The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismantles the main philosophical teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche, who professed self-construction of meaning in life through (...) one’s own will to power. However, it is impossible to self-construct meaning in life in the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, superdeterminism strongly suggests the existence of a supremely intelligent God, who predetermined everything that happens in the universe, including the lives and thoughts of all human beings. Meaning in life is God given under the philosophy of superdeterminism. God is anything but dead. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. In a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics, what we might traditionally call dynamic behavior or (...) causal relationships is reinterpreted as static patterns across the dimension of time described as correlations. If particles are statically patterned to behave a certain way through the dimension of time, one does not need a causal mechanism to account for their behavior. It is the wrong assumption that cause and effect in physics are real that leads to the imaginary belief in the real existence of quantum fields. A superdeterministic interpretation of the universe is one where all events, whether past, present or future, are predetermined and already exist in our static block universe and correlations between those events can produce patterns of behavior in those events through the dimension of time. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The scientifically verified bomb tester experiment also confirms the absence of cause and effect in physics. In this experiment, a (...) photon is directed towards a photon detecting “bomb” that will explode if it comes into contact with the photon preventing the photon from being detected at a later point. Remarkably, the experiment allows for determining whether a bomb is functional or not without detonating it. This is achieved by placing the bomb in one of the paths of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. If a bomb is live, its mere presence without detonation alters the photon's quantum superposition, changing the interference pattern observed. This experiment demonstrates that a “probabilistic cause” can have a real effect on whether a photon is detected later on despite possibilities not being real by definition. In other words, the bomb tester experiment proves a real effect without any interaction with a real cause confirming that cause and effect are merely illusory appearances of underlying correlations. (shrink)

A common assumption is that psychological egoism, the view that a person can do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest, combined with ought-implies-can, the view that a person morally ought to do an act only if she can do it, entails the view – call it OIB – that a person morally ought to do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest. I argue that psychological egoism and (...) ought-implies-can, interpreted fairly, use “can” in different ways; consequently, they do not entail OIB. They entail something similar to OIB, but not OIB itself. From these facts several significant results follow, each concerning arguments or assumptions about psychological, ethical, or rational egoism. For instance, they undermine the view that psychological egoism rules out those other two forms of egoism. (shrink)

There are two main groups of essays in this volume. The first centres on Locke's theories of religion and their relation to contemporary scientific thought and the work of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume. The second group explores the relation between biology and physiology, and the science of man.

Will enable the ordinary person to discover his or her own unique life myth and live it from moment to moment.

The principle of "organism"—of intrinsic and dynamic unity—and the existence of "organized bodies"—of living things—in the physical world represented crucial preoccupations for philosophers of nature and experimental naturalists across the eighteenth century. How to make sense of these in a manner consistent with a unified scientific understanding of the physical world became the inevitable challenge that accompanied these recognitions. In just this theoretical enterprise, Leibniz emerges to historical scrutiny as an indispensable and pervasive influence. Thus, we are very fortunate to (...) have the body of scholarship that François Duchesneau has devoted to this topic over the course of his illustrious career. In this... (shrink)

I told the workers they had to be prepared for the tortures of success. Success in our business, the trade union business, means getting workers to middle-class status. You succeed and Huelga is just going to be an exciting recollection. The guy who carried a banner in 1966—well, in five years you're going to have a hard time getting him to a union meeting: Revolutions become institutions, that's a truism of our business.

It is in the complex interplay of silence, speech, and action that Zumbrunnen teases out the meaning of democracy for Thucydides in both its domestic and international dimensions and shows how we may benefit from the Thucydidean text in ...

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismantles the philosophical teachings of Jean-Paul Sartre, who professed that humans are condemned to be free, (...) burdened with the responsibility of creating their own essence through their choices. However, it is impossible for human beings to self-construct their own essence through their choices in the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, superdeterminism strongly suggests the existence of a supremely intelligent God, who predetermined everything that happens in the universe, including the lives and thoughts of all human beings. Human essence is God given under the philosophy of superdeterminism co-existing with human existence in our static block universe. (shrink)

In reply to the readily inferable denial, in para. 304 of the papal exhortation Amoris Laetitia, that there are any exceptionless negative moral norms, this article (1) recalls and reaffirms the philosophical and doctrinal tradition’s thesis that there are such norms. It then (2) sketches what is involved in identifying a kinds of act by its object; (3) reflects briefly on the three successive and different iterations of the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church on capital punishment; and (...) (4) draws attention to the Catechism’s notable but little discussed, non-pacifist teaching against all intending to kill, even in just war. ------------------------------------ Received: 30/04/2024. Reviewed: 25/09/2024. Accepted: 7/10/2024. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismisses many commonly held beliefs as illusions of our static block universe. People widely believe in (...) many things which simply are not true under Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism. Rather, these false beliefs are merely illusions caused by our static block universe without cause and effect in physics. These illusions include cause and effect in physics, locality, motion, an open future, free will on Earth, the independent existence of objects, time as a flowing river or background ticking clock, conservation of physical reality in time, and temporal privilege. However, the idea of illusions in our block universe is quite old with its roots in Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity first published in 1905. So, we need to recognize that our common sense is being fooled by illusions created by our static block universe. (shrink)

From early in his philosophical career, Spinoza took a central part of his project to involve identifying the nature and scope of human power. For, he argues, "The better the mind understands its own powers, the more easily it can direct itself and propose rules to itself" (TIE[40]). Thus, the practical goals of living well, and of building a stable, well- functioning social order, are both intimately connected to the metaphysics of power. This entry provides an overview of Spinoza’s account (...) of power, both in his metaphysics and in his politics. (shrink)

"Singular thing" (res singulares) is one of the terms Spinoza uses to denote finite particulars. The term figures prominently in most of his philosophical works. However, its precise meaning evolves from its earliest appearance in the TIE to its final appearance in the Ethics. In the Ethics, the definition of the term (i) stipulates that singular things are finite and (ii) specifies the conditions under which many things compose one singular thing. However, in Spinoza’s earlier writings, the term is not (...) restricted to finite and mutable things, nor is it associated with the composition of one (singular) thing from many distinct things. This short entry traces those shifts in meaning. (shrink)

Many of Spinoza’s arguments, ranging from his metaphysics to his political philosophy, draw on claims about the relationship between part (pars) and whole (totus). This entry surveys Spinoza’s views about the metaphysics of parts and wholes, as well as the various ways that mereological concepts figure in different elements of his system.

Both of Spinoza’s major political works make frequent use of the concept of right (jus). However, his understanding of right–both natural right and political right–is not moralistic. That is, to have (a) right is not an intrinsic moral status, such that others have a moral obligation either to provide some benefit or to avoid interference with the rightsholder. For Spinoza, if someone lacks the actual power to take some action or secure some benefit, they also lack the right to take (...) that action or obtain that benefit. The same point applies to political authorities: when a political authority lacks the power to enact some law, it is simply false that they have the right to enact that law. Spinoza holds that in our political thinking, we must confront the actual distribution of power in the world, not "a Fantasy, possible only in a Utopia, or in the golden age of the Poets" (TP1.1). This entry examines three components of Spinoza’s view of right: his doctrine of natural right; his account of how people transfer their natural right to a central authority to form a civil order; and his notion of being sui juris, in command of one’s own right. (shrink)

It is argued that a shared agency account of large-scale knowledge transmission provides a viable way forward for understanding a variety of phenomena, including the transmission of knowledge via diverse technologies such as Wikipedia, Google Search, and Siri. In fact, the lessons learned arguably apply more generally than this. If the arguments of the paper are sound, much of what is said here will apply to large-scale knowledge generation as well, including knowledge generation via large-scale technologies. Finally, the paper considers (...) generative AI technologies such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Med-PaLM, and asks whether these can be understood as either transmitting knowledge or generating it. Several models are considered for each of these possibilities. (shrink)

Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show (...) that either has the answer ‘yes’. I consider the idea that rationality is normative for instrumental reasons, because it helps you to achieve some of the things you ought to achieve. I also consider the idea that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. I reject both. (shrink)

Abstract: Contrary to received opinion, Descartes' view on the merits of the ontological proof may actually agree with that of Thomas Aquinas, whose rejection of the a priori existence proof has stocked the armories of anti-Anselmians ever since. In a rarely noted passage of the First Replies, Descartes claims not to differ in any respect from Thomas on the proof, a claim that gains sense in light of recent work on the Fifth Meditation. That work in turn reveals a well-founded, (...) if surprising, understanding of the Cartesian proof and of Cartesianism's true relation to Thomism. (shrink)

When a collective is blamed, the responsibility does not escape individuals. Spheres of influence are designed to determine the scale of blame; namely, by proximity and ability to influence a different result. Agents in the respective role types will be responsible upon our examining their extent of influence. Although you may be inclined to say that the responsibility lies with those who have access to policy-making, this doesn't allow for the deviants we expect at appropriate times. Here we are compelled (...) to seek a new moral outlook that maintains our perception of ourself: “what is not worthy of me must not be confused with special requirements of my ‘station and its duties’.”This essay offers a direction to assuage Lewis's fears toward collective responsibility. The challenges to individual responsibility behind such an ascription is complex but need not obliterate it. The delineation of roles by spheres of influence and activity gives some markers to the culpable agents. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper explores the limitations of artificial intelligence (AI) in fulfilling the obligations inherent in close personal relationships, particularly in the context of loneliness. While AI technologies may offer some of the goods that we associate with close personal relationships, they lack the capacity for genuine commitment and individualized care that characterize human interactions. The finitude of human existence—our cognitive, emotional, and temporal limitations— and our capacity to make judgments concerning distinct kinds of value imbues human relationships with significance that (...) AI cannot replicate. (shrink)

This paper explores the theme of religious naturalism, attempting to clarify different salient meanings for both component terms. We consider what forms of religious naturalism may recommend themselves as serious options for contemporary religious commitment. We argue that a viable robustly religious naturalist option may be built on the idea that the natural Universe has an overall purpose.

This collection reflects the extraordinary career of the man it honors in its variety of subjects and range of scholarship. Mortimer Adler proposes six amendments to the Constitution. Paul Eidelberg surveys the rise of secularism from Socrates to Machiavelli. Hellmut Fritzsche, a physicist, catalogs some famous scientific mistakes. David Grene (Anastaplo's dissertation advisor) looks at Shakespeare's Measure for Measure as "mythological history." Harry V. Jaffa continues a running debate with Anastaplo on how to read the Constitution, James Lehrberger examines Aquinas's (...) views on natural law, Harry Newman argues "The Case Against Politics." Studs Terkel interviews Anastaplo on his encounter with the Illinois bar, and John Van Doren and others contribute a selection of poems. George Anastaplo turned to an academic career when he was denied admission to the bar in 1950 because, on principle, he affirmed the right of revolution and refused to say whether he was a Communist. In this age of academic specialization, Anastaplo's career has been distinguished by a remarkable versatility of thought. Author of five books, including The Artist as Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce (Swallow Press, 1983), Human Being and Citizen: Essays on Virtue, Freedom and the Common Good (Swallow Press, 1986), The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (1989), and The American Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government (Ohio University Press, 1992), Anastaplo has also, for the past three decades, produced a steady stream of essays, articles, and papers on subjects from baseball to the Koran, from Socrates to Freud. Volume 2 of Law and Philosophy includes a complete bibliography of his works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews How Philosophy Uses Its Past. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Foreword by Cornelius Krus~. (The Matehette Lectures, Wesleyan University, 1961; New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv + 106. $3.50.) One could easily characterize this small volume as a minor masterpiece on a major theme. It is an admirable statement from the pen of one of America's leading thinkers in both the history (...) of philosopy and philosophy "proper." Actually the distinction between these two fields of philosophic activity becomes superfluous since Professor Randall has an elaborate theory of his own, whereby to do philosophy and do it well involves, in a serious and inescapable way, competent performance in the history of philosophy. How Philosophy UsesIts Past may have to be read, and I propose here that it should, as the general introduction to Randall's projected three volumes of his monumental The Career of Philosophy, of which only Volume One has been published. The close analyses of specific men and issues presented in the latter work can be seen as the evidence meant to corroborate the thesis asserted in How Philosophy Uses Its Past. In his own words: "It remains true that it is impossible to gain insight into the history of philosophical ideas--into the dimensions of philosophizing--without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change" (p. 20). Randall has made in this volume a significant contribution if only by way of focusing his powerful lens on three central issues: (1) how genuine philosophizing is still "metaphysical" thinking; (2) why it is necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the antecedents leading up to our prevailing philosophies of experience; (3) how to understand the seemingly chaotic situation in our philosophical affairs, under the age-old distinction of the "one and many." In a critical and appreciative article on Lovejoy, Randall stated his reservations toward Lovejoy's "atomistic" conception of intellectual history and proceeded to note that the history of philosophy has a philosophic function iust as philosophy has historical dimensions such that when adequately explored can tell us much about the nature and limits of our own philosophizing.1 A permeative thesis in the volume under review is that to do "history of philosophy" is to do "philosophy." To show how and why Randall believes this to be the case, we must consider in some detail three of his main themes: the redefinition of metaphysics, the broader conception of experience, and the "one and many" aspect of contemporary philosophy. One may go so far as to say that Randall is doing philosophy just as he is formulating a theory of the philosophy, for the sake of responding philosophically to the stated problems. But to respond philosophically is something that one must learn in conjunction with the examination of the historical past of philosophy. Randall thus believes, on the evidence gathered, that philosophy has revealed itself to be "a clarification and criticism of fundamental beliefs involved in all the great enterprises of human culture, science, art, religion, the moral, social and practical activity, when some new idea or some altered experience has impinged upon them and generated intellectual tensions and maladjustments" (pp. 19; 100). This way of understanding philosophy affects his approach to every problem he mentions. Indeed, even the denial of the importance of the history of philosophy is rooted in historical processes which must be understood before the denial can be fully illumined. Without historical knowledge, he argues even our decisions will suffer (p. 14). Randall calls his approach to defining philosophical problems "operational." Accordingly, we do not know whether we have a philosophical problem until a philosophical response has occurred. Looking back from the response to what it was that philosophers responded to, we See Randall's "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the History of Ideas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,XXII (1963), 475-479; also book under review, p. 36. [1071 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY discover that these were problems that emerged "whenever strife of ideas and experiences forced men back to the fundamental assumptions in any field" (p. 18). Briefly put, the response has always been that of analysing, clarifying, criticizing and reconstructing "fundamental assumptions." The problems vary and... (shrink)

The paper argues for a model of polysemy based on the blueprint offered by Paul Pietroski whereby the meaning of a lexical item is an instruction to fetch a concept from an address. We show that the bare idea of fetching admits of a deep construal, where a concept is fetched, and a shallow construal, where the instruction merely links a lexical item to an address without automatically retrieving anything from the address; retrieval only occurs when the item is embedded (...) within a syntactic structure. We offer considerations in favour of the shallow construal, which is consistent with a root conception of lexical items. (shrink)

In response to a recent article by Myron Penner, April Cordero, and Amanda Nichols in this journal, this essay offers a critical analysis. Their article makes a case against gender essentialism rooted in biology, drawing from the biology of sex determination. While commending their thorough exposition of the science of sex determination, we argue that most of their anthropological conclusions are unfounded. After reviewing their article, we present several criticisms that undermine their case. In particular, we take issue with the (...) authors’ methodological commitments and demonstrate that the evidence they present from the science of human sex determination does not convincingly support rejecting an essentialist view of biological sex. Furthermore, we argue that human sexuality solidifies into a binary and fixed state following sex determination during gestation. Contrary to the original essay, our analysis concludes that the science of sex determination leaves wide open the possibility that some biology-based form of gender essentialism is true. (shrink)

Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area where concerns about the risks of social comparison are paramount: the contemporary debate about moral grandstanding or “virtue-signaling”. Neil Levy and Evan Westra have recently attempted to defend virtue-signaling against Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke’s critique. I argue (...) that these defences fail and that a consideration of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is critical to seeing why. The over-confidence to which they give rise exacerbates certain vices with the potential to do moral, social and epistemic harm: I focus in particular on self-righteousness (complementing Kierkegaard’s discussion of envy). I then argue that Kierkegaard’s contrast between the religious category of the “single individual”—the genuine person of “character”—and the person who effectively appeals to the authority of some version of “the public” deepens our understanding of why we should reject defences of virtue-signaling. It helps us to distinguish between two kinds of virtue-signaler (“superficial enthusiasts” and “clear-eyed cynics”), both of whom contribute, in different ways, to the negative impacts of the vice of self-righteousness. Contrary to Levy’s claim that virtue-signaling is virtuous, I conclude that typically it is closer to vice than to virtue. (shrink)

John Wilson; Emotion, Religion and Education: A reply to Richard Allen, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 195–203, https.