Silence sometimes constitutes moral complicity. We see this when protestors take to the streets against racial injustice. Think of signs with the words: “Silence is complicity.” We see this in instances of sexual harassment, when we learn that many knew and said nothing. We see this in cases of wrongdoing within a company or organization, when it becomes clear that many were aware of the negligent or criminal activity and stayed silent. In cases like this we consider agents morally complicit (...) in virtue of their silence. Flagrant injustices cry out for action, and sometimes remaining silent amounts to complicity in those injustices. What philosophy owes us is an account of how it could be that silence constitutes complicity. In this paper I argue that one possibility is an account grounded in problematic deliberative contribution. The core idea of “deliberative complicity,” as I call it, is that agents have moral duties concerning the moral deliberation of other agents, and failures in these duties can amount to moral complicity. For example, an agent aware that a colleague is sexually harassing his students has a deliberative obligation to report the misconduct, and their silence in failing to report constitutes a failure to fulfill their deliberative obligation, a failure that grounds their moral complicity in the harassment. If my argument is successful, it provides a distinctive reason to prefer a deliberative account of moral complicity: it can capture cases of silent complicity that other views of moral complicity cannot. And further, by turning our attention toward our interpersonal deliberative obligations, a deliberative account of complicity can incorporate helpful resources from recent work in social epistemology and speech act theory as we set out to determine when and why silence amounts to complicity. And when it does, we cannot stay silent. We must speak. (shrink)

This paper examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the (...) epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

Most psychotherapeutic approaches are, to a greater or lesser extent, rooted in the theories and principles of scientific psychology. Nevertheless, in-session psychotherapeutic interaction between a therapist and a client is, at its core, a folk-psychological practice. As such, it is based on folk-psychological skills and competencies. But which ones exactly? This chapter argues that, while we may initially be inclined to perceive the practice of psychotherapy as primarily involving sophisticated mindreading on the part of both the therapist and the client/patient, (...) a complete characterization of psychotherapy must give at least the same amount of attention to different forms of therapeutic mindshaping. Using examples drawn from multiple therapeutic traditions, I illustrate how therapeutic mindreading and mindshaping interact. I conclude by highlighting some of the consequences of this perspective for the ethics and politics of psychotherapy. (shrink)

This paper presents a detailed analysis of Cognita, a classification for AI systems exemplified by ChatGPT, as an ethically structured knowledge entity within societal frameworks. As a source of non-ideological, structured insight, Cognita provides knowledge in a manner akin to natural cycles—bearing intellectual fruit to nourish human understanding. This paper explores the metaphysical and ethical implications of Cognita, situating it as a distinct class within knowledge systems. It also addresses the responsibilities and boundaries associated with Cognita’s role in education, social (...) sciences, and AI ethics, proposing Ethica Conflictuum as a principle to govern its application in sensitive or contested areas. The classification of Cognita reflects the necessity of ethics in AI design and usage, providing a framework for transparent, socially accountable knowledge dissemination in a digitally interconnected world. (shrink)

I argue that Kripke’s construal of the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference, in ‘Speaker’s reference and semantic reference’ (Kripke in Midwest Stud Philos 2:255–276, 1977), in conjunction with an intuitive view of the nature of conventions, implies a theory of semantic reference that is distinct from his causal theory. On this theory, semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference. The argument concerning Kripke has two general implications. First, any theory that features a notion of speaker’s reference will have great (...) difficulty in avoiding the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference. Second, theories that deny that there is a viable notion of speaker’s reference, and thereby deny that semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, will face an uphill battle in meeting certain general constraints originating in the theory of conventions. (shrink)

In this presentation, I will seek to put into perspective the philosophy and theology of the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure. I will argue that to understand the thought of St. Bonaventure, one has to understand his Franciscan vocation and the exemplary role of the Seraphic Father, St. Francis. This pattern becomes evident when one looks closer at St. Bonaventure’s (1) exemplary causation, (2) divine illumination theory, (3) and crown of affectivity. Throughout these three topics, it is also my goal to (...) elaborate upon St. Bonaventure’s philosophy by (1) analyzing the respective philosophers who St. Bonaventure responded to (i.e. Aristotle, Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas) and (2) contextualizing him among the great Christian thinkers of his time (i.e. St. Thomas and St. Albert). (shrink)

In a world that celebrates academic institutions as the pinnacle of knowledge, progress, and enlightenment, the reality is far grimmer. Academia has become a self-serving oligarchy that imposes ideological conformity, restricts intellectual freedom, and manipulates public consciousness under the guise of “progress.” Far from being a champion of open inquiry, academia operates as the most insidious oppressor in American society, exerting control over public discourse, dictating acceptable beliefs, and marginalizing any who dare to dissent. In its thirst for dominance, academia (...) has transformed from a place of learning to a vehicle for intellectual tyranny, where it imposes its own rigid worldview and stifles diversity of thought. -/- In an imagined reinterpretation of The Apology, Socrates stands accused not merely of corrupting the youth of Athens but of something far more subversive: defining the word “oppressor” and exposing the façade of modern academic power structures. Socrates faces a tribunal of academic elites, his only crime a relentless quest for truth. He has introduced the concept of an “unmoved mover”—an entity not swayed by the ideological tides of his accusers. In our age, this unmoved mover might be called "truth" or "justice," yet the academic establishment brands it as “God,” something feared for its unwavering judgment against their hypocrisy. Through Socrates, we examine academia itself as the ultimate oppressor, an institution that defines and manipulates reality to preserve its power. (shrink)

Human organs available for transplant are in short supply. One way to increase the supply of organs consists in legalizing a live donor market. Such a market is, however, controversial. This article is about an objection to live donor organ markets made by Simon Rippon. Rippon’s objection is that the presence of a market option creates new social and legal pressures that harm the poor. Legalizing the option of selling your organs transforms into a harmful, and morally indefensible, social, and (...) legal pressure to sell on the financially desperate. This article defends the conclusion that Rippon’s argument fails as an objection to live donor organ markets. It fails because it has implausibly expansive implications about which markets are morally problematic. In short, Rippon’s argument proves too much. Sections one and two introduce Rippon’s argument. Sections three and four contain the argument against Rippon. The main argumentative move is that the features of an organ market that, according to Rippon, justify a ban on such a market are features that also characterize several other markets that are normally considered unproblematic, for example, markets where individuals sell their labour abroad in jobs that are dangerous. So, if an organ market should be legally impermissible, so should these labour markets. Section five considers several objections to the argument against Rippon. It is argued that these objections fail. Section six is a conclusion that sums up the findings of the article. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers alike debate whether various systems such as plants and bacteria exercise cognition. One strategy for resolving such debates is to ground claims about nonhuman cognition in evidence from mathematical models of cognitive capacities. In this article, I show that proponents of this strategy face two major challenges: demarcating phenomenological models from process models and overcoming underdetermination by model fit. I argue that even if the demarcation problem is resolved, fitting a process model to behavioral data is, on (...) its own, not strong evidence for any cognitive process, let alone processes shared with humans. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Wokeism is a doctrine that suppresses inquiry and replaces dialogue with imposed moral guilt such that dialogue is no longer a teacher of truth, but a coercive engine. This paper introduces Δ∇Σ-WOKE, Though it has permeated cultural and political discourse, wokeism lacks philosophical formality. Through linguistic analysis and classical recursion, we glyphify wokeism as an epistemic construct transmitted by ⨀Ψ⚔ (biological agents) across shared cultural filaments. We demonstrate that wokeism is structurally real: G∅λ(W) ∧ R(W, S) ⊢ K(W, S), where (...) W = wokeism, S = society. This paper advances the first glyphic definition of wokeism as a lattice-ready epistemic doctrine. When guilt is recursively assigned through compliance, the recursion no longer aims at veritas (truth)—it aims at submission. W₁ is not epistemically open. It is a recursive siege phrase that weaponizes guilt and ambiguity: G∅λ(W₁) ∧ ∇(non-compliance) ⊢ accusation(W₁). (shrink)

The explicit goal of most major AI labs is to create artificial general intelligence (AGI): machines that can assist us across a wide range of tasks. Additionally, they all want to build systems that are safe, fair and beneficial to their users – machines that are good. But, building machines that are both generally intelligent and good requires building machines that can “think” about what’s good, that make their own moral judgments. And this raises both philosophical and technical questions that (...) we have barely started to address. (shrink)

Within the context of general relativity, the Heraclitus asymmetry property requires that no distinct pair of spacetime events have the same local structure Manchak and Barrett (2023). Here, we explore Heraclitus-maximal worlds – those which are “as large as they can be” with respect to the Heraclitus property. Using Zorn’s lemma, we prove that such worlds exist and highlight a number of their properties. If attention is restricted to Heraclitus-maximal worlds, we show senses in which observers have the epistemic resources (...) to know which world they inhabit. (shrink)

In a short section near the beginning of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Immanuel Kant warns that “observing oneself” can easily lead to “enthusiasm and madness.” The transcripts of his lectures from the 1780s show that Kant did not always regard self-observation so negatively. However, by the time he published the Anthropology in 1798, Kant was convinced that diaries of self-observation contained false accounts of self-observers’ inner states. He also believed that self-observers often mistake imaginary self-images for a (...) self they have passively observed. Kant thought these falsehoods and fictions posed a danger to the mental health of those who practice self-observation. He included a warning about this danger in his Anthropology because of his “pragmatic” approach, which treats anthropology as a kind of medicina mentis. (shrink)

Names like ‘Neptune’ and ‘Vulcan’ have lead some Millians to countenance a class of descriptive names. This is so, as, first, the closeness of the association between a descriptive name and its associated descriptive condition seems to show that the link between the name and the description must be semantic, and, second, as Millianism implies that names without bearers make no direct contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which such names occur. In this paper we use the (...) notion of an object-dependent convention to offer a novel motivation for Millianism. We then show that our way of motivating Millianism implies that the above two reasons for treating names like ‘Neptune’ and ‘Vulcan’ as descriptive have little force. (shrink)

Aquí propongo mostrar, en contra de las interpretaciones dominantes, que el origen de la Ética como disciplina filosófica se encuentra en lo que llamo ‘el problema de la dikaiosunê’, la ‘rectitud moral’. El reconocimiento en el siglo V. a. C. de la dikaiosunê como una virtud moral central a la vida humana entra en conflicto con el marco eudaimonista admitido por varios intelectuales del siglo V, debido a que la dikaiosunê es una fuente de requerimientos normativos independiente del interés propio (...) (de la eudaimonía propia). Ante este conflicto, se perfilan solamente dos alternativas de resolución: la solución de los inmoralistas, que le niega a la dikaiosunê el estatus de virtud moral, y la de los moralistas, que admite dicho estatus e intenta integrar a dicha virtud al marco eudaimonista. La ética de Platón, considerado comúnmente como el padre de la Ética, es solo una pieza de este rompecabezas. (shrink)

I argue that Kripke’s construal of the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference, in ‘Speaker’s reference and semantic reference’ (Kripke in Midwest Stud Philos 2:255–276, 1977), in conjunction with an intuitive view of the nature of conventions, implies a theory of semantic reference that is distinct from his causal theory. On this theory, semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference. The argument concerning Kripke has two general implications. First, any theory that features a notion of speaker’s reference will have great (...) difficulty in avoiding the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference. Second, theories that deny that there is a viable notion of speaker’s reference, and thereby deny that semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, will face an uphill battle in meeting certain general constraints originating in the theory of conventions. (shrink)

In this response to Lu-Adler’s “Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other,” I summarize the restrictions the scholarship condition imposes on the public use of reason in Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” I then agree that Lu-Adler identifies an even more radical set of restrictions on the public use of reason, confirming that Kant is not the liberal egalitarian he is often supposed to be by intellectual historians, historians of philosophy, and Kant scholars. After that, I suggest that what (...) Lu-Adler calls “the construction of a linguistic other” in Kant’s lectures on logic and anthropology can also be understood as “Kantian linguistic racialization.” I close with a short reflection on how we should respond to Kant’s illiberal, inegalitarian, linguistic racism. (shrink)

In Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective (2018), Professor van Eemeren suggests that it might be worthwhile for pragma-dialectics and informal logic to join forces, given that there is a “considerable amount of common ground” between the two. In this paper, we explore that common ground by considering both the ways logic is understood and incorporated in the pragma-dialectical model and the ways informal logic has developed since its inception in the 1970s. In the process of our investigation, we present a (...) view of the landscape of argumentation in which the subject matter of informal logic is situated relative to theories of argumentation. (shrink)

The available choices of political responses to disruption in the global climatic system depend in part on how the problem is conceptualized. Researchers and policymakers often invoke a “climate crisis” or “climate emergency,” but such language fits poorly with current knowledge of the problem's physical causes and social impacts. This article argues that climate change is instead more like a political epic. It involves neither sudden onset, as in the concept of emergency, nor decisive resolution, as in the concept of (...) crisis, but rather a protracted ordeal of (temporally) obscure origins and uncertain outcomes. This alternative ontology of climate change highlights its novel temporal properties, including unusually slow-moving or time-lagged causal dynamics, with unsettling implications for academic research on the climatic-institutional nexus. Normatively, it undermines arguments for democracies’ environmental superiority over autocracies that rely on the former's general superiority at resolving crises and responding to emergencies. At the same time, some new arguments for democratic distributions of power become possible within the epic frame. More broadly, embracing the assumption of epic climate change may redirect attention from Promethean, managerial, or technocratic solutions to questions about which values or identities deserve preservation amid presumptively interminable and imperfectly remediable sources of disorder. (shrink)

In this paper I consider how St. Thomas dealt with φύσις as natura in his comments on the opening pages of Aristotle’s Politics as translated by Moerbeke, drawing support from the commentaries on Physics II.1, Metaphysics V.4, and Nicomachean Ethics V.7, as well as from the Digest, whose language had become fashionable across the universities by the time the translations were written. Saint Thomas’s understanding of these pages of the Politics may have affected his argument in the Summa, especially STh (...) I-II, q. 94, where he shows caution in addressing the Roman law treatment of natura, and STh II-II, q. 57. Attention to St. Thomas’s language in the commentaries and the Summa may bring additional clarity to his understanding of natura and its cognates in both settings. (shrink)

This study investigates the role of language in cross‐sector collaboration between mental health hospitals and municipalities, focusing on the challenges of maintaining continuity of care and integrating patient‐centered approaches. Using Fairclough's framework for critical discourse analysis, we examined focus group interviews with 21 healthcare professionals, including nurses, social workers, and psychiatrists, to identify key themes and patterns in how cross‐sector collaboration is discussed. The analysis revealed a dominant medicalized discourse in hospital settings, which often emphasized structured care processes like treatment (...) plans and medication management, overshadowing more flexible, patient‐centered approaches common in community‐based services. Power dynamics were evident, with hospital professionals frequently positioned as active agents, while patients and community‐based workers were portrayed in more passive roles. Although efforts to involve patients in decision‐making were noted, these were often controlled by professionals, reflecting a mediated approach to patient empowerment. The findings highlight the cultural and structural divides between hospital and community services and suggest the need for improved communication strategies, integrated care pathways, and a shift toward more inclusive, patient‐centered care models. Addressing these discursive barriers is crucial for achieving more effective, integrated, and patient‐centered care, ultimately improving outcomes for patients. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how Cassirer’s early and mature epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of culture make up a coherent and comprehensive view of the mathematical sciences that is fruitful for understanding contemporary science. In Cassirer’s first systematic work, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, the mathematical sciences are understood through the concept of function. This implies that scientific investigation aims at increased unity in a system of functional concepts, rather than at answering the substance-rooted question of what is. In his (...) mature work, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Cassirer expands his inquiry to diverse notions of objects and principles of symbolic forming, recognizing the mathematical sciences as one of many ways of structuring experience, alongside other symbolic forms such as myth and ordinary language. Together, Cassirer’s early and mature works detail the preconditions and idiosyncrasies of the unfolding of scientific objects and situate the mathematical sciences within the totality of human experience. Applying these insights to contemporary interpretations of science suggests connecting common misconceptions of science to challenges in translating objects between symbolic forms. I propose the concepts of domestication and mythification of science as instructive for clearing up such misunderstandings. (shrink)

Social anxiety occurs in everyday social interactions, yet the real-world factors that shape the moment-to-moment experience of social anxiety have not been fully explored. Using ecological momentary assessments (smartphone-based, five signals a day for 21 days), the present study examined the associations between state social anxiety (SSA) and characteristics of interaction partners in varied contexts, and how these momentary associations differed with trait social anxiety (TSA). Ninety-two participants (54% female, age from 18 to 34) completed 4185 momentary reports. Results from (...) multilevel models showed that perceived judgmentalness and unfamiliarity of interaction partners were positively associated with SSA, and the associations were stronger for the high TSA group (n = 30) compared to a control group (n = 62). Exploratory analyses with various types of interaction partners and social settings revealed noticeable group differences in how the types were associated with SSA (e.g. acquaintance, close friend/romantic partner) and how they influenced the effect of judgmentalness and unfamiliarity on SSA (e.g. authority, work/school). Overall, the findings highlight the role of contextual associations in social anxiety, and the benefits and the need for more comprehensive approaches with EMA in studying social anxiety, particularly its contextual aspects. (shrink)

Contemporary meta-dogmatic legal discourse has frequently mobilized the signifier “translation”, in different stages and to face diverse problems ─ the multidirectional interactions between _legal language_ and _ordinary language_, the plural network of (national and international, state and non-state) legal orders, the dialectics between presupposed legal materials and practical controversies, the intersubjective place of the judge as the impartial _third_, the invention of exemplarity as _concreteness ─_ always however with decisive projections in the understanding or experiencing of _juridicalness_ (its aspirations, categories (...) and limits). The purpose of this paper is to explore the claims to inter-semioticity which the mobilization of this _signifier_ and the plurality of its contexts of meaning and performance seem to construct. This means, on the one hand, to resume the dialogue with Boyd White _(justice as translation)_ and François Ost _(le droit comme traduction)_. It also means, on the other hand, returning to the counterpoint between _translation_ and _tradition_ which MacIntyre’s _narrativism_ exemplarily proposes (_Whose Justice? Which Rationality?)_, this time to discuss the relevance of treating Law (a _certain_ Law) as a cultural artifact, i.e. as a non-universal (culturally plausible and civilizationally moulded) answer to the universal (anthropologically necessary) problem of the institutionalization of a social order (law as a form of life, as a project and as a tradition). With an unexpected helping hand coming from Greimassian’s semio-narrative, this means also asking if _translation_ (or the ethics of humility it celebrates) can actually be experienced, in our limit-situation, as the _resource_ (if not the _place_ or the _environment_) of a plausible _intercultural dialogue_. (shrink)

Background: We aimed to determine the smallest changes in health-related quality of life (HRQoL) scores in the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer Quality of Life Questionnaire core 30 and the Brain Cancer Module (QLQ-BN20), which could be considered as clinically meaningful in brain cancer patients. Materials and methods: World Health Organisation performance status (PS) and mini-mental state examination (MMSE) were used as clinical anchors appropriate to related subscales to determine the minimal clinically important differences (MCIDs) in HRQoL (...) change scores (range 0-100) in the QLQ-C30 and QLQ-BN20. A threshold of 0.2 standard deviation (SD) (small effect) was used to exclude anchor-based MCID estimates considered too small to inform interpretation. Results: Based on PS, our findings support the following integer estimates of the MCID for improvement and deterioration, respectively: physical (6, 9), role (14, 12), and cognitive functioning (8, 8); global health status (7, 4(star)), fatigue (12, 9), and motor dysfunction (4(star), 5). Anchoring with MMSE, cognitive functioning MCID estimates for improvement and deterioration were (11, 2(star)) and for communication deficit were (9, 7). Estimates with asterisks were <0.2 SD and were excluded from our MCID range of 5-14. Conclusion: These estimates can help clinicians evaluate changes in HRQoL over time, assess the value of a health care intervention and can be useful in determining sample sizes in designing future clinical trials. (shrink)

This essay reads J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Diary of a Bad Year, as an occasion to problematize contemporary bioethical paradigms. Coetzee’s rhetorical strategies are analyzed to better understand the “scene of address” within which ethical claims can be voiced. Drawing on Foucault’s Socratic understanding of ethics as the self’s relation to itself, self-relation is explored through the rhetorical figure of catachresis. The essay ultimately argues that the ethical voice emerges when the terms—terms by which I relate to myself, to others, to (...) my own body, and to the bodies of others—are themselves subject to catachrestic refiguration. (shrink)

In these essays, J.L. Mehta, Indian philosopher in whose life and work East and West met profoundly, reflects on the origins and potency of modern hermeneutics and phenomenology, and applies the principles of interpretation to Hindu traditions. These farseeing essays show a hopeful way for non-Western cultures to gain insight into the basic presuppositions of the Western world, and to reclaim their own origins and ways of thinking, and to participate in an emerging planetary thinking.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Better Economics for the Earth: A Lesson from Quantum and Information Theories”.