Western civilization is over. So begins Jan Zwicky’s trenchant exploration of the root of global cultural and ecological collapse: a way of thinking that is also linked to some of the West’s most noted achievements. The Renaissance merged imperial enterprise with Islamic algebra and recently recovered Greek mathematics to precipitate mechanized industry and resource extraction; these in turn made possible the growth of capitalism, the military-industrial complex, and Big Technology. Despite its self-image as objective, Zwicky argues, the West’s style of (...) thought is not politically neutral, but intensely anthropocentric. It has led those who adopt it to regard the more-than-human world as nothing more than timber licences and drilling sites, where value is not recognized unless it is monetized. Oblivious to context and blind to big-picture thinking, it analyzes, mechanizes, digitizes, and systematizes, while rejecting empathy and compassion as distorting influences. Lyric comprehension, in Zwicky’s view, offers an alternative to this way of thinking, and she provides a wide range of examples. Once upon a Time in the West documents how a narrow epistemological style has left Western thought blind to critical features of reality, and how the terrifying consequences of that blinkered vision are now beginning to unfold. (shrink)

The paper discusses the impact of the thought of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) on several Polish emigré writers, including Józef Czapski and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, but first of all Czesław Miłosz (1911–2004) and Aleksander Wat (1900–1967). Miłosz’ approach oscillated between early fascination through an unjust rejection during the war, due to the “appropriation” of Brzozowski’s thought by the right wing publicists, to the new phase of fascination after the war, culminating in the publication of a book on Brzozowski ( A Man Among (...) Scorpions , 1962) and prolonged in several important articles till the very end of his life. Wat’s approach shifted from the communist practice of “overcoming” Brzozowski through the affirmation of his criticism and rejection of catholic obscurantism to the process of the internalization of the catholic faith. (shrink)

(1999). Freud's Metapsychology and the Culture of Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 29, Supplementary Volume 25: Civilization and Oppression, pp. 211-226.

As one of the earliest English religious reformers of the 1520s, William Tyndale sought to influence ecclesiological reform in England through a vernacular printing campaign. Beginning with an English translation of the New Testament, Tyndale extended European ecclesiological controversy into England by offering the English people a distinct and radical ecclesiology that was built upon “a congregation.” This study examines the body of Tyndale’s printed works to illuminate the variety of methodologies he developed and utilized to gain public consensus for (...) his understanding of congregation and church in hopes that lexical reform in English would initiate ecclesiological reform in England. Over time, and perhaps because of Thomas More’s criticisms, Tyndale found that the best way to appeal to the public was by lexical flexibility. Contrary to his historiographical reputation, Tyndale embraced the public’s traditional fondness for church so that he did not have to sacrifice his theological preference for congregation. (shrink)

In the early 1930s, Julien Benda provided one of the most uncompromising visions for a united Europe. In line with his rationalist universalism, Benda sought a continent that was cleansed of passion and particularism, and called on European intellectuals to act as a rationalist vanguard in constructing such a Europe. However, Benda fatefully wavered between polity-building strategies of reshaping and redirection. For the most part, Benda seemed to demand nothing less than a comprehensive reshaping of the moral and political psychology (...) of European citizens. However, his universalism faltered frequently, and he conceived of Europe rather as a large nation, in which the ‘passion for reason’ would come to dominate other passions. Such ambiguities - and failures to draw a clear line between normative ideals and the pragmatics of polity-building - persist in many present debates on European unification. (shrink)

Most books defending the position now know as “libertarianism”, the thesis that government ought to confine itself only to the most minimal functions of preventing or punishing force and fraud, can be dismissed with little scruple as the work of cranks. And some have already done so with this one as well: but wrongly. It is clearly the work of a person of extraordinary brilliance, penetration, and learning, possessed of a pungent style and an uncommon flair for paradox and counterexample. (...) Those who are inclined to reject it out of hand because its conclusions will seem incredible might also bear in mind that its author is a man to whom his colleague John Rawls has expressed gratitude and indebtedness. At any rate, I propose to take the work with complete seriousness. And after all, should there not be considerable attraction i n the view that the only enforceable duty is that of respecting the freedom of our fellows as completely as possible? Surely it behooves us to see just why this will not do, if it won't; and no better opportunity for examining the view has arisen than that provided by the publication of this book. (shrink)

Where does domestic policy leave off and foreign policy begin? I point out that many domestic policies have major repercussions forother countries, some of them of a kind that are conducive to violence if not outright warfare. My examples are the drug laws, which create huge incentives for foreign criminals as well as domestic ones; concerns about “global warming” which are likely to impoverish many poor countries or prevent them from advancing; and the penchant for extensive government intervention in the (...) economy, which affects both directly and indirectly the progress of other countries. (shrink)

There are fourteen original papers in this substantial volume devoted to the general problem of the relation of Marxism, or at least Marxism as found in the works of Marx, and moral theory. The questions are, in Nielsen's words, “whether there should be or even could be a Marxist moral theory and if there could be a Marxist moral theory, what sort of a moral theory it should be”. Why does he not include the question what Marx's moral theory is? (...) For a few of these writers do think that Marx had some moral views that inform his writing, and attempt to say what they are. But Nielsen is justified in putting the questions they treat of in the way he does, for as is commonly known, Marx had no explicit, worked- out moral theory. So if one wishes to argue that he nevertheless has a morality or part of a morality, one has no alternative to attempting to infer it from what he does say. (shrink)

Professor Heath’s thesis that Canada is “The Efficient Society” has shock value. In contemplating our country, the image of efficiency is not the first one that comes to mind. But in this engagingly—indeed, breezily—written book, that is just what we are told. The claim is that we have discovered the virtues of good government, and other more hapless places such as the United States, have not. Contrary to what we might suppose, government is efficient! The idea certainly tickles the intellect, (...) as does Professor Heath’s working-out of it. (shrink)

This is the age of the welfare state. The general assumption is that something is amiss if governments do not provide benefits to its people. Since these benefits are funded by coercive taxation, this implies that those who are taxed are morally required to pay for benefits for others. This paper argues that this assumption is mistaken. Like the founders of the American republic, I argue that government should protect individual liberty, not provide benefits to the needy.

This book interprets and reflects on the conception of God that is implied by the Lord’s Prayer. It explains the epistemic status and ontological implications of the Christian faith in God and proposes a non-essentialist account of central identity-defining attributes of God.

No detailed description available for "Theory of the Linguistic Sign".

The paper deals with the ontological questions related to tradition, especially focusing on Gadamer and Dilthey. It is argued that tradition should be regarded not that much as a limitation, but rather as an enabling finitude that gives access to reality. This ontological structure concerns several aspects of human existence, nomothetic science included. Historical background thus has an ontological impact that surpasses objectivistic approaches. A short discussion of causality in natural science traces the genealogy of the causal scheme and compares (...) the notion of effect with the Wirkung in the sense of effective history. In this context the difference between the modern scientific concept of nature and the natura of the elder tradition appears to be important in order to understand the specificity of Diltheyan philosophy of life. There seems to be a complementary relation between hermeneutics and philosophy of life insofar as both currents are trying to reinstall the modern subject in reality, Gadamers main concern being the historical incarnation in a process, profoundly marked by language and Dilthey still trying to save part of nature in history. These two aspects can be regarded as almost direct answers to the inverse Cartesian tendency to liberate the subject from its history and from its bodily nature. Experience and lived experience thus seem less contradictory than some passages in Gadamers Truth and Method would suggest. (shrink)

Monografie interpretuje a hodnotí pouze jeden rys Aristotelova učení, filosofii přírody, zejména ontologický problém pohybu. Tento problém sleduje od předsokratovských myslitelů až do doby, kdy Hegel obnovil původní.

Von der Auffassung des Raumes bei Kant ausgehend, entwickelt der Autor einige Motive der Erwagungen Finks uber die Welt. Das Raumganze geht notwendig allen konkreten Beschrankungen voraus, die Beschrankung als solche gehort jedoch zum Ganzen mit derselben Notwendigkeit. Dieses Ganze bildet gemeinsam mit der Zeitdimension eine Fuge, die allem Einzelnen die Stelle und Weile seines Aufenthalts gewahrt. Das Seiende erscheint auf dem Hintergrund dieser Fuge, die selbst keine Gestalt, welche in Erscheinung treten konnte, sondern herrschendes Gesetz des Erscheinens und Wiedersinkens (...) des Seienden in die Verborgenheit ist. In dieser "Phanomenologie des Weltganzen" nimmt der Mensch eine Sonderstellung ein: er ist eins der zufalligen Seienden und zugleich ein Zentrum, dem alles, einschliesslich des Notwendigen, erscheint. Im Rahmen des gesamten Erscheinens gibt es also noch einen anderen Typ des Erscheinens, der in der Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz grundet; das Weltganze wird einerseits fur diese Existenzbewegung zur Heimat, andererseits gewinnt es in ihr Transparenz und Verstandlichkeit. (shrink)

In this contribution, I deal firstly with the problem of whether ‘religion’ can actually be defined. My answer is twofold. Firstly, that such a definition must indeed be deemed to be extremely un-like¬ly, if not downright impossible. Secondly, however, that definition also has more modest uses which may turn definitions of religion, that have shed this universalist ambition, into quite useful tools in the academic study of religions. In the second section, I shall address the question of why, if a (...) definition of religion turned out to be merely a useful research tool, one should bother to define ‘religion’ at all. My answer will be that one may indeed well dispense with it, but that, despite its very modest usefulness, it would still be unwise to do so. In my third section, I shall discuss these modest uses of definitions of religion, as well as their strategic implications. In the fourth and last section, I shall discuss the operational, or instrumental, definition of ‘religion’ which I have developed for my particular line of studies as an illustration of the pur¬poses which a definition of religion may serve in the academic study of religions. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the concept of adaptive rationality. I present a simple model of ecology and the set of decision rules. The basic structure of the process of cognitive adaptation to ecology is described as a structure comprising perceptual space, a function valuating perceived items, a set of available decision rules and the adaptation process - identification and selection of the best strategies in given ecological conditions. The presented model of ecosystem allows a conclusion that completely opposite strategies (...) may be compatible with the assumption of adaptive rationality. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the human dimension of technology-enhanced learning; many suppositions are made about this but the amount of attention it has been given relative to that paid to technology is quite limited. It is argued that an aspect of the question that deserves more attention than it has received in the work on the application of technologies to education is epistemology on the grounds that the nature of knowledge and the general character of mind are critically important. (...) As regards epistemology this paper draws on recent developments in philosophy by John McDowell and Robert Brandom that deal with the relation of mind to world and the nature of experience. From McDowell it draws on the idea of second nature and particularly the argument that human beings acquire their cognitive capacities by initiation into language and tradition. From Brandom it draws on the idea that humans stand apart from animals and machines in that they respond to reasons as well as to causes. It is argued that the implication of these ideas for education differ radically from the pedagogic models that underpin much work on technology-enhanced learning where the suppositions about experience are quite different. Indeed the nature of knowledge is usually presumed rather than examined and often what is taken for granted is awareness as a conceptually unmediated response to the world. These questions are raised in the context of so far disappointing results of the use of technologies to enhance learning. (shrink)

We prove that any left-ordered inp-minimal group is abelian and we provide an example of a non-abelian left-ordered group of dp-rank 2. Furthermore, we establish a necessary condition for a group to have finite burden involving normalizers of definable sets, reminiscent of other chain conditions for stable groups.