Den filosofiske tidssituasjon (innledning).--Georg Simmel.--Kritikken av intellektualismen.

O presente artigo apresenta argumentos em defesa da hipótese de que nomes próprios gerais são impossíveis no contexto da filosofia geral de Stuart Mill. Minha tese é contrária à posição de John Skorupski sobre esta questão. Ofereço dois argumentos que representam, respectivamente, duas diferentes perspectivas: pragmático e sistemático. No primeiro, analiso o problema dos nomes próprios gerais no contexto da linguagem natural. No segundo, discuto o problema no contexto interno do Sistema de Lógica de Mill.

Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...) way we think of objects determines how we see them, thus threatening the role of perception in justifying beliefs. In this paper, I show that the psychological findings can be accounted for without admitting cognitive penetrability. An underestimated but key feature of the experiments is that observers had to judge colors in borderline cases, in conditions of reduced acuity, or on the basis of color-concepts instead of matching. Such judgments are sensitive to the form of bias that Tversky and Kahneman (Science 185:1124–1131, 1974) have termed ‘anchoring’. Adopting a suggestion from Raffman (Philos Rev 103(1):41–74, 1994), I argue that the way subjects in the experiments think of the objects could affect their color judgments without altering their color experiences. (shrink)

The danger of human operators devolving responsibility to machines and failing to detect cases where they fail has been recognised for many years by industrial psychologists and engineers studying the human operators of complex machines. We call it “the control problem”, understood as the tendency of the human within a human–machine control loop to become complacent, over-reliant or unduly diffident when faced with the outputs of a reliable autonomous system. While the control problem has been investigated for some time, up (...) to this point its manifestation in machine learning contexts has not received serious attention. This paper aims to fill that gap. We argue that, except in certain special circumstances, algorithmic decision tools should not be used in high-stakes or safety-critical decisions unless the systems concerned are significantly “better than human” in the relevant domain or subdomain of decision-making. More concretely, we recommend three strategies to address the control problem, the most promising of which involves a complementary coupling between highly proficient algorithmic tools and human agents working alongside one another. We also identify six key principles which all such human–machine systems should reflect in their design. These can serve as a framework both for assessing the viability of any such human–machine system as well as guiding the design and implementation of such systems generally. (shrink)

No mathematical background is necessary to appreciate this classic of probability theory, which remains unsurpassed in its clarity, readability, and sheer charm. Its author, British logician John Venn (1834-1923), popularized the famous Venn Diagrams that are commonly used in teaching elementary mathematics.

Fresnel's theory of light was (a) impressively predictively successful yet (b) was based on an "entity" (the elastic-solid ether) that we now "know" does not exist. Does this case "confute" scientific realism as Laudan suggested? Previous attempts (by Hardin and Rosenberg and by Kitcher) to defuse the episode's anti-realist impact. The strongest form of realism compatible with this case of theory-rejection is in fact structural realism. This view was developed by Poincare who also provided reasons to think that it is (...) the only realist view of theories that really makes sense. (shrink)

En este artículo se analizan las relaciones del conocimiento científico con las sociedades en las que se produce. Tras repasar sus diversas funciones en tipos distintos de sociedades, la discusión se centra en los fines de la ciencia en las sociedades democráticas pluralistas. Frente al cada vez mayor rol instrumental de la ciencia, por el que ha recibido los nombres de «ciencia postacadémica» o «tecnociencia», se defienden los roles no instrumentales tradicionales de la investigación académica clásica. Se argumenta que sólo (...) si la ciencia académica mantiene su autonomía y su integridad frente a intereses políticos o empresariales podrá ser de utilidad al público al ofrecerle conocimiento imparcial y fidedigno frente a los sesgos producidos por la naturaleza propia de la ciencia postacadémica. (shrink)

John Woods' The Logic of Fiction, now thirty-five years old, is a ground-breaking event in the establishment of the semantics of fiction as a stand-alone research programme in the philosophies of language and logic. There is now a large literature about these matters, but Woods' book retains a striking freshness, and still serves as a convincing template of the treatment options for the field's key problems. The book now appears in a second edition with a new Foreword by Nicholas (...) Griffin and an extended bibliography covering the period 1969-2009. As Griffin notes in his Foreword, it is "surprising on looking back to discover how little was written on the semantics of fiction before John Woods' The Logic of Fiction was published in 1974. The surprise is the greater because Woods' book appeared after almost a quarter century of fierce philosophical debate about reference Fictional discourse, one would have thought, would be an important testing ground for philosophical theories of referential expressions and one, moreover, in which the standard theories would likely be tested to destruction. " " One of the great merits of Woods' book is that it takes seriously the wide-ranging demands that fiction imposes on logic and semantics, and does not try to force fiction into some pre-conceived logical mould. but thanks to Woods' pioneering efforts, we are much closer to one now than we were when he set out to write his book. His book was not the last word on the logic of fiction; it was much more important: it was nearly the first." NICHOLAS GRIFFIN is Canada Research Chair in Philosophy at McMaster University. Recent publications include Russell vs Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting," edited with Dale Jacquette. JOHN WOODS is Director of the Abductive Systems Group at the University of British Columbia and Charles S. Peirce Visiting Professor of Logic in the Group on Logic and Computational Science, King's College London. He has two forthcoming books on fiction - an edited volume, Fictions and Models: New Essays, and a research monograph, Sherlock's Member: New Perspectives on the Semantics of Fiction, both to appear in 2010. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 1, April 2003, pp. 125-141 Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician JOHN P. WRIGHT The publication of a new intellectual biography of George Cheyne1 provides a "propitious" occasion for "a thoroughly skeptical review"2 of the question which has long exercised Hume scholars, whether Cheyne was the intended recipient of David Hume's fascinating pie-Treatise Letter to a Physician,3 the (...) letter which describes his own hypochondriacal physical and mental symptoms and gives an account of his early philosophical development.4 Hume's nineteenth-century biographer, John Hill Burton, argued that Hume was probably writing to Cheyne,5 while Ernest Mossner claimed to definitively refute that hypothesis in an article entitled "Hume's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," published in 1944.6 Anita Guerrini's intellectual biography does not discuss Cheyne as a possible recipient of Hume's letter, but she does present a well-rounded picture of this interesting eighteenth-century physician from which we can judge his appropriateness as its addressee. In the following discussion I will make use of the biographical material found in this new biography of Cheyne, as well as other sources, to show that Mossner's arguments are less than definitive, and that it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility that the letter was sent to George Cheyne.7 This is a possibility that, for reasons that I will make clear, makes good biographical and philosophical sense. At the same time, it is important to keep a proper suspense of judgment as Burton did, for the evidence that the letter was either intended for or actually sent to Cheyne is not definitive. John P. Wright is Professor of Philosophy, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 126 John P. Wright Burton, who first published the autobiographical letter of the 22-yearold Hume in 1846, narrowed down the possible addressees of Hume's letter to either Cheyne or John Arbuthnot. He also pointed out that it is possible that the letter was never sent, and that the ten and a half page manuscript is only a neatly written draft, rather than a fair copy of an actual letter. Nevertheless, Burton thought he could identify the unnamed addressee on the basis of the internal evidence of the manuscript and the records of Scottish physicians practicing in England at the time. In the letter, Hume refers to the intended recipient as his "Countryman, a Scotchman [,]... a skilful Physician, a man of Letters, of Wit, of Good Sense, & of great Humanity."8 Further he writes that he is consulting him because he is a person "of great Learning beyond [his]... own Profession" who is acquainted with the "Motions of the Mind" he has described in his letter, and that "Fame pointed [him]... out as the properest person to resolve my Doubts..." about the cure of his disorder.9 Burton tells us that "the first name that suggested itself... was Arbuthnot, whose fine genius was just then flickering in the socket."10 (John Arbuthnot had been ill for some time, and died a year later.) But he then added that "a more full consideration showed to my satisfaction that it must have been destined for Dr. George Cheyne." His main reason for settling on Cheyne was that Cheyne's immensely popular The English Malady (1733) had recently been published, and that "there is a certain unison of tone between Hume's letter and this book." Burton quotes a portion of Cheyne's own long autobiographical account of his own disease in The English Malady. Cheyne's autobiography begins with the claim that "I passed my Youth in close study, and almost constant Application to the abstracted Sciences, (wherein my chief pleasure consisted) and consequently in great Temperance and a Sedentary Life"; it is followed by the reflection that any overindulgence in food or drink led to physical and psychological problems.11 He goes on to describe these in great detail for 39 pages, along with a history of his life. Burton also quotes a section of the book in which Cheyne describes how a studious and sedentary life causes the symptoms... (shrink)

A partire dalla produzione saggistica e letteraria di Umberto Eco, l’articolo analizzerà l’immaginario del Medioevo inteso come culla di ogni genere di millenarismo. La trattazione prenderà avvio dal suo saggio Palinsesto su Beato ; tenendo conto dell’originalità della prospettiva strutturalista di Eco, si confronterà l’ultima riedizione di questo scritto con un quadro bibliografico sul ruolo dell’Apocalisse di San Giovanni in seno alla tradizione occidentale. Il primo riferimento sarà la tesi genealogica di Karl Löwith, il quale nel suo Significato e fine (...) della storia affermò che le moderne filosofie della storia rispondono alla stessa ispirazione millenarista della cultura cristiana. Il secondo confronto sarà con uno dei ritratti dell’eresiarca Fra Dolcino; nella fattispecie, sarà considerata la prospettiva del filosofo socialista Antonio Labriola, elaborata a fine Ottocento per distinguere le applicazioni scientifiche del materialismo storico dai suoi fraintendimenti escatologici. Questi due opposti interlocutori condurranno a problematizzare l’interpretazione del millenarismo per come rappresentato da Umberto Eco ne Il nome della rosa. Il romanzo intende infatti l’apocalittica dolciniana come la prefigurazione del terrorismo degli Anni di Piombo? O si tratta di una mera strizzata d’occhio, un gioco con il lettore, il quale è chiamato a non confidare troppo nella potenza simbolica delle analogie? Considering Umberto Eco’s articles and novels, the paper will examine the imaginary of the Middle Age as the cradle of every kind of millenarianism. The analysis will start from Eco’s essay Palinsesto su Beato. Looking at the originality of his structuralist view, I will compare the last editing of this text with a bibliographical framework about the role of the Apocalypse of St. John in the Western tradition. The first reference will be the genealogical thesis of Karl Löwith, who in Meaning in History affirmed that the modern philosophies of history have the same eschatological aim of the Christian culture. The second comparison will be with a portrait of the medieval heresiarch Fra Dolcino. In this case, I will consider the perspective of the socialist philosopher Antonio Labriola, who elaborated it at the end of the XIX Century to distinguish the scientific applications of historical materialism from his eschatological misinterpretations. These two opposite references will drive me to problematize the representation of millenarianism as it was depicted by Umberto Eco in his The Name of the Rose. Indeed, is Dulcinian millenarianism intended by the novel as a prefiguration of the political terrorism in Italy during the Years of Lead? Or is this only a wink, a joking interaction with the reader, who should be careful to rely not on the symbolic strength of analogies? (shrink)

This book provides an intellectual biography of Max Horkheimer during the early and middle phases of his life and analyzes his model of early Critical Theory.

I want to discuss a doctrine and a concept in theory of knowledge which has various manifestations from at least the seventeenth to the early twentieth century. The concept is that of direct or immediate cognition, the doctrine says that only what is like mind can be directly or immediately present to mind. This doctrine raises the question of how we can know things other than ourselves and our experiences: the concept of direct presence most usually had the consequence of (...) making our knowledge of the world indirect, uncertain, or impossible. The directly present must in some way inform us about the indirectly present. (shrink)

Partimos da afirmação de K.-O. Apel, repetida por João Maria André, de que "[...] é na ‘mística' do ‘logos' e na teologia negativa do Pseudo-Dionísio que, de modo determinante, Nicolau de Cusa irá beber os traços fundamentais da sua filosofia da linguagem". Com base no De filiatione Dei propomo-nos refletir sobre a relação fundamental e constitutiva entre o verbo mental humano e o Verbo ou Logos eterno. A importância desse texto, no âmbito do problema da linguagem em Nicolau de Cusa, (...) é reconhecida por Casarella justamente por sua inflexão cristológica em relação aos primeiros sermões, pois, em oposição à reflexão intratrinitária dos sermões, a imagem humanamente visível de Cristo torna-se o espelho da linguagem, ou seja, em Cristo, vemos de modo perfeito o que pode ser expresso por meio da linguagem. O texto cusano é uma meditação sobre Jo, I, 12: "Mas a todos que o receberam deu o poder de se tornarem filhos de Deus: aos que creem em seu nome". Interessa-nos principalmente a meditação sobre os exemplos aduzidos por Nicolau de Cusa para explicitar de que modo colhemos a unidade divina intelectualmente, pois serão nesses exemplos ou enigmas que o autor pensará a relação constitutiva entre o verbo mental humano e o verbo mental inefável. We begin with the statement of K.-O. Apel, repeated by João Maria André, that "[…] it is in the ‘mystic' of the ‘logos' and in the negative theology of pseudo-Dionysus that, in a determinate manner, Cusa would receive the fundamental features of his philosophy of language". Based on De filiatione Dei, we reflect on the fundamental and constitutive relationship between the mental human word and the eternal Word or Logos. The importance of this text in the context of the problem of language in Cusa is recognized by Casarella, specifically for its Christological inflection in relation to Cusa's first sermons. In opposition to the intra-Trinitarian reflection of the sermons, in De filiatione Dei the humanly visible image of Christ becomes the mirror of language; that is, it is in Christ that we see the perfect mode that can be expressed by means of language. Cusa's text is a meditation on John 1:12: "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name". Of principal interest to us are the examples adduced by Cusa that make explicit the way in which we intellectually receive the divine unity, as it is in these examples or enigmas that the author reflects on the constitutive relation between the mental human word and the ineffable mental word. (shrink)

John Passmore was a renowned Australian empirical philosopher and historian of ideas. In this book, which was originally published in 1952, Passmore's intention was to disentangle certain main themes in Hume's philosophy and to show how they relate to Hume's main philosophic purpose. Rather than offering a detailed commentary, the text provides an account based on specificity and critical scholarship, seeking to complement the other more comprehensive works on Hume's philosophy that had become available around the same time. This (...) book will be of value to anyone with an interest in perspectives on Hume and Passmore's philosophical approach. (shrink)

1. Premessa Nel filone di studi che prende il nome di “ontologia sociale” l’espressione “intenzionalità collettiva”, o “we-intention”, si riferisce agli stati soggettivi indicati dall’uso (appropriato) della prima persona plurale – ad esempio “noi vogliamo x”, “noi facciamo y”, “noi crediamo z” ecc. Come è noto, tutta la ricostruzione teorica che John Searle, il punto di riferimento di questa letteratura, propone della realtà socio-politica si basa su tre nozioni principali, di cui una è prop...

Philosophy as a separate discipline is a rather new phenomenon. This presents problems for our understanding of what constitutes the history of philosophy. Past writers often approached their concerns from a multi-disciplinary perspective; thus to understand them we have to do more than answer a contemporary set of issues. To that end, I suggest we attend to Locke's advice on how to read a text. Following this advice may permit us to avoid several puzzles which result from misreading a text.

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature presents the most important account of skepticism in the history of modern philosophy. In this lucid and thorough introduction to the work, John P. Wright examines the development of Hume's ideas in the Treatise, their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions, and the reception they received when Hume published the Treatise. He explains Hume's arguments concerning the inability of reason to establish the basic beliefs which underlie science and morals, (...) as well as his arguments showing why we are nevertheless psychologically compelled to accept such beliefs. The book will be a valuable guide for those seeking to understand the nature of modern skepticism and its connection with the founding of the human sciences during the Enlightenment. (shrink)

What’s so bad about the placebo effect? John Worrall discusses the recent Nurofen labelling “scandal”.

Gerald Sykes -- Aldous Huxley -- Gerald Heard -- Christopher Isherwood -- John van Druten -- Marianna Masin -- J. Crawford Lewis -- Dorothy F. Mercer -- Kurt Friedrichs -- Swami Atulananda -- Jane Molard -- The Countess of Sandwich -- John Yale -- Joan Rayne -- Durgacharan -- Pravrajika Saradaprana.

Neste artigo, apresento e discuto a solução oferecida por John Perry para o Problema de Frege em termos do conteúdo reflexivo de elocuções. Em primeiro lugar, discuto sua solução para a versão indexical do Problema de Frege, e argumento que o conteúdo reflexivo não pode explicar a trivialidade de certas e locuções. Se isso está correto, então o conteúdo reflexivo não é o tipo de coisa que explica adequadamente o valor cognitivo. Depois, discuto a solução de Perry para o (...) Problema de Frege envolvendo nomes próprios. Argumento que, mesmo que esse conteúdo explique o valor cognitivo, ele não o faz em termos do significado das expressões, como Perry pretendia originalmente. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Triangular Landscapes: Environment, Society, and the State in the Nile Delta under Roman Rule by Katherine BlouinBrendan HaugKatherine Blouin. Triangular Landscapes: Environment, Society, and the State in the Nile Delta under Roman Rule. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. xxvi + 429 pp. 14 halftones, 28 tables, 5 maps. Cloth, $150.00.American journalist Hal Boyle is often said to have remarked, “What makes a river so restful (...) to people is that it doesn’t have any doubt—it is sure to get where it is going and it doesn’t want to go anywhere else.” Restful, perhaps. But the single-mindedness of a river’s flow can also be a source of anxiety. In contemporary America, the Lower Mississippi’s steady westward shift is a prominent example. Were its floodgates removed and the river allowed to “get where it is going,” it would soon abandon the cities of Baton Rouge and New Orleans, decimating their port-dependent economies.An awareness of such fluvial hazards has percolated into the study of ancient history over the last decade and a half, and works on the ancient Mediterranean’s riverine environments have been appearing with frequency. As in ancient environmental [End Page 528] history more broadly, Francophone scholars have led the way; Philippe Leveau’s work on the Rhône and the multiple colloquia spearheaded by Ella Hermon are particularly notable (e.g., Philippe Leveau, ed. “Le Rhône romain,” Gallia 56 [1999]; Ella Hermon, ed. Riparia dans l’Empire romain [2010]). On the Anglophone side, Gregory Aldrete’s Floods of the Tiber in Ancient Rome 2007, Peter Thonemann’s The Maeander Valley 2011, and Brian Campbell’s Rivers and the Power of Ancient Rome 2012 are essential.Katherine Blouin’s new study of the Mendesian nome (administrative division) in Egypt’s northeastern Nile Delta unites these twin streams. The book, an updated version of a French dissertation supervised by Hermon, focuses on the changing course and eventual extinction of the Nile’s Mendesian branch, documenting the effects of a shifting fluvial landscape, environmental stressors, and Roman agro-fiscal policy on the society and economy of the Delta during the first few centuries c.e. By merging Francophone scholarship on rivers, theoretical perspectives drawn from American environmental history, and a thorough command of the papyrological evidence, Blouin has made a significant contribution to the emerging field of ancient environmental history.In her introduction, Blouin grounds herself in what Hermon dubs “l’approche écosystémique” to environmental history. Casting aside environmental determinism and lachrymose tales of pristine nature violated (“l’approche égologique”), ecosystems thinking characterizes environments as “dynamic, multidimensional entities made up of a complex amalgam of continuities and ruptures” (7). While humanity is regarded as a constituent element of the natural world, human beings nonetheless possess the ability to adapt natural phenomena in significant ways. Thus, nature’s impacts upon society are never predetermined, for they are always mediated by human decision-making at multiple levels.The rest of the book is divided into four thematic sections. Part I situates the reader within the geomorphological and hydrological contexts of the Mendesian nome and reviews the surviving evidence. Parts II and III reconstruct the landscape and investigate agricultural diversification. Part IV offers environmental perspectives on a fiscal crisis in the late second century c.e. and the famous revolt of the Boukoloi.Synthesizing previous geomorphological and archaeological scholarship, chapter 1 traces the evolution of the Nile Delta from at least seven major branches to the modern two—the Rosetta and Damietta—by the early Arab period, a process significantly abetted by large-scale canalization projects (35). (See also John P. Cooper, The Medieval Nile [2014], who carries the story forward.)In chapter 2, Blouin surveys the archaeological and papyrological evidence for the Mendesian nome. Although excavations at its two ancient metropoleis of Mendes (Tell al-Rub’a) and Thmuis (Tell al-Timai) are ongoing—the latter partly under Blouin’s own direction—their evidence is secondary to her arguments, which depend primarily upon the papyri. This corpus is comprised of some ninety texts spanning the fourth century b.c.e. to the sixth century c.e., the majority... (shrink)

Since its modern inception in the early 1970s, informal logic has placed a special emphasis on the analysis of fallacies and argumentative dialogue schemes. Concurrent developments in speech communication circles exhibit a like concentration on the dialectical character of argument.

In the newly discovered letter Hume answers Reid's charge that he held a theory of ideas derived from his predecessors and criticizes Reid's own theory of innate ideas. He defends his own theory that ideas are derived from impressions. I discuss Reid's own puzzlement that in the first _Enquiry_ Hume ascribes a natural belief in necessary connections to the vulgar without an idea--and its influence on subsequent readings of Hume as a 'regularity theorist.' I argue that it was the 'Common (...) Sense' school of philosophers following Reid, rather than Hume, who insisted that beliefs must be based on legitimate ideas. (shrink)

The conflict between Kant and the medical faculty was far more complex and substantial than is indicated in the section of his famous Conflict of the Faculties addressing this matter. In this essay I will consider not only what Kant, as a philoso­pher, thought of medicine as a faculty, but what medicine as a faculty thought of Kant as a philosopher.

Chi è quel soggetto che nell’autobiografia dice “io”? Raccontarsi non è già diventare altro? L’autobiografia è un esercizio filosofico in cui l’identità si scopre tramata da altre vite e l’io emerge soltanto perché dislocato nei suoi segni. Sono forse proprio le condizioni di impossibilità di un’autopresentazione trasparente e definitiva che rendono possibile una soggettività autobiografica. Scrivere di sé infatti è già trascendenza: insinua il sospetto di un’alterità, di un’alterazione e turba la rigida identità, che si presume autonoma e precedente alle (...) sue iscrizioni. L’intreccio tra autós, bíos e graphein non è dunque una neutra auto-espressione, ma uno specchio in cui il proprio volto è riflesso e capovolto, il sé si racconta e si ascolta, recita e osserva. In che modo quindi l’autobiografia è un luogo di verità? «La verità può essere il cuore dell’autobiografia», afferma John M. Coetzee, «ma ciò non vuol dire che l’autobiografia abbia a cuore la verità». Ogni lettera scritta traccia l’aderenza di sé a sé e alle cose, nell’istante stesso in cui marca una separazione e una distanza. In questo paradosso si infrange ogni pretesa di obiettività o di adeguazione. Qui la trasparenza dell’io viene disdetta, come anche la sua sovranità del discorso. L’autobiografia è, allora, la scrittura impossibile come unica iscrizione possibile: il tentativo estremo di restituire il senso di una vita incompiuta, di dare una verità senza verità, di raccontare di sé da sé. È una messa in scena dell’identità e della propria distanza, un’autosospensione e una torsione tropica dell’io, che si racconta e si espone. Dietro ogni scrittura autobiografica c’è infatti un nome proprio, che sigilla l’autore, il narratore, il personaggio. Ma proprio in questa firma si custodisce, più che il diritto a una proprietà, la promessa di verità per sé e per gli altri: un corpo a corpo con la lingua e con la propria storia. (shrink)

El presente texto de Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) apareció por primera vez en una traducción al italiano de Guido Neri bajo el título “II nome Berlino” [El nombre Berlín], publicado en 1964 en la revista literaria dirigida por Elio Vittorini e Italo Calvino Il menabó 7, año 6, pp. 121-25. El texto original en francés se extravió y, con la autorización del propio Blanchot, Hélène Jelen y Jean-Luc Nancy tradujeron la versión italiana al francés para publicarla en 1983 como “Le (...) Nom de Berlin” en una edición bilingüe. Desde entonces, la versión francesa ha sido reimpresa múltiples veces: en Cafe 3 (1983), 43-6; Berlin, collection Libération, 4 (1989); y Po&sie 52 (1990), 6-8. El texto fue finalmente republicado con su nombre original en francés, es decir, “Berlin” para la publicación de la traducción cuatrilingüe francés, inglés, ruso y alemán) aparecida en 1994 en MLN, Vol. 109, No. 3, German Issue (Apr.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 345-355. Se ha decidido traducir este texto también en lengua hispana por su innegable actualidad y peculiar claridad. En él no se trata exclusivamente sobre la realidad política, económica y lingüística de Berlín (o de Alemania) durante la Guerra Fría. Las reflexiones de Blanchot permanecen tan vigentes como el fenómeno que aquí decide enfrentar en sus múltiples aspectos: los fundamentos mismos de la política y el Estado en la modernidad. Para esta primera traducción al castellano del texto se ha tomado como referencia la versión de Jelen y Nancy antes mencionada. (shrink)

For scientific essentialists, the only logical possibilities of existence are the real (or metaphysical) ones, and such possibilities, they say, are relative to worlds. They are not a priori, and they cannot just be invented. Rather, they are discoverable only by the a posteriori methods of science. There are, however, many philosophers who think that real possibilities are knowable a priori, or that they can just be invented. Marc Lange [Lange 2004] thinks that they can be invented, and tries to (...) use his inventions to argue that the essentialist theory of counterfactual conditionals developed in Scientific Essentialism [Ellis 2001, hereafter SE ] is flawed. (shrink)

The appeal of scientific realism is chiefly based on the – staggering – empirical success of the theories currently accepted in science. The realist exhibits some currently accepted scientific theory (the General Theory of Relativity, say), points to its astounding empirical success (with the gravitational redshift, the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, etc) and suggests that it would be monumentally implausible to suppose that the theory could score such empirical successes and yet not reflect, at least to some good approximation, the (...) underlying nature of reality. To hold that combination of beliefs would be, in Poincaré’s celebrated phrase (1905/1952, p. 150), “to attribute an inadmissible role to chance”. (shrink)

Baseado no filme “Sociedade dos Poetas Mortos” (1989), o artigo assinala o caos instaurado no âmbito da escola tradicional norte-americana Welton através do trabalho do professor John Keating na instauração de novos métodos de ensino e aprendizagem para a literatura, na medida em que tende a fomentar o questionamento acerca do sentido e do valor da vida e o cultivo de si como possibilidade de produção de um conteúdo novo e extemporâneo e o conhecimento enquanto afirmação das forças da (...) vida. Dessa forma, fundado na crítica de Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) em relação à “cultura histórica” enquanto produto da contradição envolvendo vida e cultura, o artigo sublinha que o saber que guarda raízes na “cultura histórica” se caracteriza como um capital improdutivo, assinalando a inexistência de direitos da Filosofia entre a cultura histórica e o processo formativo-educacional e a necessidade da correlação envolvendo arte e filosofia diante da ciência e da verdade. Assim, contrapondo-se à transformação da filosofia em erudição em nome da “cultura histórica” e aos “filósofos” que se colocam a seu serviço, Nietzsche denuncia a redução do ser, da vida e da visão ao arcabouço de conceitos, opiniões, passados, livros em uma análise crítica que se detém na questão envolvendo os professores de filosofia entre a vida e a ciência do vir-a-ser universal: filósofos ou servidores da “história”? (shrink)

Animal rights and vegetarianism for ethical reasons are positions gaining in influence in contemporary American culture. Although I think that certain rights for animals are consistent with and even entailed by the Catholic understanding of morality, vegetarianism is not. There is a plausible argument for an omnivorous diet from a Rawlsian original position. It is in direct contradiction to the Rawlsian-influenced ethical vegetarianism espoused by Mark Rowlands. Vegetarianism is not the moral high ground: ethical vegetarianism is in fact contrary to (...) a position on animals that is fundamentally pro-life. (shrink)

This article describes methods and ideas that emerged from a continuing enquiry into ‘metadesign’ that led us to think about the role of ‘consciousness’ in teams, communities and the biosphere. In the West the notion of ‘consciousness’ has been shaped by humanism, industrialization and some strident forms of individualism. These have encouraged us to see it in strongly anthropocentric and solipsistic terms. The global economic system also reflects this individualistic ideology, given that ‘growth’, is driven by personal avarice on a (...) collective scale. On the other hand, capitalism encourages enterprises to scale-up when they become successful. Both tendencies reduce the consciousness of organizations and communities. The article illustrates this idea by describing a ‘quadratic’ model of team consciousness that was developed to enhance practical developments that support personal, interpersonal, transpersonal and environmentally situated modes of awareness. (shrink)

The distinctive feature of Professor Purtill's interesting, though somewhat promissory, paper, is its willingness to have the tail of pragmatics wag the dog of semantics. I myself find the pre-emption unfortunate, though I should hasten to add that Professor Purtill and I share something of a common view about the problems that should be solved by a decent account of fictionality; and some of our own solutions happen in fact to coincide. We part company, however, in respect of the following (...) two theses.Thesis. Professor Purtill holds that the sentences literally constitutive of a piece of fiction are neither true nor false, that they do not make assertions, that they do not make assertions about what they would appear to be about. Such sentences in fact tell tales, and in such nonassertive uses, they are spared the burdens of all but the limits of semantic significance. That is, they are not true and they are not false. (shrink)

Hayek's reputation has gone through a remarkable cycle. An eminent exponent of the Austrian theory of business cycles in the 1930s, he was worsted in the controversy over Keynes' _Treatise on Money_. Following this defeat, Hayek retreated into capital theory, an esoteric branch of economics in which few economists then took an active interest. He gave up economics altogether after the war and turned to psychology, political philosophy, philosophy of law and the history of ideas. However, in 1974 he won (...) the Nobel Prize and returned to mainstream economics as a leading critic of Keynesianism and an advocate of free banking as the answer to inflation. Today Hayek reigns supreme as the kind of moral philosopher and political economist that economics has not seen since Adam Smith. Also forthcoming in this series is _Paul A. Samuelson, 2nd Series_. (shrink)