Naïve realists have a motive to but have thus far been unable to offer compelling reasons for positing an external constraint on the occurrence of the consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. If the occurrences of such consciousness were confined to abnormal perceptual contexts, the possibility of perfect hallucinations would have no bearing on the nature of the consciousness involved in cases of perception. On the other hand, it is unclear why the character of the perceptual context should matter constitutively to (...) the occurrence of the sort of consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. Supposing (reasonably) that such consciousness does not consist in an awareness of the environment, it is puzzling why the latter should be a certain way for the former to occur. I propose a solution to this puzzle, which helps secure the naïve realist approach to perception. Perfect hallucinatory experiences issue from exercises of the perceptual system operating in a second, defective mode – complementary to the normal one, whose exercises issue in an awareness of the environment. (shrink)

Is property-awareness constituted by representation or not? If it were, merely being aware of the qualities of physical objects would involve being in a representational state. This would have considerable implications for a prominent view of the nature of successful perceptual experiences. According to naïve realism, any such experience—or more specifically its character—is fundamentally a relation of awareness to concrete items in the environment. Naïve realists take their view to be a genuine alternative to representationalism, the view on which the (...) character of such experiences is constituted by representation. But naïve realists must admit qualities or property instances as items of awareness if they are to remain wedded to common sense, and the nature of property-awareness may smuggle constitutive representation into the naïve realist account of character. I argue that whether property-awareness involves representation, and consequently whether naïve realism is distinct from representationalism or not, depends on what qualities are fundamentally. On universalist and nominalist accounts, property-awareness turns out to involve representation. Not so under tropism. (shrink)

How do we come to like the things that we do? Each one of us starts from a relatively similar state at birth, yet we end up with vastly different sets of aesthetic preferences. These preferences go on to define us both as individuals and as members of our cultures. Therefore, it is important to understand how aesthetic preferences form over our lifetimes. This poses a challenging problem: to understand this process, one must account for the many factors at play (...) in the formation of aesthetic values and how these factors influence each other over time. A general framework based on basic neuroscientific principles that can also account for this process is needed. Here, we present such a framework and illustrate it through a model that accounts for the trajectories of aesthetic values over time. Our framework is inspired by meta-analytic data of neuroimaging studies of aesthetic appraisal. This framework incorporates effects of sensory inputs, rewards, and motivational states. Crucially, each one of these effects is probabilistic. We model their interactions under a reinforcement-learning circuitry. Simulations of this model and mathematical analysis of the framework lead to three main findings. First, different people may develop distinct weighing of aesthetic variables because of individual variability in motivation. Second, individuals from different cultures and environments may develop different aesthetic values because of unique sensory inputs and social rewards. Third, because learning is stochastic stemming from probabilistic sensory inputs, motivations, and rewards, aesthetic values vary in time. These three theoretical findings account for different lines of empirical research. Through our study, we hope to provide a general and unifying framework for understanding the various aspects involved in the formation of aesthetic values over time. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Schopenhauer on the Inevitability of Suffering Criticisms of Schopenhauer's Thesis that to Desire Is to Suffer The Unattainability of True Satisfaction The Inevitability of Boredom The Negative Nature of Pleasure and Satisfaction Happiness and Well‐Being Degrees of Unhappiness: The Possibility of Amelioration The Paradox of the Suspension or Negation of the Will The Inevitability of Unhappiness References Further Reading.

The main focus of acquaintance theorists has been the nature and mechanism of perceptual acquaintance with particulars. Generally, one’s view of perceptual acquaintance with general features has taken its bearings from one’s view of perceptual acquaintance with particulars. This has led to the glossing over of significant differences in the mechanisms of perceptual acquaintance with particulars and with general features. The difference in mechanisms suggests a difference in the sort of epistemic state at play in the two kinds of cases. (...) While the existence of such a difference might initially seem to spell trouble for acquaintance theorists, it can be made palatable by being traced back to the distinct basic functions concepts of particulars and of general features serve in thought. (shrink)

A disconnect remains between theories about responsible management and application in real-life organizations. Part of the reason is due to the complexity and holistic nature of the field, and the fact that many of the benefits of aligning business objectives with changing societal conditions are of an intangible nature. Human resource management is an increasingly important part of the field with benefits including talent retention, higher levels of motivation, and improvements in organizational cohesion. This paper sets out an experiment run (...) at a large Spanish university to try to analyze the impact on worker productivity of a responsible management stance by an employer. Based on the Corporate Social Performance model, the paper examines the issue from the point of view of responsibilities, responsiveness, and outcomes, and considers the cost/benefit effect of incorporating a social responsibility variable into the wage structure to measure the impact on productivity. (shrink)

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual (...) anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing. (shrink)

The main result proved in the paper is that on every recursive structure the intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets coincide with the relatively intrinsically hyperarithmetical sets. As a side effect of the proof an effective version of the Kueker's theorem on definability by means of infinitary formulas is obtained.

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.

While agreeing with Bernard Reginster that Nietzsche's advocacy of the will to power as a psychological thesis is much more fundamental than his extension of it as a cosmological or metaphysical thesis, I criticize him for failing to support this interpretation, and I attempt to supply an analysis that does support it. Then, I take issue with the common tendency to sanitize Nietzsche's theory of the will to power, to make it more palatable—and with Reginster's treatment of this issue. This (...) leads me to an examination of Nietzsche's conception of power—and a critique of Reginster's account of it. (shrink)

I propose that the fundamental challenge Berkeley left realists is to account for experiences’ ability to present items as mind-independent, consistent with the claim that experiences always present themselves among the items of awareness. By exploring two ways of responding to this challenge, and ruling out the second, I hope to show that realists aiming to secure a role for experiences in grounding our grasp of mind-independence need to adopt a specific view of perceptual experience. They must take experiences to (...) have translucent aspects, and accord such aspects an essential role in presenting us with a mind-independent world. (shrink)

The relation between philosophy and theology in Martin Heidegger’s thought is multilayered and tense. On the one hand, he admits that his theological origin, i.e. his Christian-Catholic rootedness, determines the direction of his thought, while on the other hand, he has been fighting against theology that is too much tinted with philosophy. At the same time, he opposes that his thought be called theistic or atheistic. In the analytic of Dasein he wants to create assumptions that would enable him to (...) talk about God, gods or divine in general. This brings him close to mysticism, and even more so to mythology, which is revealed in his interpretation of Hölderlin. Nietzsche’s talk about God’s death helps him in this context. However, neither with Nietzsche nor with Heidegger does this death look like real death. Both thinkers hold that death strikes that God who has in philosophy and theology been made a being. After the thinking of the Being had thrown light upon their thought, God of Biblical theology and above all God whose coming is expected according to Heidegger cannot be left to death, because he evades human comprehension, especially one in the form of philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Three partners founded the Grenada Chocolate Company in 1999: Mott Green, Doug Browne and Edmond Brown. Several years ago Doug passed away of cancer and in June 2013 Mott suffered a fatal electrocution while repairing a piece of equipment. Edmond was now thrust into the leadership position and left to decide what direction GCC should take. The GCC product line was becoming increasingly popular both on the island and internationally and demand was high,but the original vision for the company was (...) to produce bean-to-bar chocolates while providing a fair wage to the local employees and farmers. Expansion could be an option for Edmond and GCC, but was it possible to expand and stay true to the ideas on which GCC was founded? (shrink)

An external characterization of the inductive sets on countable abstract structures is presented. The main result is an abstract version of the classical Suslin-Kleene characterization of the hyperarithmetical sets.

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

Este texto recoge parte de las reflexiones y del desarrollo del capítulo 5 del libro La barbarie que no vimos: Fotografía y memoria en Colombia. Aquí algunas preguntas que se intentan responder en este ensayo: ¿son las tecnologías las únicas responsables de la imposibilidad de ejercer una contemplación activa frente al infortunio de los demás? A propósito de la Parábola del Buen Samaritano, ¿este habría sido reemplazado por el espectador distante o implicado? ¿Qué sucede cuando ese espectador, de tanto ver (...) naufragios, termina fatigado? ¿Y de tanta fatiga, se vuelve indiferente? ¿Qué significa ser espectadores de naufragios en una época en la que la catástrofe no es ocasionada exclusivamente por fuerzas naturales sino por los propios seres humanos? ¿Es posible hallar hoy alguna orilla segura para reconocernos distanciados y salvados de las catástrofes ajenas? (shrink)

As result of the ongoing doctoral research, this paper composes the Communication delivered at the First National Post-Graduate Meeting in Philosophy of the University of Brasilia. The thesis relates to the real political action arising from liberty and immanent power. Structured in two moments of the Gramscian thought, that is: a) the juvenile phase (1914-1919), correspondent to the initial period of political engagement towards adherence to the Turin labor movement; and b) the analysis of the 48th § of Volume 3 (...) Prison Notebooks (Q 3, 48, 197) about the real political action. The whole problematic of the research relies in the investigation about Gramscian philosophical demands of the real political action that distinguishes it from the utopian idealism. In this sense, which are Gramscian´s contributions towards the Philosophy of praxis? The research indicates that the praxis requires a critical consciousness – passed through intellectual action in the formation of the people –, since the historical conditions are already given. (shrink)

This article carries out a critical analysis of the discourse/practice of Business Ethics that has developed to an unprecedented extent in the last decade or so. It argues that in the late-modern global political economy (GPE) there develops a form of a Gramscian hegemony of transnational capital and the discourse/practice of Business Ethics can be seen as a form of moral leadership in the context of the emerging hegemonic order.

Applying Heideggerian tool ontology to antiblack racism in the United States, Ontological Branding argues that race is a tool to constrain nonwhite persons, especially Black persons, to ways of being in service to the white world. U.S. law’s colorblind “equality” safeguards white supremacy, and racial justice instead requires ontological equality.

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

We analyse the reception of Niklas Luhmanns social metatheory in Slovenian social. The first part outlines the intellectual climate that prevailed in the decade before the post-socialist transition. The decline of the previously dominant Marxist ideology created space for other social theories. Luhmanns ideas were the most prominent among social macro theories in the initial phase. The second part describes variations in the reception of his ideas. The initial affirmative approach was upgraded by a number of more selective and critical (...) approaches. The third part shows that, although his ideas are no longer quite so prominent, his work is both well recognized and firmly embedded in Slovenian social thought. (shrink)

Mi comentario se divide en tres partes que obedecen, sin método ni exhaustividad, a las tres facetas que más me han interesado de Dworkin y que esta biografía me permitió revisitar: su faceta de intelectual público, su liberalismo ético o perfeccionista y un breve colofón sobre su generosidad académica.

This study aims to apply self-congruity theory to examine the relationship between self-congruity of tourists and their perceived image of a gambling destination. This study employs the Euclidean distance model and extends Malhotra's pars of adjectives with five new items about gambling motives. A face-to-face questionnaire survey was used, and a total of 152 samples were collected from tourists in Macau. The results show that the actual self-image of tourists is more related to their perception of Macau image. For actual (...) congruence, tourists exhibit a greater tendency to match the informal, liberal, and emotional image of Macau. For ideal congruence, they have a tendency to match the contemporary, organized, and pleasant image of Macau. This study makes up for the deficiency of self-congruity theory in tourism research. This study helps tourism departments to develop appropriate strategies to promote gambling tourism and disseminate relevant information that can bring gambling destinations closer to tourists. (shrink)

El presente ensayo no pretende hacer una investigación de las razones por la cualesHeidegger no escribió un tratado ético como tal, mucho menos, una apología acerca desu silencio, intencional o no, respecto a dicho asunto. Tampoco se pretende escribir unaética “de” Heidegger, sino más bien, encontrar las señales que “dejan-ver” la dimensiónética de su pensar y desde allí, llevar nuestro pensar por el camino que nos conduce a laposibilidad de rehabitar la tierra.

The aim of this study was to find out what interpretive repertoires young people use in the symbolic management of the pandemic. Qualitative research using several methods on a sample of 172 young people in three countries, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Austria, and the subsequent discursive analysis showed that young people symbolically coped during the Covid-19 pandemic with the help of widespread concepts such as cutting off, closing sci-fi and panic. The interpretations used by young people to symbolically deal (...) with the pandemic are close to those present in the public discourse—the discourses of threat, loss, emotion—but there was also a search for the concepts and language for use by experts and the general public in communicating about the pandemic. There were no significant differences in the interpretations of life during the Covid-19 pandemic in the three Central European countries. (shrink)