We consider the investigation of the embedding of semigroups in groups, a problem which spans the early-twentieth-century development of abstract algebra. Although this is a simple problem to state, it has proved rather harder to solve, and its apparent simplicity caused some of its would-be solvers to go awry. We begin with the analogous problem for rings, as dealt with by Ernst Steinitz, B. L. van der Waerden and Øystein Ore. After disposing of A. K. Sushkevich’s erroneous contribution in this (...) area, we present A. I. Maltsev’s example of a cancellative semigroup which may not be embedded in a group, which showed for the first time that such an embedding is not possible in general. We then look at the various conditions that were derived for such an embedding to take place: the sufficient conditions of Paul Dubreil and others, and the necessary and sufficient conditions obtained by A. I. Maltsev, Vlastimil Pták and Joachim Lambek. We conclude with some comments on the place of this problem within the theory of semigroups, and also within abstract algebra more generally. (shrink)

"Heimat" ist zutiefst doppeldeutig. Heimat steht zum einen für Sicherheit und Geborgenheit, zum anderen für Enge und Exklusion. Heimat ist zugleich Paradies und Sehnsuchtsort wie auch Hölle. Das Buch lotet diese Spannung aus. Im Fokus steht nicht nur der gegenwärtige politische Gebrauch des Begriffs. Gefragt wird auch, ob es angesichts der Individualität, Pluralität und Heterogenität, die das Lebensgefühl der Menschen prägen, überhaupt noch Sinn macht, den Begriff "Heimat" zu verwenden. Gleichzeitig fordern Migration und Flucht die modernen westlichen Gesellschaften heraus, sich (...) neu mit kulturellen Verortungen auseinanderzusetzen. Mit Beiträgen von Hans-Joachim Höhn, Markus Kotzur, Jürgen Manemann, Ulrich Hemel, Jörg Wächter, Birgit Recki, Christian Starck, Saskia Wendel, Hans Joas und Gerhard Kruip. "Homeland" is full of ambiguity. "Homeland" refers to safety and feelings of security, at the same time it is perceived as narrowness and exclusion. Homeland is experienced as paradise as well as hell. The book fathoms the tension and raises the question how to speak of homeland today. (shrink)

In this paper, I am going to offer a reconstruction of a challenge to intuition-based armchair philosophy that has been put forward by experimental philosophers of a restrictionist stripe, which I will call the 'master argument'. I will then discuss a number of popular objections to this argument and explain why they either fail to cast doubt on its first, empirical premise or do not go deep enough to make for a lasting rebuttal. Next, I will consider two more promising (...) objections, the grounding objection and the expertise objection, which aim at the second, epistemic premise of the argument. Against this background, I will then suggest what I call 'conservative restrictionism' as the most reasonable default reaction to the experimentalist challenge, which is a combination of the two views of local restrictionism and methodological conservativism. (shrink)

Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay (...) intuitions; second, that expert intuitions are superior to lay intuitions; and third, that expert intuitions accord with the relevant philosophical consensus. At present, there is only little experimental evidence that bears on these issues. To advance the debate, we conducted two new experiments on intuitions about knowledge with experts and lay people. Our results suggest that the intuitions of epistemological experts are superior in some respects, but they also pose an unexpected challenge to the expertise defense. Most strikingly, we found that even epistemological experts tend to ascribe knowledge in fake-barn-style cases. This suggests that philosophy, as a discipline, might fail to adequately map the intuitions of its expert practitioners onto a disciplinary consensus. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds from the standard picture of the relation between intuitions and experimental philosophy: the alleged evidential role of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and experimental philosophy’s challenge to these judgments, based on their variation with philosophically irrelevant factors. I will survey some of the main defenses of this standard picture against the x-phi challenge, most of which fail. Concerning the most popular defense, the expertise defense, I will draw the bleak conclusion that intuitive expertise of the envisaged kind is (...) largely a myth. Next, I will consider the mischaracterization objection, which has mainly been developed by Deutsch and Cappelen on the basis of textual evidence: that philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their case judgments, but instead argue for them. This would render the x-phi challenge mostly irrelevant, due to its focus on intuitions about hypothetical cases. I will then consider a few instructive replies to the mischaracterization objection, which are all unconvincing on further inspection. Finally, I will discuss some potential normative consequences of the mischaracterization objection, and I will argue that it recommends a shift away from the excessive focus on intuitions about cases in metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy, towards more work on the role of argumentation in the method of cases. More speculatively, I claim that philosophers should always argue for their case judgments, even if they have strong intuitions about them, because an argument-based methodology would be more transparent and philosophically fruitful than one that mainly relies on intuition. (shrink)

In recent work, E. J. Lowe presents an essence-based account of our knowledge of metaphysical modality that he claims to be superior to its main competitors. I argue that knowledge of essences alone, without knowledge of a suitable bridge principle, is insufficient for knowing that something is metaphysically necessary or metaphysically possible. Yet given Lowe's other theoretical commitments, he cannot account for our knowledge of the needed bridge principle, and so his essence-based modal epistemology remains incomplete. In addition to that, (...) Lowe's account implies a psychologically unrealistic reconstruction of how we ordinarily acquire knowledge of metaphysical modalities. The discussion of Lowe's suggestive essence-based account is also intended as a case study that illustrates a more general problem in the epistemology of modality: the great difficulty of explaining our modal knowledge in terms of a single overtly nonmodal kind of knowledge. The failure of Lowe's account suggests that such a sweeping reductive explanation of our modal knowledge might simply not be available. This should be good news for those philosophers who champion less reductive or more pluralistic accounts of our modal knowledge. (shrink)

Along with the rapid worldwide advance of nanotechnology, debates on associated ethical issues have spread from local to international levels. However, unlike science and engineer- ing issues, international perceptions of ethical issues are very diverse. This paper provides an analysis of how sociocultural factors such as language, cultural heritage, economics and politics can affect how people perceive ethical issues of nanotechnology. By attempting to clarify the significance of sociocultural issues in ethical considerations my aim is to support the ongoing international (...) dialogue on nanotechnology. At the same time I pose the general question of ethical relativism in engineering ethics, that is to say whether or not different ethical views are irreconcilable on a fundamental level. (shrink)

There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method (...) of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. A natural motivation for this argument is the following seemingly plausible principle: if knowledge is a natural kind, then the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept. Since this principle lacks adequate support, the crucial semantic claim that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept must be defended in some more direct way. However, there are two striking epistemic disanalogies between the concept of knowledge and paradigmatic natural kind concepts that militate against this semantic claim. Conceptual analyses of knowledge are not affected by total error, and the proponents of such analyses are not subject to a priori conceptual obliviousness. I conclude that the argument from natural kindhood does not succeed in undermining the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

There is the popular notion according to which the world is built up in a hierarchical order, such that combining entities from the lower level results in entities of the next higher level, and so on. It seems beyond doubt in this view that the entities at the lowest level are some subatomic particles, to be followed at the next levels by atoms, molecules, biological organs and organisms including humans, and eventually societies. Accordingly, a scientific discipline is assigned to each (...) level, resulting in a disciplinary hierarchy that starts with physics and goes via chemistry, biology, and psychology to sociology. This popular notion has its merits as it assures us that both the world and our scientific knowledge are perfectly ordered in a harmonious but hierarchical manner. It provides philosophical food to discuss the interfaces between the ontological levels or disciplines in terms of reduction, emergence, supervenience, and so on. And it appeals to some philosophers who are interested in science but unable to read the about two million scientific publications per year, because it allows them to focus on the handful of publications in what is supposed to be the fundamental level of Everything. The hierarchical picture became popular in the 19th century just when most of our scientific disciplines emerged in a process of horizontal diversification, when each discipline carved out and established its own specific subject matter, methodology, theories, and problems and rejected just the idea of the hierarchical dependencies between the disciplines (Stichweh 1984). Despite its anachronism at the time of its popularization, the hierarchical picture was appealing to all those who felt lost in the exploding fields of science and who were yearning for the good old days in which a simple metaphysical scheme could provide order to the entire world. It is more than likely that the hierarchical picture is appealing still nowadays for the same reasons. It would not be worthwhile to discuss the anachronistic hierarchical picture, if it had not such a great appeal to many philosophers.1 In this paper I discuss only one particular problem of the hierarchical picture, the lack of matter or stuffs2 in the ontological hierarchy, which actually consists in a series of structures or forms.. (shrink)

Bentham was once thought to be the father of the principle which he called ‘the greatest happiness principle’. Now Hutcheson with his ‘greatest happiness for the greatest numbers’ is the generally accepted source of this test of moral behaviour. It is not in Britain, however, but in Germany that one finds its origin. A quarter of a century before Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, a German philosopher provided a formulation of the principle (...) on which Hutcheson relied. (shrink)

This chapter combines rhetorical with conceptual analysis to argue that the concept of convergence of technologies is a teleological concept that does not describe or predict any recent past, present, or future development. Instead it always expresses or attributes political goals of how future technology should be developed. The concept was already fully developed as a flexible rhetorical tool by US science administrators to create nanotechnology (as nano-convergence), before it was broadened to invent the convergence of nano-, bio-, info-, and (...) cogno-research (NBIC-convergence). Analyzing the use of “convergence” in various US reports, such as in convergence did, does, can, will likely, will necessarily, should, and ought to happen, sheds new light on how science policy avoids public debates about goals and values in deliberating the future, which poses new challenges to STS. (shrink)

This book does not only attempt to clarify concepts used in the context of dialectical reasoning but also develops an epistemological theory by answering the question: What does it mean to possess a language? The epistemological theory then is used to ground the basis of social science in the logic of our common-sense language. This logic is viewed as more comprehensive than traditional formalized logic, which is viewed as only one though an important aspect of the more general and basic (...) logic of our common-sense language. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap hat nur im Vorwort zum „Logischen Aufbau der Welt“ Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit zur Kunst und Architektur seiner Zeit veröffentlicht. Aber sein emphatisches Bekenntnis zur Moderne der 20er-Jahre hat bisher nur selten Aufmerksamkeit in der philosophiegeschichtlichen Sekundärliteratur gefunden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich in den ersten beiden Abschnitten, seinen kulturellen Hintergrund seit seiner Schul- und Studentenzeit zu skizzieren und dann seine persönlichen Kontakte und Austauschbeziehungen mit Vorkämpfern der Moderne wie Franz Roh und Siegfried Giedion zu beschreiben. (...) Nach diesen Vorbereitungen wird die Frage gestellt, ob und in wieweit Carnaps Philosophie selbst als ein Teil der Bewegung der Neuen Sachlichkeit verstanden werden kann oder sogar muss. Zur Beantwortung werden eine Reihe von Charakteristika dieses Zeitgeist-Phänomens aus den – gleichzeitig mit Carnaps „Aufbau“ erschienenen Werken der Genannten – herauspräpariert und dann untersucht, ob diese Kriterien sich auch im Werk Carnaps finden. Das Ergebnis ist, dass man ihn mit Fug und Recht als „Philosoph der Neuen Sachlichkeit“ bezeichnen kann. (shrink)

'Jeder denkt doch nur an seinen eigenen Vorteil'. Diese schwer überprüfbare Lebensweisheit ist in den letzten zwanzig Jahren von der neueren Ökonomik zu einer modelltheoretisch fundierten Ethik ausgearbeitet worden, die fordert, innerhalb geeigneter Rahmenbedingungen dem 'unbändigen Vorteilsstreben' nicht nur im Marktgeschehen, sondern auch im alltäglichen Zusammenleben freien Lauf zu lassen. Beispielhaft demontiert Hans-Joachim Niemann das Modelldenken der neuen Ökonomik und zeigt: Wer seine Modelle nicht durchschaut oder die Komplexität des sozialen Lebens unterschätzt, läuft Gefahr, das soziale Gefüge aus den (...) Angeln zu heben. Eine solche 'Ethik der Zukunft' brauchen wir nicht. Not tut stattdessen, die herkömmliche Moral als 'säkulare Moral' zu analysieren, zu formulieren und sie dadurch kritisierbar und verbesserbar zu machen. Das geeignete Instrument dazu ist die Problemlösungsethik des kritischen Rationalismus. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses different kinds of data documents, including data sets, data studies, data papers and data journals. It provides descriptive and bibliometric data on different kinds of data documents and discusses the theoretical and philosophical problems by classifying documents according to the DIKW model (data documents, information documents, knowl­edge documents and wisdom documents). Data documents are, on the one hand, an established category today, even with its own data citation index (DCI). On the other hand, data documents (...) have blurred boundaries in relation to other kinds of documents and seem sometimes to be understood from the problematic philosophical assumption that a datum can be understood as “a single, fixed truth, valid for everyone, everywhere, at all times”. (shrink)

Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist der anthropologische Personenbegriff Heinrichs von Gent (vor 1240-1293). Die zentrale These lautet, Heinrich entwickele zwar keine geschlossene Theorie der menschlichen Person, verbinde aber ganz verschiedene philosophische Kontroversen seiner Zeit inhaltlich durch eine bestimmte Perspektive auf den Menschen in seinem Verhältnis zu Gott auf der einen Seite und der Natur auf der anderen Seite miteinander. Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich der Autor Heinrichs Beitrag zu den Fragen nach dem Prinzip der Individuation, der Ewigkeit der Welt sowie dem (...) Verhältnis von Verstand und Wille. Im Zentrum der Darstellung steht hierbei jeweils, wie Heinrich zu seiner Positionierung unter Rückgriff auf verschiedene Autoritäten ein Konzept entwickelt, hinter dem eine scharfe Grenzziehung zwischen den Bereichen Gott, Mensch und Natur steht. Die Bestimmung dessen, wie der Mensch einerseits aus reinen Naturkategorien herausgehoben wird, wie zugleich aber vermieden werden muss, den Menschen selbst zu Gott werden zu lassen oder Gott in denselben Strukturen wie die von ihm geschaffene Natur zu verstehen, verknüpft Heinrich von Gent immer wieder mit dem Begriff Person. Sich als Person gegenüber Naturkausalitäten frei verhalten zu können, begründet für Heinrich die Würde einer Person. Die philosophiehistorisch angelegte Studie zeigt durch die direkte Auslegung der Quellentexte auf, wie Heinrich von Gent eine solche Position entwickelt: Einerseits durch Rückgriff auf verschiedene Traditionen und andererseits in Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Denkern seiner Zeit, allen voran Thomas von Aquin. (shrink)

Drawing upon case study research investigating the Irish Health Service Executive’s (HSE) response to a fake news attack on their human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination campaign, we argue that responses to fake news should be analyzed from a legitimacy perspective. A model for emotional legitimacy management is proposed in which the HSE and a third-party collaborate to (a) connect with the emotional aspects of the issue; (b) leverage emotions to build vicarious legitimacy; (c) transfer the third-party’s legitimacy to the HSE; and (...) (d) emotionally activate the public. This study contributes to fake news and legitimacy management by moving beyond fact-checking and debunking strategies. We suggest a framework centered on legitimacy in which emotions are used to counteract fake news. Finally, we emphasize the importance of third-party vicarious legitimacy building and the transfer of this legitimacy to the organization. (shrink)

Classical aesthetics cherishes the image of a self‐contained author who expresses himself by creating a work of art. This definition is markedly challenged by authors who create their work in co‐operation with a congenial partner. Twin authors are a rare phenomenon but they show that it is possible to split up a literary project and to write novels in tandem. In 1997 I approached some joint authors, questioning them on their common experience, on the distribution of their work load and (...) the harmonisation of the style and content of their novels, as well as the individual steps of production. The material I accumulated was complemented by investigations on late writers such as the brothers Goncourt and the double author Ellery Queen.The project made it evident that twin authors display a number of common features which are characteristic of their trade. All authors asked reported that writing in tandem required a pervasive internal harmony and mutual calculability. A close personal relationship appears to be vital, in the sense that the partners complement each other in their skills and views. When they assemble the material for their plots, most twin authors draw on journalistic research rather than on inspiration and empathy. Their novels normally appeal to a down‐to‐earth taste and avoid digressions into poetry or copious descriptions of feelings and moods. (shrink)

U. Hoyer's argument for the linearity is discussed and a modification of the argument is proposed.

Aus psychoanalytischer Sicht wird die therapeutische Haltung in der Beziehungsarbeit mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen beschrieben. Eine solche psychodynamische Haltung ist nicht nur in der Praxis des Psychoanalytikers hilfreich, sondern bewährt sich auch in der Akutstation einer psychiatrischen Klinik, in der sozialen Rehabilitation oder bei der Psychopharmakologie. Im ersten Teil wird die Arbeit in und an der therapeutischen Beziehung als Ausgangspunkt gewählt und die für die Autoren maßgebliche Haltung anhand der beiden Begriffe Engagement und Respekt dargestellt. Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird (...) im zweiten Teil darauf hingewiesen, dass eine Therapie – nicht nur, aber auch mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen – eine Gratwanderung zwischen beiden Dimensionen sein kann. Im dritten Teil schließlich werden die ersten beiden Teile von der Mitautorin, die psychose- und psychiatrieerfahren ist, kommentiert. (shrink)

Die psychoanalytische Debatte um unrepräsentierte psychische Zustände und die Grenzen der Behandelbarkeit schwerer seelischer Leiden ist theoretisch ebenso wie klinisch für die Psychoanalyse der Gegenwart zentral. Theoretisch gehaltvoll ist sie, weil das Verhältnis von verbalsprachlichen und infralinguistischen »Einschreibungen« sowie zwischen intrapsychischer und interpersonaler Erfahrung neu zu klären ist und einige enorm heterogen verwendete psychoanalytische Kernbegriffe zur Repräsentation neu zu sichten und voneinander abzugrenzen sind. Klinisch entscheidet sich an diesen Fragen, welche Leiden der psychoanalytischen Therapie zugänglich sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit will (...) einen sowohl theoretisch wie klinisch relevanten Beitrag zur Diskussion leisten. Sie geht aus von Sigmund Freuds Konzepten zu den unbewussten Vorstellungen, aus deren Perspektive die weiterführenden Gedanken neu gelesen und überprüft werden. Dabei stehen die Modelle von Green, Levine, Botella & Botella und Kristeva im Mittelpunkt. Sie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass es vorschnell ist, infralinguistische oder semiotische Erfahrungsschichten als »nicht repräsentiert« einzustufen. Vielmehr sollen die verschiedenen Darstellungsformen seelischer Zustände gewürdigt und aufeinander bezogen werden, die schließlich sprachlicher Repräsentation und so der Behandlung geöffnet werden. Ein ausführlicher Fallbericht und Hinweise auf die Behandlungsdynamik der Anorexia nervosa erläutern beispielhaft, wie das in der Kur gelingen kann. (shrink)

Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. (...) But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. (shrink)

Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2024, Page 1502-1507.

Im Wintersemester 1967/68 bin ich nach Göttingen gegangen, um dort ein Studium der Germanistik, Klassischen Philologie und Philosophie zu beginnen. Schon im zweiten Semester habe ich die Philosophie anstelle der Germanistik als Hauptfach genommen. Die Philosophie in Göttingen wurde damals von Günther Patzig und Erhard Scheibe vertreten, der eine die Kapazität der klassischen griechischen Philosophie in Deutschland, der andere – mit einem massiven Hintergrund in der Mathematik und Physik – in der Wissenschaftstheorie und Logik zu Hause.

Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl’s early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book’s general argument, and which I call Husserl’s Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to (...) be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book’s opening chapter, and which I call Husserl’s German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science’s positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl’s early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced. (shrink)

In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.

Background: The experimental method to acquire knowledge about efficacy and efficiency of medical procedures is well established in evidence-based medicine. A method to attain evidence about the significance of diseases and interventions from the patients' perspectives taking into account their right to self-determination about their lives and bodies has however not been sufficiently characterized.Design: Identification of a method to acquire evidence about the clinical significance of disease and therapeutic options from the patients' perspectives.Arguments: Communication between patient and physician is analyzed (...) as the method to attain evidence about what is at stake for individual patients in disease and therapy. It is the method that enables physicians to directly take into account patients' disease experiences and their aims regarding treatments. These patients' perspectives in turn determine the clinical significance of diagnoses and therapeutic options, if patient-autonomy is taken seriously.Conclusions: A full account of evidence-based medicine needs to include experimentation and communication between physician and patient as equally important methods to attain evidence necessary to practice patient-oriented medicine. The communicative method is especially important for primary physicians as they direct patients within the medical system to have their medical problems most effectively and efficiently addressed. (shrink)