Results for 'Joint commitment'

976 found
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  1.  70
    Joint commitments.Burleigh Wilkins - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (2):145-155.
    I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert''s account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts.
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  2. Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World.Margaret Gilbert - 2013 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.
    This new essay collection by distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert provides a richly textured argument for the importance of joint commitment in our personal and public lives. Topics covered by this diverse range of essays range from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to the unity of the European Union.
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  3.  61
    Joint Commitment.Thomas H. Smith - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:38-52.
    I defend some of Gilbert’s central claims about our capacity jointly to commit ourselves, and what follows from an exercise of it. I argue that, to explain these claims, we do not need to suppose, as Gilbert does, that we ever are jointly committed, that is, jointly in a state of being committed. I offer a diagnosis of why the gratuitousness of this supposition has been overlooked.
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  4.  61
    Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation.Margaret Gilbert - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.
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  5.  43
    Joint Commitment Model of Collective Beliefs.Alban Bouvier - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:55-73.
    For almost three decades, Margaret Gilbert has introduced a new account of social facts taking “joint commitments”, not only explicit but also implicit, as the cement of sociality properly understood. Gilbert has used this original account of collective phenomena to clarify a variety of issues, both in the philosophy of rights and in the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper focuses on the latter domain; it argues that although Durkheim and Mauss are central references in her pioneering work, (...)
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  6. Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different (...)
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  7. Shared Intention is not Joint Commitment.Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2):179-189.
    Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature. Here (...)
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  8. Joint commitment and circularity.Michael H. Robins - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 1--299.
     
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  9.  77
    The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership.Titus Stahl - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 229-244.
    Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social (...)
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  10. Considerations on joint commitment: Responses to various comments.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 1--73.
  11.  47
    Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, written by M. Gilbert.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):475-478.
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  12.  17
    Political friendship as joint commitment: Aristotle on homonoia.Cansu Hepçağlayan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Aristotle devotes Nicomachean Ethics IX.6 to the notion of homonoia. Commonly translated as ‘concord’ or ‘like-mindedness’, homonoia is a central concept in Aristotle’s account of political friendship. I argue in this paper that Aristotle’s concept of homonoia cannot be perspicuously rendered as ‘like-mindedness’ or its cognates. For homonoia does not just involve the sameness of belief or opinion: it involves both shared commitments to the same goals and collective action aimed at realizing those goals, and cognates of ‘like-mindedness’ do not (...)
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  13. The Impersistence of Joint Commitments.Line Edslev Andersen & Hanne Andersen - manuscript
    The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2000c, 2014b) argues that a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend to do A. But we need to know more about the nature of joint commitments to know what exactly this implies. While the persistence of joint commitments has received much attention in the literature, their impersistence has received very little attention. (...)
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  14.  27
    Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account.Titus Stahl - 2024 - Analyse & Kritik 46 (1):67-83.
    In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to respect social norms can be explained without invoking the concept of ‘joint commitment.’ Her resulting account is, in one important sense, individualistic, and therefore struggles to account for widely held intuitions about the normative significance of social norms. I argue that we can rescue the notion of joint commitment from Valentini’s objections, and incorporate it into a version of her account that preserves its (...)
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  15.  28
    Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Matti Heinonen - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):175–178.
  16.  37
    Remarks on joint commitment and its relation to moral thinking.Margaret Gilbert - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):755-766.
  17. Joint Commitments and Group Identification in Human-Robot Interaction.John Michael & Alessandro Salice - 2017 - In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Cham: Springer.
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  18. Obligation and Joint Commitment.Margaret Gilbert - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2):143.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes (...)
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  19. Individual and joint commitments.Kaarlo Miller - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 255--272.
     
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  20.  46
    Intuitions about joint commitment.John Michael & Stephen Butterfill - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    ABSTRACT In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action themselves perceive commitment as essential? Attempts to answer this question have so far been hampered by clashes of intuition. Perhaps this is because the intuitions in question have mostly been investigated using informal methods only. To explore this possibility, we adopted a more formal approach to testing intuitions about joint action, sampling naïve participants’ intuitions about experimentally controlled (...)
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  21. Dialogue and Joint Commitment.Maura Priest & Margaret Gilbert - forthcoming - In Maura Priest & Margaret Gilbert (eds.), Les Defis de Collectif.
  22. (1 other version)Joint commitment, coercion and freedom in science : Conceptual analysis and case studies.Alban Bouvier - 2009 - In Jeroen Van Bouwel (ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 143--61.
  23.  42
    Binding the Present and the Future: Transgenerational Social Actions as Joint Commitments.Costanza Penna - 2024 - Rivista di Estetica 86:196-214.
    Transgenerational social actions are collective actions that endure over a considerable period of time and require the cooperation of multiple generations. Yet, it remains unclear what kind of obligations and rights, if any, allow actions to persist through the ages, binding future generations to be part of them. This paper proposes a way forward by considering transgenerational actions as a particular type of long-term joint commitments. Drawing on plural subject theory, I explore the conditions for membership, normativity, and justification (...)
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  24.  41
    Legal Rights and Joint Commitment.Jeffrey Helmreich - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):518-524.
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  25.  37
    Obligation and Joint Commitment.Ii Hart On Obligations - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2).
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  26. How do non-Joint Commitments come into Being? An Attempt at Cultural Naturalism.Ingvar Johansson - 2007 - In Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of sociality. New Brunswick: Ontos. pp. 135--150.
     
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  27.  5
    How do non-Joint Commitments come into Being?Ingvar Johansson - 2006 - In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. De Gruyter. pp. 135-150.
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  28.  11
    (1 other version)Acting together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. De Gruyter. pp. 153-168.
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  29.  80
    Sellars’ Theory of We-Intentions and Gilbert’s Theory of Joint Commitment: A critical notice of Jeremy R. Koons, The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars.Ronald Loeffler - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):114-127.
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 114-127.
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  30. Once More, With Feeling! A Joint Commitment Account of Musical Groups.Michel Lara - 2024 - In Ludger Jansen & Thorben Petersen (eds.), ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC GROUPS: Identity, Persistence, and Agency of Creative. New York, NY: Routledge.
     
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  31.  57
    Commitments and the sense of joint agency.Victor Fernández Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (3):889-906.
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how (...)
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  32.  97
    Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong.Víctor Fernández Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7597-7626.
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide an account of what (...)
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  33.  65
    On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in (...)
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  34. Alignment and commitment in joint action.Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):831-849.
    Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms (...)
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  35.  47
    Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.
  36.  20
    Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Review by: Caroline T. Arruda - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):258-262,.
  37.  98
    Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):258-262.
  38. Investing in commitment: Persistence in a joint action is enhanced by the perception of a partner’s effort.Marcell Székely & John Michael - 2018 - Cognition 174 (C):37-42.
    Can the perception that one’s partner is investing effort generate a sense of commitment to a joint action? To test this, we developed a 2-player version of the classic snake game which became increasingly boring over the course of each round. This enabled us to operationalize commitment in terms of how long participants persisted before pressing a ‘finish’ button to conclude each round. Our results from three experiments reveal that participants persisted longer when they perceived what they (...)
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  39.  64
    Observing joint action: Coordination creates commitment.John Michael, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):106-113.
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  40.  3
    On Agency and Joint Action.Andreea Popescu - 2020 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia:67-84.
    In this article I focus on two conflicting directions of supraindividualism concerning joint agency. The two representative authors here are Schmitt (2003b) and Pettit (2003). The tension lies between assuming there is a joint agent, without ontologically committing to such an agent, any reference to it being just a façon de parler, or, on the contrary, assuming there is a joint agent and ontologically committing to it. The problem of joint agency is discussed in relation to (...)
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  41. A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind (...)
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  42.  42
    Addressing joint action challenges in HRI: Insights from psychology and philosophy.Victor Fernandez Castro, Kathleen Belhassein, Amandine Mayima, Aurélie Clodic, Elisabeth Pacherie, Michèle Guidetti, Rachid Alami & Hélène Cochet - 2022 - Acta Psychologica 222 (103476):103476.
    The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article proposes some perspectives borrowed from psychology (...)
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  43.  75
    Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action?Guido Löhr - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):754-762.
    There are two general views that social ontologists currently defend concerning the nature of joint intentional action. According to ‘non-normativists’, for a joint action to be established, we need to align certain psychological states in certain ways. ‘Normativists’ argue that joint action essentially involves normative relations that cannot be reduced to the intentional states of individuals. In two ground-breaking publications, Javier Gomez-Lavin and Matthew Rachar empirically investigate the relation between normativity and joint action in several survey (...)
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  44. Joint attention and the problem of other minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It (...)
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  45.  80
    Joint action without and beyond planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known prior intentions that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the apparently (...) cooperative activities of agents that lack the capacities for planning and “mindreading” that one must have in order to be a party to a shared intention. The second lacuna concerns how participants are able to coordinate their actions “online”—that is, during action execution as a joint activity unfolds—without recourse to plans that specify in advance what they should do. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the first lacuna, while chapters 4 and 5 focus on the second. In chapter 2, I focus on why participants must have mutual or common knowledge of each other’s intentions and beliefs in order to have a shared intention: Why must these attitudes be “out in the open”? I argue that, if participants lack the concept of belief, then one of the two main motivations for the common knowledge requirement—to filter out certain cases that intuitively aren’t cases of genuine joint activity—actually dissipates. Furthermore, a kind of “openness” that only requires of participants that they have the concept of goal but not that of belief can satisfy the other main motivation, to make sense of the idea that joint activities are non-accidentally coordinated. In chapter 3, I offer an account of a kind of joint activity in which agents such as young children and some non-human primates could participate, given what we know about their socio-cognitive capacities. In chapter 4, I argue that ‘shared intention’-accounts are unable to say much about spontaneous or skilful joint action because of the following widely accepted constraint on what one can intend: while an agent might intend—in the sense of commit to a plan—that “we” do something together, an agent cannot intend to perform “our” joint action. I reject this constraint and argue that some joint actions are joint in virtue of each participant having what I call ‘socially extended intention-in-action’ that overlap. In chapter 5, I review empirical work on subpersonal enabling mechanisms for the coordination of joint action. The review provides clues to what it is that enables participants to successfully coordinate their actions in the absence of plan-like intentions or beyond what such intentions specify. While what I address are lacunas rather than problems, an upshot of this thesis is that leading philosophical accounts of joint activity may have less explanatory scope than one might otherwise be led to believe. The accounts of joint activity and joint action that are presented in this thesis are arguably applicable to many of the joint activities and joint actions of adult human beings. The account also helps us avoid the false dichotomy between a very robust form of joint activity and a mere concatenation of purely individualistic actions—a dichotomy that accounts such as Bratman’s arguably invite us to adopt. (shrink)
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  46. Joint Guidance: a Capacity to Jointly Guide.Marco Mattei - 2025 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-31.
    Sometimes, we act in concert with others, as when we go for a walk together, or when two mathematicians try to prove a difficult theorem with each other. An interesting question is what distinguishes the actions of individuals that together constitute some joint activity from those that amount to a mere aggregation of individual behaviours. It is common for philosophers to appeal to collective intentionality to explain such instances of shared agency. This framework generalizes the approach traditionally used to (...)
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  47.  24
    The Influence of Volunteers’ Psychological Capital: Mediating Role of Organizational Commitment, and Joint Moderating Effect of Role Identification and Perceived Social Support.Li Ping Xu, Yu Shen Wu, Jing Jing Yu & Jie Zhou - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  48. Trust and commitment in collective testimony.Leo Townsend - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 39-58.
    In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of (...)
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  49. Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
    Joint action is central to countless aspects of human life. Here I examine the roots of joint action in infancy. First, I provide evidence that—contrary to popular belief—1‐year‐old infants do have the social‐cognitive prerequisites needed to participate in joint action, even in a relatively strict sense: they can read others’ goals and intentions, they have some basic understanding of common knowledge, and they have the ability and motivation to help others achieve their goals. Then I review some (...)
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  50. Normativity in joint action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.
    The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods. Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-relative normative relations are inherent in joint action, while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that there are minimal cases of joint action without normative relations. In this work, we describe the first experimental examinations of these intuitions, and report the results of six studies that weigh in favor of the (...)
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