With the cure rate for many pediatric malignancies now between 70% and 90%, infertility becomes an increasingly important issue. Strategies for preserving fertility in girls and adolescent women occur in two distinct phases. The first phase includes oophorectomy and cryopreservation of ovarian cortex slices or individual oocytes; ultrasound-guided needle aspiration of oocytes, with or without in vitro maturation, followed by cryopreservation; and ovarian autografting to a distant site. The second phase occurs if the woman chooses to pursue pregnancy, and includes (...) IVM of the oocytes, followed by in vitro fertilization and transfer of any created embryos to the woman's uterus. For ovarian autografting, the woman would undergo menotropin ovarian stimulation and retrieval of matured oocytes. The ethical challenges with each of these phases are many of fertility preservation and include issues of informed choice. The lack of proven benefit with these strategies and the associated potential physical and psychological harms require careful attention to the key elements of informed choice, which include decisional capacity, disclosure, understanding and voluntariness, and to the benefits of in-depth counseling to promote free and informed choice at a time that is emotionally difficult for the decision makers. (shrink)

Artykuł podejmuje się pytania o trwałość granic ludzkiego ciała i jego związki z otaczającą rzeczywistością. W odniesieniu do pogłebiającego się w wyniku zmian klimatycznych i zwiększającej się toksyczności środowiska lęku przed tym, co wnika z zewnątrz do naszego ciała, przywołuję koncepcje takich myślicielek, jak Stacy Alaimo, Donna Haraway i Karen Barad, by zastanowić się, w jaki sposób przemyśleć nasze relacje ze środowiskiem. Problem ten poruszam poprzez lekturę dwóch powieści eko-grozy, „Wilder Girls” Rory Power (2019) oraz „Unicestwienia” Jeffa VanderMeera (2014). Najważniejsze (...) tematy analizy to relacja między wnętrzem i zewnętrzem ciała, powiązania między ludźmi a środowiskiem, przemiany ciał wynikajace z zakażenia oraz znaczenie języka. Odwołując się do artykułu Bethany Doane „Sublime Annihilation and Planetary Ecohorror” (2020), zastanawiam się nad etycznym wymiarem podobnych opowieści i ich znaczeniem w obliczu katastrofy klimatycznej. (shrink)

There may be circumstances in which it is morally justifiable intentionally to kill a person who is morally innocent, threatens no one, rationally wishes not to die, and does not consent to be killed. Although the killing would wrong the victim, it might be justified by the necessity of averting some disaster that would otherwise occur. In other instances of permissible killing, however, the justification appeals to more than consequences. It may appeal to the claim that the person to be (...) killed has acted in such a way that to kill him would neither wrong him nor violate his rights, even if he has not consented to be killed or to be subjected to the risk of being killed. In these cases, I will say that the person is liable to be killed. Although I borrow the notion of liability from legal theory, and although much of what I say will be informed by the literature on liability in both tort law and criminal law, my concern in this article is with moral rather than legal liability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Weight I Just Can’t LoseShelley Lynn MeyersI have always been a “fat person”. According to the medical definition though, I have not always been obese. I have spent most of my life on a journey from chubby to obese, finally ending at my current “overweight” status. After years of struggling with obesity I had gastric bypass surgery, finally losing enough weight to be “normal.” However, regardless of the (...) number on the scale or the BMI category into which I fell, I was still “fat”. I may have lost weight but I did not lose the experience and memories of life as an obese person. I was a fat girl on the inside.My earliest memories of childhood consist of feeling fat and awkward. I was the kid reading a book, watching other little girls practice their cartwheels and boys play tag. I was the kid who also hated gym class, especially the days we practiced tumbling or had to climb ropes. I heard the other kids laugh when I had difficulty doing these things. It’s no surprise that I was last or next to last when we had to choose teams for sports. At least when we played flag football I could play center and use my weight as an asset, blocking players from the other team.Certainly, taunts about my weight and even my own intrusive condemning thoughts were not constant, but they were frequent. Admittedly, I probably berated myself much more often than my peers did. I hated being different. What saddens me to this very day are promises I would make to God if I only I could be “like everyone else”. Oh the things that I would change, or give up for the gift of being a normal size. Even my good qualities, such as academic achievement, became another characteristic that made me stand out when all I wanted to do was hide amongst the crowd. I would have happily traded the high GPA for a lower number on the scale. [End Page E4]Some memories from that era seem to be forever etched into my mind. It has been more than thirty years since I was in the seventh grade, but I remember one particular incident very clearly. I went to my first school dance and was thrilled that I actually slow danced with a boy that I had liked since the fourth grade, Jeff1*. We danced to “How Much I Feel” by Ambrosia. Jeff wore a plaid flannel shirt, and I remember how soft it felt when I put my arms around his neck. The puppy love joy I felt that night was short-lived. At school the next day I read a note written by a female classmate. She wrote about the dance, saying that she had wanted to dance with Jeff, but “he was dancing with that fat pig”. She included my name as well, so there was no mistaking to whom she was referring. I felt nauseous. I decided that happiness was just a set-up for disappointment.Even though I thinned out somewhat during high school, I was still larger than most of my friends and saw myself as fat. I received few actual comments about my weight but I just knew they were thinking it. My best friends were exceptionally thin (one, I would later find out had an eating disorder), which added to my distorted body image. I also was the “friend”, rather than the “girlfriend”, with boys asking me to introduce them to my skinny friends. I was ecstatic when I had a horrible case of the flu and lost a lot of weight due to vomiting and the inability to keep food down. I remember hoping that I could get the flu every couple of months.I read fashion magazines and studied the latest, greatest ways to lose weight. Diet pills, fad soup diets and low calorie frozen dinners were popular and I tried most of them. Sadly, the very methods I tried to “get skinny” likely put me on the path to obesity. Starving myself just led to unhealthy eating, cravings and quite possibly, a metabolism that had no... (shrink)

Vector-based models of word meaning have become increasingly popular in cognitive science. The appeal of these models lies in their ability to represent meaning simply by using distributional information under the assumption that words occurring within similar contexts are semantically similar. Despite their widespread use, vector-based models are typically directed at representing words in isolation, and methods for constructing representations for phrases or sentences have received little attention in the literature. This is in marked contrast to experimental evidence (e.g., in (...) sentential priming) suggesting that semantic similarity is more complex than simply a relation between isolated words. This article proposes a framework for representing the meaning of word combinations in vector space. Central to our approach is vector composition, which we operationalize in terms of additive and multiplicative functions. Under this framework, we introduce a wide range of composition models that we evaluate empirically on a phrase similarity task. (shrink)

The dominant conception of brain death as the death of the whole brain constitutes an unstable compromise between the view that a person ceases to exist when she irreversibly loses the capacity for consciousness and the view that a human organism dies only when it ceases to function in an integrated way. I argue that no single criterion of death captures the importance we attribute both to the loss of the capacity for consciousness and to the loss of functioning of (...) the organism as a whole. This is because the person or self is one thing and the human organism is another. We require a separate account of death for each. Only if we systematically distinguish between persons and human organisms will we be able to provide plausible accounts both of the conditions of our ceasing to exist and of when it is that we begin to exist. This paper, in short, argues for a form of mind-body dualism and draws out some of its implications for various practical moral problems. (shrink)

This paper explores the central question of why soldiers in democratic societies might decide to fight in wars that they may have reason to believe are objectively or questionably unjust. First, I provide a framework for understanding the dilemma caused by an unjust war and a soldier's competing moral obligations; namely, the obligations to self and state. Next, I address a few traditional key thoughts concerning soldiers and jus ad bellum. This is followed by an exploration of the unique and (...) contradicting moral problems that confront modern soldiers and their officers. I argue that although traditional positions such as invincible ignorance provide a rather dangerous ‘head-in-the-sand’ mentality, soldiers serving a democratic government are nonetheless very limited in their legal and moral ability to interpret what is a justifiable war. However, a very few select senior officers are in positions to make such legal and moral decisions concerning jus ad bellum. (shrink)

Many people who believe that abortion may often be justified by appeal to the pregnant woman’s interests also believe that a woman’s infliction of significant but nonlethal injury on her fetus can seldom be justified by appeal to her interests. Yet the second of these beliefs can seem to cast doubt on the first. For the view that the infliction of prenatal injury is seriously morally objectionable may seem to presuppose a view about the status of the fetus that challenges (...) the permissibility of abortion. The fear of being interpreted as implicitly endorsing such a view has thus led some defenders of abortion to be reluctant for tactical reasons to condemn the infliction of prenatal injury. In this they are encouraged by those who exploit the issue of prenatal injury in their campaign against abortion. When, for example, the House and Senate in 2004 passed legislation recognizing two victims of an assault against a pregnant woman, many viewed this as a tactic in a larger strategy to restrict access to abortion. This tactic is potentially effective. For people may find it compelling to infer that, if injuring a fetus is seriously objectionable, abortion must be even more objectionable, since killing is normally more seriously objectionable than merely injuring. (shrink)

I'm very grateful to receive such long and thoughtful responses from some of the world's most creative and influential moral philosophers. Since I largely agree with Jeff McMahan and Larry Temkin, I will devote most of my scarce space to Rob Sparrow.Sparrow earlier claimed that since women gestate and live longer, enhancers are committed to parents conceiving only girls. To avoid this absurdity, we must reject enhancement and endorse what Sparrow calls “therapy”. I noted we first need to know (...) what “therapy” means, and devised various clarificatory cases. This central aspect of my paper remains unaddressed, with Sparrow admitting his view is ill-defined.1 He also grants his reductio is inapplicable to some enhancement doctrines, implying he provided no case uniquely favouring therapy.Other enhancement doctrines may avoid Sparrow's reductio for different reasons. For example, John Harris noted that enhancers are not committed to enhancing regardless of consequences, including extinction. Sparrow then denies extinction-avoidance provides reasons for individuals. I argued that it is wrong for individuals to contribute to disasters like extinction or climate change. Sparrow now admits this but claims parents may permissibly do so for their children's sake.1 Their children presumably can reciprocate, so family emissions can grow with everybody permissibly taking for others what it remains impermissible for those others to take for themselves. Since this is implausible, Sparrow's argument fails.Sparrow also claimed that a non-individual concern to prevent extinction is akin to Nazi eugenics, and comparable to creating people with barely worth-living lives to feel superior to them. Commenting on the case, I claimed that “the avoidable creation of lives barely worth living is itself abhorrent”.2 McMahan assumed I meant ‘creating such lives is never permissible’,3 but by “avoidable” I meant ‘when creating better …. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a reclusive and enigmatic philosopher, writing his most significant work off campus in remote locations. He also held a chair in the Philosophy Department at Cambridge, and is one of the university’s most recognized even if, as Ray Monk says, ‘reluctant professors’ of philosophy. Paradoxically, although Wittgenstein often showed contempt for the atmosphere at Cambridge and for academic philosophy in particular, it is hard to conceive of him making his significant contributions without considerable support from his academic (...) colleagues, his research fellowship and later teaching career at Cambridge. It is this conflicted relationship we explore, between the revolutionary thinker and his base within an educational institution. Starting from a brief biographical sketch of Wittgenstein’s academic life at Cambridge, including his involvement as a student and faculty member in the Moral Sciences Club, we look at how he reconceived the role of philosophy throughout this... (shrink)

Consider the proposition that: A: "while it is impermissible, epistemically or morally, to believe the propositions of theism as they lack sufficient evidence, it is permissible, epistemically or morally, to hope that those propositions are true and thereby to act as if they are true." I examine a problem facing anyone who endorses (A), and advocates erecting the superstructure of theistic commitment on a base of theistic hope. Concisely put, those who endorse (A) will very likely violate the evidentialist standards (...) which drove them toward (A) in the first place. This problem is in many respects a simple one, but even so, an intractable problem rendering conformity to (A) problematic. (shrink)

In this article, the relationship between second-order comprehension and unrestricted mereological fusion (over atoms) is clarified. An extension PAF of Peano arithmetic with a new binary mereological notion of “fusion”, and a scheme of unrestricted fusion, is introduced. It is shown that PAF interprets full second-order arithmetic, Z_2.

Some opponents of epistemic two-dimensionalism say that the view should be rejected on the grounds that it misclassifies certain a posteriori claims as a priori. Elliott, McQueen, & Weber [2013] have argued that any argument of this form must fail. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken, and defend my argument [Speaks (2010] against their criticisms.

This paper examines Gandhian philosophy and practice to reinterpret UNESCO's educational vision towards establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. The uniqueness of the Gandhian perspective is its ability to withstand the dominant political, philosophical and religious challenges with its contextually rooted, spiritually oriented, socially responsible and human person centred reinterpretations. UNESCO’s educational vision-Learning: The Treasure Within published in 1996 is a catalyst in establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. Consistent changes and challenges in knowledge societies necessitates the reinterpretation of this (...) educational vision. The four pillars of learning in this educational vision are analysed together with four aspects of Gandhian philosophy and practice: ‘learning to know’ and Nai Talim, ‘learning to do’ and ashrams, ‘learning to live together’ and constructive programme and ‘learning to be’ and swaraj. The paper discusses this confluence of the UNESCO’s theoretical approach of four pillars of education with Gandhian pragmatic philosophy and practice to offer a contextually rooted and future-oriented outlook for reinterpreting the educational vision for establishing stable and sustainable knowledge societies. (shrink)

According to Roderick Chisholm, one distinctive characteristic of mental phenomena is that they relate to their objects "under an aspect'": Lois Lane admires the one object that is both Superman and Clark Kent as "Superman" but not as "Clark Kent". This paper argues that visual attention exhibits no such characteristic. This suggests that attention is an exceptional mental phenomenon, and understanding it may provide insight into mind-body or mind- world relations.

In his most distinctly political book, The Public and Its Problems, John Dewey describes a never-ending process of achieving democratic governance, in which obstacles to such governance inevitably emerge, and are progressively overcome. However, even in that evidently political work, Dewey still emphasizes that there is a “distinction between democracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government. . . . The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the (...) state even at its best” (143). The typical political bodies that exercise legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial power are not the only institutions that significantly impact how individuals live .. (shrink)

Healthcare delivery and access, both in the United States and globally, were negatively affected during the entirety of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was particularly true during the first year when countries grappled with high rates of illness and implemented non-pharmaceutical interventions such as stay-at-home orders. Among children with special healthcare needs, research from the United Kingdom (U.K.) has shown that the pandemic response uniquely impacted various aspects of their care, including decreased access to care, delays in diagnosis, and poorer chronic (...) disease control. In response to these findings, and to begin to comprehend whether the concerning findings from the nationalized system of healthcare in the U.K. extend to the highly dissimilar United States (U.S.) healthcare context, we reviewed the literature on alterations in access to and delivery of care during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic for children with special healthcare needs in the U.S. We then utilize these findings to consider the ethical and policy considerations of alterations in healthcare provision during pandemics and crisis events in the U.K. and U.S. and make recommendations regarding how the needs of CSHCN should be considered during future responses. (shrink)

Key Enlightenment minds are often juxtaposed with their iconic foes, religious conservatives. When discussing the subject of women’s rights, however, this comparison creates a false impression that Enlightenment male thinkers held ideas very much opposed to a dogmatic institution such as the Catholic Church. Ironically, and damaging to their legacy of prejudice-free rationalism, nearly all of the philosophes, many of whom were “freethinking” atheists, viewed woman’s intellectual nature and societal purpose through a prejudice-tainted glass, not unlike the most conservative establishments (...) of their time. Indeed, when it came to the perception of women, the philosophes had less in common with a virulently secular feminist such as Nicholas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, than they do with modern conservative Christians who believe women should be treated more fairly, but still cling to gender stereotypes. (shrink)

In his most recent work on John Dewey, John Shook explores Dewey’s political thought in order to illuminate Dewey’s conception of democracy and demonstrate the interlocking quality of his democratic and educational theories. As the book’s subtitle indicates, Shook sees democracy and education as inseparable enterprises for Dewey, with democracy being fundamentally defined by the continuous education of individuals, and with specifically educational spaces serving to directly promote this definitive purpose of democracy. The particular educational goal that Shook identifies in (...) Dewey’s thought is the cultivation of “social intelligence,” a quality that allows individuals to effectively engage.. (shrink)

This paper describes the approach that Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility uses to advise and influence government policymakers at the local, state, and federal levels. It analyzes why CPSR - a relatively small organization - has enjoyed a fair amount of success in influencing policy. It also describes a recurring pattern that applies to CPSR's involvement in policymaking, using as an example CPSR's involvement in policymaking on the Calling Number Identification telephone service. An appendix lists situations in which CPSR has (...) directly advised policymakers. (shrink)

This article argues that the testimony of mystics provides an interesting potential source of evidence fortheism. The model of inference to the best explanation is utilized to analyze and assess mystics’ testimony.It is argued that the evidential value of the reports from mystics, both within the theistic tradition and fromwithout, ultimately proves weak.