The nature of the soul is attribute-less and boundless. To experience its true potential, the dimensionless soul manifests itself in the physical dimension as a body. Materialism originates with the creation of the body as it grows around the soul and in the process of forming, enchants the soul with its materialistic conducts. The soul has the ability to materialize and dematerialize into bodily forms as per will, but such an entropic amendment may change the true essence of bodily life. (...) The avarice for materialistic needs mutilates the body physically and mentally, and unshackles the soul; for as we grow in our materialistic conducts, the body and its senses endure this burden, gradually progressing towards a lesser body and more soul. (shrink)

The practice of killing day-old chicks in the Dutch egg sector is a recurrent subject of societal debate. Preventing the killing of young animals and in ovo sex determination are the two main alternatives for this problem available. An online questionnaire was held to ask the opinion of the Dutch public about these alternatives. The results show that no alternative will be fully accepted, or accepted by more than half of Dutch society. However, the survey does provide an insight to (...) what people think is important for their choice: food safety and a good treatment of animals. Irrespective of the alternative chosen, these values should be safeguarded and communicated clearly. (shrink)

The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves (...) the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts. (shrink)

Most psychotherapeutic approaches are, to a greater or lesser extent, rooted in the theories and principles of scientific psychology. Nevertheless, in-session psychotherapeutic interaction between a therapist and a client is, at its core, a folk-psychological practice. As such, it is based on folk-psychological skills and competencies. But which ones exactly? This chapter argues that, while we may initially be inclined to perceive the practice of psychotherapy as primarily involving sophisticated mindreading on the part of both the therapist and the (...) client/patient, a complete characterization of psychotherapy must give at least the same amount of attention to different forms of therapeutic mindshaping. Using examples drawn from multiple therapeutic traditions, I illustrate how therapeutic mindreading and mindshaping interact. I conclude by highlighting some of the consequences of this perspective for the ethics and politics of psychotherapy. (shrink)

British idealism is usually regarded as having been, in the main, indifferent to the problems of the philosophy of history. The interest in the philosophy of history found in German, and later in Italian, idealism was allegedly not shared by the early generations of the British idealists. At best they are regarded as unwitting precursors of things to come, some of their reflections paving the way for subsequent advances in historical thinking. The British idealists, however, were not as economical with (...) their historical pronouncements as commonly believed. A more careful examination of their general writings and lesser known contributions reveals a more complex picture. One of stronger historical consciousness, knowledge of the philosophical developments in history, interest in its problems, and active involvement with historical scholarship. Further study will certainly illuminate the details of the entire character of British idealism with regard to its historical concerns. (shrink)

This chapter discusses author's view a Thomistic‐like dualism. Next, it lays out the details of his position and he argues that it has certain advantages over physicalist treatments of the human person, and, to a lesser degree, over alternate versions of substance dualism. Then, he responds to some objections against his position. He accepts constituent realism regarding properties (and relations), according to which properties (and relations) are universals that, when exemplified (and they need not be to exist), become constituents (...) of the ordinary particulars that have them. Furthermore, with the Thomistic framework in mind, the chapter offers his view of a human person. Finally, there is the argument that attempts to show that the unity of consciousness cannot be explained if one is a brain, because a brain is just an aggregate of different physical (separable) parts. (shrink)

The conception of entropy came from the theoretical study of the steam-engine, and, neglecting refinements of mathematical treatment, can easily be illustrated. The motive power of the engine comes from the transformation of the heat generated by the combustion of the fuel. The mechanism transforms the kinetic energy of the molecules of heated steam into the kinetic energy of the parts of the engine. Consider a steamship under way: for a brief period of time this can be regarded as an (...) automatic physical system. Some of the heat conveyed by the steam transforms directly into mechanical energy and some passes out into the ocean in the condenser water. We take the latter fraction: in the boiler there is a certain quantity, Q 1 , at a temperature of, say, 200°C, that is, 473° absolute, and its entropy is simply Q 1 /473° ab. The same quantity passes out into the ocean where its temperature falls to, say, 10°C, or 283° ab., and its entropy is now Q 1 /283° ab. Plainly the former quantity of entropy is less than the latter, so that in the transformation of heat into mechanical energy entropy has increased . The conception has been generalized so as to include all forms of energy and all physical transformations, and it can be shown that in all physical events that occur of themselves entropy increases. The conception includes these notions: Available and unavailable energy; greater or lesser improbability of the elements of the systems contemplated; and the physical meanings of before and after. (shrink)

This chapter examines truthfulness, or veracity, in the context of health care services within prisons, jails, and detention facilities in the United States. Mainstream discussions of bioethics often highlight the general importance of veracity within the patient-provider relationship, including providers’ obligations and constraints with respect to telling the truth to their patients, and, to a lesser extent, patients’ responsibilities and concerns regarding truthful reporting to their providers. However, a great deal of this literature largely overlooks how structural barriers to (...) health care impact the functions of veracity in the provision of health care—including racist and sexist biases in clinical judgment, inadequate staffing, infrastructure, and accessibility in medical facilities, and institutionally specific constraints. Through an analysis of Assata Shakur’s political autobiography, this chapter focuses on such structural barriers to health care in carceral facilities with a focus on the institutionally specific constraints that arise through the punitive aims of carceral facilities. By focusing on the intersection between punishment and health, this chapter argues that bioethicists and clinicians alike would be better equipped to analyze structural barriers to health care that exist both within and beyond prison walls through a nonideal approach. (shrink)

THE WORK OF ART AS COUNTER-VALUE: ASGER JORN'S CRITIQUE OF MARX'S ECONOMISK VALUE-THINKING IN CAPITALAs one of the rather significant and influential Modernist and Avant-garde artists of the 20th century Asger Jorn is internationally well-known and admired. Lesser known – or lesser accepted in the reception of his work – is the fact that his many critical writings on art, philosophy, and politics as well as his archives and political activism are integrated and important parts of his entire (...) artwork. For the first time in the reception of Jorn’s critical thinking the essay examines his Situationist criticism of Marx’ concepts of value, as outlined in the commodity analysis in Capital vol. 1, by regarding it a crucial example of his understanding of counter value as the only or most prominent quality of the artwork as such. (shrink)

Amongst Kant's lesser known early writings is a short treatise with the curious title Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, in which, with considerable acumen and brilliance, and not a little irony, Kant exposes the empty pretensions of his contemporary, the Swedish visionary and Biblical exegete, Emanuel Swedenborg, to have access to a spirit world, denied other mortals. Despite his efforts, it must be feared, however, that Kant did not, alas, succeed in laying the spirit of (...) Swedenborg himself to rest once and for all, for there has arisen in our own day, and within philosophy itself, a movement of thought, if such it can be called, which, like that of Swedenborg, is founded upon an unbridled and unhealthy exercise of the imagination, and apparently believes that philosophical problems can be discussed and resolved by the elaboration of fantastical, and at times repulsive, examples; if we require a name for this contemporary pretence at philosophy, we could take as our model the Italian word for science fiction, fantascienza, and call it ‘fantaphilosophy’: it is my aim to show that this fantaphilosophy is a phantom philosophy. (shrink)

In every generation the overwhelming majority of those who inhabited the imperium Romanum worked on the land and derived their sustenance directly from it. The notion is commonplace and scarcely admits of debate, but its implications for long have suffered unwarranted neglect. The well-being of any society ultimately rests upon the quantity and diversity of its food supplies, but the immediacy of their contact with the soil continually reminded the Roman people of this platitude with a force which few students (...) of their history today can readily appreciate. The annual yield of wheat in particular, always a staple item in the Roman diet, and to a lesser extent of such cereals as panic and millet, acutely affected every segment of the Roman community. One example will serve to illustrate the point. The dependence of the plebs urbana upon imported surpluses is notorious, equally the intense suffering and violence which typically accompanied any disruption of their supply. Such outbreaks frequently punctuated the chaotic final decades of the Republic, but they also scarred more than one régime during the first two centuries of the Principate. (shrink)

Background Visual atypicalities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are a well documented phenomenon, beginning as early as 2–6 months of age and manifesting in a significantly decreased attention to the eyes, direct gaze and socially salient information. Early emerging neurobiological deficits in perceiving social stimuli as rewarding or its active avoidance due to the anxiety it entails have been widely purported as potential reasons for this atypicality. Parallel research evidence also points to the significant benefits of animal presence for reducing (...) social anxiety and enhancing social interaction in children with autism. While atypicality in social attention in ASD has been widely substantiated, whether this atypicality persists equally across species types or is confined to humans has not been a key focus of research insofar. Methods We attempted a comprehensive examination of the differences in visual attention to static images of human and animal faces (40 images; 20 human faces and 20 animal faces) among children with ASD using an eye tracking paradigm. 44 children (ASD n = 21; TD n = 23) participated in the study (10,362 valid observations) across five regions of interest (left eye, right eye, eye region, face and screen). Results Results obtained revealed significantly greater social attention across human and animal stimuli in typical controls when compared to children with ASD. However in children with ASD, a significantly greater attention allocation was seen to animal faces and eye region and lesser attention to the animal mouth when compared to human faces, indicative of a clear attentional preference to socially salient regions of animal stimuli. The positive attentional bias toward animals was also seen in terms of a significantly greater visual attention to direct gaze in animal images. Conclusion Our results suggest the possibility that atypicalities in social attention in ASD may not be uniform across species. It adds to the current neural and biomarker evidence base of the potentially greater social reward processing and lesser social anxiety underlying animal stimuli as compared to human stimuli in children with ASD. (shrink)

More than six centuries of Christian and non-Christian reflection and admiration of Meister Eckhart are the subject matter of this very scholarly yet very readable work. Philosophers like Nicolas Cusanus and Hegel, great scholars like H. Denifle and a number of lesser men are examined in order to determine what they thought about Eckhart, what they learned from him, how much they knew of him. The medieval condemnations and Cusanus' admiration issued into a period of relative neglect of Eckhart, (...) broken only by the deserving attempts of Daniel Sudermann to collect Eckhart's manuscripts. The great Dominican did not come into his own until the beginning of the last century. Franz von Baader was the one who "discovered" him and who drew Hegel's attention to some of his texts. With the monographs by C. Schmidt and Bishop Martensen, Eckhart had become known to the philosophical public as a forerunner of nineteenth-century speculation and this image had not been shattered until Denifle shifted the focus of attention to the Latin texts with their more orthodox formulations. In this century there has been a renewal of interest in the German writings which continue to have a certain popular appeal, but now, thanks to the monumental edition of the complete works, a more objective and more scholarly atmosphere pervades the literature on Meister Eckhart.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Common-sense morality seems to tell us that a rescuer who can save either one individual or five other individuals from death has a duty to save the greater number. But contractualism, a moral theory on which principles must be justifiable to individuals, seems to imply that it is permissible to save the one. This is because a commitment to individual justification blocks the possibility of appealing to the aggregate amount of lives saved. Does contractualism really have this implication? If so, (...) should we side with the common-sense approach, or is there any reason to side with the contractualist? In this paper, I first examine a new argument from Jay Wallace which claims to reconcile contractualism with a duty to save the greater number. I find the argument to be unsuccessful. I then suggest that common-sense morality doesn't support a duty to save the greater number as straightforwardly as it might initially seem as it might initially seem. I introduce two mundane cases in which the permissibility of saving either the lesser or greater number is intuitively plausible, and I offer some reasons to think that the permissibility of saving the lesser number coheres with our value judgements more generally. (shrink)

Pseudonymous mathematician Nicolas Bourbaki and his lesser-known counterpart E.S. Pondiczery, devised respectively in France and in Princeton in the mid-1930s, together index a pivotal moment in the history of modern mathematics, marked by international infrastructures and institutions that depended on mathematicians’ willingness to play along with mediated personifications. By pushing these norms and practices of personification to their farcical limits, Bourbaki’s and Pondiczery’s impersonators underscored the consensual social foundations of legitimate participation in a scientific community and the symmetric fictional (...) character of both fraud and integrity in scientific authorship. To understand authorial identity and legitimacy, individual authors’ conduct and practices matter less than the collective interpersonal relations of authorial assertion and authentication that take place within disciplinary institutions. (shrink)

I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can (...) be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory. (shrink)

The Basotho of Lesotho and South Africa speak the same language, namely Sesotho. However, the two countries do not use the same orthography when writing Sesotho. This orthographic representation and its variations pose a significant challenge when Bible translators translate it into Sesotho. It also presents difficulties to readers of the Bible in South Africa when they have to read the Bible written in Lesotho orthography for the first time or to Lesotho readers who encounter Sesotho written in South African (...) orthography. The two orthographies are independent but complementary. The Lesotho orthography is older than the South African. It differs in the choice of letters and the marking of initial syllabic nasals and (to a much lesser extent) in written word division and the use of diacritics on vowels to distinguish some ambiguous spellings. Contribution: This article provides a historical examination of the problem beginning with the first efforts by French missionaries to write the language in the 19th century, the separate but interrelated development of the two orthographies in Lesotho and South Africa and the current impasse concerning a unified orthography. The analysis will include an examination of the linguistic issues involved, the sociolinguistic topics (including politics, education and religion) and various possible scenarios for resolving the problem will be considered. (shrink)

Part I. Aristotle proposed a method of defining an entity, e.g. an animal species, by successive subdivisions of the broader class ( genos) to which it belongs; if fully implemented, this would have resulted in a classification of animals. Definition of bird-species by subdivision of the class Birds would require the description of sub-classes intermediate between the major class and individual species. Examination of Aristotle's main discussions of birds shows that he had no complete system of such sub-classes, but four (...) groups of bird species are repeatedly mentioned and are described in some detail: Hook-taloned birds, terrestrial birds which fly weakly (i.e. Gallinaceous birds), web-footed birds, and fissipede waterside birds. Aristotle must have thought of these groups as, at least, likely to be usable in the definition of bird-species, but made little progress towards formulating such definitions. Part II. Pliny offers a hint of a different approach to avian classification; but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Edward Wotton, Belon, Gesner and Aldrovandi were most strongly influenced by Aristotle, and so, to a much lesser extent, were Willughby and Ray. Linnaeus and Yarrell are examples of eighteenth and nineteenth century authors who still made use in their classifications of the four groups, of hook-taloned birds etc., described in Part 1. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to give a high-level overview of Irenaeus’s beatific vision, and to suggest that for him, the beatific vision has a temporal dimension (now and future) and a dimension of degree (lesser now, greater in the future). His beatific vision is witnessed as it intersects with at least four main ideas in his writing—the Trinity, anthropology, resurrection, and his eschatology. Irenaeus famously held that ‘the glory of God is living man, and the life of (...) man is the vision of God’ (AH 4.20.7), which speaks to the reality of seeing God in the present, but he could also look forward in anticipation to beholding the face of God in the resurrected body in the new creation. What made the latter possible is the gradual beholding of God in the present that makes one prepared to see God’s glory in the future. Additionally, the visio Dei is Trinitarian. We behold God in Christ, since God the Father is invisible, and it is the Holy Spirit who prepares us incrementally to see God. (shrink)

In accord with its title this book focuses on the controverted object of Aristotelian metaphysics, under the formula of metaphysica generalis vis-à-vis a metaphysica specialis. It approaches the topic in the Wolffian setting standardized by Natorp, in which theological philosophy is a "regional" study without the universality required for a science of being qua being. Merlan insisted that there never had been a metaphysica generalis in Aristotle. Brinkmann concludes very differently that here Aristotle remained unclear and uncertain. However, in a (...) turning around of Merlan’s meaning through Hegel’s Logik the metaphysica generalis emerges triumphant. It has absorbed into itself the special types of metaphysics as well as the Aristotelian practical and productive sciences in a manner neither found in nor envisaged by the Stagirite himself. In no lesser way, and even then not absolutely, will being qua being coincide with the divine as Merlan wanted. The preoccupation with Merlan at the beginning and end, as well as the proportionately numerous references to him throughout, show emphatically enough that the book aims at a new meaning acceptable as an alternative to Merlan’s elimination of metaphysica generalis from Aristotle’s thought. (shrink)

Ce travail pose la question des critères de la „progression biologique“ , d'après les documents fossiles, dans le monde des organismes, c'est-à-dire de ce perfectionnement qui ne s'arrête pas à l'intérieur du cadre d'un phylum donné, comme le „perfectionnement de l'adaptation“, mais qui conduit, au-de-là de phylums de rang différent, à des types supérieurs, par exemple, des Poissons pas les Amphibies et les Reptiles jusqu'aux Mammifères ou aux Oiseaux. Deux groupes de critères y sont recensés en détail, leur contenu est (...) exposé, et on les examine pour voir s'ils caractérisent sans ambiguïté la „progression biologique“. Le premier groupe comprend les critères de „différenciation croissante“ et „d'intégration harmonique”. Ils sont fondés sur la différenciation morphophysiologique ou plus exactement sur la „totalité” des organismes, c'est-à-dire leur multiplicité dans l'unité. Le second groupe de critères, à savoir „indépendance croissante du milieu” et „autonomie individuelle croissante”, part des relations de l'organisme au milieu et aux autres formes vivantes et souligne la „subsistence” des individus, c'est-à-dire leur plus ou moins grande indépendence ou leur stabilité interne. Comme „totalité” et „subsistence” sont les éléments décisifs d'une définition biologique de l'individu, on peut dire que la „progression biologique“ d'un organisme est d'autant plus élevée que sa totalité et subsistence et par là son être individuel sont plus accusés.Tous les critères mentionnés ne sont pas uniformes. Les motifs de leur imprécision sont divers. Tout d'abord, il n'y a pas encore de définition unique et complète de l'individu biologique, de sorte qu'on ne peut circonscrire d'une manière univoque ce qui confère à un organisme une individualité plus forte ou moins forte. Ensuite les lignées au-delà desquelles s'accomplissent des perfectionnements, et dont l'une reste intérieur au phylum , tandis que l'autre le transcende , sont entrelacées si intimement et d'une façon si particulière qu'elles ne se laissent pas séparer franchement et décrire rigoureusement selon leurs signes distinctifs. Tout représentant d'un phylum, peu importe son palier, est en effet nécessairement inséré dans un milieu et en quelque façon spécialisé. Il n'existe pas des types à caractères phylétiques purs, qui ne montrent dans aucune direction un „perfectionnement de l'adaptation”, mais seulement des marques caractéristiques de la „progression biologique”. Enfin nous ne connaissons pas les restes fossiles que le développement ou la formation des grands phylums du règne animal, à savoir du rameau des Vertébrés et des divers groupes des Invertébrés, mais non pas le plus intéressant et le plus important, leur „progression biologique” jusqu'au degré d'organisation qu'ils présentent déjà à l'époque du Silurien ou plutôt du Cambrien. C'est cela seulement qui permettrait une vue plus profonde sur la nature de la „progression biologique”.Die Arbeit stellt die Frage nach den Kriterien des fossil belegten Biologischen Aufstiegs” der Organismenwelt, d.h. derjenigen Vervollkommnung, die sich nicht innerhalb des Rahmens eines gegebenen Bauplans hält, wie die „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern über verschiedenrangige Baupläne hinweg zu höheren Typen führt, z.B. von den Fischen über die Amphibien und Reptilien zu den Säugern bzw. Vögeln. Ausführlich werden zwei Gruppen von Kriterien besprochen, ihr Inhalt dargelegt und ihre Eindeutigkeit zur Charakterisierung des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” untersucht. Die erste Gruppe umfasst die Kriterien der „zunehmenden Differenzierung” und „harmonischeren Integration”. Diese legen die morphologisch-physiologische Differenzierung oder genauer die „Ganzheit” der Organismen zugrunde, d.h. ihre Vielheit in der Einheit. Die zweite Kriteriengruppe, nämlich „zunehmende Umweltunabhängigkeit” und „zunehmende individuelle Autonomie”, geht von den Beziehungen des Organismus zur Umwelt und zu andern Lebensformen aus und betont die „Subsistenz” der Individuen, d.h. ihr grösseres oder geringeres Losgelöstsein oder ihre Selbständigkeit. Da nun „Ganzheit” und „Subsistenz” die entscheidenden Elemente einer biologischen Definition des Individuums sind, lässt sich sagen, dass der „Biologische Aufstieg” eines Organismus um so höher ist, je stärker seine Ganzheit und Subsistenz und damit sein Individuumsein ist.Eindeutigkeit kommt allen genannten Kriterien nicht zu. Die Gründe für ihre Unschärfe sind verschiedener Art. Zunächst gibt es noch keine eindeutige und vollständige Definition des biologischen Individuums, so dass sich nicht eindeutig umreissen lässt, was einem Organismus eine stärkere oder weniger starke Individualität verleiht. Dann sind die Linien, über die sich Vervollkommnungen vollziehen und von denen die eine innerhalb des Bauplans bleibt , die andere aber über ihn hinausführt so innig und in so eigenartiger Weise miteinander verflochten, dass sie sich nicht sauber scheiden und in ihren charakteristischen Merkmalen genau beschreiben lassen. Jeder Vertreter eines Bauplans, ganz gleich von welcher Ranghöhe, ist nämlich notwendig in eine Umwelt eingepasst und irgendwie spezialisiert. Es gibt keine Typen mit reinen Bauplanmerkmalen, die nach keiner Richtung hin eine „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern nur Merkmale des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” aufweisen. Schliesslich kennen wir fossil nur die Entfaltung oder Ausgestaltung der Grossbaupläne des Tierreichs, nämlich des Wirbeltierstammes und der verschiedenen Gruppen der Wirbellosen, nicht aber das Interessanteste und Wichtigste, nämlich ihren „Biologischen Aufstieg” zu der organisatorischen Höhe, mit der sie sich im Silur bzw. im Kabrium bereits vorstellen. Das erst würde einen tieferen Einblick in das Wesen des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” vermitteln.This article deals with the question of the criteria for the “biological ascent” of the organic world, resting on fossil evidence. That is, of that improvement which is not only restricted to the framework of a given “general structure” as is the “improvement of adaptation”, but which also leads beyond general structures of differentiated levels to a higher type,e.g. from the fishes through the amphibians and reptiles to the mammals or birds. Two groups of criteria are discussed at length, their content exposed and their univocity for the characterisation of this “biological ascent” is examined. The first group includes the criteria of “increasing differentiation” and “more harmonious integration”. The basis for these is the morphological-physiological differentiation, or more exactly, the “totality” of the organisms,i.e., their variety-in-unity. The second group of criteria, “increasing independence of environment” and “increasing individual autonomy”, is derived from the relationships of the organism to its environment and to other living forms, and stresses the “subsistence” of individuals,i.e., their greater or lesser degree of independence or self-sufficiency. Now since “totality” and “subsistence” are the decisive elements in a biological definition of the individual, it may be said that the “biological ascent” of an organism is higher, the more perfect its totality and subsistence and therefore its individuality is.The criteria mentioned are not univocal. The reasons for this lack of clarity are varied. First of all, there is no univocal and complete definition of the biological individual, so that it cannot be exactly stated just what gives an organism a more or less perfect individuality. Then the lines, along which improvements are made, and according to which the one remains within the general structure and the other goes beyond the general structure , are so intimately and singularly bound together, that they cannot be cleanly distinguished, and their characteristic notes exactly described. For each representative of a general structure, regardless of its level, is necessarily fitted into an environment and somehow or other specialised. There are no types with only notes of the general structure which show in no direction an “improvment of adaption”, but only the signs of “biological ascent”. Finally, we only have fossil evidence for the development or deployment of the “great general structures” of the animal world, namely that of the vertebrates and of the different groups of invertebrates, not for the most interesting and most important, that is, their “biological ascent” to the level of organisation with which they are found in the Silurian or Cambrian periods. Only that would give us a deeper insight into the essence of “biological ascent”. (shrink)

The relative neglect of Greek commentary by modern Aristotelian scholarship could be justified, if only the neglectors had sufficient knowledge of the material they disdain. The curt dismissal of ancient views on the active intellect by W. D. Ross is perhaps a paradigm case of misplaced condemnation, for he evidently failed to take account of what their authors were about. It would be open to those who wish to discount these commentators to argue that they were, to a greater or (...) lesser extent, influenced by their Neoplatonism, and that this impairs their judgment on Aristotelian problems. But that would not be sufficient ground for total neglect: it merely indicates the need for careful utilization. One might go so far as to ask whether it is not perfectly possible for a commentator who happened to be a Neoplatonist to offer straightforward and reasonably unbiased commentary on Aristotle. Even if the answer to that question were negative, is it not likely that such Neoplatonic views as he read into Aristotle would at least be slanted towards Aristotelianism? (shrink)

While the Bhagavad Gītā is an acknowledged treasure of world spiritual literature, few people know a parallel text, the Īśvara Gītā. This lesser-known work is also dedicated to a god, but in this case it is Śiva, rather than Kṛṣṇa, who is depicted as the omniscient creator of the world. Andrew J. Nicholson’s Lord Śiva’s Song makes this text available in English in an accessible new translation. A work of both poetry and philosophy, the Īśvara Gītā builds on the (...) insights of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra and foreshadows later developments in tantric yoga. It deals with the pluralistic religious environment of early medieval India through an exploration of the relationship between the gods Śiva and Viṣṇu. The work condemns sectarianism and violence and provides a strategy for accommodating conflicting religious claims in its own day and in our own. (shrink)

It is difficult for a philosopher to contemplate with equanimity the fate which is overtaking, if it has not already overtaken, the word logical. “Logical” is one of a trio of words selected by the Greeks to represent the three main departments of philosophy; and of this trio the other two members, the words “ethical” and “physical,” have at least remained respectable; and to be called “philosophical” is almost a compliment. But to be logical is apparently, at least in England, (...) to enter on very questionable courses: it is to class yourself with every reckless extremist, with the latest and wildest ism in art, politics, and literature, with Russians and Frenchmen and the “Latin mind.” No less a person than H.M. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on no less an occasion than an Assembly of the League of Nations, has lately proclaimed proudly to the gathered nations that lack of logic is the special virtue and privilege of the British Empire. The “lesser breeds with in the law” heard no doubt and trembled, wondering how they could ever compete with a Power to which the laws of thought themselves were mere expediencies. Thus it appears, if Sir Austen Chamberlain is right, that to be logical is to fall into a human weakness or vice, and that this weakness or vice is fortunately commoner outside than inside the British Empire. (shrink)

Collingwood’s aim in The Principles of Art is “to answer the question: What is art?” (p. 1) The answer Collingwood offers to that question, that art is the expression of emotion, has become notorious for its implausibility. I consider one objection against this theory, namely that it is unclear what is rendered art by this definition: for it sometimes appears to define art too broadly, containing all utterances and gestures; but at other times to define art too narrowly, excluding much (...) of what we intuitively consider art. -/- I argue that this objection is mistaken, because it is founded upon a misunderstanding of the sort of project in which Collingwood is engaged. I propose a new reading, via his philosophical methodology, under which ‘art’ is differentially rather than binarily realisable. According to this new reading, art is something found in every human experience or activity, but to a greater or lesser extent. I close by suggesting one reason why Collingwood’s project under this reading is more philosophically interesting than it is under the standard reading, namely that it can give a better account of borderline cases of art. (shrink)

The most arresting aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment is its conception of commercial society as a distinct and distinctive social formation. Christopher Berry explains why Enlightenment thinkers considered commercial society to be wealthier and freer than earlier forms, and charts the contemporary debates and tensions between Enlightenment thinkers that this idea raised. The book analyses the full range of literature on the subject, from key works like Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations', David Hume's 'Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects' and (...) Adam Ferguson's 'Essay on the History of Civil Society' to lesser-known works such as Robert Wallace's 'Dissertation on Numbers of Mankind'. (shrink)

Some prominent contemporary ethicists, including Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan, do not consider human beings with profound intellectual disabilities to have the same moral status as “normal” people. They hold that individuals who lack sufficiently sophisticated cognitive abilities have the same moral value as nonhuman animals with similar cognitive capacities, such as pigs or dogs. Their goal—to elevate the moral standing of sentient nonhuman animals—is an admirable one which I share. I argue, however, that their strategy does not, in fact, (...) achieve this goal and that there are better ways to advance it than to attach lesser value to the lives of profoundly intellectually disabled persons. (shrink)

The famous ‘trolley problem’ began as a simple variation on an example given in passing by Philippa Foot , involving a runaway trolley that cannot be stopped but can be steered to a path of lesser harm. By switching from the perspective of the driver to that of a bystander, Judith Jarvis Thomson showed how the case raises difficulties for the normative theory Foot meant to be defending, and Thomson compounded the challenge with further variations that created still more (...) puzzles of broader interest. In recent years, her thought experiments have even been co-opted by psychologists engaged in the empirical study of moral judgment . Yet more than thirty years after launching the trolley problem, Thomson has now strikingly reversed course, retracting the very claim she had originally used to raise puzzles for Foot. I shall argue that this reversal is a mistake, leading to a needlessly counterintuitive, contrarian position about damage-control cases. Instead of overturning her earlier position, her new variations merely uncover a surprising insight about the conditions under which one may permissibly sacrifice another for a good end.1. The central case at issue is what Thomson now calls Bystander's Two Options: you are a bystander who sees a runaway trolley headed toward five innocent people who cannot move off the track; you cannot stop the trolley, but you have access to a switch that will divert it onto a side track where one innocent person is trapped. Is it permissible to throw the switch and divert the trolley toward lesser harm? The common answer, and Thomson's earlier one, is that it is: in cases like this, where there is a public threat and we can act on it so …. (shrink)

The rapid rise in interest in geoengineering the climate as a response to global warming presents a clear and significant challenge to environmental ethics. The paper articulates what I call the 'presumptive argument' against geoengineering from environmental ethics, a presumption strong enough to make geoengineering almost 'unthinkable' from within that tradition. Two rationales for suspending that presumption are next considered. One of them is a 'lesser evil' argument, the other makes connections between the presumptive argument, ecofacism, and the anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism (...) debate. The discussion is designed to prompt reflection on how environmental ethicists should orient themselves to the rapidly moving geoengineering debate and what they should think about the moral significance of the earth's large-scale biogeochemical processes compared to the moral significance of individuals, species, and ecosystems. (shrink)

In this concluding piece, we identify and discuss various aspects of convergence and, to a lesser degree, divergence in the ideas expressed in the contributions to this special section. These contributions emphatically illustrate that approach–avoidance motivation is integral to the scientific study of emotion. It is our hope that the articles herein will facilitate cross-talk among researchers and research traditions, and will lead to a more thorough understanding of the role of approach–avoidance motivation in emotion.

This book explores in detail the relation between ontology and ethics in the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, notably the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and, to a lesser extent, the _Notebooks 1914-1916_. Self-contained and requiring no prior knowledge of Wittgenstein's thought, it is the first book-length argument that his views on ethics decisively shaped his ontological and semantic thought. The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of the _Tractatus_ is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic (...) doctrines: the tractarian world is the world as it appears in language and thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the _Tractatus_ can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we interact with reality. Although detailed studies of Wittgenstein's ontology and ethics exist, this book is the first thorough investigation of the relationship between them. As an introduction to Wittgenstein, it sheds new light on an important aspect of his early thought. (shrink)

This is a thorough and balanced guide to modern French philosophical thought, providing lucid, authoritative accounts of famous philosophers whilst also highlighting lesser-known figures. Author Robert Wicks introduces the major works of each philosopher, explaining their impact on their peers and on the wider world. Covering such major movements as Existentialism, Surrealism, Structuralism and Postmodernism, this handbook is a useful resource for Francophiles, students of philosophy and all those interested in the intellectual landscape of 20th- and 21st-century France. The (...) book includes detailed coverage of such philosophers as Henri Bergson, Beauvoir, Sarte, Camus, Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Levi-Strauss, among others. (shrink)

This comprehensive survey is particularly valuable for the intelligence and originality with which it approaches aesthetic speculation. The author permits the original texts to serve as the basis of his study, and exhibits each of the major aesthetic systems of the period as an integral whole involving logical and psychological principles. Each of the writers chosen from the tradition is criticized in his own terms, without detracting from the originality of his contribution to the body of aesthetic theory. A few (...) of the lesser-known aestheticians of the 18th century here receive fuller discussion than has previously been available.--J. F. D. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC PRIDE AND LIBERAL VICE 1 PAUL J. WEITHMAN University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana L IBERALISM IS often portrayed, and sometimes portrays itself, as a moral and political view that rejects the claims of tradition. Thus liberals characteristically claim that the traditional standing of a social arrangement contributes little or nothing to its political legitimacy. Whether an arrangement is legitimate depends upon whether or not those who (...) currently live under it can understand and accept its rationale. Members of each generation must be able to examine arrangements as if they themselves were signatories of the social contract; the justification of regimes must, as it were, be susceptible of renewal in every age and to every citizen. Jefferson gave this view its most extreme expression when he claimed that each generation has the right to begin its nation's political life anew, and that national constitutions should be rewritten every two decades.2 Liberals often seem no kinder to intellectual than to political traditions. As they think political life can periodically begin anew, so they sometimes seem to think that political and moral philosophy can begin anew. Hobbes famously castigated the obscurities of scholasticism and argued that political philosophy could achieve firm footing only if the rubble of the past were swept away.3 Liberal contract theorists have followed Hobbes's lead, developing political theories that rely not at all upon classi1 Thanks to Alasdair Macintyre, David O'Connor, Michael Pakaluk, David Solomon, Eleonore Stump, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend, Prof. Judith Shklar. 2 See Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789 (The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Viking, 1977], 444ff.), as well as his lesser known missive to Samuel Kercheval of July 12, 1816 (ibid., SS2ff.). 3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 727, for an especially pungent expression of a view that runs throughout the Leviathan. 241 242 PAUL J. WEITHMAN cal and medieval moral philosophy. To take but one example of this neglect of the past, the ethical writings of scholasticism are dominated by richly detailed analyses of the virtues and vices, yet liberal writers roundly ignore these discussions. Liberals have been quick to defend their suspicions of the thought and politics of the past, but critics of liberalism have been equally quick to seize upon them. Champions of virtue ethics have been among the most vocal critics of liberalism in recent years, arguing that liberals court philosophical peril by neglecting the insights of earlier moral theories. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century opponent of liberalism, had an additional complaint. Burke discerned an arrogance in the liberal rejection of intellectual and political tradition. It was mere pride, Burke thought, to suppose that politics and political theory could be made transparent to the reason of every individual in the way that liberals sometimes claim.4 Burke's allegation that the liberal rejection of tradition reflects pride is ironic, for pride is a central element of one of the traditions of moral thought that liberals seem determined to reject. During a lengthy period of philosophy's history, pride was thought to be a motive of all wrong action. The biblical book of Sirach says that pride is the beginning of all evil5 and a long line of medieval moralists labored to explain how this might be so. Yet the tradition of moral thought that accorded pride so central a role now suffers from neglect at the hands of many philosophers. And pride itself is a vice that many philosophers now consider unworthy of attention. Most fail to consider it seriously as a motive for any wrong action at all. I have three aims in this paper. One is to examine pride's neglect more closely. I shall argue that pride suffers this neglect because of its centrality to a religiously based tradition of moral thought that many philosophers no longer accept. The alleged connection between pride and religion is, I shall argue, suggestive. It suggests what an account of pride would have to include 4 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on... (shrink)

Intersectionality has utilized various feminist theories that continue subculture of violence thinking about Black men and boys. While intersectional feminists often claim that intersectionality leads to a clearer social analysis of power and hierarchies throughout society and within groups, the categories and claims of intersectionality fail to distinguish themselves from previously racist theories that sought to explain race, class, and gender, based on subcultural values. This article is the first to interrogate the theories used to construct the gendered categories and (...) the assumptions behind Black male positionality under intersectional analyses. Contrary to its promises for more liberated Black identities, intersectionality merely replicates the pseudo-science of racist criminology and presents decades old theories as cutting-edge gender analyses. In short, while intersectionality has allowed Black women to create nuanced experiences and epistemological accounts of Black womanhood, the very same theory has confined Black male experience to the perpetration of violence and defined Black manhood as lesser—merely the exemplification of white masculinity’s pathological excess. (shrink)

Author of _The Conservative Mind_, Russell Kirk was a principal architect of the American intellectual conservative movement. This book takes a closer look at his works on such subjects as law, history, economics, and statesmanship to introduce a new generation of readers to the depth and range of his thought. Kirk probed the very meaning of conservatism for modern intellectuals, and in _The Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk, _Gerald Russello examines such key concepts of his thought as imagination, historical consciousness, (...) the interplay between the individual and tradition, and the role of narrative in constructing individual and societal identity. By stressing the importance of Kirk’s perception of imagination, he offers a new approach to understanding him, showing not only that Kirk laid the groundwork for the “new conservatism” of the 1950s and ’60s, but also that his work evolved into a sophisticated critique of modernity paralleled in the work of some postmodern critics of liberalism. In order to reconstruct Kirk’s attack on modernity, Russello examines his textbook on economics, his fiction, his work on Robert Taft and Orestes Brownson, his writings on the role of the statesman, and his neglected essays such as “The Age of Discussion” and “The Age of Sentiments.” Russello shows that Kirk welcomed the rise of some form of postmodernism, seeing in it a new opportunity for conservatism to engage the wider culture. Through this analysis, he situates Kirk within wider currents of contemporary thought, connecting him not only with such major thinkers as Lyotard, Boorstin, and Koestler but also with such lesser-known figures as Bernard Iddings Bell, Charles Baudouin, and Christopher Dawson. By examining Kirk’s development of the imagination as a tool of conservative discourse, Russello offers an alternative genealogy for conservative thought that melds its antimodernism with postmodern themes. He has forged a lively and provocative work that provides unusual perspectives on Kirk within the wider context of debate over the future of conservatism in a time of shifting alliances—a book that will be a valuable resource for anyone seeking to understand Kirk or conservative thought. (shrink)

Sociology of Science: A Critical Canadian Introduction provides an overview of how sociology approaches science and, to a lesser extent, technology. It examines how science developed as a set of theories about both what we know and how we know. The book provides a succinct critical examination of the current state of science studies with a particular emphasis on research conducted by Canadian scholars. Hird illustrates that science studies offers useful perspectives on current and ongoing sociological debates, such as (...) the strengths and limitations of social constructionism, as well as popular public debates, such as the ethics of stem-cell research. Using examples from throughout history and with a focus on the Canadian context, the book provides students with an examination of influential science studies concepts, theories, and debates and situates these theories and debates within contemporary field of sociology. (shrink)

The occasion for this collection of four essays—by Vlastos, Ostwald, Callahan, and Solmsen—was Plato’s 2400th birthday in 1974. We note at once the book’s most disappointing and inexplicable flaw: it includes no example of North’s own fine classical scholarship and luminous understanding of the spirit of Platonic thought. Ostwald’s essay, ranging over much of the Platonic corpus, tills the well-plowed field of Plato’s contribution to the nomos-physis problem. His thesis is clear and familiar: Plato introduces new objects, eide, into nature, (...) the knowledge of which objects founds both the techne [[sic]] of the true king and justice. The science of such knowledge is the bulwark against Thrasymachus’s, Callicles', and Glaucon’s arguments concerning ‘natural law'. Ostwald seems unwilling, though, to grapple with the practical details of this techne [[sic]] in the political sphere. Rep. 546b-e and Polit. 310d ff. are programmatic, not substantive, and supply more puzzlement than answer. Callahan takes no smaller a topic than dialectic, myth, and history in Plato. His most interesting claim is that myth provides a setting for dialectic; each dialogue, he argues, is itself a myth, providing a locus wherein mythical topics, historical personages, and records of dialectical examinations can themselves be examined. Solmsen’s quite suggestive essay asks why Plato should investigate the physical world, which is intrinsically less than fully knowable, as well as being an insufficient source of guidance for man on issues of justice, moderation, and conduct. Though pointing out that physical bodies and their science must be of lesser rank than dialectic, Solmsen reminds us that not only did bodies provide a starting-point for mathematical demonstrations, and the incentive for solid geometry, but also that the planetary motions provided a taxis, an order, which was an image of an ordered cosmos, itself an image of an ordered eidetic realm. (shrink)

Television medical dramas sometimes depict medical professionalism and bioethical issues, but their nature and extent are unclear. The authors systematically analysed the bioethical and professionalism content of one season each of Grey's Anatomy and House M.D., two of the most popular current television medical dramas. The results indicate that these programmes are rife with powerful portrayals of bioethical issues and egregious deviations from the norms of professionalism and contain exemplary depictions of professionalism to a much lesser degree.

In the area of politics one is not surprised to encounter bias, prejudice, rationalization, special pleading; yet rarely does one encounter these phenomena so often, so blatantly, as in the area relating to equality. Indeed, even among those whose job it is to be impartial, rational, informed, namely, philosophers, one finds less objectivity, less evidence of a genuine search for the truth, and a greater concern to press preconceived views than elsewhere in their work. Among Western philosophers, there is a (...) very widespread commitment to equality as a political value. So deep has been and is the commitment in theory at least, to this value, that concern for knowledge and truth have been subordinated to it by many — as in the refusal to allow or determination to discourage research into racial differences, for fear that the results of such research may lead to a lesser political commitment to equality. Yet, for all this professed concern for equality, a genuine lover of equality could be excused for being perplexed by the attitudes of those who profess such a concern for equality. (shrink)

This study analyzes the domestic political, economic, and social conditions in the Western Balkans that provide fertile ground for hostile and maligned actors to manipulate and exploit governments and societies with hybrid war measures, namely cyberattacks and cyber intrusions and disinformation and fake news. It begins with a review and assessment of the prevailing empirical and theoretical literature on hybrid warfare. It then describes two leading empirical indices that measure degrees of permeability and structural vulnerability that elevate or reduce the (...) risks associated with maligned and hostile interventions. The article also examines leading indicators measuring resilience levels in cybersecurity and media/information literacy, highlighting political, social, and economic vulnerabilities. It concludes by suggesting that domestic conditions in the region encourage maligned and hostile actors, especially Russia and for different reasons and to a lesser extent China and Turkey, to use hybrid measures to exploit the region. The article proposes that in addition to strengthening institutions and trust, membership in NATO and the E.U. are directly related to mitigating structural vulnerability and reducing uncertainty and insecurity in the Western Balkans. (shrink)

Postmortem evidence of chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) in the brains of American National Football League players who suffered concussions while playing have intensified concerns about the risks of concussion in sport.1 Concussions are frequently sustained by amateur and professional players of Australia’s three most popular football codes (Australian football, rugby league, and rugby union) and, to a lesser extent, other contact sports such as soccer. This raises major concerns about possible long-term neurological damage, cognitive impairment and mental health problems (...) in players of these sports. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to relate the operative and constructive formulation of symbolic logic carried out by Lorenzen—and to a lesser degree Kolmogorov and Markov—to both Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic as set forth in the Tractatus and later modified in the Investigations, and to Brouwer's critique of classical logic, especially the principles of excluded middle. The first chapter contains an exposition of Wittgenstein's critical analysis of the "mythical" views of Russell and Frege; and it develops his own "operative" (...) theory of elementary logic. The second chapter concerns the relations of the theories of Brouwer and Wittgenstein; the last section is a detailed survey of chiefly Lorenzen's operative logic in which the presentation of a dialogue-like interpretation of logic is exhaustively analyzed: the notion of a "winning strategy" in such a two-person dialogue is set forth, the technique is extended to classical logic from its original, weaker operational form, and its relations to Gentzen's Sequenzen-kalkül is discussed. The work was the author's Habilitationsschrift at Innsbruck University.—P. J. M. (shrink)

This book expounds the basic principles of Axiology as a major field of philosophical inquiry. Those principles can be discovered and demonstrated by scientific method. In treating scientific inquiry the book throws light on what values are and how they are known. It explores questions of Good and Bad, Ends and Means, and Appearance and Reality as applied to values. Axiology, argues the author, provides the basis for ethics as the science of oughtness: the power that a greater good has (...) over a lesser good in compelling our choices. The book concludes with a survey of efforts to establish Axiology as a science. (shrink)

Are socialists best regarded as those who are most truly and consistently committed to democracy, under modern industrial conditions? Is the underlying issue that divides liberals from socialists the degree of their wholeheartedness in affirming the ideal of a democratic society? On the liberal side, Friedrich Hayek has remarked: “It is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible that a democracy governs with a total lack of liberalism. My personal preference is for (...) a liberal dictator and not for a democratic government lacking in liberalism.” No doubt many socialists would wish to quibble with Hayek's free-market oriented conception of liberalism. But I am wondering whether the conceptual map implicit in Hayek's remark is apt. Hayek appears to assume that there are two independent lines of division, one marking greater and lesser commitment to liberal values, the other marking greater and lesser commitment to democratic procedures. According to the conception of socialism as democracy that I wish to examine, a better picture of the political landscape would show one line of division with gradations indicating greater and lesser commitment to democracy. On this continuum, socialists are located at the extreme pro-democratic end, those who favor autocracy at the other end, and liberals somewhere in the middle. The analyst who finds this latter conceptual picture the more illuminating of the two will say that Hayek reveals his rejection of socialism by being less than wholehearted in his support of democracy. (shrink)

As we write this paper in spring 2008, many are hopeful that November’s election will open the door to some form of comprehensive health care reform. In all likelihood, we will elect a president who has campaigned to a greater or lesser extent on promises of improving access to health care, improving quality, and reducing costs. Equally important, it seems likely that the 111th Congress is preparing to undertake meaningful health care reform. And perhaps most important, despite recent attention (...) to energy issues and the economy, opinion polls consistently show that the American public continues to rank health care as one of the two or three most important domestic issues in the fall elections and supports comprehensive health care reform. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 201-207. “Poetry is experience, linked to a vital approach, to a movement which is accomplished in the serious, purposeful course of life. In order to write a single line, one must have exhausted life.” —Maurice Blanchot (1982, 89) Nikos Karouzos had a communist teacher for a father and an orthodox priest for a grandfather. From his four years up to his high school graduation he was incessantly educated, reading the entire private library of his granddad, comprising mainly (...) the Orthodox Church Fathers and the ancient classics. Later on in his life he sold the library for money, only to buy a little more time before he went broke again: “I carry sorrow like a cage/ I got no birds/ as I come back from her hair/ I see the profit emptied/ cool from terror.” (1993, Ι, 101) Nowadays—and ridiculously recently—we are more than apt to speak of a certain insouciance pertaining to the Greek form of expenditure: expenditure without any type of investment, sometimes not (even) symbolic. In the vaults of the European unconscious, this imprudent stance still conjures a “capital punishment” in the form of de-capitation, reflecting back the fear of excess and the terror of its consequences.1 Thus the Greek way of living is very close to what a stranger could have termed as “the Greek way of dying.” Yet, what is not often understood is that the Greek esprit , the same one that invented the maxim μηδ?ν ?γαν (“nothing in excess”), does not experience death solely as an imminent fear of bankruptcy. For it miraculously combines its unconditional acceptance with the promise of a resurrection that is always there in the scents of Spring, from Dionysus to the orthodox Christ: “Everyone resurrects himself through dying [….] Resurrection is the switching of mortalities.” (2002, 94) Hence, if an entire library was imprudently traded for a plate with seven olives, a sliced tomato and some fresh goat cheese, let us not be fooled: this is not the meal of the pauper, but that of “an aristocrat from God” (1993, II, 491) feeding his eloquent loudmouth, ridiculously cut open in an otherwise rock-solid caput . *** To speak of the Greek experience is to speak about a half-dead language that still utters in life what is seemingly excluded from it and thus forbidden to be talked about: death. Death as anything that is out of this world, as something that will never return . Still, along with an experience of death that recently waned as a worn-out academic fashion, the Greek experience is dead too. Nearly 2300 years of written words separating Homer from the fall of Byzantium equal 500 books on a library traded for money: “I am with the killed. Hence my deepest solitude. I do not feel this tremendous macho society, beyond from the fact that it is a ruthlessly consuming one. It is me who pays all the time .” (2002, 57) Let us do the math and see how much this dealing with the Greek experience is costing the poet and how much dealing with the Greek experience might cost us today. *** “I do not guarantee a single word.” (Karouzos, 1993, II, 454) Through its various dialects and forms, the Greek language speaks through an incessant historical dissemination. Anyone who is aware of this terrifying polymorphy and still calls himself a poet, must stand against a white sheet of paper, pen-in-hand, with a very particular duty: to be as fully inconsistent as possible. In the formally ironic uniqueness of the poem, the poet functions as “a band-aid for lesser and greater antinomies.” (1993, I, 251) Of course these antinomies are not exhausted in language—they are historical, political and, alas, existential. Yet, beyond appearances , it is language that ruthlessly encodes them through history, submitting the poet to the temptation of placing them one next to the other on a single white sheet. The closer their neighboring, the greater the scattering of the writer in the ironic uniqueness of the paper. In a work where poetic license is described as a “freedom-impasse” (2002, 51), this task is undertaken in full conscience of its personal consequences: “what I am interested in is to escape my individuality (envisioning the non-ego) […] Nevertheless, my dissociations never achieve duration.” (2002, 74-75) Hence, though poetry is the “deserted direction of will,” (1998, 62) the stance of the poet is not that of a Nietzschean “great man.”2 Whereas drunkenness provides a thread between the poem and the excess it both presupposes and infuses (“Poetry always enlarges. ‘Drunkenness’ is nothing more than that,” (2002, 85)), whereas language flashes in loudmouth spurts of déraison (“When I am alone I do something else. I utter words. For example, while having my ouzo and listening to music I am most likely capable of randomly shouting ‘Electricity!’” (2002, 138)), the poet never gives in to the double affirmation that would eventually risk the “element of pleasure in discourse.” (2002, 80)” It is exactly because the gap of the antinomies is so vast that poetry is not meant to be written with a hammer. Neither does writing consist in a reevaluation of those elements. In short, poetry is not an affirmation of difference, but the surprising beauty of chiming antinomies. We might never transcend them, but it is up to us to put them together. Yet again, this voisinage is not to be identified with the necessity of chance as an eternal return.4 On the contrary it is a return from that very return : Let us treat Yes as a No to No and No as a Yes […] And let us not forget that this pissed affirmation crumbled down Nietzsche’s intellect in the dark paths of this world. (2002, 88) This return from the “vicious circle” should in no way be taken as a form of artistic prudence. Rather it can be seen as a dribble of demonic inconsistency as Dionysus transforms himself into a Christ that is in turn de-theologized: “Who can forbid that? Every man is capable of his own theology, nothing can stop him.” (2002, 73-74) This is a turn towards an existential vision of the world, historically coinciding with a particular political defeat of the Left, to which the poet devoted all his life: after the defeat of the popular front I raised the question “why do we exist?” while others were asking “why we failed.” (2002, 57)5 But most of all it is a return to poetry that exceeds the existential question itself, going beyond the issue of faith. Poetry comes in as a question of return after a defeat that is confessed in full profanity. Though it accepts the necessity of the defeat, it does not affirm it. Though it negates it, the negation is not in the name of a promise to be delivered in the kingdom of heavens. Following a historical and existential defeat, poetry is born post mortem . It signals a return to Christ as “groundless religiousness in the surprise of the real as such” (2002, 72) which is at once a return to the refuge of childhood. It is not a question of endurance towards an eternal return. Rather it is a question on the possibility of an existential return. Returning in a world as someone who cannot enjoy any returns exactly because he is averse to guarantees. A return without returns. *** PHOTOCOPY OF HAPPINESS When I was young I used to pin down cicadas and step on ant nests. I used to stand there silent for hours. With threads I decapitated bees. Now I am a dead man breathing. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 336.) The return to the “paradise of childhood” (2002, 68) constitutes the devouring refuge of its own memory when defeat becomes the synonym of adulthood. The political struggles of a young communist in a country torn up by a civil war right after World War II fraught with incarcerations and exiles. Historically they resulted in the defeat of the communist movement in Greece and opened up a long turbulent road that would peak in the dictatorship of 1967. Existentially they led to a series of disillusionments: mental breakdown, divorce, abandonment of studies in law school. To the question “why do we exist” the answer was poetry. Still this exposé should not be read as a sweeping chronography of a man. For it actually happens to coincide with the historical fate of a nation that after its modern constitution never stopped dreaming of the glories of its past youth, in a present that was (and is) sweepingly disappointing. But isn’t this return to youth finally a way of compensating for a loss of youth that necessarily results in a losing adulthood? Will Greeks, the eternal children of Plato and Nietzsche, ever learn? How to return without dying, how to remember without wasting time? WE ARE IN THE OPEN MEANING Living the coldest mauve night right across Parthenon I went to take a piss on some foliage and I was enjoying the foliage as it was steaming. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 340) Beyond the historical tragedies of modern Greece and away from any personal disappointments, the relation that this land holds with language and history is mediated through the Greek light—whose omnipresence is the very condition of its transcendence. All historical contradictions from Dionysus to Christ took place under this light; all those disseminated dialects were spoken beneath its warmth. To paraphrase Lévinas,6 light is both the condition of the world and of our withdrawal from it—a withdrawal towards the invisibility of God, of the dead, of meta-physics, resulting from the temptation that all is still here, behind this light the visibility of which they once evaded: “birds, the allurement of God.” (1993, I, 17) Under that luminous sky, if Greeks can do anything at all, it is to envision a return that will never come. All they can do is write poetry—which is doing nothing; other than lending an ear to a disseminated language whispering a unity that cannot be promised, as an adulthood in defeat is ready to recognize. Trying “to trap the invisible in visibility” (1993, II, 483) they forget that they have grown up and one day they die—with the promise of return. Hence an additional meaning must be given to this return to childhood. It does not signal salvation but rather its promise. To the ears of an aged continent it means that the return to/of poetry is a losing game, a return without returns. “Europe, Europe… you are nothing more than the continuation of Barabbas.” (1993, I, 295) *** “Life is not there to verify theories.”7 The records show that Karouzos was finally given a second-class pension from the Greek government, at the time when he was being recognized by the literary press as one of Greece’s major contemporary poets. Being neither a bourgeois nor a nobelist, he proclaimed himself to be an anarcho-communist, unconditionally faithful to the utopia of a classless society. He also drank, heavily. “Capitalism made an animal out of man/ Marxism made an animal out of truth/ Shut up.” (1993, II, 369) Perhaps one of the most scandalous divides of our times has been the one between the living and the dead, the latent prohibition that the living should not be concerned with the dead based on the mere impossibility of the dead to be concerned with the living in the first place. What adds to this scandal is that this divide abuses anything that cannot return to us by subsuming it under the same futility. Hence death is no longer “loss” in the usual sense. It no more refers to the things we lost but to our “loss” (of time, money and well-being) as we insist to dwell on them. Death is a waste —of time. It is this waste that we find in the insouciance of Greek expenditure; the waste in dealing with a language that most of its historical part is no longer spoken (a dead language); the waste in translating a poet who is ex definitio untranslatable; the waste of his vision, his money, his life. The waste of dealing with anything that cannot return and that cannot bring in any returns . But it is also the waste of life that poetry itself presupposes, the waste of dealing with invisibility, with anything that is out of this world and thus invokes the fear of death that is in turn—and surprisingly— nowhere to be found. Instead of death, what is there, beyond the light, is the being without us (to recall the Lévinasian il y a ), the mumble of our own nothingness which constitutes the price to be paid for writing poetry under an evergreek light. To understand this to-and-fro, is to realize that poetry is something out of this world that nevertheless takes place in this world, by virtue of this world. But to ridiculously equate this to-and-fro with death as non-existence, is to exile poetry along with its own possibility from this same old world: I do not believe that poetry will ever disappear from this world. […] But I am also sure that it does not have many chances of playing, as you say, a redemptive role in our vertiginous technological future. Without being endangered as a creative need, it will be placed on the side of history. (2002, 32) It is mainly there that we would like to locate the meaning of Nikos Karouzos’s poetry today. If we are willing to include the Greek original it is because we consider that it will be both a waste of time for us to do so (since most of you cannot read Greek) and because it might induce you to the even larger waste of learning it. We would additionally be glad if this small introduction served as an equally wasteful, academically useless piece of reading, gesturing towards a taboo of investing in anything Greek—that is in anything dead among the living, in anything that will never come back and maybe was never here in the first place. This is the only way to reserve for ourselves the possibility of poetry and preserve the light of its promise. “To return: that is the miracle.” (1993, I, 17) Athens, Greece July 10, 2011 NOTES 1 “ Capitale (a Late Latin word based on caput “head”) emerged in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries in the sense of funds, stock of merchandise, sum of money or money carrying interest.[…] The word and the reality it stood for appear in the sermons of St. Bernardino of Siena (1380-1444) ‘… quamdam seminalem rationem lucrosi quam communiter capitale vocamus ’, ‘that prolific cause of wealth that we commonly call capital’” (Braudel, 1992, 232-233). 2 “A great man – a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style – what is he? First : there is a long logic in all of his activity, hard to survey because of its length, and consequently misleading; he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life and to despise and reject everything petty about him, including even the fairest, ‘divinest’ things in the world.” (Nietzsche, 1968, 505, §962) 3 Cf. Deleuze, 1986, 186-9. 4 “Return is the being of becoming, the unity of multiplicity, the necessity of chance: the being of difference as such or the eternal return.” (Deleuze, 189)5 In this 1982 interview Karouzos refers to the defeat of the communist movement in Greece after the civil war of 1946-1949 between the Governmental Army and the Democratic Army of Greece, the military division of the Greek communist party. Karouzos’s father was a member of the communist National Liberation front (EAM) members of which formed the mainl resistance movement (ELAS) in Greece during WWII. The poet was a member of the United Panhellenic Organization of Youth (EPON), which was a youth division of EAM. After the end of the war, ELAS was called to disarmament in view of the formation of a National Army. The members of EAM resigned from the government of national unity and a series of protests led to a 3 year civil war between ELAS and the Government Army. After the defeat of ELAS the Communist party was outlawed and many communists were exiled in deserted Greek islands. Karouzos, who took action in the Greek resistance and was active during the Greek civil war, was exiled in Icaria on 1947 and in Makronisos on 1953 where he was called two years earlier to do his military service. 6 “Existence in the world qua light, which makes desire possible, is then, in the midst of being, the possibility of detaching oneself from being. To enter into being is to link up with objects; it is in effect a bond that is already tainted with nullity. It is already to escape anonymity. In this world where everything seems to affirm our solidarity with the totality of existence, where we are caught up in the gears of a universal mechanism, our first feeling, our ineradicable illusion, is a feeling or illusion of freedom. To be in the world is this hesitation, this interval in existing, which we have seen in the analyses of fatigue and the present.” (Lévinas, 1988,43-4) 7from a TV interview. THE POETRY OF NIKOS KAROUZOS From Redwriter [ Ερυθρογρ?φος ], in Collected Works, Vol . II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 463-4. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 9-10.] JESUS ANTI-OEDIPUS* Why were we once saving till the fifth day the Paschal lamb? The scriptures say: with this victim’s meat we ought to cleanse all of our senses. To give life to the whitest wave miraculous odors in the extension of the chest. Ideals to death. For us to witness the illustrious dawns of Absinthe and for the soul to be a deeply carved ornament on the fore we named will. Then many deer running amidst the evergreen growth with watery hymns, then, the unintended angels descending with heights spiraling in their momentum offer themselves to the luminous Adventure. Whence the need for speech and our sufferings covered with flags like the glorified dead. An incorporeal finger pointing at the flamboyant and fragrant holocausts within the tired horizons and the exhausted breadths with joys of the mistletoe on fire and shivering all of the green-leaved love. Something would have chirped again had we not driven it away— maybe the ewe’s grass. Something would have called us to the eternal resurrection— maybe the grace of spring. But now our heart is fiercely blinded, withdrawn to the appearances of Hades. Silence and ice incessantly cover the Infant Spirit in thatched times. While the cherry trees are dreaming faintly glowing in absolute darkness there’s nothing the Babylonians can contemplate in labs with automatic colored lights. How to rejoice now in the fifth day of the lamb? We have forked the stars. We’ve gradually become supposedly sublime with plucked chimeras in our hands. Avenged relentlessly by science. *Though the poem appears in a 1990 collection, it was actually written in 1968. Hence the reader must be aware in not associating Karouzos’ Anti-Oedipus with the famous 1972 work of Deleuze and Guattari, given that the former precedes the latter. ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΑΝΤΙ-ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ Γιατ? κρατο?σαμε κ?ποτε ?ς την π?μπτη μ?ρα το πασχαλιν? πρ?βατο; Τα κε?μενα λ?νε: μ’ αυτο? του θ?ματος το κρ?ας ?πρεπε να καθαρ?σουμε ?λες τις αισθ?σεις. Για να δ?σουμε κ?μα στη ζω? λευκ?τατο θαυμ?σιες ευωδι?ς στην ?κταση του στ?θους. Ιδανικ? στο χ?ρο. Για να βλ?πουμε τα λαμπρ? χαρ?ματα του ?ψινθου και να ’ναι η ψυχ? στ?λισμα βαθυχ?ρακτο της πλ?ρης που την ε?παμε θ?ληση. Τ?τε πολλ?ς δορκ?δες τρ?χοντας αν?μεσα στην καταπρ?σινη φ?ση με τους υδ?τινους ?μνους, τ?τε, κατεβα?νοντας οι αθ?λητοι ?γγελοι με κυλινδο?μενο το ?ψος στην ορμ? τους χαρ?ζονται της αστραφτερ?ς Περιπ?τειας. ?θεν η μιλι? γι’ αυτ? χρει?ζεται και τα δειν? σκεπ?ζονται ωσ?ν τους τιμημ?νους νεκρο?ς με σημα?ες. Ασ?ματο δ?χτυλο δε?χνει τα φλογ?δη και μοσχοβ?λα ολοκαυτ?ματα στους κουρασμ?νους ορ?ζοντες στα εξουθενωμ?να πλ?τη καθ?ς αν?βουν οι χαρ?ς του νερα?δ?ξυλου και τρ?μει ολ?κληρη η πρασιν?φυλλη αγ?πη. Κ?τι θα κελαηδο?σε π?λι αν δεν το δι?χναμε— μπορε? της προβατ?νας το χορτ?ρι. Κ?τι θα μας καλο?σε στην απ?ραντη αν?σταση— μπορε? του ?αρος η χ?ρη. Μα η καρδι? μας ?γρια τυφλ?θηκε π?ρασε στα φαιν?μενα του ?δη. Σιγ? και π?γος αδι?κοπα σκεπ?ζει στους αχυρ?νιους καιρο?ς το Ν?πιο Πνε?μα. Την ?ρα που ονειρε?ονται οι βυσσινι?ς και λ?μπουν αμυδρ? μεσ’ στο απλ?τατο σκοτ?δι τ?ποτα δε στοχ?ζονται οι βαβυλ?νιοι στα εργαστ?ρια με τ’ αυτ?ματα χρωματιστ? φ?τα. Π?ς να χαρο?με πια την π?μπτη μ?ρα του προβ?του; Φουρκ?σαμε τ’ αστ?ρια. Γ?ναμε σιγ?-σιγ? δ?θεν υπ?ροχοι με μαδημ?νες χ?μαιρες στα χ?ρια. Μας ν?μεται σκληρ? η επιστ?μη. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], in Collected Works, Vol. II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 472. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18.] DIALECTΙCS OF SPRING Christ the straight angle; Christ the Pythagorean theorem. Christ the infinitesimal calculus from above the blessed Sets Christ. Christ the tessellation of massive particles Christ the zero mass. Hence we spray numbers and fields of lust. We are carabineers of diseased logic plus something— Observed means observer and Hekate The darkness luminous and light in the dark Astarte banqueters demons from today. ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΑΡΟΣ Χριστ?ς η ορθ? γων?α· Χριστ?ς το πυθαγ?ριο θε?ρημα. Χριστ?ς ο απειροστικ?ς λογισμ?ς ?νωθεν ?λβια Χριστ?ς τα Σ?νολα. Χριστ?ς η ψηφιδογραφ?α στα μαζικ? σωμ?τια Χριστ?ς η μ?ζα μηδ?ν. ?ρα ψεκ?ζουμε αριθμο?ς και πεδ?α λαγνε?ας. Ε?μαστε τυφεκιοφ?ροι νοσο?σης λογικ?ς και κ?τι-- παρατηρο?μενο σημα?νει παρατηρητ?ς και Εκ?τη σκ?τος το π?μφωτο και φως εν τ? σκοτ?? η Αστ?ρτη συνδαιτημ?νες δα?μονες απ’ ?ρτι. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18. [1993, II, 472]. CREDO (as we are used to say in Latin) Α I believe in one Poet expelled from heavens / fugitive from the god and vagabond, Empedocles / and here on earth / exile on the earth etc. of Baudelaire /. Β I believe in one Computer inside thunder and through matter. Γ Suffering undefiled / substantive / the Poet uplifts himself slow-burning suicidal implying lengthy sleeps. Δ Cutting down on prospective mistakes. Ε Of all things visible and invisible officiating the onion-peelings. Ζ The Poet has nothing / see the departed /. Η I believe in one Poet that says: madness I enjoy; he ridicules existence; let me light up from my mana. Θ Syntax he doesn’t care about when musicality commands him. Along with still more licenses, and Ts are played according to the concept sound anywhere. E.g. the winters here, he winters there; it will not come—I will not rest, etc. etc. Ι The Poet exercises thought until it’s stripped down. Κ And if he’s Greek he must always study the fineness of Attica, in light, mountains, fields and sea. For this fineness teaches language. Λ And if he’s deeply destined the Poet expresses the unexplainable of the explained; he happens to be a rightful heir to the scientist and his predecessor. Μ On the froth he does not last; the Poet blusters at the bottom of the pot. Ν Flamebred and never redeemed. Ξ The Poet must sometimes say: what a consumption of presence — be a bit lonely for a change! Ο The Poet is twilit. Π He is susceptible of deaths and resurrections. Ρ He looks from the corner of his eye and exists in a glance. Σ He follows behind the mother. Τ Eveningless when it comes to age. Υ I believe in one Poet who says: let the purities coincide. Until the Corinth of the Universe or even further. Φ In a higher despair. Χ In a brighter quintessence. Ψ In one sensation that lifts off. Ω Forgiving everyone. CREDO (ως ε?θισται να λ?με λατινιστ?) Α Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν εκτ?ς ουρανο? / φυγ?ς θε?θεν και αλ?της, Εμπεδοκλ?ς / και επ? της γης / εξ?ριστος π?νω στη γη κ.λπ. του Βωδελα?ρου /. Β Πιστε?ω εις ?να Υπολογιστ?ν εντ?ς κεραυνο? και δια της ?λης. Γ Υποφ?ροντας ?χραντα / ουσιαστικ?ν / ο Ποιητ?ς ανατε?νεται βραδυφλεγ?ς αυτ?χειρας εξυπακο?οντας πολ?ωρους ?πνους. Δ Τα υποψ?φια λ?θη λιγοστε?οντας. Ε Ορατ?ν τε π?ντων και αορ?των ιερουργ?ντας την αποκρομμ?ωση. Ζ Ο Ποιτ?ς ?χει τ?ποτα / βλ?πε τους αναχωρ?σαντες /. Η Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: η τρ?λα μ’ αρ?σει· γελοιοποιε? την ?παρξη· ας αν?ψω απ’ τη μ?να μου. Θ Συνταχτικ? δεν το γνοι?ζεται στην προσταγ? της μουσικ?τητας. Μαζ? και μ’ ?λλες ακ?μη λευτερι?ς, και τα νυ πα?ζονται κατ? την ?ννοια ?χος οπουδ?ποτε. Π.χ. τον χειμ?να εδ?, το χειμ?να εκε?· δε θ? ’ρθει – δεν θα καταλαγι?σουμε, κ. λπ. κ.λπ. Ι Ο Ποιητ?ς γυμν?ζει τη σκ?ψη σε απογ?μνωση. Κ Κι αν ε?ναι ?λληνας οφε?λει να σπουδ?ζει π?ντοτε της Αττικ?ς τη λεπτ?τητα, σε φως, βουν?, χωρ?φια και θ?λασσα. Διδ?σκει γλ?σσα η λεπτ?τητα το?τη. Λ Κι αν ε?ναι βαθι? πεπρωμ?νος ο Ποιητ?ς εκφρ?ζει το ανεξ?γητο του εξηγητο?· τυγχ?νει ν?μιμος δι?δοχος του επιστ?μονα και προκ?τοχ?ς του. Μ Στον αφρ? δεν ?χει δι?ρκεια· στο πατοκ?ζανο μα?νεται ο Ποιητ?ς. Ν Φλογοδ?αιτος και ποτ? ξελυτρωμ?νος. Ξ Ο Ποιητ?ς κ?ποτε πρ?πει να λ?ει: μεγ?λη καταν?λωση παρουσ?ας – γενε?τε και λ?γο μοναξι?ρηδες! Ο Ο Ποιητ?ς ε?ναι αμφ?φλοξ. Π Επιδ?χεται θαν?τους και αναστ?σεις. Ρ Ακροθωρ?ζει και υπ?ρχει σε ξαφνοκο?ταγμα. Σ Ε?ναι ουραγ?ς της μητ?ρας. Τ Αν?σπερος απ? ηλικ?α. Υ Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: να συμπ?σουν οι αγν?τητες. Μ?χρι την Κ?ρινθο του Σ?μπαντος ? μακρ?τερα. Φ Σε αν?τερη απελπισ?α. Χ Σε φαειν?τερη πεμπτουσ?α. Ψ Σε μια α?σθηση που πτηνο?ται. Ω Συγχωρ?ντας τους π?ντες. From Large Sized Logic [ Λογικ? μεγ?λου σχ?ματος ], Athens: Erato, 1989, n.p. [1993, II, 521-3]. (shrink)

A reprint of the Routledge edition of Medieval Political Theory, a Reader: The Quest for the Body Politic, 1100-1400. This anthology includes writings of both well-known theorists such as Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury as well as those lesser known, including Christine de Pisan and Marie de France, and will be of value to students of the history of political theory as well as those of medieval intellectual history.