Nous partons baliser des milieux d’apprentissage non-hiérarchiques, non-rentables et non-disciplinaires où des collectifs se regroupent pour étudier des problèmes qui les interpellent : ils nous permettent de questionner et d’aérer d’une manière vitale nos structures de formation et de recherche. Il faut ne pas rester enlisé dans le dedans toxique et visqueux qui se déploie à la jonction entre l’intérieur de l’institution académique et l’extérieur du marché néo-libéral….

Jacopo Zabarella’s two treatises On Methods and On Regressus (1578) are among the most important Renaissance discussions of how scientific knowledge should be acquired, arranged, and transmitted. They belong to a lively debate about the order in which sciences should be taught and the method to be followed in scientific demonstration that roiled the Late Renaissance world for decades. In these famous works Zabarella rejected the views of Ramists and modern Galenists in favor of the pure doctrine of Aristotle, (...) freed from misunderstandings foisted upon it by medieval interpreters. The influence of these works on Galileo’s scientific method and Descartes’ famous Discourse on Method (1637) has long been debated. They are here translated into English for the first time, along with a new Latin text based on the corrected 1586 edition. Volume 1 contains On Methods, Books I-II. Volume 2 contains On Methods, Books III-IV, and On Regressus. (shrink)

Jacopo Zabarella’s two treatises On Methods and On Regressus (1578) are among the most important Renaissance discussions of how scientific knowledge should be acquired, arranged, and transmitted. They belong to a lively debate about the order in which sciences should be taught and the method to be followed in scientific demonstration that roiled the Late Renaissance world for decades. In these famous works Zabarella rejected the views of Ramists and modern Galenists in favor of the pure doctrine of Aristotle, (...) freed from misunderstandings foisted upon it by medieval interpreters. The influence of these works on Galileo’s scientific method and Descartes’ famous Discourse on Method (1637) has long been debated. They are here translated into English for the first time, along with a new Latin text based on the corrected 1586 edition. -/- Volume 1 contains On Methods, Books I-II. (shrink)

In this paper, I give an analysis of neg-raising inferences as scalar implicatures. The main motivation for this account as opposed to a presupposition-based approach like Gajewski (Linguist Philos 30(3):289–328, 2007) comes from the differences between presuppositions and neg-raising inferences. In response to this issue, Gajewski (2007) argues that neg-raising predicates are soft presuppositional triggers and adopts the account of how their presuppositions arise by Abusch (J Semantics 27(1):1–44, 2010). However, I argue that there is a difference between soft triggers (...) and neg-raising predicates in their behavior in embeddings; a difference that is straightforwardly accounted for in the present approach. Furthermore, by adopting Abusch’s (2010) account of soft triggers, Gajewski (2007) inherits the assumptions of a pragmatic principle of disjunctive closure and of a non-standard interaction between semantics and pragmatics—assumptions that are not needed by the present proposal, which is just based on a regular theory of scalar implicatures. I also show that the arguments that Gajewski (2007) presents in favor of the presuppositional account can be explained also by the scalar implicatures-based approach proposed here. Finally, while the main point of the paper is a comparison with the presuppositional account, I sketch a preliminary comparison with more syntactic approaches to neg-raising. (shrink)

Les positions philosophiques d'Anthony Collins étaient audacieuses et novatrices, de son rejet de l'idée d'un Dieu doué d'intelligence et de volonté à celui de l'existence d'une âme immatérielle, en passant par sa conception déterministe de la nature et sa vision de l'homme comme machine proche de l'animal, et mue par des pulsions tout aussi hédonistes.

Numerous studies over the past two decades have indicated that autism prevalence in China is lower than international estimates, believed to be around 1%. However, various publications, especially newspaper articles and activist reports, have still characterized autism prevalence in the country as 1%. This paper examines the discrepancy between data by writing the biography of the 1% estimate, exploring its sociopolitical implications and cultural significance. It highlights the attractiveness and power of the 1% value in China, hinting at a possible (...) role played by numbers in the “looping effect” described by Ian Hacking. Moreover, the author suggests that the emphasis on this specific estimate downplays the importance of questions opened up by the discrepancy in findings between Chinese and international autism research. (shrink)

libro 1. Il Fedro.--libro 2. L'Ortensio.

This paper will be concerned with the role acquaintance plays in contemporary theories of introspection. Traditionally, the relation of acquaintance has been conceived in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind as being only epistemically relevant inasmuch as it causes, or enables, or justifies a peculiar kind of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowledge by acquaintance. However, in recent years a novel account of the role of acquaintance in our introspective knowledge has been offered. According to this novel constitutive approach, acquaintance is, in (...) itself, a sui generis—i.e., non-propositional—kind of knowledge. As we will suggest, a stalemate between David Chalmers’ account of direct phenomenal concepts—as a prototypical example of a causal view—and Anna Giustina’s account of primitive introspection—as a prototypical example of a constitutive view—is looming in the current controversy between the two families of theories. Towards the end of the essay, we will point to some possible ways for a constitutive theorist to break the stalemate. (shrink)

This paper analyses the ms. Matritensis 4625 (Pollux’s Onomasticon), a witness neglected by Bethe in his edition. The text of this manuscript preserves a different and in several passages more complete redaction of the Onomasticon. It was therefore possible to identify, in Book 2, two unnoticed references to Aristophanes and one to Demosthenes.

_Riassunto_: Il dibattito contemporaneo sull’impatto causale degli stati mentali e delle decisioni consce sui fenomeni naturali e sociali fa largo uso di dati ricavati da test neurofisiologici e comportamentali, che esplorano il ruolo di processi cognitivi inconsci e interpretazioni post-hoc caratterizzate da intenzionalità dichiarativa. I dati neuroscientifici sono spesso utilizzati per sostenere una prospettiva fisicalista che privilegia il determinismo neurocognitivo rispetto alle discussioni sul libero arbitrio. Tuttavia, questa impostazione tende a ignorare, almeno parzialmente, il dibattito sui limiti epistemologici e tecnici (...) nella generazione dei dati e i pregiudizi filosofici insiti nelle interpretazioni. Questo lavoro evidenzia tali limiti, proponendo un’analisi filosofica della relazione complessa tra razionalità, esercizio del libero arbitrio e costruzione dell’identità personale. Distinguendo il concetto di scelta autentica da quello di impulso o spinta ad agire, si sostiene una concezione enattiva e fenomenologica dell’azione umana libera, offrendo così un’interpretazione del libero arbitrio che respinge l’eliminativismo come inadeguato. Rifiutando un dualismo semplicistico, il libero arbitrio viene definito come la capacità di una soggettività incarnata, situata ed enattiva di interagire con un ambiente naturale e sociale attraverso compiti che implicano processi stratificati di valutazione e decisione. In conclusione, si argomenta che, sebbene le scienze fisiche e psicologiche possano indagare le basi dell’esecuzione dell’azione, non sono in grado di risolvere né di spiegare l’aspetto più complesso del processo decisionale stratificato ed esteso. Questo riguarda la relazione intenzionale tra la persona, considerata nella sua interezza, e un mondo ricco di valori, che conferisce senso e orientamento alle scelte individuali. Parole chiave: Libertà; Persona; Cervello; Inconscio; Determinismo/Eliminativismo; Thomas Fuchs _Embodied freedom. The role of person in decision-making_ _Abstract_: The contemporary debate on the causal impact of mental states and conscious decisions on natural and social phenomena extensively relies on data derived from neurophysiological and behavioral tests. These tests investigate the role of unconscious cognitive processes and post-hoc interpretations characterized by declarative intentionality. Neuroscientific data are often employed to support a physicalist perspective that prioritizes neurocognitive determinism over discussions of free will. However, this approach tends to partially overlook the epistemological and technical limitations inherent in data generation and the philosophical biases embedded in interpretations. This paper highlights these limitations by proposing a philosophical analysis of the complex relationship between rationality, the exercise of free will, and the construction of personal identity. By distinguishing the concept of genuine choice from that of impulse or urge to act, it advocates for an enactive and phenomenological conception of human free action, offering an interpretation of free will that rejects eliminativism as inadequate. Rejecting a simplistic dualism, free will is defined as the capacity of an embodied, situated, and enactive subjectivity to engage with a natural and social environment through tasks involving layered processes of evaluation and decision-making. In conclusion, it is argued that while physical and psychological sciences may explore the foundations of action execution, they cannot resolve nor explain the more complex aspect of the stratified and extended decision-making process. This aspect concerns the intentional relationship between the person, considered as a whole, and a world rich in values, which gives meaning and direction to individual choices. _Keywords_: Freedom; Person; Brain; Unconscious; Determinism/Eliminativism; Thomas Fuchs. (shrink)

Un nouveau cinéma italien, illustré ici par le film Le quattro volte de Michelangelo Frammartino, propose une redéfinition radicale d’une éthique documentaire qui se situe aux confins de l’esthétique et de l’écopolitique. En l’absence d’une construction fictionnelle, la vie s’expose dans sa totalité multiple et non hiérarchique où tout acte, tout objet, toute sensation (aussi humble, minime et singulière soit-elle) garde un droit de perception et conséquemment de pensée.

Bermúdez identifies the “Interface Problem” as the central problem in the philosophy of psychology: how commonsensical psychological explanations can be integrated with lower-level explanations? In particular, since folk psychology is meant to provide causal explanations on a par with, say, neurobiological explanations, the question of how to understand the relation between the two layers arises naturally. Donald Davidson claimed that the interface problem is actually ill-posed and put forward his version of the “Autonomy Picture”, the view known as anomalous monism. (...) This work reviews Davidson’s proposal in the light of digital universes: we model the key claims of the theory using cellular automata and show that Davidson’s original version of the Autonomy Picture is immune to two arguments against autonomy. (shrink)

In the last few years, a remarkable convergence of interests and results has emerged between scholars interested in the arts and aesthetics from a variety of perspectives and cognitive scientists studying the mind and brain within the predictive processing (PP) framework. This convergence has so far proven fruitful for both sides: while PP is increasingly adopted as a framework for understanding aesthetic phenomena, the arts and aesthetics, examined under the lens of PP, are starting to be seen as important windows (...) into our mental functioning. The result is a vast and fast-growing research programme that promises to deliver important insights into our aesthetic encounters as well as a wide range of psychological phenomena of general interest. Here, we present this developing research programme, describing its grounds and highlighting its prospects. We start by clarifying how the study of the arts and aesthetics encounters the PP picture of mental functioning (§1). We then go on to outline the prospects of this encounter for the fields involved: philosophy and history of art (§2), psychology of aesthetics and neuroaesthetics (§3) and psychology and neuroscience more generally (§4). The upshot is an ambitious but well-defined framework within which aesthetics and cognitive science can partner up to illuminate crucial aspects of the human mind. -/- This article is part of the theme issue ‘Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives’. -/- . (shrink)

Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the (...) overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct. (shrink)

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In (...) the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens. (shrink)

This essay takes into account the pedagogical reform for the poor proposed in England by Andrew Bell, Joseph Lancaster and Patrick Colquhoun between Eighteenth and Nineteenth century. Differentiating individuals and reproducing social order through the implementation of a pedagogical plan is a response both to the excessive expectations of well-being raised among the English poor by the Revolution in France, and to the uncontrolled spread of crime and undisciplined behaviours in the new manufacturing districts. This is why social reformers looked (...) at the pedagogical reform of mutual instruction as a way to build the conditions of reproduction of social differences: the plans proposed by Bell and Lancaster, based on emulation, competition and merit, are supported by Colquhoun because they offer a possible solution for the problems of crime and immoral behaviour. «The order of Merit», triggered by emulation, distinction and reward, thus become the main tool of influencing poor’s expectations so to predict and discipline their conduct as future waged workers. (shrink)

Au carrefour entre une longue tradition théorique (de Benjamin à Rancière) et le contexte contemporain de la culture numérique, nous nous demandons si nos publics sont pris dans les filets de la production – institutionnelle, marchande, individualiste – ou bien s’ils leur échappent largement en tant que processus attentionnels collectifs animés par un dynamisme et une diffusion imprévisibles.

Pourquoi une université « cheap »? Pourquoi nous en faut-il davantage? Les membres de The Cheapest University nous expliquent les enjeux et les tactiques qui structurent leur plateforme d’initiatives, où se mélangent création artistique, activité pédagogique et pratiques de convivialité.

Fin dalle sue origini l’alchimia ha dovuto confrontarsi con il problema dell’ordine. La sua eccentricità rispetto agli altri saperi medievali poneva questioni sulla sua collocazione e sulla natura dell’oggetto che cercava, la pietra filosofale. L’articolo presenta il tentativo fatto dal medico Pietro Bono da Ferrara di riordinare la materia alchemica e di incasellarla nel sistema scientifico scolastico. Nella sua opera, la _ Pretiosa Margarita Novella _, egli utilizza il sillogismo per ordinare la trattazione dell’alchimia, la _ subalternatio _ per definirla (...) come una tra le scienze naturali e collocarla all’interno del sistema dei saperi e il concetto di _ forma specifica _ per descrivere la pietra filosofale e inserirla nel processo di generazione dei metalli. In questo modo Bono concepisce l’alchimia come una scienza che risponde a due ordini, quello naturale di generazione dei metalli, nel quale opera, e quello divino, al quale deve fare appello per trovare la pietra, che sono complementari tra loro, poiché hanno la loro origine in Dio. _ Since its origins, alchemy has had to deal with the problem of order. His eccentricity compared to other medieval knowledge posed questions about his collocation and the nature of the object he was looking for, the philosopher’s stone. This article presents the attempt, made by the doctor Pietro Bono da Ferrara, to embed alchemy in the school scientific system. In his work, the Pretiosa Margarita Novella, he uses syllogism to order the treatment of alchemy, the subalternatio to place it within the system of sciences and the concept of forma specifica to describe the philosopher’s stone and insert it in metals’ generation process. In this way, Bono conceives alchemy as a science referring to two orders, the natural one of metal generation, in which it operates, and the divine one, to which he must appeal to find the philosopher’s stone, which are complementary to each other since they both have their origin in God. _. (shrink)

Idea generation, the process of creating and developing candidate solutions that when implemented can solve ill-defined and complex problems, plays a pivotal role in creativity and innovation. The algorithms that underlie classical evolutionary, cognitive, and process models of idea generation, however, appear too inefficient to effectively help solve the ill-defined and complex problems for which one would engage in idea generation. To address this, these classical models have recently been redesigned as forward models, drawing heavily on the “predictive mind” literature. (...) These pose that more efficiency can be achieved by making predictions based on heuristics, previous experiences, and domain knowledge about what material to use to generate ideas with, and evaluate these subsequently generated ideas based on whether they indeed match the initial prediction. When a discrepancy occurs between prediction and evaluation, new predictions are made, and thus shaping what actions, and how these actions, are undertaken. Although promising, forward models of idea generation remain theoretical and thus no empirical evidence exists about whether such predictions and evaluations indeed form part of the idea generation process. To take a first empirical look at this, a mixed-methods study was conducted by analyzing people’s self-reports for the reasons of the actions that they take during an idea generation task. The results showed that predictions and evaluations are pervasive in the idea generation process. Specifically, switching between concept selection and conceptual combination and idea generation, as well as repeating idea generation based on earlier selected conceptual combination, and possibly (but to a lesser extent) concept selection and the repetition thereof, are likely to be driven by predictions and evaluations. Moreover, the frequencies of the predictions and evaluations that drive these actions influenced the amount of ideas generated, amount of concepts used, and within-concept fluency (the ratio of the amount of ideas generated per concept used). Therefore, the contribution of this paper is the first empirical evidence that indicates that the idea generation process is driven by both predictions and evaluations. (shrink)

Volume 1, Books I-II. On methods -- Volume 2, Books III-IV. On methods-On regressus.

This special issue is devoted to trust, institutions, and their ties, specifically. Such ties have been of central concern for philosophers and social scientists for a while, and seem to become an increasingly widespread subject of public debate. This bundle covers two distinct worries, resulting in two (generally complementary) directions of investigation. The classic one, inherited from Hobbes, deals with the importance of institutions for trust. The other one, which is more central to this...

While the debate on values in science focuses on normative questions on the level of the individual (e.g. should researchers try to make their work as value free as possible?), comparatively little attention has been paid to the institutional and professional norms that researchers are expected to follow. To address this knowledge gap, we conduct a content analysis of leading national codes of conduct for research integrity of European countries, and structure our analysis around the question: do these documents allow (...) for researchers to be influenced by “non-epistemic” (moral, cultural, commercial, political, etc.) values or do they prohibit such influence in compliance with the value-free ideal (VFI) of science? Our results return a complex picture. On the one hand, codes of conduct consider many non-epistemic values to be a legitimate influence on the decision-making of researchers. On the other, most of these documents include what we call _VFI-like positions_: passages claiming that researchers should be free and independent from any external influence. This shows that while many research integrity documents do not fully endorse the VFI, they do not reject it and continue to be implicitly influenced by it. This results in internal tensions and underdetermined guidance on non-epistemic values that may limit some of the uses of research integrity codes, especially for purposes of ethical self-regulation. While codes of conduct cannot be expected to decide how researchers should act in every instance, we do suggest that they acknowledge the challenges of how to integrate non-epistemic values in research in a more explicit fashion. (shrink)

Recent works in epistemology have defended the existence of acquaintance knowledge - a non-propositional form of knowledge constituted by the subject's acquaintance with particulars. A significant obstacle to the epistemic legitimacy of acquaintance knowledge lies in the fact that acquaintance is a descriptive psychological phenomenon, whereas knowledge is a normative one. In this paper, I aim to address this challenge by arguing that introspective acquaintance knowledge - the subject's knowledge of their own experiences constituted by acquaintance with them - exhibits (...) a normative dimension. My argument critically hinges on the role of conscious introspective attention. Based on the idea that a distinctive manifestation of the presence of epistemic normativity has to do (at least) with the possibility for a piece of knowledge to be epistemically better or worse, I will argue that we can have epistemically better or worse introspective acquaintance knowledge and that this depends on the degree of attention that is involved in it. By assuming that possibly being epistemically better or worse implies for a piece of knowledge to possibly instantiate different degrees of epistemic goodness, and that conscious introspective attention comes in degrees, I will argue that conscious attention plays a gradual epistemic role in acquaintance knowledge. The paper aims to strengthen the case for introspective acquaintance knowledge as a genuine form of epistemic achievement, governed by attention-based normative standards. (shrink)

Ce qu’on désigne du nom de « complotisme » mérite d’être considéré comme un symptôme – un symptôme de dynamiques et de désirs profondément ambivalents – bien davantage que comme un ennemi « inédit ». L’anti-conspirationnisme nous semble aussi dangereux et ridicule que ce qu’il dénonce sous la catégorie de « complotistes ». Comment nourrir les conspirations émancipatrices qui se tissent dans l’ombre sans se laisser aveugler par des fantasmes de complot embrasés par les élites réactionnaires et certaines viralités toxiques?

C’est en regardant le portrait aberrant de la planétarité reflétée sur le miroir des complotismes environnementaux que la difficulté collective d’assumer cette échelle écologique se dévoile impitoyablement. Un tel malaise n’est pas seulement lié à une incapacité humaine et individuelle d’accepter la complexité de la crise planétaire. Elle émane de l’ensemble des rapports socio-politiques (verticaux, élitistes) que nous entretenons avec les méditations techniques qui permettent la perception, mais aussi la réparation, de notre planète.

In this article, I contrast two of the main schools of thought within eco-Marxism, namely Metabolic Rift (MR) and World-Ecology (WE). These differ above all else in their accounts of the ontological status of society and nature. The Covid-19 pandemic constitutes a moment of concretisation of this long-standing debate, which is able to dissolve at least in part its issues. The article consists of four parts. I begin with a summary of the two schools of thought and their core stances, (...) before proceeding to unpack their respective theoretical points of contention. I subsequently proceed to explore the conceptualisation of health according to the Marxist scientists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin through the model of dialectical biology. In the third section, I unpack the conceptualisation of the Covid-19 pandemic by the epidemiologist Robert Wallace, before finally concluding with the contrasts of the two schools in the light of dialectical biology. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the relations between trust, agency and latent forms of discrimination. Its main argument is in social philosophy, and it articulates considerations from moral psychology and the philosophy of language. The aim is to provide a better insight into the deflated level of trustworthiness that members of stigmatized categories are credited with. Identity prejudice determining low levels of credibility for its victims has received substantial philosophical attention in the wake of the epistemic injustice literature. Instead of (...) the standard cognitive concept of trust usually brought in, I apply a moral (or agential) account of trust (drawing on Domenicucci and Holton 2017) to discriminatory issues. We can fail to trust the trustworthy (Jones 2013) in a variety of ways. When it comes to the members of discriminated categories, I argue in the first part, this happens because they are refused a necessary condition of trust: a presumption of agency. This presumption of agency, prima facie attributed to human adults, is precisely what goes wrong for the members of stigmatized groups. Not recognised as individual agents, but as mere quasi-agents, the discriminatees cannot be trusted: their trustworthiness actually becomes unthinkable. The very possibility to give reasons for or against out-group members’ trustworthiness is thus dismissed. Articulating documentality and feminist philosophy of language, the second part shows that members of stigmatized categories have their conduct described and recorded through a non-agential grammar. Once widespread and socially dominant, non-agential descriptions of their action give the discriminatees a peculiar moral status that jeopardizes the very possibility of their being recognised as trustworthy. (shrink)