This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...) a buck-passing fashion (§II). The second are the buck-passing analyses of good for proposed by John Skorupski (§III), Henry Sidgwick (§IV), and Stephen Darwall (§V). Along the way the paper shows that Michael Smith’s and Peter Railton’s analyses of other concepts—analyses that could be (and have been) taken to be analyses of good for —are similarly unsuitable as analyses of it. The paper concludes by suggesting that the fact that none of the buck-passing accounts of good for considered here is satisfactory, coupled with an appreciation of the various problems that a buck-passing analysis of good for would have to avoid, suggests that we should be sceptical about the prospects of finding such an analysis and should look for one of a different type. (shrink)

the philebus is a puzzling dialogue, both for the substantive views it puts forward,1 and for the unexpected twists and turns of the discussion. Commentators frequently complain about the dialogue's lack of unity, due to its many apparently unnecessary digressions and interruptions.2 The discussion of the so-called 'divine method' seems to be one of the worst offenders on this score, for it is described and exemplified at length, only to be set aside as unnecessary shortly afterwards.I argue that the divine (...) method plays a vital role in the subsequent examination and evaluation of pleasure and knowledge. I focus in particular on the application of the divine method to pleasure, since the method is... (shrink)

Understanding contemporary environments in the laboratory and elsewhere requires grappling conceptually with multiple, coexisting, nonconforming infrastructures which actors engage at the same time. In this article, I develop the analytical vocabulary of “seams” for studying heterogeneous, multi-infrastructural environments. Drawing upon six years of ethnographic fieldwork with two distributed science teams, as well as studies in Ubiquitous Computing, I examine overlaps among infrastructures and how actors work creatively with and across their seams. Rather than suggesting that actors are hemmed in or (...) incapacitated by multiple infrastructural commitments, inclusions, and exclusions, I show instead how they work artfully to align them in ways concordant with membership and how this produces both consequences for their work and opportunities for analysis. (shrink)

The contributors to this issue focus on legal internationalism, including hybrid mixes with nationalist forms. They have provoked us as editors to think more about these sites and forms of engagement. Sankey shows how civic participation in the ECCC has played a key role in surfacing the gendered harms of separation and starvation. Turan highlights the problems with ICC exclusion of the experience of men and boys from sexual violence. Peroni expresses her hesitations over the Istanbul Convention given an association (...) between assumed vulnerability and migrant women, while admiring its uncoupling of violence and culture. Cruz’s interview with Wendy Brown contextualizes and expands on these themes as they consider, with other participants, the future of feminist theory in the context of neo-liberal capturing of rights and legal space. Thinking more about internationalism and commitment in this context also helps us hold a mirror up to ourselves as we reflect more critically on our own naming of FLS as an ‘international’ journal. Together these contributions, and the reviews of new work, play a role in fleshing out an editorial commitment to enacting the journal as a living thing that ‘hangs together somehow’ even as it is known differently in different places. (shrink)

In the theory of rights we repeatedly encounter the problem of reconciling someone’s having a right, with his properly suffering damage to the interest protected by the right. In the case of right to life, we have to assess numerous cases in which individuals are killed or allowed to die, and yet we wish nonetheless to affirm their right to life. These cases include killing an aggressor in self-defense, accidental homicide, terminating life-sustaining therapy, and capital punishment.

This book, first published in 1975, is an examination of the theoretical foundation of the sociology of art and literature and an in-depth study in the sociology of knowledge. In discussing and clarifying some of the important philosophical issues in this field, the constant underlying reference is to the creative and artistic-expressive areas of knowledge ¿ so that the better understanding of the social nature and genesis of all knowledge may point the way towards a similar comprehension of art and (...) society. (shrink)

Professor W. B. Anderson'S paper ‘Livy and the Lexica’ in C.Q. XXV., 1931, pp. 38–48, prompts me to put together from my notes this further list of words and idioms used by Livy but not recorded in the lexica as Livian. With one or two clearly indicated exceptions, I have included nothing which is given in Lewis and Short, Forcellini-Corradini-Perin or Georges, and I have included nothing in which Mr. Anderson has anticipated me, except that in a few places I (...) have added to the citations he gives; but my citations make no more claim to be exhaustive than his do. I have given within parentheses the authors who are cited by the lexica for a particular word or use, but I have refrained from adding other authorities. (shrink)

Apollodorus' Bibliotheca is often used, though little studied. Like any author, however, Apollodorus has his own aims. As scholars have noticed, he does not include any discussion of Rome and rarely mentions Italy, an absence they link to tendencies of the Second Sophistic, during which period he was writing. I refine this view by exploring the nature of Apollodorus' project as a whole, showing that he creates a system of genealogies that connects Greece with other places and peoples of the (...) ancient world, specifically the Near East. The nature of the Bibliotheca allows us to see these myths as a closed system, in which these genealogical connections depend upon the perceived importance of these peoples; e.g. the Persians have more connections with the Greeks than the Molossians do. It is from this system that Apollodorus excludes Rome, thereby denying the Romans any genealogical connections with the Greeks and thus marking them as being of little importance. The consciousness of Apollodorus' decisions is clear from the many opportunities he had to include Rome and the fact that his sources contained myths about Rome or Italy. The Bibliotheca is a tendentious account of Greek myth with its own goals, and our knowledge of Apollodorus' aims must condition any use of this text. (shrink)

It seems worth while giving some account of this MS., because in recent years it has been said to contain certain pieces of the Moralia which it does not, and not to contain others which it does. At the foot of the first page of the text the MS. carries the pontifical shield with the arms of the Medici, and from this it is reasonable to suppose that there was a time when it belonged either to Leo X., who was (...) Pope from 1513 to 1521, or to Clement VII., who was Pope from 1523 to 1534. This being so, 1534 is established as the terminus ante quem of its writing. Towards the end of this century, about 1598, it was acquired by the Spanish Cardinal Saverio de Zelada. In 1801 the Cardinal Archbishop Antonio de Lorenzana bought in Rome a certain number of Greek and Oriental manuscripts which had formerly been in the collection of Cardinal Saverio de Zelada, and placed them in the Chapter Library at Toledo. Included with these was this MS. of the Moralia, which remains there to this day. (shrink)

Angus Fletcher is one of our finest theorists of the arts, the heir to I. A. Richards, Erich Auerbach, Northrop Frye. This, his grandest book since the groundbreaking Allegory of 1964, aims to open another field of study: how thought--the act, the experience of thinking--is represented in literature. Recognizing that the field of formal philosophy is only one demonstration of the uses of thought, Fletcher looks for the ways other languages (and their framing forms) serve the purpose of (...) certain thinking activities. What kinds of thinking accompany the writing of history? How does the gnomic sentence manage to represent some point of belief? The fresh insights Fletcher achieves at every turn suggest an anatomy of poetic and fictional strategies for representing thought--the hazards, the complications, the sufferings, the romance of thought. Fletcher's resources are large, and his step is sure. The reader samples his piercing vision of Milton's Satan, the original Thinker, leaving the pain of thinking as his legacy for mankind; Marvell's mysteriously haunting "green thought in a green shade"; Old Testament and Herodotus, Vico and Coleridge; Crane, Calvino, Stevens. Fletcher ranges over the heights of literature, poetry, music, and film, never losing sight of his central line of inquiry. He includes comments on the essential role of unclear, vague, and even irrational thinking to suggest that ideas often come alive as thoughts only in a process of considerable distress. In the end he gives us literature--not the content of thought, but its form, its shape, the fugitive colors taken on by the mind as represented in art. (shrink)

The postmodern rejection of essentialism does not mean that feminist theorists must abandon all categorizations of women. Indeed, while it is important to deconstruct identities and highlight the differences among women, we need to arrive at some notion of gender identity for political purposes. In paying careful attention to the distinction between nominal essences and real essences, the author shows that the category of women can be maintained without resorting to the problems of traditional essentialism. The author argues that the (...) marginalization of women is a product of culturally determined identities rather than ontological differences between men and women.Le refus postmoderne de l’essentialisme ne signifie pas que la théorie féministe doive abandonner toutes catégorisations de femmes. En effet, bien qu’il soit important de déconstruire les identités et mettre en valeur les différences parmi les femmes, il faut en arriver à une certaine notion d’identité sexuelle pour des raisons politiques. Se laissant guider par la distinction entre essences nominale et réelle,l’auteure montre que la catégorie de femme peut être maintenue tout en éludant les problèmes de l’essentialisme traditionnel. L’auteure soutient que la marginalisation des femmes est le produit d’identites determinées culturellement plutôt que de différences ontologiques entre hommes et femmes. (shrink)

The ‘return to beauty’ raises a number of questions for feminism. This paper begins by suggesting that there is no real reason for a feminist distrust either of beauty or of the discourses of beauty. The more difficult question is how to comprehend the bases of aesthetic judgement more generally, given feminist and other critiques of aesthetics and art criticism. The paper proposes looking at the cognate ‘value’ fields of ethics and political philosophy, in order to develop an approach to (...) aesthetics that recognizes aesthetic criteria as grounded in community. It has been argued that uncertainty is the necessary basis for morality and for political judgement after the demise of ideologies of universalism. For the same reasons, an ‘aesthetics of uncertainty’ can be developed which refuses both the new universalism of the ‘return to beauty’ and the temptation to abandon principled criteria of judgement. (shrink)

The concept of `the feminine' has generally been employed to denigrate the work of women artists. A central project of feminist art historians, therefore, has been to challenge the use of the term. This article argues instead that the term can be mobilized in a more productive way, to investigate the very constitution of discourses of gender and, in particular, the discursive production of modernism as itself `masculine'. Reading for `inscriptions in the feminine', as well as for tensions and contradictions (...) in `the masculine', allows for a critical practice which is based on interrogation rather than correction, and which refuses the idea of modernism as monolithic. The article approaches these questions about modern art through a discussion of gender and modernity and, in particular, through an exploration of the prospects of such a critique available in some of the writings of Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

The author reflects on her own experience as a congregational minister and in national and international positions of leadership, alongside working in Feminist Theology and the development of inclusive language in worship. As a minister and leader, she has found herself cast in a male role, and thus prevented from modeling women’s leadership in a way that might empower other women.

Hope is not passive or quietist. Despair is without energy, but hope springs out of, and gives power to life. Countless campaigners have found that hope involves struggle. Feminism shares the struggle with other liberation movements, but I want to argue that it has very specific characteristics as well. The struggle for liberation is political and sometimes physical; it is also ideological – a struggle with and for ideas, vision. All these, feminism shares with other great movements. But the struggle (...) for women to be free is existential in a way that almost no other can be. And it takes place in a broken context, constantly in need of reinventing itself. I will draw on a number of liberation movements, and also on the long history of women’s struggle to be free and powerful. (shrink)

This commentary is in agreement with the thrust of Koehler's target article. The issue I deal with is whether a Bayesian framework represents an adequate general normative framework for deciding the rationality of lay judgments, even when it can be unambiguously applied.

Americans believe in the criminal jury as a vehicle of democratic participation as well as a bulwark against state oppression. Racial and gender discrimination poses a threat to the ideal of democratic participation. The vehicle for discrimination is the use of peremptory challenges against candidates for the jury. Since 1986 the Supreme Court has tried to work out rules restricting the use of peremptory challenges. One problem has been the extending application of the principle of non-discrimination to tactical decisions by (...) defense counsel. Another has been the determination of the groups that will be protected under the principle of non-discrimination. The articles criticizes the Supreme Court's ignoring the kind of considerations that motivate lawyers in picking a jury. In the end the conflict is one between egalitarian ambitions and protecting the liberty of the accused. Amerikaner sehen in Geschworenen sowohl Träger demokratischer Mitwirkung als auch ein Bollwerk gegen staatliche Unterdrükung. Diskriminierung in bezug auf Rasse oder Geschlecht stellt eine Bedrohung für das Ideal demokratischer Mitwirkung dar. Ein Einfallstor für Diskriminierung sind die "peremptory challenges" gegen Kandidaten für das Geschworenenamt, das ist das Recht u. a. der Verteidigung, solche Kandidaten ohne Angabe von Gründen rechtswirksam abzulehnen. Seit 1986 hat der Supreme Court versucht, Regeln zu entwickeln, die den Gebrauch der "peremptory challenges" einschränken. Dadurch entstehen Probleme. Ein Problem ergibt sich aus der zunehmenden Anwendung des Diskriminierungsverbots auf taktische Entscheidungen der Verteidigung, ein anderes aus der Bestimmung der Gruppen, die vom Diskriminierungsverbot geschützt sein sollen. Der vorliegende Beitrag kritisiert, daß der Supreme Court es nicht berücksichtigt, von welchen Überlegungen Anwälte sich bei der Auswahl von Geschworenen leiten lassen. Letztendlich handelt es sich um einen Zielkonflikt zwischen egalitären Bestrebungen und dem Versuch, die Rechte des Angeklagten zu sichern. (shrink)

Legalized gambling has all the hallmarks of a large-scale moral and social concern, yet, remarkably, philosophers have paid scarce attention to the moral issues surrounding this phenomenon. I believe that this neglect is unjustified. While much could be said about gambling in terms of its social impact, I offer an account on the moral status of gambling and avoid the temptation to give a “thin” account in simply categorizing gambling as “permissible” or “impermissible.” I attempt to assess its impact on (...) character and the moral life, felt in five closely interrelated ways. In particular, I will argue that gambling A) injures self-control, fosters moral incontinence, and indeed courts addiction; B) involves greed; C) shows a disregard for money that is incompatible with responsible care of one’s resources; D) cultivates indifference to others’ welfare; and E) represents a reckless assault on practical rationality, the faculty necessary for the moral life and the discharge of one’s responsibilities. (shrink)