Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there (...) still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories. Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality. (shrink)

Contemporary formalisations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid. However, in the same formalisations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties . Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes (...) of size : too many objects or too many properfies are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuifive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics . We need however to look for phenomenologically well grounded protecfions against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects. (shrink)

Putting individual constants and quantifiers into the same syntactic category within first-order language promises to have far-reaching consequences: a syntax of this kind can reveal the potential of any such language, allowing us to realize that a vast class of noun phrases, including non-denoting terms, can be accommodated in the new syntax as expressions suited to being subjects of sentences. In the light of this, a formal system that is an extension of classical first-order logic is developed here, and is (...) equipped with an appropriate semantics. An ontological interpretation of the new logic is then also provided, with several categories of object and notions of existence being distinguished. Last but not least, a modal version of the logic, with some interesting formal features, is proposed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Leśniewskian Ontology (LO) is a system in which the basic subject-predicate formula takes the form of a b and express one-argument predication, e.g. John is a student. In LO’s language, there is no many-argument form of predication given that would allow for the structural expression of, for example, the sentence John is Anne’s son. In this article, a simple and natural extension of LO is suggested to encompass many-argument predication. The system thus obtained corresponds to polyadic second-order logic.

The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.

Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. (...) Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

This paper comments on five problems concerning the transformation of the Polish economy with special emphasis on employee participation and trust. 1) There can be no ethical evaluation or justification of employee participation independent of the goals of the transformation. 2) In Poland this participation is affected by deep distrust towards the whole process of transformation. 3) Privatisation is the topic most often mentioned in this connection. 4) The definition of trust becomes even more crucial when the phenomenon of distrust (...) has to be explained. 5) Institutions can become the substitute of trust. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality, and in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. We show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible. Finally, we argue that her models are not adequate for EPR-phenomena, since they ignore modal and spatiotemporal aspects inherent in their setup.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie wielości teoretycznych ujęć w nauce (w refleksji przedmiotowej, jak i metaprzedmiotowej) oraz mnogość perspektyw w ramach filozofii nauki. Zagadnienie pluralizmu omówiono w odniesieniu do stanowiska lubelskiego filozofa nauki, ks. prof. Zygmunta Hajduka. Twierdzi się, że swoiste pluralistyczne podejście do nauki oraz problemów z zakresu filozofii nauki zajmowało istotne miejsce w jego filozoficznej refleksji. Celem artykułu jest próba scharakteryzowania i interpretacji jego podejścia. Cel ten realizowany jest w kilku etapach. Zarysowano historyczne tło omawianej problematyki. W oparciu o (...) literaturę przedmiotu zostały wyróżnione rodzaje pluralizmów, a następnie przedstawiono własną propozycję ich odróżniania (w nawiązaniu do prac ks. Hajduka). Jest to model trzech płaszczyzn analizy nauki: przedmiotowej, metodologicznej oraz metametodologicznej. Na każdej z tych płaszczyzn można stwierdzić pluralizm ujęć. Model ten zastosowano do studium stanowiska ks. Hajduka w kwestii pluralizmu w nauce i metanauce. Nawiązując do filozofii nauki Paula Feyerabenda, zaproponowano interpretację filozoficznego dorobku ks. Hajduka i określonojego stanowisko mianem „dobry empirysta”. (shrink)

Author: Sójka Jacek Title: STUDIES IN CULTURE AND THEIR ORIGINS (Kulturoznawstwo i jego źródła) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 171-181 Keywords: STUDIES IN CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, JÓZEF CHAŁASIŃSKI, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author traced the origins of studies in culture (in Polish: kulturoznawstwo). The first part deals with the philosophical tradition out of which (...) several philosophies of culture had emerged, esp. within German philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The second part is dedicated to the tradition of British cultural studies which has influenced considerably today’s reflection on culture. Finally, the third part points at the Polish sociology of culture of the last century. A special emphasis was put on the work of Józef Chałasiński who tried to work out a “science of culture in its totality”. His “American culture” from 1962 can be seen as a project of cultural studies in today’s sense of the word. In conclusion the author tries to relate all three sources of studies in culture to the theory of Jerzy Kmita, a founder of studies in culture developed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. (shrink)

We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. We claim that "plain" and "necessitated" counterfactuals differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework. We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of the identification of "would" with "would necessarily".

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.