This paper develops and explores a new framework for theorizing about the measurement and aggregation of well-being. It is a qualitative variation on the framework of social welfare functionals developed by Amartya Sen. In Sen’s framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned to each profile of real-valued utility functions. In the qualitative framework developed here, numerical utilities are replaced by the properties they are supposed to represent. This makes it possible to characterize the measurability and interpersonal comparability of (...) well-being directly, without the use of invariance conditions, and to distinguish between real changes in well-being and merely representational changes in the unit of measurement. The qualitative framework is shown to have important implications for a range of issues in axiology and social choice theory, including the characterization of welfarism, axiomatic derivations of utilitarianism, the meaningfulness of prioritarianism, the informational requirements of variable-population ethics, the impossibility theorems of Arrow and others, and the metaphysics of value. (shrink)

Important study focuses on the revival and assimilation of ancient Greek mathematics in the 13th–16th centuries, via Arabic science, and the 16th-century development of symbolic algebra. This brought about the crucial change in the concept of number that made possible modern science — in which the symbolic "form" of a mathematical statement is completely inseparable from its "content" of physical meaning. Includes a translation of Vieta's Introduction to the Analytical Art. 1968 edition. Bibliography.

The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That (...) is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments. (shrink)

Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers, following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion: that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of lives that are barely worth living whose existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant (...) conclusion, as well as its analogues involving suffering populations and the lengths of individual lives. The theory is grounded in some independently plausible views about the structure of well-being, identifies a new source of incommensurability in population ethics, and avoids some of the implausibly extreme consequences of other lexical views, without violating the intuitive separability of lives. (shrink)

Books Reviewed in this Article: Beyond Ideology: Religion and the Future of Western Civilization. By Ninian Smart. Pp.350, London, Collins, 1981, £9.95. Neophtonism and Indian Thought. Edited by R. Baine Harris. Pp.xiii, 353, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1982, $39.00, $12.95. Monotheism: A Philosophic Inquiry into the Foundations of Theology and Ethics. By Lenn Evan Goodman. Pp.122, Totowa, Allenheld, Osmun, 1981, $13.50. Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Edited by Dominic J. O'Meara. Pp. xviii, 297, Albany, State University of New (...) York Press, 1981, $39.00, $12.95. The Path to Transcendence: From Philosophy to Mysticism in Saint Augustine. By Paul Henry, introduction and translation by Francis F. Burch. pp.xxix, 120, Pittsburgh, The Pickwick Press, 1981, $10.95. The Adequacy of Christian Ethics. By Brian Hebblethwaite. Pp. 144, London, Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1981, £5.95. Ethics. By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Pp. 220, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1981, $10.95. Human Nature, Election, and History. By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Pp. 116, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1982, £2.95. Ethics, Religion and Politics. By G.E.M. Anscombe. Pp.ix, 161, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981, £12.00. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method and Point. By R.M. Hare. Pp.viii, 242, Oxford University Press, 1982, £11.00, £3.95. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Pp.vii, 290. £7.50. Cambridge University Press, 1982, £20.00. Language and Political Understanding. By Michael J. Shapiro. Pp.253, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, £18.20. Marx's Politics. By Allan Gilbert. Pp.xv, 326, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981, £16.50. Feuerbach. By Marx W. Wartofsky. Pp.xx, 460, Cambridge University Press, 1977, £30.00, £9.95. Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art. By Martin Heidegger, translated with notes and an analysis by D.F. Krell. Pp.xvi, 263, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, £11.50. Freedom and Karl Jaspers's Philosophy. By Elizabeth Young‐Bruehl. Pp.xiv, 233, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1981, £14.00. ‘Being and Meaning’: Paul Tillich's Theory of Meaning, Truth and Logic. By I.E. Thompson. Pp.x, 244, Edinburgh University Press, 1981, £15.00. The Rationality of Science. By W.H. Newton‐Smith. Pp.xii, 294, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, £9.95, £5.95. Realism and the Progress of Science. By Peter Smith. Pp.viii, 135, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £12.50. Angels and principalities. By Wesley Carr. Pp.xii, 242, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £13.50. Rconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology. By Ralph P. Martin. Pp.233, London, Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1981, £8.95. Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament. Edited by William Horbury and Brian McNeil. Pp.xxi, 217, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £17.50. Constantine and Eusebius. By Timothy D. Barnes. Pp.viii, 458, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981, £24.50. Songs of Glory: the Romanesque Façades of Aquitaine. By Linda Seidel. Pp.x, 220, figs.63, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 1981, £17.50. Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer. Translated and edited by Michael J.B. Allen. Pp.x, 274, Berkeley‐Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1981, £18.50. The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, Volume 3. Pp.xiv, 162, London, Shepheard‐Walwyn, 1981, £8.00. The World of the Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol. By David B. Ruderman. Pp.xvii, 265, Cincinatti, Hebrew Union College Press, 1981, $20.00. A Dialogue Concerning Heresies. Edited by T.M.C. Lawier, G. Marc'hadour and R.C. Marius. Pp.xiv, 888, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, £56.00. Canterbury and Rome, Sister Churches: A Roman Catholic Monk reflects upon Reunion in Diversity. By Robert Hale. Pp.xi, 188, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982, £5.95. Rome and Canterbury through Four Centuries: A Study of the Relations between the Church of Rome and the Anglican Churches 1530–1981. By Bernard and Margaret Pawley. Pp.xi, 387, London and Oxford, Mowbray, 1981, £4.95. American Indians and Christian Missions. By H.W. Bowden. Pp.xix, 255, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, £10.50. Catholics in Western Democracies: A Study in Political Behaviour. By John H. Whyte. Pp.193, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan. 1981, £13.00. Päpstliche Unfehlbarkeit bei Newman und Döllinger: Ein historisch‐systema‐tischer Vergleich. By Wolfgang Klausnitzer. Pp.280, Innsbruck, Tyrolia Verlag, 1980, 54 DM. The Letters of Baron Friedrich von Hügel and Professor Norman Kemp Smith. Edited by Lawrence F. Barmann. Pp.353, New York, Fordham University Press, 1981, no price given. Merton: A Biography. By Monica Furlong. Pp.xx, 342, London, Collins, 1980, £6.95. The Autonomy of Religious Belief: A Critical Inquiry. Edited by Frederick J. Crosson. Pp.vii, 162, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, £8.95. The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God. By Gordon D. Kaufman. Pp.309. Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1981, $13.95. Spirits of Power: An Analysis of Shona Cosmology. By Hubert Bucher. Pp.231, Capetown, Oxford University Press, 1980, £8.75. Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah. By Jacob Neusner. Pp.xix, 419, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, £17.50. (shrink)

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...) some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias. (shrink)

I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some (...) ways of understanding "ought" so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail. (shrink)

Objective interpretations of probability are usually discussed in two varieties: frequency and propensity accounts. But there is a third, neglected possibility, namely, probabilities as deriving from ranges in suitably structured initial state spaces. Roughly, the probability of an event is the proportion of initial states that lead to this event in the space of all possible initial states, provided that this proportion is approximately the same in any not too small interval of the initial state space. This idea can also (...) be expressed by saying that in the types of situations that give rise to probabilistic phenomena we may expect to find an initial state space such that any "reasonable" density function over this space leads to the same probabilities for the possible outcomes. This "method of arbitrary functions" was introduced by Poincaré, studied and extended by Hopf and more recently by Eduardo Engel, Jan von Plato and Michael Strevens. The natural-range, or method-of-arbitrary-functions approach to probabilities is usually treated as an explanation for the occurrence of probabilistic patterns, whereas I examine its prospects for an objective interpretation of probability, in the sense of providing truth conditions for probability statements that do not depend on our state of mind or information. The main objection to such a proposal is that it is circular, i.e. presupposes the concept of probability, because a measure on the initial state has to be introduced, and density functions over the space are considered. I try to argue that this objection can be successfully met. (shrink)

Matthew Adler's Measuring Social Welfare is an introduction to the social welfare function (SWF) methodology. This essay questions some ideas at the core of the SWF methodology having to do with the relation between the SWF and the measure of well-being. The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities, there are multiple scales that can be used to represent the same information about well-being; no one scale (...) is special. Like physical laws, the SWF and its ranking of distributions cannot depend on exactly which of these scales we use. Adler and other theorists in the SWF tradition have used this idea to derive highly restrictive constraints on the shape of the SWF. These constraints rule out seemingly plausible views about distributive justice and population ethics. I argue, however, that these constraints stem from a simple but instructive mistake. The SWF should not be applied to vectors of numbers such as 1 and 2, but rather to vectors of dimensioned quantities such as 1 util and 2 utils. This seemingly pedantic suggestion turns out to have far-reaching consequences. Unlike the orthodox SWF approach, treating welfare levels as dimensioned quantities lets us distinguish between real changes in well-being and mere changes in the unit of measurement. It does this without making the SWF depend on the scale on which welfare is measured, and in a way that avoids the restrictive constraints on the shape of the SWF. (shrink)

Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...) rational individuals and choices that guarantee worse distributions. These results, I suggest, undermine Buchak’s argument for rank-weighted utilitarianism. (shrink)

I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various (...) difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence. (shrink)

Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...) conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both the individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework. (shrink)

The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as (...) they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not. (shrink)

Is well-being the kind of thing that can be summed across individuals? This paper takes a measurement-theoretic approach to answering this question. To make sense of adding well-being, we would need to identify some natural "concatenation" operation on the bearers of well-being that satisfies the axioms of extensive measurement and can therefore be represented by the arithmetic operation of addition. I explore various proposals along these lines, involving the concatenation of segments within lives over time, of entire lives led alongside (...) one another or in sequence, and of evaluatively basic propositions via conjunction. All of these proposals turn out to carry highly controversial commitments about the good. I do not claim that these commitments are unacceptable. But they suggest that we cannot simply take for granted, as many philosophers do, that there is any such thing as the sum of well-being. (shrink)

This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several “calibration dilemmas,” in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, (...) we show that our results challenge common utilitarian accounts of the badness of inequalities in resources. (shrink)

This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being. How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interpersonal comparability of well-being is hidden in Harsanyi's premises. Others argue that it is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi's theorem, which is not presupposed by any one (...) of the premises. I argue instead that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-utilitarian conclusion do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key to making sense of this possibility is to treat Harsanyi's weights as dimensional constants rather than dimensionless numbers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.

How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.

According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...) idea of conditional goods, and generalize it to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. I also address the objection that asymmetric comparativism has unacceptably antinatalist implications. (shrink)

A conception of probability that can be traced back to Johannes von Kries is introduced: the “Spielraum” or range conception. Its close connection to the so-called method of arbitrary functions is highlighted. Possible interpretations of it are discussed, and likewise its scope and its relation to certain current interpretations of probability. Taken together, these approaches form a class of interpretations of probability in its own right, but also with its own problems. These, too, are introduced, discussed, and proposals in response (...) to them are surveyed, some of which also go back to von Kries. (shrink)

This volume is a study of the relationship between philosophy and faith in Søren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. It is also the first book to examine the role of Socrates in this body of writings, illuminating the significance of Socrates for Kierkegaard's thought. Jacob Howland argues that in the Fragments, philosophy and faith are closely related passions. A careful examination of the role of Socrates demonstrates that Socratic, philosophical eros opens up a path to faith. At the same time, the (...) work of faith - which holds the self together with that which transcends it - is essentially erotic in the Socratic sense of the term. Chapters on Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus and on Plato's Apology shed light on the Socratic character of the pseudonymous author of the Fragments and the role of 'the god' in Socrates' pursuit of wisdom. Howland also analyzes the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Kierkegaard's reflections on Socrates and Christ. (shrink)

I argue that comparisons of Stoic virtue to stochastic skills — now standard in the secondary literature on Stoicism — are based on a misreading of the sources and distort the Stoic position in two respects. In paradigmatic stochastic skills such as archery, medicine, or navigation the value of the skill’s external end justifies the existence and practice of the skill and constitutes an appropriate focus of rational motivation. Neither claim applies to virtue as the Stoics understand it. The stochastic (...) model of virtue almost certainly originated with Carneades and should be distinguished clearly from the Stoic account. Doing so clarifies the Stoic position and shows that it anticipates what Thomas Hurka calls a modern view of value. (shrink)

Recent research indicates that compensation structure can be used by firms to discourage their employees from whistleblowing. We extend the ethics literature by examining how compensation structures and financial rewards work together to influence managers’ decisions to blow the whistle. Results from an experiment indicate that compensation with restricted stock, relative to stock payments that lack restrictions, can enhance the likelihood that managers will blow the whistle when large rewards are available. However, restricted stock can also threaten the effectiveness of (...) whistleblowing systems without the presence of large financial rewards for whistleblowing. Thus, the large potential rewards for whistleblowing enacted by the Dodd–Frank Act appear timely as firms are moving toward compensation agreements that include greater proportions of restricted stock. (shrink)

In engaging five of Plato's dialogues—Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Cratylus, Sophist, and Statesman—and by paying particular attention to Socrates' intellectual defense in the "philosophic trial" by the Stranger from Elea, Jacob Howland illuminates Plato's understanding of the proper relationship between philosophy and politics. This insightful and innovative study illustrates the Plato's understanding of the difference between sophistry and philosophy, and it identifies the innate contradictions of political philosophy that Plato observed and remain entrenched within the field to this day. This is (...) essential reading for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of political philosophy. (shrink)

Panpsychism is a solution to the mind-body problem that presumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality instead of a product or consequence of physical processes (i.e., brain activity). Panpsychism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem: it effectively rids itself of the explanatory gap materialist theories of consciousness suffer from. However, many theorists and experimentalists doubt panpsychism can ever be successful as a scientific theory, as it cannot be empirically verified or falsified. In this paper, I present (...) a panpsychist model based on the controversial idea that consciousness may be a so called higher physical dimension. Although this notion seems outrageous, I show that the idea has surprising explanatory power, even though the model (as most models) is most likely wrong. Most importantly, though, it results in a panpsychist model that yields predictions that can be empirically verified or falsified. As such, the model's main purpose is to serve as an example how a metaphysical model of consciousness can be specified in such a way that they can be tested in a scientifically rigorous way. (shrink)

According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...) contexts. (shrink)

Welfarism is the view that individual welfare is the only thing that matters. One important contribution of social choice theory has been to provide a precise formulation and axiomatic characterization of welfarism using Amartya Sen's framework of social welfare functionals. This paper is motivated by the observation that the standard formalization of welfarism is too restrictive, since a welfarist social planner need not be committed to maximizing a preference ordering or any other binary relation over alternatives. We therefore provide a (...) characterization of welfarism in a more general choice-functional setting and show that welfarism, so understood, carries no commitment to rationalizability. This characterization is compatible with welfare values having any structure whatsoever. It also sheds light on different formulations of anonymity, revealing only some of these to be fundamental requirements of impartiality. (shrink)

As the World Anti-Doping Code is up for revision, the paper proposes a framework for reading the Code based on a relatively literal approach and an almost exclusive focus on the ?spirit of sport? as a key element of the Code. The author argues that this single element can contribute to revealing the underlying rationale of the Code, as it serves to justify bans of doping substances and methods, in some cases without recurring to evidence sustaining the claims made. For (...) a substance/method to be banned, the Code requires that two out of three criteria be met: performance enhancement, health risk and the spirit of sport. The paper demonstrates how these provisions link to other parts of the Code, (under the rules of the Code 2009) in the absence of performance-enhancing properties combined with a health risk. The paper draws implications from these findings regarding terminological (im)precision, legal certainty/predictability, transparency/accountability, limits to arbitrary exercise of power and internal/external validity. (shrink)

Values are incommensurable when they cannot be measured on a single cardinal scale. Many philosophers suggest that incommensurability can help us solve the problems of population ethics. I agree. But some philosophers claim that populations bear incommensurable values merely because they contain different numbers of people, perhaps within some range. I argue that mere differences in how many people exist, even within some range, do not suffice for incommensurability. I argue that the intuitive neutrality of creating happy people is better (...) captured by a version of average utilitarianism. But this view is problematic. So I suggest a version of total utilitarianism that avoids the repugnant conclusion by appealing to incommensurable dimensions of wellbeing. (shrink)

Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one's moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit's metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit's project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit's responses to my counterexample.

This article raises problems both for the view that safe belief is necessary for knowledge and for the view that it is sufficient. Focusing on ‘meta‐epistemic beliefs,’ or beliefs about the epistemic status of one's own beliefs, it is shown that the necessity claim has counterintuitive implications and that the sufficiency claim implies a contradiction. It is then shown that meta‐epistemic beliefs raise similar problems for a wide range of accounts of knowledge, and hence that they provide a powerful test (...) for theories of knowledge. (shrink)

This study investigates factors impacting perceptions of ethical conduct of peers of 293 students in four US universities. Self-reported ethical behavior and recognition of emotions in others (a dimension of emotional intelligence) impacted perception of ethical behavior of peers. None of the other dimensions of emotional intelligence were significant. Age, Race, Sex, GPA, or type of major (business versus nonbusiness) did not impact perception of ethical behavior of peers. Implications of the results of the study for business schools and industry (...) professionals are discussed. (shrink)

How should we incorporate algorithms into humanistic scholarship? The typical approach is to clone what humans have done but faster, extrapolating expert insights to landfills of source material. But creative scholars do not clone tradition; instead, they produce readings that challenge closely held understandings. We theorize and then illustrate how to construct bad robots trained to surprise and provoke. These robots aren’t the most human but rather the most alien—not tame but dangerous. We explore the relationship between the reproduction of (...) tradition and the generation of surprise and then show how formalizing a particular humanistic theory as a Bayesian prior allows us to identify readings that disrupt it through a process of algorithmic abduction. Among the exploding universe of surprising (and mostly ridiculous) possible readings, algorithmic efficiency allows us to select readings that nonetheless garner substantial support from the total archive and so merit interpretation and engagement. It is in such interaction between alien and human readers that meaning is made and understanding disturbed; it is by extending alien readings to novel texts that the scholarly community tests the value of those readings. (shrink)

Contractualism, the view that morality is to be grounded on an hypothetical agreement among rational agents, is a very plausible conception for the justification of morality under modern circumstances. No metaphysical assumptions are made, morality is supposed to be erected on undisputed, minimal foundations. However, contractualists generally underestimate or downplay the degree to which their idea allows to convert might into right. This is shown exemplarily by an examination of the conceptions of David Gauthier and Peter Stemmer. A more realistic (...) variety of contractualism would admit that, depending on contingent circumstances, idiosyncratic or massively discriminating moral principles can easily be part of the hypothetical agreements. (shrink)

"Jacob Howland's book is an engaging, readable, and extremely suggestive addition to the literature on Plato's magnum opus." --Ancient Philosophy.