Biological taxonomists rely on the so-called ‘type method’ to regulate taxonomic nomenclature. For each newfound taxon, they lay down a ‘type specimen’ that carries with it the name of the taxon it belongs to. Even if a taxon’s circumscription is unknown and/or subject to change, it remains a necessary truth that the taxon’s type specimen falls within its boundaries. Philosophers have noted some time ago that this naming practice is in line with the causal theory of reference and its central (...) notion of rigid designation: a type specimen fixes the reference of a taxon name without defining it. Recently, however, this consensus has come under pressure in the pages of this journal. In a series of articles by Alex Levine, Joseph LaPorte, and Matthew Haber, it has been argued that type specimens belong only contingently to their species, and that this may bode problems for the relation between type method and causal theory. I will argue that this ‘contingency debate’ is a debate gone wrong, and that none of the arguments in defense of contingency withstand scrutiny. Taxonomic naming is not out of step with the causal theory, but conforms to it. However, I will also argue that this observation is itself in need of further explanation, since application of the type method in taxonomic practice is plagued by errors and ambiguities that threaten it with breaking down. Thus, the real question becomes why taxonomic naming conforms to the causal theory in the first place. I will show that the answer lies in the embedding of the type method into elaborate codes of nomenclature. (shrink)

In the study of nonmonotonic reasoning the main emphasis has been on static (declarative) aspects. Only recently has there been interest in the dynamic aspects of reasoning processes, particularly in artificial intelligence. We study the dynamics of reasoning processes by using a temporal logic to specify them and to reason about their properties, just as is common in theoretical computer science. This logic is composed of a base temporal epistemic logic with a preference relation on models, and an associated nonmonotonic (...) inference relation, in the style of Shoham, to account for the nonmonotonicity. We present an axiomatic proof system for the base logic and study decidability and complexity for both the base logic and the nonmonotonic inference relation based on it. Then we look at an interesting class of formulas, prove a representation result for it, and provide a link with the rule of monotonicity. (shrink)

This article aims to be a confrontation with Nancy's 'deconstruction of Christianity.' Its arguments are instructed by Derrida's thesis in his On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy , in which he speaks of the 'destructive effects' of Nancy's own thinking. One such effect is, according to Derrida, Nancy's complicity with some form of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this article therefore aims to expound on just what sort of metaphysics returns in Nancy's work and proposes a more viable—and phenomenological—option with regard to the (...) question of what is to be done with the relics of the Christian tradition through forging an opening towards Levinas' and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Temporal logic can be used to describe processes: their behaviour ischaracterized by a set of temporal models axiomatized by a temporaltheory. Two types of models are most often used for this purpose: linearand branching time models. In this paper a third approach, based onsocalled joint closure models, is studied using models which incorporateall possible behaviour in one model. Relations between this approach andthe other two are studied. In order to define constructions needed torelate branching time models, appropriate algebraic notions are (...) defined(in a category theoretical manner) and exploited. In particular, thenotion of joint closure is used to construct one model subsuming a setof models. Using this universal algebraic construction we show that aset of linear models can be merged to a unique branching time model.Logical properties of the described algebraic constructions are studied.The proposed approach has been successfully aplied to obtain anappropriate semantics for non-monotonic reasoning processes based ondefault logic. References are discussed that show the details of theseapplications. (shrink)

Wagner’s reform of opera into musical drama introduced new formal solutions, which have been sparking discussions between analysts from the moment Wagner’s mature works (_Der Ring des Nibelungen_, _Tristan und Isolde_, _Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, _and _Parsifal_) premiered. It was Friedrich Nietzsche who formulated the most famous critique of Wagner’s alleged inability to handle great forms, which stems from miniaturism as the principal compositional characteristic, or even as the main symptom of Wagner’s decadent style. Drawing from Karol Berger’s book _Beyond_ (...) _Reason_, this paper will look at the historical context of Nietzsche’s reproach, question its adequacy, and lastly illuminate the paths and problems the artist and the philosopher faced while exploring new ways of thinking and creating in the times of crisis brought on by the decline of the Enlightenment’s faith in the power of reason. (shrink)

The Modern Synthesis has been receiving bad press for some time now. Back in 1983, in an article entitled “The Hardening of the Modern Synthesis” Stephen Jay Gould criticized the way the Modern Synthesis had developed since its inception in the 1930s and early 1940s (Gould 1983). Back then, those who would later become known as ‘architects’ of the synthesis were united in their call for explaining evolution at all levels in terms of causation at one level: genetics. What drove (...) changes in gene frequency remained an open question. It could be mainly selection, or drift, or some (other) form of constraint. But in the two decades that followed, the synthesis underwent a major change. By the late 1940s the synthesis had ‘hardened’ around adaptationism, according to Gould. Influential contributors like Dobzhansky, Simpson and Wright had increasingly expressed adaptationist views in the later editions of their landmark books. Not because evidence had piled up, showing that selection was in fact pervasive. Instead, Gould argued, adaptationist tendencies had been preserved by some kind of cultural inertia, and were now being revived. “Certain ‘national styles’ persisted from the eighteenth century, through Darwin’s era, and into our own time. Views on adaptation provide a good example” (Gould 1983). Gould did not just argue that some form of adaptationism had resurfaced. He became well-known for his efforts to intervene on this status quo by attempting to make evolutionary biology more ‘pluralistic’. In collaborative work with Richard Lewontin (Gould and Lewontin 1979), Elisabeth Vrba (Gould and Vrba 1982; Vrba and Gould 1986) and Niles Eldredge (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and Eldredge 1977) he criticized the synthesis for its adaptationism and its lack of appreciation for hierarchical perspectives. Gould exerted his influence in a different way as well. Together with Eldredge, he had facsimiles reprinted of the first editions of two books that had shaped synthesis, but with their own critical introductions (Eldredge 1982; Gould 1982). Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin of Species and Mayr’s Systematics and the Origin of Species appeared as reprints in the ‘Columbia Classics in Evolution’ series, sending an unambiguous message to the readers: these are foundational works, but they have been superseded. In the summer of 2008, some 25 years after Gould made his point about the hardening of the Modern Synthesis, a group of sixteen biologists and philosophers gathered at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) near Vienna, Austria, to discuss cutting-edge research that reaches beyond the synthesis framework. Before it even started, this workshop on the ‘Extended Synthesis’ had already attracted a fair share of attention in the blogosphere and had resulted in a news feature in Science (Pennisi 2008). After the meeting, Nature weighed in on the matter (Whitfield 2008). The results of over 3 days of presentations and extensive discussion have now been published as Evolution—The Extended Synthesis. 1 The publication of this collection of sixteen essays is accompanied by the republication of Julian Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern Synthesis; the book that introduced the term ‘Modern Synthesis’. Both books are introduced by the organizers of the KLI workshop, Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd Müller. Like Gould and Eldredge before them, Pigliucci and Müller did not reissue one of the canons of the Modern Synthesis without giving the readers some ‘guidance’. Starting with the cover, the editors proclaim boldly that this is ‘the definitive edition’ of Huxley’s book. In a new foreword, they sketch the context in which the book was written and assess some of its features. They voice some mild criticism of alleged ‘adaptationism’. But their tone is different from that of Gould and Eldredge. Pigliucci and Müller praise Huxley for his pluralistic outlook, which has again become essential in the forging of an Extended Synthesis. That makes Huxley’s book more than just an interesting but obsolete classic. Instead, it can teach valuable lessons about how to ‘soften up’ a synthesis that has become hardened over time. (shrink)

To foster research integrity (RI), it is necessary to address the institutional and system-of-science factors that influence researchers’ behavior. Consequently, research performing and research funding organizations (RPOs and RFOs) could develop comprehensive RI policies outlining the concrete steps they will take to foster RI. So far, there is no consensus on which topics are important to address in RI policies. Therefore, we conducted a three round Delphi survey study to explore which RI topics to address in institutional RI policies by (...) seeking consensus from research policy experts and institutional leaders. A total of 68 RPO and 52 RFO experts, representing different disciplines, countries and genders, completed one, two or all rounds of the study. There was consensus among the experts on the importance of 12 RI topics for RPOs and 11 for RFOs. The topics that ranked highest for RPOs concerned education and training, supervision and mentoring, dealing with RI breaches, and supporting a responsible research process (e.g. through quality assurance). The highest ranked RFO topics concerned dealing with breaches of RI, conflicts of interest, and setting expectations on RPOs (e.g. about educating researchers about RI). Together with the research policy experts and institutional leaders, we developed a comprehensive overview of topics important for inclusion in the RI policies of RPOs and RFOs. The topics reflect preference for a preventative approach to RI, coupled with procedures for dealing with RI breaches. RPOs and RFOs should address each of these topics in order to support researchers in conducting responsible research. (shrink)

This article defends the Negative View of natural selection explanation, according to which natural selection cannot explain of any given individual why it has the traits it does. Over the years, this view has been criticized on empirical, metaphysical, and explanatory grounds. I review the debate and offer additional reasons for rejecting the empirical and metaphysical objections. The explanatory objection, which holds that the Negative View is rooted in a flawed account of contrastive explanation, initially seems plausible. However, I argue (...) that a closer consideration of the desiderata of contrastive explanation shows that this objection fails as well. (shrink)

Chronostratigraphy is the subfield of geology that studies the relative age of rock strata and that aims at producing a hierarchical classification of (global) divisions of the historical time-rock record. The ‘golden spike’ or ‘GSSP’ approach is the cornerstone of contemporary chronostratigraphic methodology. It is also perplexing. Chronostratigraphers define each global time-rock boundary extremely locally, often by driving a gold-colored pin into an exposed rock section at a particular level. Moreover, they usually avoid rock sections that show any meaningful sign (...) of paleontological disruption or geological discontinuity: the less obvious the boundary, the better. It has been argued that we can make sense of this practice of marking boundaries by comparing the status and function of golden spikes to that of other concrete, particular reference standards from other sciences: holotypes from biological taxonomy and measurement prototypes from the metrology of weight and measures. Alisa Bokulich (2020b) has argued that these ‘scientific types’ are in an important sense one of a kind: they have a common status and function. I will argue that this picture of high-level conceptual unity is mistaken and fails to consider the diversity of aims and purposes of standardization and classification across the sciences. I develop an alternative, disunified account of scientific types that shows how differences in ontological attitudes and epistemic aims inform scientists’ choices between different kinds of scientific types. This perspective on scientific types helps to make sense of an intriguing mid-twentieth-century debate among chronostratigraphers about the very nature of their enterprise. Should chronostratigraphers conventionally make boundaries by designating golden spikes, or should they attempt to mark pre-existing ‘natural’ boundaries with the help of a different kind of scientific type? (shrink)

This article explores Schürmann’s relation to religion and theology. Since the publication of his early essays in Ways of Releasement (2023), Schürmann scholarship will find new ways to think about Schürmann’s troubled relation to religion. This article will name some significant traits that surface in these early papers: First, Schürmann’s sense for the mystery, which will, however, quickly vanish from his thinking. Second, the growing influence of Heidegger from 1966 onwards. Third, an increasing departure from determinate religion through a reading (...) of Eckhart, and a growing taste for a universal experience, first, of the mystery, and then of “borrowed being.” Our aim is to show Schürmann’s farewell to religion and theology through succumbing to Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, which, for Schürmann, seems to have spelled the end of theology. (shrink)

Sociological studies of work and time have argued that academic temporalities are increasingly rationalized and rendered accountable, resulting in a divergence of planned and experienced time in academic work. Shared research facilities that provide platform technologies to large user pools are no exception to this, as its administrations seek to increase the profitability of limited instrument time. Based on an ethnographic study of three facilities at an American university, this article examines how diverging rhythms are enacted in organizational schedules and (...) instrument work and kept aligned on the laboratory floor. Drawing insights from time studies and repair sociology, I argue that although technologies of time accounting provide powerful templates for action, they become effective only through ongoing “synchronization” work. Synchronization calls attention to discrete techniques and work practices, such as the adjustment of users’ bodies, user expectations, or work processes, that technical staff draw upon to resolve slippages between organizational rhythms and the temporal realities of data collection. This analysis suggests that technicians’ local and embodied practices not only affect their own professional roles but also organizational stability and productivity in time-sensitive environments. (shrink)

‘Type’ in biology is a polysemous term. In a landmark article, Paul Farber (Journal of the History of Biology 9(1): 93–119, 1976) argued that this deceptively plain term had acquired three different meanings in early nineteenth century natural history alone. ‘Type’ was used in relation to three distinct type concepts, each of them associated with a different set of practices. Important as Farber’s analysis has been for the historiography of natural history, his account conceals an important dimension of early nineteenth (...) century ‘type talk.’ Farber’s taxonomy of type concepts passes over the fact that certain uses of ‘type’ began to take on a new meaning in this period. At the closing of the eighteenth century, terms like ‘type specimen,’ ‘type species,’ and ‘type genus’ were universally recognized as referring to typical, model members of their encompassing taxa. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the same terms were co-opted for a different purpose. As part of an effort to drive out nomenclatural synonymy – the confusing state of a taxon being known to different people by different names – these terms started to signify the fixed and potentially atypical name-bearing elements of taxa. A new type concept was born: the nomenclatural type. In this article, I retrace this perplexing nineteenth century shift in meaning of ‘type.’ I uncover the nomenclatural disorder that the new nomenclatural type concept dissolved, and expose the conceptual confusion it left in its tracks. What emerges is an account of how synonymy was suppressed through the coinage of a homonym. (shrink)

At one point in We will never have been modern Latour notes that his thinking is a “challenge to philosophy”. This article argues that Latour's challenge lies in his repeated claim that his ontology makes us able to think again about the “passing of time”. If this is indeed the case then, this essay looks to Martin Heidegger to think of the question of temporality and ontology. This essay will in effect find that on a deeper level Latour repeats crucial (...) Heideggerian insights with regard to the ontological difference between being and beings. Yet on other points too Heidegger's impact is notable: for Heidegger too, something has gone wary with modernity and our modern constitution. Here too Latour's metaphors point in a rather Heideggerian direction, for the “invisible” modern constitution has become “visible” in certain ontic events—Latour notes the end of communism. This recalls Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. The article will then focus on Latour's distinction between delegation and what is being delegated, a distinction that pervades the conclusion of his 1991 book. Latour thus introduces a difference between delegation and what is being delegated. How not to recognize a duplicate of Heidegger's ontological difference? And, once recognized, what does this mean for our thinking of being and the thinking of the event of world which has been delegated to us? (shrink)

In this article, the differences between Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Heidegger’s approaches to ontotheology are discussed. Whereas Marion argues for a historical approach to this question, i.e., testing whether ontotheology can be detected in this or that thinker in this history of philosophy, this article aims, with Levinas and Heidegger, for an ontological approach to the question concerning ontotheology. In this regard, this text expresses wonder about Marion’s claim that Medieval theology would not have succumbed to ontotheology whereas (...) ancient and modern did. It is shown that ontotheology, for Levinas as well as Heidegger, might not be overcome with a simple command but rather belongs to the very structure of thought. The article concludes with offering some corrections to the Levinasian ‘God outside of onto-theology’ by a more phenomenological account of being-in-the world. (shrink)

Most studies are inclined to report positive rather than negative or inconclusive results. It is currently unknown how clinicians appraise the results of a randomized clinical trial. For example, how does the study funding source influence the appraisal of an RCT, and do positive findings influence perceived credibility and clinical relevance? This study investigates whether psychiatrists’ appraisal of a scientific abstract is influenced by industry funding disclosures and a positive outcome. Dutch psychiatrists were randomized to evaluate a scientific abstract describing (...) a fictitious RCT for a novel antipsychotic drug. Four different abstracts were created reporting either absence or presence of industry funding disclosure as well as a positive or a negative outcome. Primary outcomes were the perceived credibility and clinical relevance of the study results. Secondary outcomes were the assessment of methodological quality and interest in reading the full article. Three hundred ninety-five psychiatrists completed the survey. Industry funding disclosure was found not to influence perceived credibility nor interpretation of its clinical relevance. A negative outcome was perceived as more credible than a positive outcome 0.43 to 1.18, p?), but did not affect clinical relevance scores. In this study, industry funding disclosure was not associated with the perceived credibility nor judgement of clinical relevance of a fictional RCT by psychiatrists. Positive study outcomes were found to be less credible compared to negative outcomes, but industry funding had no significant effects. Psychiatrists may underestimate the influence of funding sources on research results. The fact that physicians indicated negative outcomes to be more credible may point to more awareness of existing publication bias in the scientific literature. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Biological market theory has in recent years become an important part of the social evolutionist’s toolkit. This article discusses the explanatory potential and pitfalls of biological market theory in the context of big picture accounts of the evolution of human cooperation and morality. I begin by assessing an influential account that presents biological market dynamics as a key driver of the evolution of fairness norms in humans. I argue that this account is problematic for theoretical, empirical, and conceptual reasons. After (...) mapping the evidential and explanatory limits of biological market theory, I suggest that it can nevertheless fill a lacuna in an alternative account of hominin evolution. Trade on a biological marketplace can help explain why norm-based cooperation did not break down when our late-Pleistocene ancestors entered new, challenging social and economic environments. (shrink)

In Objectivity, Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century “epistemic virtue,” flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of “type specimens” in biological taxonomy. Daston :153–182, 2004) indeed (...) provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it. (shrink)

An influential species of evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism holds that since cumulative natural selection shaped the contents of our moral beliefs, those beliefs do not count as knowledge. Critics have taken issue with a range of empirical, epistemic, and metaphysical assumptions that EDAs are said to rely on, which has engendered a complex debate over whether and to what extent the debunking challenge succeeds. However, recently it has been argued that we can reject EDAs without having to enter (...) this thicket of issues. EDAs supposedly fail at the outset, by trading on a glaring misunderstanding about the scope of natural selection explanations. I argue that this objection to EDAs fails, and itself rests on a mistaken view of natural selection explanation and its relation to justification. (shrink)

This article discusses the final volume of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. It does so by contextualizing its main themes, that is, by relating it to other writings of Heidegger of roughly the same period. Three such themes can be discovered in Heidegger’s “final” writing: a discussion of the nature of phenomenology, the abandonment of the ontological difference and the relation between the thought of being and the discipline of theology. The essay concludes with a comparison of Heidegger’s thinking of Ereignis to how (...) theology configured the relation between God and the human being, so arguing that Heidegger seemed more indebted to the tradition of theology that he at times could acknowledge. (shrink)

A contemporary philosophy of religion that offers a phenomenology of love. What is to be done at the end of metaphysics? Joeri Schrijvers’s contemporary philosophy of religion takes up this question, originally posed by Reiner Schürmann and central to continental philosophy. The book navigates the work of thinkers who have addressed such metaphysical concerns, including Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-Luc Marion, Peter Sloterdijk, Ludwig Binswanger, Jacques Derrida, and more recently John D. Caputo, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, and Martin Hägglund. (...) Notably, Schrijvers engages both those who would deconstruct Christianity and those who remain within this tradition, offering an option that is “between:” between Christianity and atheism, between progressive and conservative, between faith and belief. Ultimately, Schrijvers confronts the end of metaphysics with a phenomenology of love and community, arguing for the radical primacy of togetherness. “Joeri Schrijvers’s book is a tour de force, ranging over a wide spectrum of contemporary thinkers in order to negotiate the distance between religion and religionlessness, God and Godlessness, ontotheology and its overcoming. The result is a nuanced and careful study that repays close study.” — John D. Caputo, Syracuse University “Among the many lusters of Joeri Schrijvers’s Between Faith and Belief is a beautiful recovery of Ludwig Binswanger’s phenomenology of love. Discussion of postmetaphysical theology is arid without philosophically informed and creative talk of love, and Binswanger’s is a voice that has been missing from the conversation for far too long. To put Binswanger into dialogue with Caputo and Nancy, in particular, is at once fascinating and nourishing.” — Kevin Hart, University of Virginia. (shrink)

This book explores Caputo's proposal for a radical theology of our time. Philosophers and theologians from within Europe respond to Caputo's attempt to configure a less rigid, less dogmatic form of religion. These scholars, in turn, receive responses by Caputo, thereby strengthening the development of radical theology in Europe and abroad.

Linnaean-style, rank-based codes of taxonomic nomenclature provide stability to the relation between taxon names and their referents through the device of nomenclatural types. The practice of using types to tether names to taxa is uncontroversial and well-understood. But the nature of the relation between types, names, and taxa continues to be a topic of philosophical debate. A particularly contested issue is whether it is necessary for taxa that have a type specimen to contain their type specimen. Jerzy Brzozowski has recently (...) offered a novel account of taxon names that, he claims, shows that the relation between a type specimen and the (sub)species it belongs to is contingent (Brzozowski in Hist Philos Life Sci 42(3):1–25, 2020). I argue that this is mistaken. While Brzozowski’s contribution helps to advance the debate by bringing concepts from the philosophy of reference to bear on taxonomic naming practices, his new account of taxon names fails to support his central argument. Indeed, I show that the philosophical concepts he introduces into the debate cement the view that it is necessary for a (sub)species with a type specimen to contain it. (shrink)

The phenomenon of regression toward the mean is notoriously liable to be overlooked or misunderstood; regression fallacies are easy to commit. But even when regression phenomena are duly recognized, it remains perplexing how they can feature in explanations. This article develops a philosophical account of regression explanations as “statistically autonomous” explanations that cannot be deepened by adducing details about causal histories, even if the explananda as such are embedded in the causal structure of the world. That regression explanations have statistical (...) autonomy was first suggested by Ian Hacking and has recently been defended and elaborated by André Ariew, Yasha Rohwer, and Collin Rice. However, I will argue that these analyses fail to capture what regression’s statistical autonomy consists in and how it sets regression explanations apart from other kinds of explanation. The alternative account I develop also shows what is amiss with a recent denial of regression’s statistical autonomy. Marc Lange has argued that facts that can be explained as regression phenomena can in principle also be explained by citing a conjunction of causal histories. The account of regression explanation developed here shows that his argument is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of statistical autonomy. (shrink)

Compositional verification aims at managing the complexity of theverification process by exploiting compositionality of the systemarchitecture. In this paper we explore the use of a temporal epistemiclogic to formalize the process of verification of compositionalmulti-agent systems. The specification of a system, its properties andtheir proofs are of a compositional nature, and are formalized within acompositional temporal logic: Temporal Multi-Epistemic Logic. It isshown that compositional proofs are valid under certain conditions.Moreover, the possibility of incorporating default persistence ofinformation in a system, is (...) explored. A completion operation on aspecific type of temporal theories, temporal completion, is introducedto be able to use classical proof techniques in verification withrespect to non-classical semantics covering default persistence. (shrink)

Consensus about a classification is defined as agreement on a set of classes and their relations for us in forming beliefs. While most research on scientific consensus has focused on consensus about a belief as a mark of truth, we highlight the importance of consensus in justifying shared classificatory language. What sort of consensus, if any, is the best basis for communicating and reasoning with scientific classifications? We describe an often-overlooked coordinative role for consensus that leverage agreement on how to (...) disagree such that actors involved can still achieve one or more shared aims even when they do not agree on shared beliefs or categories. Looking forward, we suggest that investigating structures and methods for coordinative consensus provides an important new direction for research on the epistemic foundations of knowledge organization. (shrink)

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics (...) for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Two levels of description of nonmonotonic reasoning are distinguished. For these levels semantical formalizations are given. The first level is defined semantically by the notion of belief state frame, the second level by the notion of reasoning frame. We introduce two specification languages to describe nonmonotonic reasoning at each of the levels: a specification language for level 1, with formal semantics based on belief state frames, a fragment of infinitary temporal logic as a general specification language for level 2, (...) with formal semantics based on reasoning frames. In our framework every level 2 description can be abstracted to level 1, and for every level 1 description there are level 2 descriptions which are a specialization of it. (shrink)

The dichotomy between ‘typological thinking’ and ‘population thinking’ features in a range of debates in contemporary and historical biology. The origins of this dichotomy are often traced to Ernst Mayr, who is said to have coined it in the 1950s as a rhetorical device that could be used to shield the Modern Synthesis from attacks by the opponents of population biology. In this two-part essay, I argue that the origins of the typology/population dichotomy are considerably more complicated and more interesting (...) than is commonly thought. In the first part, I argued that Mayr's dichotomy was based on two distinct type/population contrasts that had been articulated much earlier by George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky. Their distinctions made eminent sense in their own, isolated contexts. In this second part, I will show how Mayr conflated these type/population distinctions and blended in some of his own, unrelated concerns with ‘types’ of a rather different sort. Although Mayr told his early critics that he was merely making “a temporary oversimplification,” he ended up burdening the history and philosophy of biology with a troubled dichotomy. (shrink)

Introducing the thought of philosopher and theologian Jean-Yves Lacoste, this book provides an overview spanning Lacoste's earliest works on sacramentality to his latest work Etre en Danger in which Lacoste opens up the liturgical experience onto a spiritual experience of life. Schriijvers unfolds the logic of what Lacoste calls 'the liturgical experience' from its violent variety in Expérience et Absolu to the logic of love and love's possibility as it is developed in the later works. Throughout the book, the focus (...) is on Lacoste's dialogue with Heidegger and through this his attempt to widen the scope of phenomenology to include the phenomenality of the divine. (shrink)

What is it to make an error in the identification of a named taxonomic group? In this article we argue that the conditions for being in error about the identity of taxonomic groups through their names have a history, and that the possibility of committing such errors is contingent on the regime of institutions and conventions governing taxonomy and nomenclature at any given point in time. More specifically, we claim that taxonomists today can be in error about the identity of (...) taxonomic groups in a way that Carl Linnaeus, who is routinely cited as the “founder” of modern taxonomy and nomenclature, simply could not be. Starting from a remarkable recent study into Linnaeus’s naming of Elephasmaximus that led to the discovery of a nomenclatural error by him, we reconsider what it could mean to discover that Linnaeus misidentified a biological taxon in applying his taxon names. Through a further case study in Linnaean botany, we show that his practices of applying names in taxonomic revisions reveal a take on determining “which taxon is which” that is strikingly different from that of contemporary taxonomists. Linnaeus, we argue, adopted a practice-based, hands-on concept of taxa as “nominal spaces” that could continue to represent the same taxon even if all its former members had been reallocated to other taxa. (shrink)

The collection and classification of data into meaningful categories is a key step in the process of knowledge making. In the life sciences, the design of data discovery and integration tools has relied on the premise that a formal classificatory system for expressing a body of data should be grounded in consensus definitions for classifications. On this approach, exemplified by the realist program of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, progress is maximized by grounding the representation and aggregation of data on (...) settled knowledge. We argue that historical practices in systematic biology provide an important and overlooked alternative approach to classifying and disseminating data, based on a principle of coordinative rather than definitional consensus. Systematists have developed a robust system for referring to taxonomic entities that can deliver high quality data discovery and integration without invoking consensus about reality or “settled” science. (shrink)

God and Phenomenology: Thinking with Jean-Yves Lacoste provides a starting point for scholars who seek to familiarize themselves with the work of this French phenomenologist and theologian. Thirteen international scholars comment on Lacoste's work. In conclusion the volume offers an unpublished essay by Lacoste on the topic of eschatology. / Table of Contents -- Introduction: Thinking with Jean-Yves Lacoste by Joeri Schrijvers and Martin Koci / Part I: Critiques -- 1. "'Children of the World': A Note on Jean-Yves Lacoste," (...) by Kevin Hart / 2. "Lacoste on Appearing and Reduction," by Steven DeLay / 3. "Reduction Without Appearance: The Non-Phenomenality of God," by Robert C. Reed / 4. "Only Metaphysics Sustains Phenomenology," by John Milbank / Part II: Commentaries -- 5. "Canonical Texts," by Oliver O'Donovan / 6. "Reading Prayerfully Before God: Jean-Yves Lacoste's Treatment of Lectio Divina as an Instance of Existence Coram Deo," by Christina M. Gschwandtner / 7. "Affection, Mood, and Poetry: Overcoming Mentalism," by Joseph Rivera / 8. "Rejecting the Wrong Questions: Jean-Yves Lacoste's Resistance to a Philosophical-Theological Divide," by Stephanie Rumpza / Part III: Explorations -- 9. "For the Love of Revelation: Open and Relational Theology in Light of Lacoste," by Jason W. Alvis / 10. "Right Use, Right Thinking," by William C. Hackett / 11. "The Beautiful Life of Faith: A Liturgical Reading of Fear and Trembling," by Amber Bowen / 12. "In the Footsteps of Henri de Lubac and Gregory of Nyssa: Jean-Yves Lacoste on Human Becoming, Historical and Eternal," by Stephen E. Lewis / 13. "Kenosis and Transcendence: Jean-Yves Lacoste and Soren Kierkegaard on the Phenomenality of God," by Nikolaas Cassidy-Deketelaere / In Conclusion -- 14. "The Final Word: Prolegomena to Eschatology," by Jean-Yves Lacoste. (shrink)

This article presents Reiner Schürmann's thought of anarchy through its relation to the thought of Martin Heidegger. The main aim of this article is to examine the relation between Schürmann's two major works, Heidegger on Being and Acting and Broken Hegemonies through their respective relation towards other authors in the continental philosophical tradition such as Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. The article focuses furthermore on Schürmann's stress on the theme of the end of metaphysics and interrogates the ambiguities (...) surrounding this theme not only in Schürmann's works but also in the larger bulk of contemporary continental philosophy. (shrink)

This presentation offers a short overview of the basic insights of Jean-Yves Lacoste’s latest book La phénoménalité de Dieu. Apart from this, this essay seeks to establish some links with Lacoste’s earlier work.

Jean-Luc Nancy’s Deconstruction of Christianity views the current crisis of globalization as a mutation of our Christian culture and heritage. After outlining the basic premises of Nancy’s philosophy, this article situates Jacques Derrida’s critique of Nancy in his groundbreaking On Touching: whereas Nancy sees contemporary culture as a rupture (or indeed mutation) with the former Christian culture, Derrida argues that we are still dealing with the remnants and relics of precisely culture and are at best witnessing a metamorphosis of this (...) culture. This dialogue between Nancy and Derrida allows us to assess the critique of metaphysics in both thinkers. (shrink)