Frege's life and character -- The project -- Frege's new logic -- Defining the numbers -- The reconception of the logic, I-"Function and concept" -- The reconception of the logic, II- "On sense and meaning" and "on concept and object" -- Basic laws, the great contradiction, and its aftermath -- On the foundations of geometry -- Logical investigations -- Frege's influence on recent philosophy.

Frege begins Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, the work that introduces the project which was to occupy him for most of his professional career, with the question, 'What is the number one?' It is a question to which even mathematicians, he says, have no satisfactory answer. And given this scandalous situation, he adds, there is small hope that we shall be able to say what number is. Frege intends to rectify the situation by providing definitions of the number one and the (...) concept of number. But what, exactly, is required of a definition? Surely it will not do to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar - that would change the subject. It seems reasonable to suppose that an acceptable definition must be a true statement containing a description that picks out the object to which the numeral '1' already refers. And, similarly, that an acceptable definition of the concept of number must contain a description that picks out precisely those objects that are numbers - those objects to which our numerals refer. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of '1' and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of ‘1’ and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. There is, as we shall see shortly, a great deal of evidence that Frege’s definitions are not intended to pick out objects to which our numerals already refer. But if this is so, how can these definitions teach us anything about our science of arithmetic? And what criteria must these definitions satisfy? To answer these questions, we need to understand what it is that Frege thinks we need to learn about the science of arithmetic. (shrink)

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...) — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts. (shrink)

Deux constats sont à l'origine de ce livre. Le débat dans le monde académique autour du lien entre religions, sciences et espace public semble s'être fixé sur l'idée de 'post-sécularité'. Or, sous couvert de rendre les sociétés plus hospitalières aux religions, cette idée profite essentiellement à des courants politico-religieux absolutistes et fondamentalistes. Et la solide expertise francophone qui s'est développée sur le philosophe américain John Dewey (1859-1952) néglige trop souvent ses nombreux écrits consacrés à la critique des religions. Joan (...) Stavo-Debauge retrace donc la généalogie de l'idée de 'post-sécularité' et détaille les méfaits qu'elle peut masquer, comme les mobilisations contre l'avortement, les droits des personnes LGBT, l'expertise scientifique ou encore les politiques écologiques. Il s'appuie ensuite sur les écrits de John Dewey pour remettre au jour la pleine puissance de sa critique des religions fondée sur une pensée naturaliste et pragmatiste et la présenter comme un antidote efficace aux fondamentalismes religieux. (shrink)

In “Developing a Reflexive, Anticipatory, and Deliberative Approach to Unanticipated Discoveries: Ethical Lessons from iBlastoids,” we proposed a RAD approach to meet the challenging issues...

En el presente artículo, aparte de contextualizar el Liber de Causis exponiendo su llegada en el Occidente cristiano (s. XII) y su probable origen en la escuela de traductores de Bagdad (entre los siglos IX y X), se examinan con detalle las nociones de causalidad «per creationem» y «per informationem» que aparecen en él. El objetivo principal que aquí se persigue es el de mostrar las continuidades y las rupturas existentes entre la doctrina de la «creación» que se presenta en (...) el Liber, fuertemente influida por el platonismo, y la de Santo Tomás de Aquino. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, (...) or the criticism of that semantics offered by Fodor and Lepore, without having to abandon accepted, and unexceptionable, scientific methodology. (shrink)

If there is such a thing as a virtuous community, as Aristotle would have it, and if members of communities need to understand themselves in relation to community, then we have a large space from within which to grapple with the issues of social responsibility. Iris Marion Young developed a “social connection model” of justice which requires individuals to think outside of the borders of any one society when considering their responsibility to others. Donald Beggs advocates for a “group moral (...) virtue,” seeing the possibility of the development of virtuous characteristics of groups separate from their individual members.Combining these two ideas, I argue that it is possible to conceive of a society’s responsibility as one of developing such group virtues as will respond to the structural injustices of our interconnected world. (shrink)

Arendt wrote that "to think what we are doing" may make humans "abstain from evil-doing." I suggest that there is more to it than that. Moral Acuity is a phrase I use to discuss how one can know the right thing to do, often practically without thinking, when situations involving evil arise. Evil, for my purposes, refers to the causing of great harm to another. I propose that to be Morally Acute one must have the capacity for independent judgments and (...) possess sympathetic awareness of suffering. One must be able to make decisions independent of others. And, one must emphasize the suffering of the victim in moral decision-making. "Truly bringing the victim to mind" is a phrase which illustrates these two attributes. Truly bringing the victim to mind underscores the need for a kind of accuracy or acuity of perception unfettered by ego, belief, peers or cultural norm. Truly bringing the victim to mind emphasizes that the victim's experience be foremost in one's mind, that the suffering of another take precedence over other elements of particular circumstances. ;I stress the need for literacy regarding evil and those who refuse. I offer suggestions for moral development which stress the importance of thinking for oneself as well as the benefits of being able to see things from another person's perspective. The combination, while not the only channel for doing the right thing, will, I suggest, increase the likelihood. To be thought-full and clear-headed and sensitive to harm will, in the long run--and doesn't common sense tell us this anyway?--be the best route to determining the right thing to do. (shrink)

This paper raises the question of whether there is anything foundational to hopefulness when considering it as a virtue, and uses the Aristotelian distinction between virtue in the “natural sense” and virtue in the “strict sense” to make the claim that hopefulness has a primacy to it. While that primacy rests on the existence of care and responsiveness of community, those caretakers must themselves be possessed of hopefulness, which, at its best will be virtuous.

El decisionismo schmittiano es uno de los tópicos principales de la filosofía política contemporánea. Es a menudo recurrido entre quienes critican el liberalismo político, sea en su forma parlamentaria o mecanicista. El objetivo de este artículo es explicitar los cimientos, las implicaciones y las tesis más problemáticas de este decisionismo desde un planteamiento alternativo al de la fe. Se intenta mostrar tanto la presencia de Kierkegaard como el rechazo de Hegel en el reto que Schmitt presenta a la filosofía política, (...) así como reinterpretar sus concepciones del mito y la soberanía en un marco crítico con el pensamiento liberal. Concluyo sosteniendo que los sesgos conceptuales de Schmitt comportan un absolutismo político no menos criticable. (shrink)

Re-emergent scientific atheism bears the marks of its historical origins in the efforts of Bon-Bruevi and Jaroslavskij. The disciples of the Lenin generation use their fathers somewhat as second-level classics.

O que surge de uma descrição fenomenológica das experiências de tontura e vertigem para uma teoria fenomenológica geral da constituição do mundo? O que surge dessa contribuição para o projeto geral de uma fenomenologia da dor? Neste artigo, tentamos responder a ambas as perguntas, mostrando as suas ligações íntimas. Para isto, será necessário fazer uma descrição fenomenológica de ambos os fenómenos que permita mostrar as possíveis limitações de respetiva determinação clínica, recentemente estabelecidas por autores como Bisdorff, Von Brevern, Lempert e (...) Newman-‑Toker. Através de sucessivas descrições fenomenológicas da experiência de vertigem e tontura, tentaremos mostrar a importância do eixo da verticalidade na teoria fenomenológica da constituição do mundo, bem como a sua relação com o eixo da horizontalidade. (shrink)

Drama Trauma is a difficult book to review because it both does and does not hang together as one sustained linear argument. Made up of pieces originally written for another book-length project and of more recent critical readings of cultural performance, the book moves from a lengthy section on Shakespeare to much briefer sections on contemporary drama, performance art and installation pieces. And since there's no conclusion, it's not always clear how the sections interact with one another; how they hang (...) together, so to speak. But the sections themselves make for a provocative read; and, if one accepts the book as a loosely organized attempt to 'reflect the non-linear incursions of theory and political performance that have altered our understanding of dramatic 'genre' over more than the past decade' (21), Drama Trauma marks an important contribution to the fields of drama scholarship, performance studies, cultural studies and media studies. (shrink)

NOTES: Based on the book Socrates on trial written by Andrew Irvine and published by the University of Toronto Press. Performed at the Chan Centre for the Performing Arts, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, May 31-June 7, 2008. CONTENTS: Trailer, Who was Socrates?, Selected scenes, The production, Credits. UBC Library Catalogue Permanent URL: http://resolve.library.ubc.ca/cgi-bin/catsearch?bid=3956307.