Quem quer que de algum modo tenha se ocupado da teoria da poesia, e particularmente da tragédia, recordar-se-á de uma passagem em Aristóteles que causou muita dificuldade aos intérpretes, sem que pudessem concordar completamente sobre o seu significado. Numa caracterização mais precisa da tragédia, o grande homem parece esperar dela que, por meio da encenação de ações e acontecimentos que suscitam compaixão e medo, purifique (reinigen) o ânimo do espectador das paixões mencionadas. Acredito poder comunicar de melhor maneira meus pensamentos (...) e minha convicção sobre a passagem mencionada por meio de uma tradução dela. (shrink)

The paper treats the character and significance of J.W. Goethes personality in Simon L. Franks interpretation. The study is based upon principles of historicism and development; it uses the methods of the unity of historical and logical, comparative-typological and textual methods. The paper demonstrates why the Russian philosopher turns to examine the works of the German thinker and the role of Goethes ideas in becoming of Franks philosophical system. It clarifies Georg Simmels influence on methodological approach to the definition of (...) spiritual personality with respect to the conceptual distinction of objective and subjective culture. The paper also analyses Franks distinction between two types of genii - pure genii of life and purely objective genii, - and applying that method with respect to understand Goethes spiritual personality. Frank was very far from idealising the Goethes particular personality, but he had rather found in what he called the Goethes type an aspiration for the harmonious unity of personal and sobornoye being. Accomplishing of such a type - as far as he had been capable - was considered by the Russian thinker not only the life purpose of any spiritual personality, but as well as a peculiar prescription against the crisis of the contemporary culture. The paper also reflects on Franks participation on occasion to 100 years anniversary, since Goethes death. In appendix, there are lecture notes of Franks lecture 1932, dedicated to Goethes spiritual personality that are published for the first time. The conclusion is made that considering Goethes impact on Simon Frank - as well as any influence, caused by not a systematic philosopher, but an artist-thinker in general - one should take into consideration not only the reception of separate ideas and concepts, but significance of the personality as a whole. It is said about the unique synthesis of living personal development and the objective creative work results. (shrink)

Central representational problems of Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften are concentrated in the thematic complexes of archiving, preservation, and restoration, which have received little attention to date. Goethe’s engagement with archival discourses and techniques of the late 18th century, as will be shown here, not only illuminates an important historical background of the novel, but also makes clear that his interest in the theory and practice of archives as well as his »archival poetics« described for his late work is already crucial (...) for the time of the Wahlverwandtschaften. (shrink)

The contributors to this new philosophi­cal and historical examination of Vico, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe are Karl J. Fink, James W. Marchand, Harry Ritter, K. Michael Seibt, and David R. Ste­venson. Their essays and commentary address the question why this generation represent­ed by its great minds suddenly discov­ered science—a question posed previ­ously but only tentatively explored. Taken together, the essayists reveal significant new insights into the roles of language, imagination, intuition, em­pathy, modes of perception, and indiv­idualism in scientific creativity (...) and pro­vide important new contributions to the history of arts and sciences. (shrink)

This is one of those obviously worked-over doctoral dissertations. There is one chapter which reviews all previous studies dealing with Schweitzer, with copious footnotes in many languages. In spite of Clark's underlying attitude of adulation of the Master, his analysis of Schweitzer's thought is rather helpful. He places Schweitzer in the main stream of nineteenth-century German romantic thought and examines the impact that that thought had upon the theologians of the period. But he believes that Schweitzer is foremost an ethical (...) thinker, not a theologian, and that the true sources of his thought are in the ethicists of the nineteenth-century and not the theologians. Clark insists that Schweitzer's thought is characterized by two major emphases, one that ethics must be founded on rational thought, the second that human selfhood is fundamentally good. Clark finds the origins for these two notions in Kant's Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals. Schweitzer's relationship to such diverse thinkers as Darwin, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Nietzsche is also traced. The term "world-affirmation" emerges in Schweitzer's thought as a fundamental ethical category: it implies "ethical self-devotion to one's fellow-creatures." Hence, it is rather easy to make the jump from one's fellow-creatures, conceived solely as human fellow-creatures, to a "reverence for life" of all creatures, human and animal. Schweitzer owes a great deal to the social gospel movement of the latter half of the nineteenth-century. He believed in the "coming Era of Peace" and he spoke of the Kingdom of God as a possibility within history. "Sooner or later," he writes, "there must dawn the true and final Renaissance which will bring peace to the world." The result of Clark's work is that Schweitzer remains the enigmatic, other-worldly patrician Renaissance-man, but we now have at least a hint as to the sources of his unique and complicated philosophy of civilization. Clark mentions in passing that Goethe may be the major influence on Schweitzer's thought.--W. A. J. (shrink)

The paper aims to understand whether morphology can be framed as a language for aesthetics. In particular, whether Olaf Breidbach’s contribution can determine its fundamental terms. These are related to the notion of forms and images. Hence, the paper is structured into three parts: i) framing of research on morphology in Ger-many; ii) analysis of Goethe’s method and vocabulary from an aesthetic standpoint; iii) presentation of Breidbach’s proposal in relation to Goethe.

Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as near opposites. Whereas an intuitive understanding could have a direct grasp of something, a discursive understanding would always depend on what is given to it, as mediated by concepts. In this essay, I suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy presents a way of overcoming this opposition. For Ricoeur, an analogy works within discursive understanding, but it depends on an eventful insight that leads beyond what is (...) merely given in discourse. The analogy “gives more” for thought. Yet, as I argue, what analogy gives for thought is always explicable in conceptual terms: any intuitive understanding is commensurate with a discursive one. I illustrate Ricoeur’s mediation of discursive and intuitive understanding in particular with his conception of metaphor, which vividly depends on overcoming a discursive contradiction by analogical and intuitive means. Before introducing Ricoeur’s conception, I discuss the Kantian background of the intuitive/discursive distinction. In particular, I suggest how Goethe’s attempt to revitalize a notion of intuitive understanding can be compared to Ricoeur’s conception, though Ricoeur improves upon Goethe by grounding intuition in the specific phenomenon of analogy. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est d'examiner à fonds les relations qu'il y a entre les données de la science sur la matière et l'énergie, et les notions philosophiques de substance et d'accident. Il s'agit ici spécialement des deux questions suivantes : d'abord, doit-ön appeler vraiment exacte l'expression : « la matière se transforme en énergie » et ensuite : peut-on vraiment dire qu'il n'y ait pas de matière dans l'espace vide d'air ? C'est de propos délibéré que nous avons (...) choisi pour l'étude de ces questions la méthode qui consiste à interroger, autant que possible, les données mêmes de la science. Nous esquissons dès lors rapidement dans la première partie de l'article les théories physiques concernant notre sujet. Puis, dans la seconde partie, nous essayons d'en donner une interprétation. Cette interprétation met en lumière l'intuition plus profonde, qui se cache dans la connaissance du physicien, et qui ne saurait s'exprimer d'une manière achevée dans le cadre de la théorie physique comme telle. Il est nécessaire dès lors de donner une notion exacte de la substance. Tout physicien d'ailleurs tient implicitement compte de cette notion, dès qu'il ne se contente plus seulement des seules formules, mais qu'il y ajoute des explications. On doit toutefois circonscrire avec un soin particulier le sens attaché à la notion de « substance matérielle ». Il ne faudra pas par exemple trop insister sur l'occupation d'une certaine partie de l'espace bien tranchée. On doit aussi éviter une espèce d'anthropomorphisme dans laquelle on attribuerait à la substance matérielle une intériorité ou une indépendance trop grandes. Nous espérons être arrivé ainsi à des conclusions fondamentales sur la notion de la substance matérielle, ainsi que sur la nature de l'espace appelé vide. (shrink)

Peut-être que jusqu'ici dans les recherches philosophiques sur la nature du temps on a attribué trop peu d'attention à la distinction entre « temps » comme catégorie mathématique d'une part, et « temps » comme il est réalisé dans des processus et des périodes d'autre part. Quand on essaie de combler ce vide, on éprouve le besoin d'impliquer dans ses considérations l'apparition fréquente de « nouveauté » et de « commencement ». C'est pourquoi on examine dans la première partie de (...) cet article comment nous nous formons une notion mathématique du temps. Il apparaît que cela se fait en idéalisant la perception des périodes. On s'imagine que l'unité du temps une fois choisie peut être reproduite exactement, et même jusqu'à l'inñni. En outre on s'imagine que chaque période peut être divisée en des intervalles arbitrairement petits. Un instant est pensé comme une limite nette entre le temps qui précède et le temps qui suit ; ici la séparation entre les deux parties du temps est posée comme absolue contre arrière-plan d'un temps dont justement la cohérence est posée comme absolue. C'est ainsi que naît la catégorie du temps comme une possibilité homogène, toujours égale à elle-même pour indiquer des instants indivisibles et pour délimiter des périodes, à savoir une possibilité qui s'étend sans limites des deux côtés de l'instant actuel, aussi bien vers l'avenir que vers le passé. Quand on indique un instant, deux notions contradictoires sont posées en même temps, à savoir une séparation absolue et une cohérence absolue. Dans la physique ce schéma mathématique s'avère extrêmement utile. Pourtant il s'agit de se rendre toujours compte de l'applicabilité défectueuse de ce schéma, de sorte qu'on fasse attention aux complications qui exigent un complément et une correction de la théorie. Quand on applique le même schéma aussi aux processus vitaux et aux événements psychiques, alors l'incohérence entre le schéma mathématique et la succession réelle des périodes se trouve encore plus grande. Dans la deuxième partie on analyse le « commencement ». De la manière la plus originelle un commencement se présente devant nous, quand nous essayons d'avoir une vue d'ensemble de notre propre vie, comme elle se trouve dans notre mémoire. Dans le passé nous rencontrons alors une frontière que nous ne pouvons pas marquer cependant nettement sur une échelle mathématique. Ainsi en analysant chaque commencement on doit distinguer de nouveau soigneusement le commencement dans le domaine mathématique de celui dans l'ordre réel. Le caractère abrupt qui est propre à un commencement « mathématique » se trouve absent dans un commencement « réel ». Dans la troisième partie il est démontré que le temps et le commencement sont inséparablement liés l'un à l'autre. Le temps réel apparaît partout dans des périodes ayant un commencement et ainsi dans un ensemble compliqué de commencement et de permanence. Toutes les totalités dans la nature vivante et dans la nature inanimée, les individus ainsi que les espèces, ont été neuves une fois. Avant ce commencement multiple notre univers a été neuf. Cependant, alors il appert que cette mesure perd son utilité. Lorsque l'univers était encore en gestation, notre temps, lui aussi, avec sa mesure était en formation. C'est pourquoi une localisation exacte du commencement de l'univers sur l'échelle du temps n'est pas seulement impossible, mais même absurde. Cependant, si un commencement ne peut jamais être déñni de façon mathématique, il est pourtant défini de sa manière particulière dans le temps, c'est à dire par une définition qui essentiellement contient une certaine imprécision. Quant au commencement de l'univers les sciences physiques conduisent par des chemins différents à un même résultat, et font conclure à un âge de l'univers de quatre milliards et demi d'années environ. Finalement une question concernant la notion de création se présente. La tradition connaît en effet une notion de création dans un sens très stricte, distinguée des notions de « conservatio » et de « concursus ». On a l'habitude de lier le fait de la création à un seul ou à quelques instants. Mais nous croyons pouvoir démontrer que dans la dépendance que les créatures ont a l'égard du Créateur, il y a toujours aussi un aspect d' « être créé » dans le sens cité plus haut, un aspect qui se met d'autant plus au premier rang qu'il y a plus de nouveauté et de discontinuité vis à vis du passé. (shrink)

"This document records some important laws of classical predicate logic. It is designed as a reservoir to be tapped by users of logic, in system development. Though a systematic presentation is attempted, many of the laws appear just because they happen to be useful.".

J. W. Goethe is well known as one of the world's greatest poets. Some are also aware that throughout his long and active life Goethe devoted much of his time to natural science. His theory of colour and studies in the morphology of plants are acknowledged contributions in their fields. What is much less known is that in his scientific work Goethe was attempting to elaborate and justify a new basic methodology for the natural sciences. He opposed (...) and wished to refute the one-sided quantitative-mechanistic method which had been dominant since Galileo and Newton (and in principle still prevails today) and to set up against it a qualitative method. An essential characteristic of this qualitative method, according to Goethe, is that it is immune to a Humean reduction of the status of 'natural laws' to mere hypotheses. This claim makes Goethe's view directly relevant for current discussion of such questions as the status of scientific 'laws' and the correct method of theory construction. The present essay tries to show the fruitfulness of Goethe's view for such discussions, partly by means of an exposition of the view — drawn from various works — and partly by drawing consequences from it which bring it into direct contact with contemporary discussions in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Nastava iz prirodoslovnog područja danas se najčešće temelji na principima konstruktivizma prema kojima djeca trebaju biti aktivni sudionici procesa učenja i izgrađivati svoje znanje na temelju iskustva. Metode i sredstva korištena u nastavi prirodoslovnog područja moraju biti prilagođeni perceptivnim potrebama slijepe djece i djece s oštećenjima vida kako bi im se omogućilo aktivno sudjelovanje u procesu učenja. Cilj ovoga rada je opisati posljednje spoznaje o aktivnom i istraživačkom učenju slijepe djece i djece s oštećenjima vida u nastavi prirodoslovnog područja te (...) otkloniti postojeće zablude. Nadalje, rad predstavlja recentna istraživanja koja ukazuju na prilagođene uspješne i visokokvalitetne odgojno-obrazovne pristupe i metode. S obzirom na navedeno, sadržaj rada bit će od koristi nastavnicima iz prirodoslovnog područja, kao i istraživačima inkluzivnih učionica. (shrink)

The paper concerns the science of colors (die Farbenlehre) on which among others J.W. Goethe and W. Ostwald were focused. The first part of this essay describes the science of colors in the period from antiquity to late Renaissance. In the pre-scientific phase it was intervened with philosophical speculations as well with symbolism of magic, religions and customs. Since Newton’s time there are distinguished the colors of light and the colors of objects. J.W. Goethe’s Farbenlehre, discussed in the (...) second part, connects empirical studies and metaphysical vision of the light and colors. W. Ostwald, a distinguished chemist and philosopher-energetist, attempted to construct measurable Farbenlehre. He is a creator of a strict colors’ taxonomy, but his soul of artist (he was also a painter) “crept into” his study of colors. The discussion of Ostwald’s deliberations is contained in the third part of the paper. (shrink)

What is the relationship between thinking and seeing a form? In his morphological writings Goethe answers this question by saying that seeing is not pure passivity, but a thoughtful look because it invokes the mobility and plasticity of our thinking. For this reason this kind of aesthetic gaze is useful to understand the world of life, equally mobile and plastic. In this article, I will try to find out whether Goethe’s considerations about aesthetic idea and plasticity can find (...) a new-look in the reflections of Catherine Malabou, one of the most influential thinkers in contemporary French debate, in whose works the concept of plastic form is central. (shrink)

Resumo: O ensaio a seguir tematiza o livro Viagem à Itália, no qual J. W. Goethe relata o período passado em território italiano, nos anos de 1786 e 1787. Procuro contextualizar essa viagem na vida e na carreira do escritor, servindo-me, para isso, especialmente de um texto sobre ele escrito por Walter Benjamin. Comento as observações de Goethe sobre a natureza, ligadas a suas pesquisas científicas, mas meu principal interesse são as observações sobre a arte e sobre a (...) Antiguidade. Nestas, identifico não só a importante influência do historiador da arte J. J. Winckelmann, como também a orientação para o classicismo, algo que marcaria a produção artística de Goethe a partir daquele período passado em território italiano.: The following paper discusses the book Italian Journey, in which J. W. Goethe described his travels in Italian territory in the years 1786 and 1787. I try to contextualize this journey within the writer’s life and career, referring especially to a text by Walter Benjamin. I comment on Goethe’s remarks on nature, which are linked to his scientific researches, but my main interest is in his remarks on art and classical antiquity. In these remarks, I recognize the important influence of the art historian J. J. Winckelmann and also a tendency toward classicism, something which defined Goethe’s artistic production from the time of his Italian travels onward. (shrink)

When philosophers put forward claims for or against 'property', it is often unclear whether they are talking about the same thing that lawyers mean by 'property'. Likewise, when lawyers appeal to 'justice' in interpreting or criticizing legal rules we do not know if they have in mind something that philosophers would recognize as 'justice'. J. W. Harris here examines the legal and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of property and offers a new analytical framework for understanding property and justice.

A. A. Fet’s translation of J. W. Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea is an important early example of Fet’s lifelong practice as a translator and attests to his well-known fidelity to his source texts. His strongest preference is to maintain the versification characteristics of his source, but the degree of his lexical-semantic fidelity is also very strong and far outranks fidelity on other levels (phonetic, grammatical). The poet evidently translated holistically within very small textual domains, within which he sometimes isolated (...) pivots of core semantic information (which he located in translation as they were in the original), around which less important material was fitted, insofar as space permitted. In Fet’s text, versification limitations sometimes led to lexical-semantic mismatches of semanticdenotation, and these mismatches are characterized in the paper: they typically involve repetitions, repeated mentions, or known information, and the mismatch may entail full or partial loss or enrichment of the semantics of the original. In addition, conflicts sometimes arise between denotative requirements within the local domain and the cumulative (usually connotative) associations generated across the larger domain of the whole text. When such conflicts arise, Fet resolves them in favour of small-domain accuracy, resulting in semantic changes (‘shifts’) in the domain of the poetic text, which thereby loses some rhetorical or poetic force, relative to the original. Dissonance between large- and smalldomain semantics is often inevitable, because of the language-specific nature of connotation. To the extent that the semantics of Fet’s translation are a consequence of his personal preferences, they may be viewed in the context of, first, his early school training (not far behind him when he translated Hermann und Dorothea) and, second, his status as both professional poet, writing in Russian, and educated native German-Russian bilingual. (shrink)

On the Threshold of Appearance: The Late Heidegger (1950 – 1976) as a Reader of Goethe The relevance of J.W. Goethe to Heidegger’s thinking still needs to be fully assessed: this is particularly true for the phase of Heidegger’s Denkweg following 1950, when by his own admission he started to re-valuate Goethe. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the late Heidegger’s (1950 – 1976) reading of Goethe in light of two recently published witnesses: 1) (...) a brief comment on a few lines of Goethe’s Pandora in Notturno I (1954 – 1957) and 2) the selection of the manuscript Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage, issued as the 2011/12 Jahresgabe of the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft under the title Auszüge zur Phänomenologie (1973 – 1975). After briefly recalling the events connected to the revaluation of Goethe in the 1950s (§1) as well as the altogether minimizing interpretations which have been given to it so far (§2), an attempt is made to demonstrate that the late Heidegger indeed experienced a growing connection to Goethe, notably as far as his way of seeing the phenomena is concerned. The paper first deals with Notturno I (§2a), where Goethe is judged to be to some extent sensible to the a-lethic movement of the Event, and then moves to the Auszüge (§2b), where Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology in terms of Phänomenophasis coincides with a new confrontation with Goethe’s Farbenlehre and in particular with Goethe’s notion of Urphänomen. (shrink)