Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

So much of Africana philosophical research and scholarship has focused on personal, anecdotal experiences to tell/disclose larger intellectual narratives of race, nation, history, time, and space.1 Yet the personal nature in which Africana philosophy articulates itself has often been seen as particular and not yet universal—in other words, not rightly or properly “philosophical.” But understood methodologically, the sort of introspection inherent in Africana philosophy becomes not only one way of “doing” philosophy but the grounding for philosophical insight.2 Kendrick Lamar’s (...) album good kid, m.A.A.d. city provides for us an example of such methodological insight, proper for “doing” philosophy.3In characterizing... (shrink)

ABSTRACT In characterizing his second studio album, good kid, m.A.A.d city, as a “short film” Kendrick Lamar offers something of a public declaration: We, the listening audience, are not hearing another hip-hop album, just another “autobiography” or slice of one person's life, but, rather, something else; we are hearing a mixture of social, cultural, and personal narrative truth in what will be termed “autoethnography.” In doing so, Lamar offers us a new way of thinking about hip-hop as a whole, (...) not simply as a capitalistic enterprise or as a “black news” channel but as a distinct method for collecting data and understanding the experiences and existence of black people. While autoethnography is not a new method for research, it has been underutilized in philosophy as an approach to reading “texts” of all sorts, in particular Africana texts. This article analyzes Kendrick Lamar's second album to demonstrate why autoethnography is important as both a way of understanding reality and an expression of reality and also why it is centrally important for “doing” Africana philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Texts and Icons in Heidegger’s Metaphysical TraditionMichael James Bennett (bio)[End Page 26]This essay is about texts that draw attention to themselves as texts, that is, as material, graphical figures, rather than as more or less efficiently pellucid semantic relays. In other words, it is about what happens when texts behave like images. In what follows I examine a series of philosophical contexts where this question appears to be (...) at issue. I claim that one way of understanding what’s going on in these contexts is that here the image-form of a text becomes a kind of icon. I begin by reflecting on a prejudice that belongs, according to Heidegger, to the “history of metaphysics”: the notion that it would be better, clearer, and less ambiguous to replace all reliance on images with self-effacing, transparent words. My goal here is to demonstrate the existence of an alternative historical trend that defends an opposite view. I compare a defense of iconography by Byzantine patriarch Nikephoros of Constantinople, as well as the Neoplatonist Porphyry’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, with works by two latter-day Heideggerians, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, who respond to the inherited problematic of non-referential, iconic texts. These responses suggest that non-semantic image-creation, as much as non-semantic verbal play, is the pre-conceptual condition of conceptuality. This essay presents a new way of understanding the philosophical issues that connect ancient and medieval discussions about icons and images with twentieth-century concerns about language.In her study of medieval European manuscript illumination, Animating the Letter (1999), Laura Kendrick emphasizes the non-semantic character of illuminated texts. Kendrick argues that the basic distinction between text and image is fundamentally at stake in illumination, and that the distinction is inherited from the Christian church fathers who opposed text and image, privileging the former and denigrating the latter. According to this traditional view, texts are better suited than images to a consideration of the divine on account of writing’s ethereal quality, its “transparency,” which leads the reader beyond the material sign to the immaterial concept. The problem with images, on the other hand, is their materiality, which may lead viewers down a dark path toward an ultimately heretical veneration for the mere image instead of for its referent. It seems to me that we find in Kendrick’s argument an exact homology with the discourse on the icon in the Byzantine Christian church. Emperor Constantine V, for instance, at the time of the “first iconoclast crisis” (the mid-eighth century CE), expresses wariness about the potentially heterodox metaphysics underpinning iconophilia. He objects to icons on the basis that their veneration would be acceptable only if the icon were to share the essence of that of which it is an icon (God), but that this is impossible; infinite divine nature cannot be encompassed within the finite line of human composition. The Byzantine iconophile’s response to this objection is not to deny the infinite, uncircumscribable nature of God, but to affirm that the icon, bound though it is to the register of images, nevertheless does not function in the same manner as an ordinary image. That is, the icon does not refer to its model by means of resemblance alone. In the language of Nikephoros of Constantinople (758–828 CE), the character of the icon consists in consubstantiality (homoousia) prior to resemblance (homoiōsis).1 [End Page 27]The problem of the limits of reference unites the discourse on the icon and the flourishing of the illuminated text. Just as the icon does not refer in the normal way to its referent, so Kendrick contends that the “animated letter” is not reducible to its pure semantic quality, is not to be understood as if it were just a kind of significative relay through which a sublime quantity of something called “meaning” is obliged to pass. “Meaning,” conceived of in what I am inclined to call the narrowly economic sense as the cargo of material vehicles called “words,” meaning that is gambled in words and then “cashed out” again, is not always what is at stake when one writes. Something else is... (shrink)

Some advocates of the doctrine of meticulous (“risk-free”) divine providence, in response to the charge that such a strong view of divine providence makes God the “author of evil,” have appealed to an authorial model according to which the relationship of God to his creation is analogous to that of a human author and his or her literary creation. This response appears vulnerable to the objection that there is a critical _disanalogy_ between the two kinds of authorship: in the case (...) of divine authorship, unlike that of human authorship, the story is _intentionally actualized_, and thus the divine author is morally culpable for the evils written into that story. Call this the “actuality objection.” In this paper, I develop a four-case defense of the authorial model that aims to neutralize the actuality objection. I also respond to five objections to the authorial model and my defense of it. (shrink)

In order to consider the question of whether empire is a subject for philosophy, I do three things. I sketch an original typology of three types of state, which I call polis, imperium and cosmopolis, in order to show that the second is an important philosophical conception which lies behind the terminology of empire and imperialism. I also consider modern theories of empire and imperialism in order to indicate some of their limitations as theories. And finally I indicate that it (...) is important even for philosophers to recognise that all imperial terminology emerges out of a very complicated history in which the concept of imperium has been extended and distorted in meaning, so that, at best, any good theory of empire or imperialism can only be some sort of recapitulation of that history. Neither the second nor the third of these claims undermines the claim of imperium to be a concept of the state which is of great political and philosophical significance. (shrink)

When people develop dementia, their ability to make important decisions recognized by law—such as to change an estate plan, make a large purchase, or get married or divorced—is increasingly comprom...

This article considers the contribution of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology to the scientific realism debate by thematizing the problem of dubitability. After first considering the rigorous standards for apodictic evidence in phenomenology, particularly in terms of the intuitive givenness of evidence, I consider how scientific theory is open, in principle, to doubt. I argue that phenomenology has both a critical and descriptive function for scientific theory: it clarifies what scientific theory can or cannot tell us about the world, both possibly and (...) necessarily; and it describes the meaningfulness that scientific theory can have for us in our experience of the world—that is, in the living flow of conscious experience that is indubitably real. As such, I explain how phenomenology can take scientific theory as a serious field of investigation. (shrink)

Values are missing from American politics. But should religion and government mix? A. James Reichley makes the provocative case that without a strong moral basis, American democracy is in trouble. The author's deep background in political theory and American Constitutional history allows him to propose practical steps for a constitutionally valid relationship between religion and public life. He surveys the seven major value systems currently competing for America's heart and soul and convincingly demonstrates that only one—what Reichley calls 'transcendent (...) idealism'—is the way to secure America's future. He then goes an extra step by pointing out examples of successful, morally-based public policies addressing critical social problems ranging from drug abuse to single parenthood to school choice. What's God got to do with good government? In The Values Connection, the answer is everything. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

2018 Reprint of the 1913 Edition. As a Man Thinketh was first published in 1903. In it, Allen describes how man is the creator and shaper of his destiny by the thoughts which he thinks. We rise and fall in exact accordance with the character of the thoughts which we entertain. Our environment is the result of the thoughts that we harbor and the behavior that our thoughts bring about. Part of the New Thought Movement, Allen reveals the secrets to (...) having the most fulfilling existence possible, guided by a proper understanding and appreciate of how thought shapes our lives. Allen advises on how to better manage our thoughts and how to direct them into more constructive behavior. Though written more than one hundred years ago, the language and resonance of this classic still hold up today, inviting each of us to reflect not on the world and others, but our own thoughts and how to regain their possession. The title for the essay comes from the Bible: "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," Proverbs, chapter 23, verse 7. In more than a century, As A Man Thinketh has become an inspirational classic, selling millions of copies worldwide and bringing faith, inspiration, and self- healing to all who have encountered it. (shrink)

Although T. H. Green is primarily remembered today as a moral and political philosopher, many of his philosophical concerns owe their origins to the Victorian crisis of faith in which a widespread belief in the literal truth of Scripture confronted seemingly incompatible scientific theories. Green attributed this crisis to the inability of science and religion to find accommodation in the popular version of empiricism widely accepted by educated men and women of his day. In his 371-page introduction to Hume’s Treatise, (...) Green argued that this philosophy was unacceptable, even on its own terms, and that it needed to be replaced with a new philosophy of life, one recognizing that both knowledge and human action are .. (shrink)

This is an Introduction to the special issue of Metaphilosophy entitled Philosophy as a Way of Life, giving a brief account of the genesis of the project, an overview of the topic, and a summary of the topics covered in the issue.

I. Introduction. In his recent book, On What There Must Be, Ross Harrison presents two arguments designed to show that in all possible worlds there are objects which exist unperceived. The modality of these two “refutations of idealism” makes them especially interesting. A philosopher might, after all, believe that there is more to this world than immaterial minds and their sensations and yet believe that a world of such entities is still possible.

Taking as a guiding theme his claim that “there are effluvia from all things that have come to be,” (DK B89), the author presents a reading of Empedocles that stresses the central role of effluvia in his natural philosophy. In presentations of Empedocles, the tradition has usually emphasized the importance of the elements—earth, air, water, fire, Love, and Strife. But as an alternative to that tradition, the author here argues that one must bring to the forefront the role of the (...) effluvia, which give to Empedocles’ cosmology a fluid, viscous character. The history of western natural science has been dominated by a mechanics of solid bodies following, however indirectly, in the tradition of the atoms and void of early Greek atomism. Empedocles represents a forgotten exception to that history, and the present paper attempts to return to his philosophy, unearth its fluid mechanical foundations, and present a challenging alternative to the dominant physical paradigm. (shrink)

I have been interested for quite some time in the relevance of reference to ontology. Another who has shown equal interest is W. V. Quine. Surprisingly, because of many other disagreements, there is a large area in which we agree about reference and ontology, namely, that there is some reason to think that both are “inscrutable.” Not so surprisingly, there is a crucial point where we disagree, namely, concerning the relativity of reference and ontology. Although it is not clear, it (...) seems that Quine holds that both reference and ontology are relative to what he calls a “background language” in a way that results in metaphysical questions, as I describe them, being senseless or meaningless. He argues for this relativity from inscrutability. I, however, explain it by postulating that ontological problems and certain referential problems are in a certain sense, “external.” In this paper I propose to lay out what I take to be the relevance of reference to ontological problems, show where Quine’s claims of inscrutability agree with my view, clarify Quine’s claims about relativity, and finally show that, given the inscrutability we both find acceptable, it is reasonable to reject the relativity only Quine accepts. (shrink)

In spite of various criticisms, both at the time of its publication and more recently, Newman’s The Arians of the Fourth Century can be recommended—indeed it offers a valuable critique of modern historical scholarship on Arianism.

In my comments on Mr. Pell’s paper, I consider the premises of his argument against diversity affirmative action showing how these premises can be either reasonably rejected or reformulated so that what remains from his argument is a set of premises that supports, or at least is consistent with, a defense of diversity affirmative action.

One well-known argument that it is morally impermissible to deploy strongly autonomous weapon systems in war comes from Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser. They argue that even if strongly autonomous weapon systems, once sufficiently technologically developed, are able to make moral decisions that are just as good as humans, deploying them in war is still morally impermissible because strongly autonomous weapon systems cannot act for the right reasons in deciding matters of life and death. In this short paper, (...) however, I argue that we have very good reason to think that Purves, Jenkins, and Strawser’s in principle argument against deploying strongly autonomous weapon systems in war is unsound. (shrink)

James McCosh considered his product of 'a labor of love', The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, From Hutcheson To Hamilton to fall within 'what may be regarded as a new department of science, the history of thought'.' The value of the book lies, therefore, in not just its outlines of works of philosophers of the period with the views afforded of the academic life most of them led; but its sense-albeit unsure-that 'the Scottish school of philosophy' (1) after its (...) rise evolved into something less distinctive, more commonplace philosophically. McCosh could not admit that the school had declined. Noting the change, he barely hints at why it happened. The explanation, it will be argued, involves the central place assigned to belief in the doctrines of the school, so is of current interest given the undue prominence belief continues to be accorded by philosophers. (shrink)

Among the distinguished contributors to the series are fellows of the Institute, past and present, Leonard E. Boyle, Jocelyn Hillgarth, Edouard Jeauneau, James K. McConica, M. Michèle Mulchahey, Joseph Owens, Walter H. Principe, James P. ...

A clear and compelling introduction to social phenomenology, this volume examines the experiential features of the basic things comprising our life-world.

We extend results of Bonet, Buss and Pitassi on Bondy’s Theorem and of Nozaki, Arai and Arai on Bollobás’ Theorem by proving that Frankl’s Theorem on the trace of sets has quasipolynomial size Frege proofs. For constant values of the parametert, we prove that Frankl’s Theorem has polynomial size AC0-Frege proofs from instances of the pigeonhole principle.