This article offers a comprehensive review of the major theoretical issues and findings of the epistemic approaches to deliberative democracy. Section 2 surveys the norms and ideals of deliberative democracy in relation to deliberation's ability to “track the truth.” Section 3 examines the conditions under which deliberative mini‐publics can “track the truth.” Section 4 discusses how “truth‐tracking” deliberative democracy is possible through the division of epistemic labor in a deliberative system.

Value alignment is essential for ensuring that AI systems act in ways that are consistent with human values. Existing approaches, such as reinforcement learning with human feedback and constitutional AI, however, exhibit power asymmetries and lack transparency. These “authoritarian” approaches fail to adequately accommodate a broad array of human opinions, raising concerns about whose values are being prioritized. In response, we introduce the Dynamic Value Alignment approach, theoretically grounded in the principles of parallel constraint satisfaction, which models moral reasoning as (...) a dynamic process that balances multiple value principles. Our approach also enhances users’ moral and epistemic agency by granting users greater control over the values that influence AI behavior. As a more user-centric, transparent, and participatory framework for AI ethics, our approach not only addresses the democratic deficits inherent in current practices but also ensures that AI systems are flexibly aligned with a diverse array of human values. (shrink)

Today, long before a child is born, its growth is monitored and measured against norms of foetal development. At birth, each child is weighed, measured and tested to assess its development. We have a wealth of scientific knowledge which tells us precisely what each child should typically achieve by a prescribed age. The ideas of development and normalcy form the overarching principle by which we now think about children. Why? Because it is the truth about children that they are developing (...) beings. ;That the child is a developing being might seem to be a timeless truth, because, to put it starkly, have children not always been children? Yet I argue that the idea of the child as a developing being is surprisingly recent, barely 150 years old, a product of momentous social transformations in the nineteenth century. In this short period, developmental thinking, with its idea of appropriate norms, has come to determine innumerable practices concerning children in Western culture. Through these practices, we mould the very being of children according to the 'natural' laws of development. ;This essay traces developmental thinking about children. It attempts a philosophical analysis of the present way of reasoning about, interacting with and bringing up children by using a structural account of the historical events that produce our present ways of thinking and doing. My investigation raises philosophical issues about the relationship between epistemology and ontology, ones not usually examined in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy. I argue that the knowledge we have about children as developing creatures not only moulds the being of children but also that of their parents, especially their mothers. Such knowledge determines what is permissible, what mothers can or cannot do; such knowledge constitutes them as mothers. The interrelation between knowledge about ourselves and the kinds of being we are--between epistemology and ontology--demands critical reflection, theoretically and concretely, because of its tremendous effects upon people's lives. A better understanding of the specific ways in which epistemology and ontology intersect may enable us to imagine other possibilities of being for ourselves. (shrink)

I will do two things in this paper. First, I examine the issue of construction in the social sciences by using “teenage pregnancy” as an example. Following Michel Foucault's genealogical studies, I show that new categories were constructed to study teenage pregnancies, but that the construction involved does not support an extreme theory of construction—a theory which allows of nothing like “reality”. Second, I study the interaction between the categories used in investigations of teenage pregnancies and those to whom such (...) categories are applied, namely the young mothers themselves. The interaction illustrates what Ian Hacking has described as a “looping effect” characteristic of categories used to study people and their behaviour. I claim that with teenage pregnancy, the looping effect is much more complex than Hacking suggests. (shrink)

The authors take up Amy Allen's suggestion that while Foucault's work may be able to support a certain type of self-critique and self-development, it does not permit the kind of interpersonal relations that are necessary for the development of intersubjective meaning in struggles against imposed identities. The authors contend that for Foucault, relations of ‘truth’ play an important constitutive role in subjectivities, and that understanding the ‘politics of ourselves’ in the context of this truth shows not only an openness to (...) meaningful interpersonal relations, but also that these relations are capable of generating the conceptual and normative resources necessary for resisting socially imposed subjectivities. The authors present such an account of intersubjective relations based on Foucault's discussion of parrhesia, and develop a model of collaborative political action that addresses the criticisms raised. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against Mark Bevir’s contention that Foucault is committed to reject autonomy but affirms agency. I argue that Bevir’s claim is extravagant, that (a) Foucault need not reject autonomy, and (b) the rejection of autonomy flies in the face of the emphasis Foucault placed on autonomy in his late work. Central to my argument is the distinction between autonomy as self-sufficiency and autonomy as self-rule. By deploying Harry Frankfurt’s structural account of identification, I show that Foucault’s (...) discussion of autonomy in his late work is best understood as self-rule. Such an interpretation has the virtue of not adopting the counter-intuitive view that Foucault is committed to reject autonomy. By way of conclusion, I explore how such a concept of autonomy as self-rule figures in Foucault’s project of self-formation in his late work. (shrink)

Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality: The Big Questions is a welcome addition to the crop of anthologies on “contemporary issues.” In the past, the tag “contemporary issues” meant abortion, pornography, euthanasia, affirmative action, and the other usual suspects. Anthology after anthology dealt with these same life-and-death issues, often reproducing the same articles. But that has changed in the last couple of years as interest in topics such as sexuality, gender, race, nationalism, and multiculturalism has reanimated the field.

Foucault’s critique of foundationalist thinking—the view that our knowledge of the world and of ourselves rests on a foundation of indubitable belief—is at the heart of Todd May’s discussion. May’s book is short but ambitious. In a scant 127 pages of text, he not only traces the development of Foucault’s project from the early “archæological” writings to the later “genealogical” and “ethical” works, but also defends Foucault against a charge of incoherence. This charge stems from the fact that Foucault tells (...) us that his various genealogical investigations are directed against “the idea of universal necessities in human existence”, such as Truth, Reason, Justice. But Foucault does not offer a “justification” of his brand of historicist critique of foundationalism, leaving room for his critics to argue that his project is incoherent because either it is itself foundationalist or it is a self-refuting relativism. May’s book seeks to address this criticism. It also has an extensive bibliography, which will be useful to those just beginning to read Foucault. (shrink)