Both the psychology of perception and the philosophy of perception seem to show a new face when the process is considered at its own level, distinct from that of sensation. Unfamiliar conceptions in physics, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and phenomenology are required to clarify the separation and make it plausible. But there have been so many dead ends in the effort to solve the theoretical problems of perception that radical proposals may now be acceptable. Scientists are often more conservative than philosophers (...) of science. I end, therefore, as I began, with a plea for help. (shrink)

For centuries psychologists have been trying to explain how a man or an animal could perceive space. They have thought of space as having three dimensions and the difficulty was how an observer could see the third dimension. For depth, as Bishop Berkeley asserted at the outset of the New Theory of Vision (1709), “is a line endwise to the eye which projects only one point in the fund of the eye.” Space was its dimensions. It was empty save for (...) a collection of objects or bodies. For an observer, the objects were in different directions at various distances and the question was how these distances could be detected. For two hundred and fifty years we have tried to answer this question and failed. The explanations have been controversial, contradictory, and confused. (shrink)

The job of philosophy -- Truth: a very deceptive subject -- Epistemology: how do you know? -- Philosophy of religion: does God exist? -- Metaphysics: what is real? -- Moral and ethical theory: between right and wrong -- Social and political theory: freedom, politics, and society.

This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...) author suggests that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete visual system. When no constraints are put on the visual system, people look around, walk up to something interesting and move around it so as to see it from all sides, and go from one vista to another. That is natural vision—and what this book is about. (shrink)

Thomas Jefferson and Philosophy: Essays on the Philosophical Cast of Jefferson’s Writings is a collection of essays on topics that relate to philosophical aspects of Jefferson’s thinking over the years. Much historical insight is given to ground the various philosophical strands in Jefferson’s thought and writing on topics such as political philosophy, moral philosophy, slavery, republicanism, wall of separation, liberty, educational philosophy, and architecture.

For all its popularity as a psychological construct, willpower is irremediably polysemous. A more helpful construct is self-control, defined as the self-regulation of conflicting impulses. We show how the process model of self-control provides a principled framework for examining how undesirable impulses may be weakened and desirable impulses may be strengthened.

In Sensations of History, James J. Hodge argues that animation in new media art transforms historical experience in the digital age. Combining close textual analysis of experimental new media artworks with discussion of key phenomenological texts, Sensations of History argues for the broad critical significance of animation as we shift from analog to digital technologies. Hodge looks closely at animation aesthetics, which allow for a clear grasp of the ways digital technologies transform our sense of historical experience.

The overall conclusion which emerges from this study is that there is no sound defense for the view that indifference to others constitutes a reasonable policy of action. ;The purpose of the work is to advance a defense of the duty of the initial equal consideration of persons . Such a duty involves these things: that an agent is obligated to consider the likely ends of those persons directly affected by his action to the limits of his abilities; that he (...) is obligated initially to rank these ends on a par with his own; and, that he is obligated to use this consideration as a basis for his action. I seek to ground the defense of this duty upon a foundation suggested by examining the ethical theories of Hume, Kant, and the twentieth century personalist, Peter A. Bertocci. (shrink)

This article re-examines the anthropological scholarship of Sir Arthur Keith (1866–1955), who served as the president of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1914–1917), the Royal Anatomical Society (1918), and the British Association of the Advancement of Science (1927), who wrote prolifically on anatomy, evolution, and the idea of race. While most commonly associated with the Piltdown man hoax, Keith's contributions to the discipline were far greater and more complex. This essay specifically considers how Keith sought to problematize the concept of the (...) nation, considering the nation-state as an evolutionary unit. The first half of this essay examines Keith's theories on the mechanism of evolution (hormonal instincts) and how this informed his ideas of races and nations as evolutionary units. The second half of the essay considers how Keith deployed his ideas about evolutionary instincts, with the goal of advising Britons about how an evolutionary perspective would help understand, if not resolve, modern political challenges, both international and domestic, that faced the British Empire around the time of the First World War. (shrink)

Review of: Wood, Allen W., Kant and Religion, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2020, 250 pp. ISBN: 978-0521799980.

Not a day passes over society where the immediate expressions of violence are not widely propagated and subsequently witnessed through cultural or political mediums. Such depictions, accounts, scenes, have been uniquely framed as a lexis of ‘subjective violence’; reactions or evident illustrations of descent in physical form. Amidst their over-representation is a lapse of measured attention given to the pretext amounting to said outbursts. Seldom is the objective, if at all, contextualized as a catalytic toward the subjective. The following work (...) suggests that a violence exists amidst society that goes substantively under-analyzed thereby negating an ability to specifically address and, therefore, challenge its causality. While recognizing the importance of such research, a movement beyond affectual approaches of theorizing violence is needed through a complimentarily mapping of how distal relations of power influence, impact, and sustain enmity. What makes this discussion further dynamic is the ironic transparency of causation. Rather than a phenomenon of concealment, conventional dynamics of authority and influence exert control through, what could be argued to be, an invisibility of visibility. Supporting an addendum to theorizing violence may, then, enable a more holistic recognition that can assist an articulate response toward both subjective and objective expressions of violence. (shrink)

Ectogestation technology, when feasible, will permit fetal development within an artificial womb. Ectogestation is termed ectogenesis when it is full (gestation occurs exclusively within an artificial womb post in vitro fertilisation) or partial (artificial gestation occurs during the course of in vivo gestation, post a caesarean-like fetal transfer). In what follows, I explore the implications for the gestational versus moral parenthood debate recently spotlighted by Benjamin Lange1 for various alternative uses of ectogestation compared to the baseline case of in vivo (...) gestation. I contrast ectogestation in four different contexts with in vivo gestation followed by vaginal delivery. I document the relevant outcomes, burdens and harms in particular, to the gestating mother, the biological father, the fetus and the child into whom it will develop. The focus on harms in considering intraparental claims to parenthood follows Lange’s focal article1: importantly, however, I focus not on harms from separation from the gestational procreator (as in adoption cases) but instead on harms arising from the use of ectogestation in various forms. I note at the outset, how, for each case discussed below, I indicate opportunities for each biological parent to establish voluntarism-based claims to moral parenthood. In the analyses, except where specifically noted, the default implication is that it is …. (shrink)

Postnatal parent-infant physiological regulatory effects described in the previous paper (Part I) are viewed here as being biologically contiguous with events that occur prenatally, preparing and sensitizing the fetus to the average microenvironment into which the infant is expected, based on its evolutionary past, to be born. Following McKenna (1986), evidence (some of which is circumstantial) is presented concerning fetal hearing and fetal amniotic liquid breathing as they are affected both by maternal cardiovascular blood flow sounds in the uterus and (...) by fluctuating maternal blood sugar levels. These data are linked in turn to the infant’s postulated postnatal responsivity to parental sensory cues, including auditory and vestibular respiratory cues that may assist infants as they “learn” to breathe and, for some, to resist a SIDS event. Data on the respiratory and vocalizing behavior of normal and hearing-impaired persons are used to show that not all forms of human breathing are innate; some forms develop with experience. These data reveal how human infants learn, for example, to coordinate higher and lower brain respiratory nuclei in the context of learning initially to cry with intent and purpose and later to speak. Voluntary, cortex-based breathing emerges at the same time that infants are most likely to die from SIDS, between 2 and 4 months of age. This switch between voluntary and involuntary breathing during both sleep (while dreaming) and wake cycles, which depends on the integration of higher cortical and lower brain stem nuclei, is complex and is possibly the basis of the human species’ unique susceptibility to SIDS—a syndrome as yet unrecognized in other species. These human infant vulnerabilities, including delayed maturity, can explain in part why natural selection ought to favor increased infant sensitivity to parental sensory cues provided by a caregiver—stimuli available in the evolving parental care environment that included parent-infant co-sleeping for more than 4–5 million years of human evolution. (shrink)

This paper extends the evolutionary and developmental research model for SIDS presented in previous articles (McKenna 1990a, 1990b). Data from variety of fields were used to show why we should expect human infants to be physiologically responsive in a beneficial way to parental contact, one form of which is parent-infant co-sleeping. It was suggested that on-going sensory exchanges (touch, movement, smell, temperature, etc.) between co-sleeping parent-infant pairs might diminish the chances of an infantile cardiac-respiratory crisis (such as those suspected to (...) occur in some SIDS cases). In this article we review recent epidemiological data and sleep research findings on SIDS to show how they relate to evolutionary and cross-cultural perspectives. Results of a preliminary study of the co-sleeping behavior of mother-infant pairs indicate that, with respect to sleep, arousal, and respiratory patterns, co-sleeping mother-infant pairs affect each other in potentially important ways. We suggest specifically that co-sleeping may shorten periods of consolidated sleep among young infants by causing them to arouse more frequently. Moreover, we suggest that partner-induced arousals might help the infant to confront sleep crises more competently. In the long run, these arousals might prevent the premature emergence of prolonged (adultlike) sleep bouts from which some infants have difficulty arousing—especially during a breathing pause or apnea. (shrink)

David Kelsey's Eccentric Existence argues that what we need is a “systematically unsystematic” account of human existence, a set of “buoys” or non‐negotiable convictions articulated on the basis of canonical Scriptures, leaving abundant room for philosophers and other non‐theologians to make their contributions. Embodied persons themselves/ourselves are constituted in three irreducibly complex canonically biblical narratives as creatures, reconciled, and consummated—although it is not always clear what aspects of these narratives are “buoys” and which are more negotiable. The God who constitutes (...) embodied persons is the triune God of Nicaea who operates as one but in irreducibly distinct ways as Father and Son and Spirit—and cannot be mere instrument of human purposes. Kelsey intentionally leaves a number of Trinitarian and Christological questions open for further treatment, creating remarkable challenges for traditionalists and modernists alike. (shrink)