By themselves, mesencephalic subcortical mechanisms provide a preattentive kind of consciousness, related to stimulus-related, short-latency dopamine release triggered by collicular input. Elaborate forms of consciousness, containing identifiable objects (visual, auditory, tactile, or chemical), imply longer-lasting phenomena that depend on the activation of prosencephalic networks. Nevertheless, the maintenance of these higher-level networks strongly depends on long-lasting mesencephalic dopamine release. (Published Online May 1 2007).

Are properties universal or particular? According to Universalism, properties are universals because there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the connections between the notions of the fundamental tie and universality and particularity. I argue, (...) first, that universality and particularity can characterize a property if and only if there is a universalist or a particularist fundamental tie, and, second, that it is unclear that these should be the fundamental ties that connect ordinary and scientific properties to their respective bearers. Then I develop an alternative approach to properties and the fundamental tie, which is neutralist because it dispenses with universality and particularity as features of properties, and naturalist because it naturalizes the possession of properties by replacing metaphysical fundamental ties with a scientific one, in particular, a physical process. I show how this approach improves our understanding of properties and instantiation. (shrink)

Is structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. Realism about structure claims that the question of ontology is about the fundamental and indispensable structure of the world. In this paper, I present a criticism of the metaphysics of realism about structure based on a version of Russell’s famous regress argument against (...) nominalism [Russell 1911. “On the Relation of Universals and Particular.” In Logic & Knowledge. Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin]. First, I argue that the three general tests for the fundamentality of structure proposed by realism about structure rely on a particular empirical test for structure, namely, the so-called ‘similarity test for structure.’ Second, I argue that the similarity test is not well-founded because it leads to a vicious regress. Third, I argue that the regress affects the whole metaphysics of realism about structure, and that no structural notion can be said to be fundamental in connection with any of the other tests. Lastly, I argue that the question of ontology as a question about structure is not substantive. (shrink)

Categories play a major role in contemporary metaphysics. They have not only been invoked in a number of philosophical theories but are themselves objects of epistemological and metaphysical scrutiny. In this article, we will discuss the following questions: How do we know when something belongs to a certain category? Is there a fundamental category of the world? Can we give a satisfactory account of the number of categories and the completeness of systems of categories? Are categories the genuine subjects of (...) ontology? (shrink)

What is the so-called “question of ontology?” Is the question of ontology genuinely a question about “categories” (Lowe 2006), “structure” (Sider 2011), “existence” (Thomasson 2015), or rather “reality” (Fine 2009)? In this article, I defend the neo-Sellarsian approach to the question of ontology, a novel, naturalistic approach according to which the foundational question of ontology is about “understanding the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their multiple relationships.” First, I argue for the thesis of Impure Eliminativism, a (...) form of constructive pluralism about the question of ontology by which the substantivity of questions of ontology which are not the neo-Sellarsian one is to be built upon certain relations with the neo-Sellarsian question of ontology. Second, I argue for the categorial plasticity of the two images and their relations in connection with the hypothesis of Weak Epistemic Factualism. Third, and lastly, I argue for a person-based ontology framed in terms of the crucial notions of “fact” and “understanding” in response to the eliminativist categorizations of the two images and their relationships proposed by substantialism and structuralism. (shrink)

1. Categories and the Scientific Turn of Metaphysics: The Notion of World-Fundamentality What are the fundamental inhabitants of the world? This question, as old as it is new, is about the fundamental structure of our world. Is our world a world of Aristotle's ordinary substances, Locke's physical substances, Husserl's wholes, Wittgenstein's facts, Sellars's processes, or Quine's sets? In order to distinguish the sort of metaphysical fundamentality at stake in this discussion from other possible types of fundamentality, I shall call it (...) from now on "world-fundamentality." In this article I want to make a proposal in the context of this metaphysical dispute. The proposal is the addition of a new criterion of world-fundamentality to the existing catalog of independence and simplicity, among some other prominent classical examples. I call this criterion "the materialist criterion of world-fundamentality" because it states that metaphysicians should not decide the question of whether our world is a world of facts rather than a world of sets or other categories without considering the explanatory power of such categories to account for the relation between "the manifest image" and "the scientific image," to use the words of Wilfrid Sellars. (shrink)

This article defends a selective eliminativist position with respect to the concept of “biological lineage” as used in certain areas of contemporary evolutionary biology. We argue that its primary epistemic roles in these contexts—explaining social evolution and cumulative selection—clash with empirical evidence, and that enforcing the concept of “lineage” even obstructs fruitful research avenues in several biological research fields, including phylogenetic research. Drawing on this, we suggest that, in many instances, it would be best to get rid of the concept (...) of “lineage” and think in terms that are more closely aligned with the empirical complexity of the biological world. Specifically, this entails that, instead of looking for the lineage that may have given rise to the entities possessing certain biological characteristics, biologists should generally look for any potential process allowing such possession, with the formation of a lineage just one possibility among many. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction.

The aim of this paper is to offer two novel solutions to two perennial problems of categorial ontology, namely, the problem of the categorial structure: how are the categories related to one another? And the problem of categorial completeness: how is the completeness of a proposed list of categories justified? First, I argue that a system of categories should have a structure such that there is a most basic category that is a bearer of all other categories and that has (...) what I shall call “combinatorial conditions”. To do so, I compare this approach to categorial structure with the approaches given by substantialist, mereological, factualist, and geo ontologies. Second, I argue that the problem of categorial completeness is only a problem for certain ontologies. In this connection, I explore views on categorial completeness proposed by substantialists and geo-ontologists. Lastly, I conclude that factualism does a better job of accounting for categorial structure and categorial completeness than other categorial ontologies. (shrink)

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, (...) 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way. (shrink)

In futsal there are two referees on the playing court and their capacity to respond to physical and physiological demands imposed during the game is essential for the success. The futsal characteristics such as size pitch, referees position and rules of games or type of league could impose specific physical efforts probably. The aim of this study were to analyze the physical demands of eight elite referees from seven matches of Spanish Futsal Cup 2020. The physical activity of each referee (...) during the match was monitored with a Local Positioning System, which was installed on futsal pitch where the matches were played. The data differences were evaluated as Paired-Samples T-Test procedure. The results revealed a similar total distance between halves. The zone 3 distance showed a significative decrease during the match in comparison to the first and second halves. The number of high-intensity acceleration and deceleration decreased in the second half of the match. Therefore, the use of the tracking device to monitoring physical performance provides knowledge of the specific activity profile from futsal referees. This information to can be useful to design more accurate the training programs. (shrink)

The Sellarsian task of ontology is to reconcile two seemingly divergent images of ordinary objects such as persons, tomatoes and tables, namely, the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image provided by fundamental physics (Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963). Can the genuine categories of the ontologies of Substantialism (Heil, The World as We Find It, 2012), Structural Realism (Ladyman and Ross,Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 2007; French, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, 2014), and (...) Factualism (Cumpa, ‘A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2014), such as ‘substance’, ‘structure’, and ‘fact’, help us to solve the problem of the reconciliation of the two images of ordinary objects? In this paper I defend the thesis that the ontology of Factualism does a better job of reconciling the manifest and the scientific images of ordinary objects than other ontologies. (shrink)

Consider two similarity facts: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G. According to the Platonist approach to similarity, the analysis of such facts forces us to admit that similarity facts are to be analyzed into facts about universal similarities of the form: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G, where similarity is a universal. In this paper, (...) I defend Neutralism, a view according to which there are properties and similarities, but these are not universals, particulars, or of other categories. After presenting the Platonist analysis of similarity proposed by Russell and Grossmann, I examine the question of whether or not the Platonist analysis of similarity leads us inevitably to a conception of similarity as a universal. Then I offer a novel, alternative analysis of similarity free of commitment to universals. (shrink)

This volume is about ontological categories. The categories of an ontology are designed to classify all existents. They are crucial and characterize an ontology.

El espacio ultraterrestre es cada vez más relevante para la conducción de las operaciones militares. Este artículo contextualiza la importancia que le conceden Estados Unidos, China, Rusia e India en el marco de las teorías estratégicas del poder espacial y en los nuevos conceptos militares relacionados con las operaciones en todos los dominios.

Recesión de D. Blanco Fernández, Principios de filosofía política, Editorial Síntesis, Madrid, 2000.

The facts and inferences exposed in this writing, and the arguments that support it, allow us to conclude that the «extension of the mind», opened during the evolutionary process, since always and today accelerated by the work of human intervention, in no case authorizes us to consider that the «extension of mind» has changed human nature, as we have always known it. Therefore, there is no justification to speak of transhumanism, as if a new man, a «transhuman», had appeared at (...) the moment of the Singularity, whose nature had undergone substantial changes in relation to the usual human nature. For this reason, we consider that we should continue speaking of an «extensive humanism». No more. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Thrasymachus’ Inmoralism, that is to say, of the set of judgements concerning the superior value of injustice in comparison with justice, issued by him in book I of Plato’s Republic. It is argued that both the argument in support of these judgements and its implicit resource to the concept of πλεονεξία cannot be interpreted descriptively, if they are to serve to justify the immoralists judgements. It is also argued that a particularly important subgroup of (...) such judgements is supported by a peculiar conception of practical reason based on the concept of πλεονεξία. Finally, the comparison is made between this ‘pleonexic’ conception of practical rationality and the one that Plato advocates in the Republic. (shrink)

Mereological Nominalism, as traditionally understood, states that properties are mereological wholes and that instantiation is mereological. Thus defined, this view faces a number of well-known issues, which make it virtually untenable. Recently, Effingham :160–185, 2020) has offered an alternative account of Mereological Nominalism, which intends to avoid these problems by accepting while rejecting. In this paper, we argue that this theory is not viable for two main reasons. First, it faces a threat of circularity. Second, the various non-mereological accounts of (...) instantiation envisioned by Effingham in order to replace seem inconsistent with. (shrink)

Esta investigación analiza la interpretación hegeliana de América. Por un lado, mostraremos su carácter más problemático, al reducir toda actividad del hombre americano como parte de la categoría «culturas naturales», aun cuando se registraron noticias de las civilizaciones azteca e inca. Por otro lado, también se revalorará a las civilizaciones aludidas, especialmente la andina, teniendo en cuenta la concepción hegeliana de la historia. Dicha reconsideración encuentra suficiente sustento para afirmar, contrario a lo propuesto por Hegel, que los incas fueron un (...) imperio, o, en otras palabras, una civilización semejante a las que existieron en Asia, África y Europa. Asimismo, se muestra que en el territorio andino se desplegó un espíritu propio, impulsando el desarrollo de los diferentes pueblos; a su vez, alcanzado su máxima expresión en el imperio de los incas o Tawantinsuyu. (shrink)

Different studies show the relevance of Emotional Intelligence (EI) to the development of the work conducted by civil engineers in terms of their satisfaction and well-being, and also their individual and collective performance regarding good organisational results (Larson et al., 2015; Rezvani et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020). The purpose of this present work is to analyse the relation between the emotional intelligence of civil engineers in Spain and their degree of professional satisfaction, as well as to determine the (...) existence of any differences in the variables studied according to their gender and years of experience. The focus of the methodology is both quantitative and exploratory, together with descriptive and correlational analyses involving a survey conducted with 248 Civil Engineers. The main results show that a positive and significant relation exists between the emotional intelligence of those participating in the survey and their degree of professional satisfaction, and furthermore that significant differences exist in this level of satisfaction in terms of their years of experience. These results endorse the relevance that the EI competencies have for the development of Civil Engineering, both for those who practice this profession and for the organisations where they work, as well as the impact this work may have on the social systems involved. (shrink)

In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics (...) emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim. (shrink)

La noción de intimidad tiene diversos orígenes y acepciones. En la tradición filosófica, Séneca, Agustín de Hipona, Lutero, Pascal, Descartes, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Mill, Freud, Ortega y Zambrano concibieron la intimidad desde diferentes enfoques. Esta contribución dedica especial atención a Ortega y Gasset, porque vinculó ensimismamiento y técnica. Asimismo afirma una intimidad voluntariamente compartida que se desarrolla mediante relaciones íntimas en red. Sin embargo, algunos sistemas tecnológicos amenazan la intimidad. Es el caso de la inteligencia artificial promovida por el transhumanismo, (...) que surgió con el programa NBIC (nano-bio-info-cogno, NSF 2001). Transhumanistas tecnocientíficos de gran influencia mundial, como Harari, han defendido ideas particularmente peligrosas para la intimidad de las personas. Para combatir esas amenazas se requiere promover una intimidad compartida y en red. Asimismo hay que desarrollar la noción de tecnopersona, reinvindicando el derecho a la intimidad de las tecnopersonas en el mundo digital. (shrink)

El sistema tecnológico TIC (tecnologías de la información y la comunicación) genera el espacio electrónico, los objetos digitales y una memoria distribuida. El desarrollo en la sociedad de la información implica el problema estructural de preservar esa memoria digital, en particular los objetos “de origen digital”, que sólo existen en red. Se analizan los principios promovidos por la UNESCO en su carta para la preservación de la memoria digital (2003) y se afirma que el patrimonio público debería ser conservado en (...) software libre, garantizando el acceso abierto y universal a esos nuevos bienes culturales. Asimismo se analiza el problema de la sostenibilidad del patrimonio digital, que corre el riesgo de desaparecer a causa del veloz ritmo de cambio tecnológico del sistema TIC. Ello da lugar a una nueva modalidad de brecha digital, la brecha mnemónica. (shrink)

In a letter of September 1679 to Huygens, Leibniz proposed a calculus situs directly applicable to geometric relations without use of magnitudes. His researehes on this kind of Geometric Calculus were developed along all his life but, unfortunately, only a few Leibniz’ s writings on these matters had been published by Gerhardt and Couturat. They were closely connected to his own researches on Logic Calculus. From a chronological point of view, the unpublished manuscript Circa Geometrica Generalia may be considered as (...) the third most important Leibniz’ contribution on Calculus Situs. CGG summarizes several results obtained by Leibniz from 1679 to 1682 and contains some interesting ideas concerning set theory, geometric axioms, General Topology and Logic Foundations of Geometry.En una carta a Huygens escrita en septiembre de 1679, Leibniz propuso un calculus situs que fuese aplicable al estudio directo de las relaciones geometricas, sin utilizar magnitudes. Sus investigaciones en torno a los Cálculos Geometricos continuaron a lo largo de toda su vida, pero, lamentablemente, Gerhardt y Couturat sólo publicaron una pequeña parte de sus manuscritos sobre estos temas. Estasinvestigaciones estuvieron estrechamente conectadas con los trabajos de Leibniz sobre Cálculos Lógicos. El manuscrito inédito Circa Geometrica Generalia puede ser considerado, desde un punto de vista cronológico, como la tercera más importante contribución de Leibniz al Calculus Situs. En CGG Leibniz resume varios logros obtenidos desde 1679 hasta 1682 y expone ideas interesantes en relación con la Teoría de Conjuntos, los axiomas de la geometria, la Topologia General y los fundamentos logicos de la Geometría. (shrink)

Este artículo describe los cambios experimentados por la filosofía de la ciencia durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Parte del positivismo lógico y comenta el giro naturalista, el giro historicista, el giro cognitivo y la concepción CTS de la ciencia y la tecnología. Se afirma que una filosofía del conocimiento científico no es suficiente para analizar y reconstruir la tecnociencia contemporánea, que difiere en muchos aspectos de la ciencia moderna. Como conclusión, se propone una filosofía de la práctica científica (...) y tecnocientífica, que vincule estrechamente la filosofía de la ciencia y de la tecnología. (shrink)

Las nanotecnologias y los programas Converging Technologies (CT) plantean importantes desafíos a la gobernanza de la ciencia y la tecnología, al desarrollarse en un sistema transnacional de l+D+i con una pluralidad de agentes que compiten y cooperan entre sí, y que tienen intereses y objetivos diversos. Integrar esa pluralidad de agencias tecnocientíficas y fijar las prioridades de los diversos programas CT es el principal problema. Tras comparar los programas norteamericano (NBIC) y europeo (CTEKS), este artículo analiza sus principales puntos comunes, (...) pero también sus diferencias, que son significativas. Se afirma que las nanociencias y las nanotecnologias constituyen uno de los grandes ejemplos de tecnociencia contemporánea, y se distingue la tecnociencia de la ciencia porque en el primer caso el conocimiento científico es un medio para el logro de otros objetivos (sociales, políticos, económicos, militares, etc.), no un fin en sí mismo. Además de proponer una hipótesis filosófica general, la colonización e industrialización de los nanocosmos, se utiliza la noción de agenda científica como herramienta para analizar y caracterizar los diversos modelos de gobernanza actualmente existentes. (shrink)