This paper and its predecessor () are about the question: 'Are the events in the entire universe encoded in and predictable from any of its parts?' To approach a positive answer in classical physics, the following result is proved and commented on: in Newton's theory of gravitation, the entire trajectory of a particle can be predicted given any segment of it, regardless of how the other particles are moving-provided that there is only a finite number of particles and that their (...) speeds remain bounded. (It is this condition, together with a set of parameters characterising the motion of the other particles, which enables us to estimate the effect of the other particles on the trajectory of the given particle.) The extension of this result to other theories, in particular to special relativity, is discussed. (shrink)

I argue that in a classical universe, all the events that ever happen are encoded in each of the universe's parts. This conflicts with a statement which is widely believed to lie at the basis of relativity theory: that the events in a space-time region R determine only the events in R's domain of dependence but not those in other space-time regions. I show how, from this understanding, a new prediction method (which I call the &unknown;Smoothness Method&unknown;) can be obtained (...) which allows us to predict future events on the basis of local observational data. Like traditional prediction methods, this method makes use of so-called &unknown;ceteris paribus clauses&unknown;, i.e. assumptions about the unobserved parts of the universe. However, these assumptions are used in a way which enables us to predict the behaviour of open systems with arbitrary accuracy, regardless of the influence of their environment--which has not been achieved by traditional methods. In a sequel to this paper (Schmidt, 1998), I will prove the Uniqueness and Predictability Theorems on which the Smoothness Method is based, and comment in more detail on its mathematical properties. (shrink)

This book develops the theses that in late Victorian England there was a move to replace the ideological orthodoxy of establishment Christianity with "scientific naturalism," that this outlook was no less ideological, orthodoxy-demanding, and establishmentarian in its mentality than what it tried to replace, and that a number of bright minds were no more willing to conform to the new order than they had been to the old. The themes are elaborated by the portrayal of the intellectual progress of six (...) pilgrims who, having left the confinement of Zion, were unwilling to settle in another prison however "natural" its restraints. (shrink)

A series of individual devotional meditations by the former President of the U.N. General Assembly. The current world crisis is more fundamentally spiritual than political, economic, or military, and hence a crisis to which the Christian gospel has relevance.--J. H. H.

The fruit of many years of research and reflection, this volume is an historical exposition of Wieman’s view of creativity. It shows how Wieman used the philosophical concepts and insights of his teachers, Ralph Barton Perry and William Ernest Hocking, and others, including Bergson, Whitehead, James, and Dewey to develop his distinctive understanding of creativity.

Obviously the work of an erudite and cultured man, this book is what it purports to be, "an informal story of China," "designed for the interested layman as well as the student rather than the specialist." Like most popularization, it suffers from oversimplification, overenthusiasm, lack of proper scholarly support for the material, and zealous digression. The somewhat stilted style is often awkward and un-English. Nevertheless, a decidedly entertaining book, distinguished by several translations of Chinese lyrics. --J. H. S.

The starting point for this book is the assertion that all gods are man-created, and that the Vedic gods were created in India, none being imported. The author then proceeds to examine the most important of the 33,000 Hindu gods and their worship. An enlightening introduction to the subject, aptly illustrated with quotations from the Hindu religious books, but difficult to read because of its monotonous, short, direct sentences, and its overt chauvinism. -- J. H. S.

The publication of Heidegger's important study of Kant not only made available in English a remarkably clear example of Heidegger's thinking but also created a need for an English commentary on the relation of Heidegger to Kant. Charles M. Sherover's attempt to meet that need fails to present Heidegger adequately. Sherover starts out with both Kant and Heidegger seeking the foundation of metaphysics "in a conception of the nature of human reasoning, in a conception of the nature of man." With (...) the exception of the last chapter, where Sherover claims to go beyond Heidegger, the book never takes us far beyond this formulation. But one of Heidegger's repeated warnings--a warning which Sherover passes over in his commentary--is that the science required is not an anthropology, not even a philosophical anthropology, since we cannot suppose we know what we mean by the question "What is man?" In a phrase which carries to an extreme a tendency to over-use the hyphen, Sherover seems to give us a glimpse of the self that lies beyond anthropology: "... the self is not a thing or an entity but a kind-of [!] reflexive event...." But this reflexive-event self is immediately brought down to the level of "our particular individual selves," the selves that on the basis of "concerns" decide which aspects of anything are important. Is the self of Heidegger's "pure self-affection" an individual? Then, since it is time, how do we all happen to live in the same time? Sherover's last chapter answers that question: It is because of what Heidegger supposedly meant by "world-time." Sherover reasons from "our success in dealing with the world" that human temporality must reflect with some accuracy "world-time." Now there is a third "time" on which the self as primordial temporality depends just as the latter is that on which time as ordinarily conceived of depends. What makes this third "time" any more satisfactory than the first? Why couldn't we do without the third and make the second again dependent on the first? Far from going beyond Heidegger, we are in danger of coming down from Kant--a surprising turn for a book that presents almost ad nauseam the "Copernican Revolution" and Heidegger's Kantianism. A work on Heidegger's Kantianism, on what Heidegger does with the Kantian turn to the subject, would be welcome, especially if written from the perspective of current analytic critiques of the notion of the self. Such a perspective would be able to throw its light on Heidegger's own critique of the self in its everyday meaning. It would also not be so attached to Kant as to speak of Heidegger's Kantianism without realizing that Heidegger's Kant is the Kant whom Heidegger understands "better than [Kant] understood himself."--J. H. (shrink)

A new volume of critical essays dealing with the central issues in the continuing discussion incited by Rudolf Bultmann's radical New Testament hermeneutics. Both theologians and historical biblical critics are confronted by the radical form of the Christological dilemma exposed by Bultmann: to avoid a non-historical docetic Christ, the Christ of faith must be grounded in the historical Jesus; but critical historical study of the texts discovers no historical details uninterpreted by the post-Easter affirmations about Christ.--J. H. H.