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Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43 (2020)
Abstract
Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.Other Versions
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Citations of this work
Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes: a Normative Model.Dennis Papadopoulos - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1125-1145.
Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich.Margaret Gilbert - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):525-538.
References found in this work
A Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello (ed.) - 2014 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
Remarks on joint commitment and its relation to moral thinking.Margaret Gilbert - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):755-766.
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