In this article, contrary to the traditional and still very current interpretations, it is shown how Russell’s philosophy, from the 1920s onwards, was on the path to Quine’s concept of naturalised epistemology, and why Russell, if he had been confronted with such a concept, could not have subscribed to it. With this objective, a re-reading of this philosophy, from the abovementioned era, is proposed, which makes evident his involvement with the problems of naturalism and behaviourism and, especially, with the respective (...) limitations. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

This excellent book has the combined virtues of being useful not only to the student at the beginning and advanced levels but also to the researcher whose main interest may not be philosophy. It should quickly supplant the weaker efforts of Borchardt and Koren and, to a lesser degree, the short, though helpful, pamphlet by Charles Higgins. In some 1500 entries DeGeorge covers those tools which make possible research and bibliography in Western philosophy from ancient to contemporary times. It is (...) arranged by form although it follows no standard list. Dictionaries, encyclopedias, histories, bibliographies, bibliographies of bibliographic biographies, periodicals and serials, guides to doctoral dissertations are all covered. Within each category the sub-divisions are made by "school," chronology, author, language, or geography. Since it was written primarily for English speaking users, English language sources are given the most space, with many exceptions for indispensable works such as the Repertoire and Ueberweg. The entries themselves are basically Library of Congress style giving author, title, publisher, date of publication, pagination and features of special interest. DeGeorge’s annotations, both descriptive and evaluative, are most helpful and prudent especially for the beginner or non-specialist librarian. The index deserves special note since its 2000 items, arranged in an alphabetical author/title/subject format, is designed to be used and not merely decorative. It acts as a unifier of material which may be otherwise spread about the book, but at the same time avoids the pitfall of having a too heavy load of references at any one entry. The introductions to the various sections are also quite useful and illuminating. Although prices are not included with the entries, a slight defect, the value of this book will surely outlast many changes in that area.—J. H. (shrink)

This revised version of Price's 1960 Gifford Lectures in two series at Aberdeen University presents an extensive analysis of the concept of belief and related problems. The author begins by exploring different senses of knowledge. He continues to examine some logical peculiarities of expressions about believing and knowing, of relationships between the two types of expressions, and remarks on the performatory aspects of the relevant expressions. Connections between believing, and the bearing on beliefs of perceptual evidence, self-consciousness, memory and testimony (...) are examined. The results of this examination are applied to introduce systematic distinctions and concepts, which are made constitutive of the concept of belief. The notion of degrees of belief is introduced. The problem of degrees of assent is examined in the context of Newman's criticisms of Locke's view. Specific theories of belief are surveyed, beginning with Hume's theory, and two traditional occurrence analyses of belief are touched upon. The first series is concluded with a brief examination of Descartes' and Hume's views on freedom of assent. The second series examines various dispositional analyses of belief; the notions of believing and "acting as if" are compared, and the connection between inference and assent examined. The notion of half-belief is reviewed, along with Newman's distinction between real and notional assent, and James' self-verifying beliefs. The second series concludes with a discussion of moral beliefs and feelings; belief "in" and belief "that" are compared, and the possibility of a rapprochement between religious belief and empiricist philosophy is examined. While the author offers no full-blown theory of belief--and does not purport to do so--he provides a most informative discussion of the matrix of epistemological and psychological problems called belief, offers new criticisms of both older and present-day views on persisting problems for belief-analysis, and refines these views with new distinctions and concepts.--J. R. H. (shrink)

Like the other volumes in this excellent series, so auspiciously inaugurated by Reale’s Metaphysics, this contains a long introduction, a translation, and copious notes. Unlike those in the Clarendon Aristotle series, these translations are designed to be readable rather than to provide an unbiased key to Aristotle’s meaning and admit an element of conscious interpretation.

One’s first reaction on seeing this book might be to wonder why it is labelled "Aristotle" at all. The de Mundo has long been regarded as spurious, the work of a later Peripatetic, or even of the vaguely Stoicizing eclecticism which was already, in the later Hellenistic period, beginning to see Aristotle and Plato as the proponents of the same philosophy. There has, however, been no general agreement about where precisely in that framework it should be placed, and Reale, who (...) has recently tried, not without success, to rehabilitate Melissus as a serious thinker, now tries to rehabilitate the de Mundo as a genuine work of Aristotle: he thinks the lack of agreement among the critics is itself an argument in its favor. Restoring the original attribution seems to be the main purpose of what is in fact the first full scale edition with commentary of the de Mundo. It contains a text, largely that established by Lorimer, with translation en face, a long introduction, copious notes and a full word index; the text and translation occupy less than a fifth of the whole. As far as a non-Italian can judge the translation is accurate—and free of effusive expansion. The notes are a real mine of information. So it should be said at the start that whether or not one accepts Reale’s thesis about genuineness does not affect the value of the edition as such. The question of authenticity is discussed with great thoroughness in the introduction, with considerable backing, some of it perhaps inevitably repetitious, in the form of detailed discussion in the notes. At the start Reale lists the charges levelled against the work at various times. These are that in general it contains non-Aristotelian elements, that the style is completely different from Aristotle’s, as is the method, being one of assertion rather than demonstration. Further, much of the material in the scientific section is post-Aristotelian, and the "Orphic hymn" of chapter 7 shows Stoic influence. Reale argues that the first three charges will stick only if the basis of discussion is the Aristotle of the treatises and claims that the objectionable material in the de Mundo can be paralleled from the exoteric works. Thus all the pre-Jaeger discussion is misconceived. (shrink)