In The Phenomenology of Religious Belief, the renowned philosopher Michael J. Shapiro investigates how art - and in particular literature and film - can impact upon both traditional interpretations and critical studies of religious beliefs and experiences. In doing so, he examines the work of prolific and award-winning writers such as Toni Morrison, Philip K. Dick and Robert Coover. By placing their work in conjunction with critical analyses of media by the likes of Ingmar Bergman and Pier Paolo Pasolini and (...) combining it with the work of groundbreaking thinkers such as George Canguilhem, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek, Shapiro takes a truly interdisciplinary approach to the question of how life should be lived. His assessment of phenomenological subjectivity also leads him to question the nature of political theology and extend the criticism of Pauline theology. (shrink)

Language plays a central role in human life. However, the term 'language' as defined in the language sciences of the 20th century and the traditions these have drawn on, have arguably, limited our thinking about what language is and does. The two inter-linked volumes of Thibault's study articulate crucially important aspects of an emerging new perspective shift on language - the Distributed Language view - that is now receiving more and more attention internationally. Rejecting the classical view that the fundamental (...) architecture of language can be localized as a number of inter-related levels of formal linguistic organization that function as the coded inputs and outputs to each other, the distributed language view argues that languaging behaviour is a bio-cultural organisation of process that is embodied, multimodal, and integrated across multiple space-time scales. Thibault argues that we need to think of human languaging as the distinctively human mode of our becoming and being selves in the extended human ecology and the kinds of experiencing that this makes possible. Paradoxically, this also means thinking about language in non-linguistic ways that break the grip of the conventional meta-languages for thinking about human languaging. Thibault's book grounds languaging in process theory: languaging and the forms of experience it actualizes is always an event, not a thing that we 'use'. In taking a distinctively interdisciplinary approach, the book relates dialogical theories of human sense-making to the distributed view of human cognition, to recent thinking about distributed language, to ecological psychology, and to languaging as inter-individual affective dynamics grounded in the subjective lives of selves. In taking this approach, the book considers the coordination of selves in social encounters, the emergent forms of self-reflexivity that characterise these encounters, and the implications for how we think of and live our human sociality, not as something that is mediated by over-arching codes and systems, but as emerging from the endogenous subjectivities of selves when they seek to coordinate with other selves and with the situations, artefacts, social institutions, and technologies that populate the extended human ecology. The two volumes aim to bring our understanding of human languaging closer to human embodiment, experience, and feeling while also showing how languaging enables humans to transcend local circumstances and thus to dialogue with cultural tradition. Volume 1 focuses on the shorter timescales of bodily dynamics in languaging activity. Volume II integrates the shorter timescales of body dynamics to the longer cultural-historical timescales of the linguistic and cultural norms and patterns to which bodily dynamics are integrated. (shrink)

(2011). Mindfulness: diverse perspectives on its meaning, origins, and multiple applications at the intersection of science and dharma. Contemporary Buddhism: Vol. 12, Mindfulness: diverse perspectives on its meaning, origins, and multiple applications at the intersection of science and dharma, pp. 1-18. doi: 10.1080/14639947.2011.564811.

Intellectual autonomy has long been identified as an epistemic virtue, one that has been championed influentially by (among others) Kant, Hume and Emerson. Manifesting intellectual autonomy, at least, in a virtuous way, does not require that we form our beliefs in cognitive isolation. Rather, as Roberts and Wood (Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, OUP Oxford, Oxford, pp. 259–260, 2007) note, intellectually virtuous autonomy involves reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, etc.) to an appropriate extent, while (...) at the same time maintaining intellectual self-direction. In this essay, I want to investigate the ramifications for intellectual autonomy of a particular kind of epistemic dependence: cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancements (as opposed to therapeutic cognitive improvements) involve the use of technology and medicine to improve cognitive capacities in healthy individuals, through mechanisms ranging from smart drugs to brain-computer interfaces. With reference to case studies in bioethics, as well as the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is shown that epistemic dependence, in this extreme form, poses a prima facie threat to the retention of intellectual autonomy, specifically, by threatening to undermine our intellectual self-direction. My aim will be to show why certain kinds of cognitive enhancements are subject to this objection from self-direction, while others are not. Once this is established, we’ll see that even some extreme kinds of cognitive enhancement might be not merely compatible with, but constitutive of, virtuous intellectual autonomy. (shrink)

This article attempts to illustrate the originality, depth, and farsightedness of Joseph Raz's conception, especially his idea that legal norms provide us with protected reasons to act, that is, with first-order reasons to behave as they prescribe, and with second-order, exclusionary reasons not to act for reasons against what they prescribe. But the article also highlights some aspects that raise doubts in my mind, especially with regard to the scope of these exclusionary reasons. This in two ways: by asking, on (...) the one hand, in what sense and subject to what limits legal norms provide exclusionary reasons for the organs entrusted with applying the law, especially for judges, and on the other hand, how and to what extent legal norms provide citizens with exclusionary reasons. So, in recognizing the strength of the Razian conception, the article also points to some of the difficulties it faces. (shrink)

Terminologically, the “topos of mu” and the “predicative self” originated in the Kyoto School and are traceable to the work of its founder NISHIDA Kitarō. The full phrase was coined by NAKAMURA Yūjirō. Conceptually, the topos of mu or place of nothingness is Nishida’s development of the Buddhist notion of anatta or no self and radiating out from that locus of emptiness is a self constituted by its predicates or the things to which it is connected by an existential copula. (...) Deeply ingrained in Western languages, metaphysics, and religion is the subjective self, in both the linguistic and psychological senses of “subjective.” That Buddhism, as reworked by the Kyota School, or Daoism, or any other non-Western tradition of thought, will catch on in the West was a puerile fantasy of some members of the first generation of environmental philosophers. There is a good chance, however, that the Western worldview may evolve toward a similar conception of the self—as ecological, relational, or systems thinking becomes ever more ingrained. We in the West may come to understand that we are constituted by our social and environmental relationships, in which we are deeply embedded and on which we are utterly dependent, such that world care is the essence of self-help. (shrink)

In this book, J.H. Plumb investigates the way that humankind has, since the beginning of recorded time, molded the past to give sanction to their institutions of government, their social structure and morality. The past has also been called upon to explain the nature of our destiny in order both to strengthen the objectives of society and to reconcile us to our lot. J.H. Plumb questions this sanction of the past, the force that it has on our sense of destiny (...) and its relevance to our own times. This classic text is now reissued with a new introduction by Niall Ferguson, placing it within a contemporary context, and with a new foreword by the eminent historian Simon Schama, a former student of J.H.Plumb himself. (shrink)

Galton and subsequent investigators find wide divergences in people's subjective reports of mental imagery. Such individual differences might be taken to explain the peculiarly irreconcilable disputes over the nature and cognitive significance of imagery which have periodically broken out among psychologists and philosophers. However, to so explain these disputes is itself to take a substantive and questionable position on the cognitive role of imagery. This article distinguishes three separable issues over which people can be "for" or "against" mental images. Conflation (...) of these issues can lead to theoretical differences being mistaken for experiential differences, even by theorists themselves. This is applied to the case of John B. Watson, who inaugurated a half-century of neglect of image psychology. Watson originally claimed to have vivid imagery; by 1913 he was denying the existence of images. This strange reversal, which made his behaviorism possible, is explicable as a "creative misconstrual" of Dunlap's "motor" theory of imagination. (shrink)

This paper traces an expanded ethical perspective for youth and community work (YCW) practice in response to the climate and biodiversity crises. Discussing ecological ethics, we problematise the liberal humanist emphasis on utilitarianism and reject it as inappropriate for YCW in these times. Instead, we argue for an ecocentric practice ethic which intrinsically values the non-human world. To advance an ecocentric ethical perspective for YCW we draw on decolonial and posthuman theory. Inspired by a Freirean dialogical approach, we apply these (...) theoretical domains as lenses to problematise YCW practice, seeking a generative dialogue between perspectives. Through this, we identify three emergent tasks for ecocentric YCW: (a) thinking and acting beyond the individual; (b) cultivating reciprocal care and connection and (c) practicing critical pedagogies of place. This third element builds on YCW's social pedagogic tradition and provides a practical means to incorporate ecocentric ideas into practice. We conclude that, given the unprecedented implications of climate crises and biodiversity collapse, a YCW ethics that does not consider these implications for young people is insufficient for the context of practice today. Enacting an ecocentric YCW ethics requires ongoing collective praxis and dialogue between young people, practitioners, educators, managers and students. (shrink)

This article reads Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the “flesh of the world” alongside the ontology that seems to undergird Frantz Fanon's sociodiagnostics as well as his theory of sociogeny. It argues that reading Fanonian sociogeny in terms of the ambiguity and intercorporeality of the flesh of the world renders the ethical and political imperatives of Fanon's decolonial project all the more pressing, since the “new human” is prefigured—if not totally determined—in the national consciousness obtained by “les damnés” through the decolonization (...) process. It then examines how Sylvia Wynter's Fanonian call to (re)fashion the future of humanness through (re)conceptualizing “being human as praxis,” also seems to rely on this ontology of the flesh of the world. Bringing these arguments together, the article suggests that the conceptual content of the new human can be found in the liberation struggles of les damnés across what Wynter calls the “poverty archipelagos” wrought by colonial humanism. Hence, the “new skin” for which Fanon calls is fashioned through forming international solidarity with les damnés, with the conceptual content of the new humanism emerging sociogenically—and autopoetically—from those struggles themselves. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The True Purpose of Religion in a Processive Naturalistic UniverseJ. Edward HackettMan's value experiences are certainly no mere subjective creations of his fancy or his mores; beauty, order, cooperation, adaptation, have their objective grounds. There are axiogenetic processes in nature, and religion is an attitude of respect for and trust in those processes.1—Edgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of ReligionSome rationality certainly does characterize our universe.2—William James, A Pluralistic Universelet (...) us start our meditation on science and religion by first thinking about what assumptions scientists are committed to in practice. Science is an attempt to know nature through four assumptions: (1) All things are physical; (2) physical relationships are cause and effect relationships; (3) by assuming all things are physical, then a scientist can systematically test various experimental findings in the hopes of those findings becoming theories and generalized laws; and finally (4) scientific inquiry may embrace (1)–(3) as an ontological limit to conceive of the whole. In acting in accordance with (1)–(4), scientists simply do science in their respective regions of inquiry. Biologists inquire into the region of living things and chemists investigate the chemical composition of matter. Scientists operate under these assumptions, and scientists may proceed under these assumptions for their entire lifetime without ever moving beyond them. The reader shall notice that I worded the fourth assumption as scientific inquiry may embrace (1)–(3) as an ontological limit to conceive of the whole because scientists may assume their methodological assumptions hold for all inquiry. They may uncritically assume such a powerful stance, and yet a scientist does not have to embrace the fourth assumption. Any methodological naturalist may be fine assuming (1)–(3) without the need to do metaphysics. At the same time, if a scientist wants to move past the methodological naturalism of (1)–(3) and not be so [End Page 22] dogmatic regarding (4), then science may be a springboard to another form of inquiry either into philosophical or theological speculation. Here, I mean speculation as Alfred North Whitehead described the term as speculative philosophy. "Speculative philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, and necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."3 For me, William James's radical empiricism united with his pragmatism succeeds in providing a necessary system of general ideas wherein all elements of experience can be interpreted.4 In agreement with Whitehead, James thinks speculative philosophy to be possible by incorporating religion and scientific elements as components of a speculative philosophy. Whitehead states:Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by its close relations with religion and with science, natural and sociological. It attains its chief importance by fusing the two, namely, religion and science, into one rational scheme of thought. Religion should connect the rational generality of philosophy with the emotions and purposes springing out of existence in a particular society, in a particular epoch, and conditioned by particular antecedents. Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity. Philosophy finds religion, and modifies it; and conversely religion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into its own scheme.5In this passage, one already sees one aspect of radical empiricism, namely, that we first experience elements in qualitative immediacy as particulars. What's more, in the explanation to follow, like Whitehead, experience is the ground in which the purposes of both religion and science are integrated. Science, for Whitehead, and for our purposes here, is only "concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the percepta [what we call percepts in James] themselves."6 Religion concerns a more intimate awareness with oneself and the cosmos and, very much like James, Whitehead returns to experience.Recall the four assumptions mentioned above. If we transgress the fourth assumption while keeping in mind (1)–(3), then we might be tempted to say that the final act of bringing science to completion is to interpret science in relationship to the very whole to which the scientist, being... (shrink)

Selections of works by and about J. Krishnamurti.

In The Stigma of Genius: Einstein, Consciousness and Critical Education, we muse over ways in which to be, to become, to recognize uniqueness and different paths to genius. Understanding that there is no prescribed procedure, but only multiple actions, means, measures in which to recognize or teach to genius, we look at Einstein's life and knowledges to connect our pedagogies and students. Today's schools often exemplify an inability to stimulate and encourage students to find passion, goals, and reasons to be (...) educated. Our public school students are often not succeeding, many are failing and are discouraged. Teachers are exhausted, overworked, lacking respect and administrative support in districts controlled by local and national politics. Using Einstein as an example, but also a metaphor for educators, The Stigma of Genius is straight talk about the needs for schools/teachers/administrators/students to become critically and contextually aware. We argue for an education which is conscious of students' needs, and the nuances within each school and each classroom. Discussing cognition, classes, urban education, and diversity, we have attempted to circle back to Einstein and understand ways to support and encourage today's geniuses. (shrink)

_The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill_ took thirty years to complete and is acknowledged as the definitive edition of J.S. Mill and as one of the finest works editions ever completed. Mill's contributions to philosophy, economics, and history, and in the roles of scholar, politician and journalist can hardly be overstated and this edition remains the only reliable version of the full range of Mill's writings. Each volume contains extensive notes, a new introduction and an index. Many of the (...) volumes have been unavailable for some time, but the _Works_ are now again available, both as a complete set and as individual volumes. (shrink)

"This volume offers a new translation of the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius' commentary on the chapters concerning place and time in Aristotle's Physics, Book Four. Written after the closing of the Athenian Neoplatonist school in A.D. 529, the commentary clarifies the structure and meaning of Aristotle's arguments and provides a rich account of 800 years of interpretation." "Surprisingly, in the first five chapters of Book Four Aristotle shows place as two-dimensional: one's place is the two-dimensional inner surface of one's surroundings. He (...) also suggests that the upward motion of air and fire and the downward motion of earth and water are partly explained by the natural places to which they tend. Place thus has power (dunamis) of its own. In his last five chapters, Aristotle argues that if time did not entail change its passage would be undetectable, and that time, by definition countable, requires the existence of conscious beings to do the counting. Among the many relevant views that Simplicius records are those of Galen, who attacks this claim, and of Eudemus, who rebuts the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. J. O. Urmson's translation serves as a companion to his earlier translation of the Corollaries on Place and Time, in which Simplicius sets forth his own views as distinct from those of Aristotle." "A major sourcebook for the interpretation of Aristotle, this volume will be welcomed by scholars and students in the fields of classics, ancient philosophy, ancient history, and medieval studies."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

With displacement, time, and force as basic undefined physical quantities, other physical quantities are defined as combinations of two vector quantities and one scalar quantity. Combinations include multiplication and division of vectors by vectors, scalars by vectors, and scalars by scalars. Defined quantities are vectors, scalars or quaternions, depending on directions of vectors in the definitions. Division of a vector by a vector is equivalent to multiplication of vectors divided by a scalar. The unit of a vector (or scalar) is (...) itself a vector (or scalar) quantity. Thesquare meter (a vector) differs from meter 2 (a scalar), and the cubic meter (a scalar) is different frommeter 3 . The characteristics of displacement, time, and force are considered known from experience. (shrink)