online; and (6) practical issues involved in ensuring acceptable use of the technology. In all cases I will argue that the objections are overestimated, and that a closer look at the use of political bots helps us realise that using them is simply a new way of speaking up in modern society. (shrink)

In sequence-space synaesthesia, members of linguistic sequences such as numbers, days of the week and letters of the alphabet are perceived to occupy spatial positions, either in the mind's eye or as locations in space around the body. In this chapter, we begin by considering the possible sequences that can induce this type of synaesthesia, with the focus on numbers, time-units and letters. We evaluate the various methods used to test the genuineness of self-reports of this type of synaesthesia, and (...) we make suggestions for novel techniques that could address the shortcomings of the current methods. Lastly, we briefly outline the current theories on the neural basis of this type of synaesthesia, including the recent reification hypothesis. We conclude by discussing how scientific findings with sequence-space synaesthetes can be beneficial for the study of cognitive psychology more generally. (shrink)

Participation in victim-offender mediation can reduce the risk of reoffending. However, relatively little is known about how VOM affects the intermediate psychological changes underlying this effect. It was hypothesized that VOM increases feelings of responsibility, guilt, and shame among offenders as well as empathy toward the victim. It was also expected that VOM leads to feelings of moral failure among offenders, increasing their intention to desist, and improving their relation with the victim, relatives, and community. Lastly, it was hypothesized that (...) offenders may experience reduced rejection, concerns about condemnation, threat to their social moral identity, and victim blame following VOM. To this end, we compared psychological changes in offenders who participated in a VOM program in the Netherlands with those of offenders who were willing to but did not participate. A quasi-experimental, pre- and postmeasure research design was used to compare these groups. Our findings tentatively suggest that offenders who participate in VOM have more responsibility-taking and victim empathy, feel more guilt and shame, and experience higher moral failure than offenders who do not participate in VOM do. Offenders also reported feeling significantly less awkward about meeting the victim again after VOM. Future research should address how and to what degree these psychological changes translate into a lower risk of reoffending. (shrink)

On Newton’s view understanding of the fundamental character of anything can only come from knowledge about that thing, gained from experience, he sought experimental knowledge of light, for example, that would provide, not in the first instance support for a prior theory of its nature, but some systematic basis for further investigation--and--possibly--an eventual more fundamental theory. Among the things to hope for as results of an investigation is the discovery both of new questions that may be profitably pursued and new (...) instrumentalities for conducting further investigations. In Newton’s account of the nature of body, lawsplay a central role; and it is regularities--laws of behavior--that he primarily sought in his study of phenomena. It is these that make the results of the investigations what I have called “systematic.”. (shrink)

This essay examines the earliest reception of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95) focusing on his notion of consciousness as “Wechselbestimmung”. The adoption of this notion leads to a divergent discussion which casts doubts on the idea of a reliable continuity in the history of reception. At this point in history, Fichte’s readers seem to be interested in a cultural aspect of his philosophical argument that is not discussed by him. Fichte is looking for a way to explain the unity of (...) consciousness in a strictly epistemological sense, whereas his poetically orientated readers identify his concept of conflicting consciousness with a cultural problem. Only Holderlin discusses the logical problem addressed by Fichte, but deliberately transfers it into his poetics. Schiller and Friedrich Schlegel discuss the concept of “Wechselwirkung” in respect of problems within modern culture partially evoking a theory of alienation. They are not interested in Fichte’s epistemological problem, even though it also is central to modern subjectivity in philosophical terms. Der Aufsatz untersucht die fruheste Rezeption der Wissenschaftslehre Johann Gottlieb Fichtes (1794/95) im Blick auf seinen Begriff vom Bewusstsein: die „Wechselbestimmung“. Dabei zeigt die Momentaufnahme ein divergentes bis disparates Bild der philosophischen Diskussion, das zur Geltung kommen soll gegenuber einer idealisierten Auffassung von hermeneutisch zuverlassiger Rezeptionsgeschichte. Es wird gezeigt, dass die ‚Rezipienten‘ sich gewisserma.en fur einen externen Aspekt des Theorems interessieren, das in dem philosophischen Werk nicht Thema ist. Wahrend Fichte mit der in Frage stehenden Einheit des Bewusstseins ein Grundproblem der theoretischen Philosophie diskutiert, behandeln seine poetisch ausgerichteten Leser die „Wechselbestimmung“ eher aus kulturkritischer Perspektive. Allein Holderlin setzt sich mit Fichtes eigentlich gemeintem, logischen Widerspruch auseinander, verschiebt seine Darstellung und ‚Losung‘ jedoch bewusst auf die Ebene seiner philosophischen Dichtung. Schiller und Friedrich Schlegel diskutieren unter „Wechselwirkung“ ein Problem der modernen Kultur, das teilweise Zuge einer Entfremdungstheorie annimmt. Sie gehen nicht auf den epistemologischen Gedankengang Fichtes ein, auch wenn dieser ebenfalls ein typisch modernes Problem behandelt: die Moglichkeit von Gewissheit im Rahmen der Subjektivitatsphilosophie. (shrink)

This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie (...) in with notorious difficulties for moral realism concerning the nature of moral truth and the relation between moral judgment and motivation to act. (shrink)

Este artigo é uma exposição fragmentada de pesquisa realizada no âmbito de doutoramento no PPGArtes/UnB. Mostra-se como uma proposta cênica-pedagógica, sendo um diálogo do corpo com as técnicas e poéticas que se encontram nas expressões de artes do povo que trazem matrizes africanas. Abordar-se-á reflexões sobre os aspectos que envolvem o trabalho do artista cênico no que concerne a sua criação estética. Com isso, pretende-se corroborar com a elaboração de saberes no que concerne ao universo das artes populares na contemporaneidade.

_Germany and the French Wars of Religion, 1560-1572_ explores how the first decade of the religious wars in France was interpreted by German Protestants and why they felt compelled to intervene.

We present a scientific analysis of Jackson Pollock's drip paintings and show that his patterns are fractal. The analysis also shows that he refined the fractal content of his paintings over the period 1943 -- 1952. We present a novel interpretation of Pollock's work described as Fractal Expressionism -- a direct expression of the generic imagery of nature's scenery.

How well is the field of political studies doing and where is it headed? Such questions are examined and answered in this broad world overview of political science, along with the advances and shortcomings, as well as the recommended prescriptions for the future decades of the new century. The book includes three world regional assessments of the discipline, along with an in-depth survey of various sub-disciplinary fields and a concluding critical essay on the future of political studies. This is the (...) final volume in a book series on the development of political science, created in 2000 by Research Committee 33 of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) on the study of political science as a discipline. Contents include: Political Science in Three Asian Democracies: Disaffected (Japan), Third-Wave (Korea), and Fledgling (China) * Political Science in Europe: Its Development as a Discipline * Political Science in North America and Other Continents: Is There a Genuinely Int. (shrink)

In 1956, the Swedish Parliament decided to invest in a national nuclear energy program. The decision rested on the conviction that it would be in the interest of the nation to use the assets of natural uranium, the advanced reactor technology, and the expertise on nuclear physics that the country had at its disposal. Since the decision concerned the largest investment ever in Swedish industrial politics, the scientists and engineers had to promise that it would lead to a prosperous future. (...) In this article, the utopian discourse and the rhetoric that were developed to support the Swedish nuclear energy program are analyzed. An important conclusion is that the scientific, technological, political, economic, and moral discourse was not sufficient to create political and civil support. Instead, the scientists and engineers had to turn to the world of myths. Thereby, the conflicts between nuclear physics and magic, scientific objectivity and demons, and rationalistic belief in progress and irrational ideas of faith were dissolved. In Sweden, as in many other Western countries during the 1950s, the world was not disenchanted, but re-enchanted. (shrink)

Francesco Berto has argued that a primitive concept of material exclusion could be employed to formulate a notion of absolute contradiction that not even dialetheists could accept. The machinery of material exclusion and absolute contradiction could then be employed as a common ground by both dialetheists as well as their opponents in debates about negation and truth. In this paper, we first put the idea on a clear basis, and then present some criticism to it. We shall argue that the (...) concepts of material exclusion and absolute contradiction hardly help with a clear basis for the debate on dialetheism; furthermore, the introduction of material exclusion threatens the coherence of dialetheism by allowing one to express the opposition between designated and undesignated values, with unwanted conclusions. (shrink)

Resumo: A finalidade deste artigo é bastante pontual e específica: evidenciar os problemas do tratamento acrítico dado à psicologia por Brian Leiter em seu recente Moral Psychology with Nietzsche. O autor inclui, sem se empenhar em qualquer discussão metodológica, a psicologia no rol do que chama de “ciências bem-sucedidas”, tomadas como i) certificadoras do m-naturalismo nietzschiano; ii) dotadas de primazia sobre a própria filosofia na determinação do que é um “raciocínio filosófico” significativo; iii) fornecedoras de um amplo e inconteste corpo (...) de evidências de que a psicologia moral de Nietzsche “está certa” em relação a teses profundamente complexas. Minha exposição consiste em mapear a construção conceitual desse m-naturalismo, e, posteriormente, evidenciar que não há, na psicologia empírica contemporânea, nada próximo da caracterização pretendida por Leiter.: This article has a very specific purpose: to highlight the problems of Brian Leiter's uncritical treatment of psychology in his recent Moral Psychology with Nietzsche. The author includes, without engaging in any methodological discussion, psychology in the list of what he calls "successful sciences" as certifiers of Nietzschean m-naturalism; ii) as endowed with primacy over philosophy itself in determining what is meaningful "philosophical reasoning"; iii) as providing a broad and uncontested body of evidence that Nietzsche's moral psychology “is right” in profoundly complex theses. My expository strategy is to map, initially, the path taken by Leiter in the conceptual construction of his m-naturalism, and, later, to show that there is nothing in contemporary empirical psychology that legitimizes Leiter’s characterization. (shrink)

O presente texto discute a ética do cuidado sob a ótica da amplitude prática de seu escopo. Carol Gilligan e, principalmente, Nel Noddings, são apresentadas como defensoras da tese segundo a qual o cuidado exige uma espécie de conexão ou encontro pessoal entre as partes envolvidas, sendo, desse modo, inerentemente “pessoal” e “parcial”. A posição de Cláudia Card é apresentada como crítica dessas teses, especialmente pela lacuna de tal modelo quanto às pessoas que jamais estarão diretamente ligadas a nós, mas (...) que nem por isso deixam de demandar nosso engajamento moral – exigem, portanto, da ética, um espaço destacado para a justiça e para os princípios impessoais. Algumas ideias de Abraham Maslow e Betty Friedan são apresentadas como meios de se avançar nesse impasse, em especial a partir da concepção das chamadas “metamotivações” ou “metanecessidades”, caracterizadas como a abertura da possibilidade, na personalidade da pessoa moral, de se sentir “conectada” com certos bens “abstratos” e distantes de si, como os englobados pelas éticas de princípios. (shrink)

This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value. In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the notion of good for a person—in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: Rønnow-Rasmussen’s discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of ‘for someone’s sake (...) attitudes’; and his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. (shrink)